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The quality of democracy depends on mass participation in political life, for engaged 
citizens can represent their interests, hold elected officials accountable, and collaborate to solve 
societal problems. In spite of the benefits to participation, many individuals do not engage in 
public affairs. Scholars have sought to explain citizen participation for decades, and one factor 
that has received attention is public attitudes toward the political system. But what causes an 
individual to support or oppose political institutions, democratic principles, and other aspects of 
the political world? Researchers have offered several answers to this question, but I contend that 
the literature has not adequately explored the connection between personality and political 
support. Unlike some factors, the causal relationship between personality and support attitudes is 
fairly clear, as a substantial amount of the variation in personality traits is attributable to genetic 
variation across individuals. The roots of personality, in other words, predate a person’s initiation 
into the political world in late adolescence and early adulthood.  
In this dissertation, I build a two-step model that links personality traits to political 
support and support attitudes to citizen behavior. The first half of my theory applies a model 
from occupational psychology to understand how personality interacts with the environment to 
influence political support outcomes. This model, known as trait activation theory, expects 
personality effects to occur only when traits are activated by relevant cues in one’s surroundings. 
As I argue in my theory, the model has implications for the direct and conditional effects of 
personality on a variety of attitudes and behaviors, including views about the political system. 
My theory also contributes to the literature on the mediation hypothesis by emphasizing political 
support as a mediator for the relationship between personality and citizen behavior. The second 
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half of my model thus points to the relevance of the personality–support relationship for 
behavioral outcomes such as political participation. 
For the empirical part of this dissertation, I explore three aspects of the model while 
incorporating public opinion surveys from as many as 24 countries. First, I provide a 
comprehensive account for the direct effects of personality on support for five objects of the 
political system: the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime 
institutions, and political actors. Then, I investigate how the relationship between personality and 
support depends on contextual factors related to threat levels in one’s environment, such as the 
degree of political corruption. Finally, I explore how personality works through political support 
to influence citizen behavior. The findings in this dissertation emphasize the impact of 
personality on support attitudes and the downstream effect of this relationship on political 
participation. Based on the results of my dissertation, politicians and nongovernmental 
organizations could target their communications to groups based on the personality traits of those 
groups, encouraging political support and thereby promoting one of the hallmarks of citizen 













 The term “personal accomplishment” obscures an important fact: Individual efforts often 
constitute a necessary condition for success, but not a sufficient one. Other people and 
organizations enable and facilitate a person’s achievements. 
 The same has been true for my dissertation project. Without supportive organizations and 
my network of colleagues, family, and friends, I would not have identified a dissertation topic, 
defended my prospectus, or written the dissertation chapters—regardless of my best efforts to do 
so.  
 First, I want to thank my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. He placed all of the individuals 
and organizations in my life that supported me during my time in graduate school. When I was 
discouraged, He comforted me. When I was uncertain, He clarified matters to me. When I felt 
uninspired, He motivated me to continue and renewed my interest in the dissertation project. And 
when I needed a break from the dissertation, He provided me with graduate assistantship work, 
side research projects, and free time with family and friends.  
 Second, I am grateful for the constant support of my adviser, Damarys Canache. From 
spring 2014 to spring 2015, I regularly met with Damarys as I considered one dissertation idea 
after another. I doubted whether a successful idea would emerge, but Damarys remained 
confident in the outcome. Since I began the current dissertation project in May 2015, Damarys 
has provided invaluable feedback on the overall design and specific structure of the paper. The 
dissertation is clearer and more straightforward as the result of her insight. 
 Third, Jeffery J. Mondak has benefitted this dissertation in multiple ways. He invited me 
to attend the personality section of his fall 2014 graduate seminar on micro-level political 
behavior, and I became inspired to work on this dissertation project through a research 
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assistantship with Jeff and Damarys on personality and politics. Furthermore, as the disssertation 
project unfolded, Jeff’s feedback enabled me to clarify the presentation and application of my 
main theoretical framework.  
 Fourth, Thomas J. Rudolph has contributed to the theoretical and methodological 
foundations of this dissertation. During my prospectus defense, Tom encouraged me to highlight 
the general scope of trait activation theory to the study of personality and behavior. I also am 
grateful for Tom’s multilevel modeling course, which prepared me to examine cross-level 
interactions between personality traits and objective contextual factors in Chapter 5 of the 
dissertation. 
 Fifth, I appreciate Matthew S. Winters’ support during the dissertation project. In the 
spring 2015 semester, Matt kindly provided feedback to a group of graduate students on their 
dissertation ideas. His input at the outset of the project inspired me to examine the practical 
relevance of the personality–political support relationship for political participation in Chapter 6 
of the dissertation, and his recent advice spurred my attention to empirical inconsistencies, or 
puzzles, in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Sixth, several graduate students have provided feedback and friendship during the 
dissertation process. Along with faculty member Matt Winters, I met with fellow graduate 
students Jillian Evans, Blair Niece, Tyler Pack, and Ashlea Rundlett during the spring 2015 
semester in order to discuss dissertation ideas. In subsequent semesters, I received feedback from 
other graduate students, including Kylee Britzman and Benjamin R. Kantack. I appreciate 
everyone’s comments and time. In addition, I am grateful for my friendships with fellow 
graduate students. Moments of laughter have constituted much-needed relief during the rigors of 
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a dissertation project. I have enjoyed getting to know my fellow graduate students and hope to 
stay in touch with them after my time at the University of Illinois draws to a close. 
 Seventh, I appreciate the useful comments from audience members who heard me present 
material from the dissertation project. Faculty members and graduate students at the University 
of Illinois offered valuable feedback in response to a practice job presentation in fall 2016. In 
addition, I am thankful for the comments from (1) panelists and participants at the 2016 and 
2017 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings and (2) faculty and graduate 
students at the University of Iowa in fall 2015 and fall 2016.  
 Eighth, I have benefitted from the information and organization of the office staff in the 
Department of Political Science. Brenda Stamm apprised me of the procedural requirements for 
defending my prospectus and dissertation, and Andrea Stark reserved a space for a group of my 
fellow graduate students to meet for weekly meetings to discuss our research and job search 
experiences. 
 Ninth, I am indebted to the data collection assistance of other individuals and 
organizations. Betsy Rajala, a fellow graduate student, served as coordinator of the Department 
of Political Science Subject Pool during the 2015–2016 academic year. Betsy discussed my 
project with me in fall 2015, and faculty member Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz provided useful 
feedback on my questionnaire. After obtaining approval from the Institutional Review Board, 
Betsy distributed the survey to undergraduate students in political science classes, de-
individualized the data, and sent me the data and codebook. Furthermore, the other empirical 
analyses in this dissertation are dependent on the design and administration of three additional 
surveys: the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), the 2012 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES), and the 2010 AmericasBarometer. With regard to the 
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CCES, I also am grateful to Matthew V. Hibbing for providing his subsample of 1,000 
respondents, who answered questions on personality and political tolerance.  
 Tenth, the congregation at Champaign First Church of the Nazarene constituted a 
valuable source of fellowship, respite, and motivation during the dissertation project. 
Encouragement from congregation members prompted me to persevere during the challenging 
moments in the dissertation process. 
 Eleventh, I am thankful for my mother, father, brother, and sister-in-law. On some 
occasions, they expressed their concern for me by asking about the dissertation project and 
advising me to continue during the difficult stretches of time. On other occasions, their 
fellowship provided a needed reprieve from my research. I appreciate every film, sporting event, 
board game, and meal that I shared with them since I began the dissertation process in spring 
2014.  
 This list is not exhaustive, for numerous other individuals and organizations have 
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PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT:  
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
The contemporary political landscape in Venezuela hardly resembles the scene from 27 
years ago. In 1990, the Democratic Action Party (AD) and Social Christian Party (COPEI) 
claimed the dominant position in Venezuelan politics, with 164 of the 201 seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies, 42 of the 46 seats in the Senate, and seven straight presidential victories. The streak 
in presidential contests ended with the election of Rafael Caldera of the National Convergence 
Party in 1993. Neither the AD nor the COPEI has captured the presidency since, and the general 
elections in 1993 also marked the last time the two parties received a collective majority of seats 




Along with change in the party system, Venezuela has experienced a noticeable decline 
in the level of democracy in recent years. Between 1990 and 2016, the country’s average 
Freedom House scores for political and civil rights rose from 2 (“free”) to 5.5 (“not free”) on a 1-
to-7 scale. According to Freedom House (2017a), much of the transformation occurred after the 
election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, has continued such 
policies as limiting the influence of opposition political leaders and critical media outlets 
(Freedom House 2017b). Venezuela now constitutes one of the least democratic countries in the 
Western Hemisphere, with only Cuba receiving a worse score from Freedom House for 2016. 
Two interrelated factors explain the transformation of the party system and political 
regime in Venezuela (Canache 2002). First, the petroleum-rich country experienced economic 
                                                 
1
 The low percentage for COPEI is partly the result of a court case that prompted the opposition coalition to replace 
candidates from the Social Christian Party with politicians from other parties for the 2015 parliamentary election 
(Neuman 2015). In the previous election, COPEI had earned just 5 seats in the 165-seat National Assembly. The 
current legislature in Venezuela is unicameral due to the 1999 national constitution.  
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hardship during the 1980s as the price of oil declined and government debt rose, resulting in less 
revenue available for redistribution to the population. Second, the public grew frustrated with the 
country’s economic situation and subsequently turned against the political system. Such 
sentiments were apparent not only in the election results mentioned above, but also in a 1995 
survey of residents in two urban areas in Venezuela (Canache 2002). Trust in government was 
anemic, averaging 1.48 on a four-item index ranging from 0 to 8. Likewise, citizens expressed 
only moderate levels of institutional support, with a mean response of 12.04 on a five-item index 
ranging from 0 to 30. These low levels of support for political actors and institutions facilitated 
the demise of the AD–COPEI system and the rise of Chávez. 
The recent history of Venezuela illustrates the aggregate importance of political support. 
When public opinion turns against the status quo, the party system may experience 
transformation (Canache 2002; López Maya 2011), individual leaders are less likely to remain in 
office (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), and the quality of democracy may decline (Dalton 
1999; Norris 1999a).  
The consequences of political support extend to individual behavior, including political 
participation.
2
 In particular, past research has connected political support to conventional 
political activities such as turnout (Birch 2010; Klesner 2009; Norris 1999b; Pattie and Johnston 
2009; Remmer 2010; Valentino et al. 2011) and unconventional political activities such as 
protest participation (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Dalton 2004; Muller et al. 1982; Norris 
1999b, 2011). This line of research generally shows that citizens who support democracy are 
more likely to hold the government accountable through conventional and protest participation, 
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 Other outcomes of political support include compliance with the law (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999b; Sunshine and 
Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2009; Tyler 1990, 2005), participation in civil society (Norris 1999b), and policy attitudes 
(Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Rudolph and Evans 2005). 
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and favorable (unfavorable) attitudes toward status quo institutions and government performance 
encourage higher rates of traditional (untraditional) activity.
3
 
Mass participation in public life is vital to a well-functioning democracy. Through 
political involvement, citizens can cooperate to address collective problems at the local and 
national levels, such as struggling education systems and ineffective economic policies (Putnam 
2000). Isolated individuals cannot effect societal change. Moreover, engaged citizens represent 
their interests to elected officials, monitor the operation of government, and reward or punish 
politicians at the ballot box based on their performance, thus promoting democratic 
accountability (Norris 2011; Schedler 1999; Tocqueville 2013). The quality of democracy thus 
depends on the proportion of participative citizens in the population.  
The benefits of citizen engagement contrast with empirical reality, for participation rates 
are often low. For example, an eight-country study of Latin America reports that citizens rarely 
engage in party politics or contact public officials (Booth and Seligson 2009).
4
 Electoral 
participation in the Latin American sample was much higher, with a mean of 82.28 on a measure 
of registration and turnout that ranged from 0 to 100. Nevertheless, many citizens in other 
countries, such as the United States, do not even cast a ballot. Only 48.8 percent of the voting 
age population came to the polls in the 1996 U.S. presidential election (Norris 1999b).  
Anemic rates of participation may motivate us to ask why some citizens are more likely 
than others to participate in community life. Researchers have considered this issue by studying 
the impact of political support on political behavior, but their work raises another question: If 
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 Booth and Seligson (2009), meanwhile, find that individuals at the extremes of political support are more 
participative. 
4
 The means for party and campaign activism, contact with public officials, communal activism, and protest 
participation all fell at 22.03 or below on a range from 0 to 100.   
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political support exerts meaningful effects on citizens and societies, what explains differences in 
support attitudes across individuals?  
Scholars have offered numerous answers to this second question. At the contextual level, 
extant research has linked political support to antecedents such as economic development 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Jamal and Nooruddin 2010), economic growth (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Booth and Seligson 2009) and political institutions (Anderson and Guillory 
1997; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). With regard to individual-level variables, scholars have shown 
that political support varies with such factors as sociodemographics (e.g., Anderson 2010a, 
2010b; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Jamal and Nooruddin 2010), political knowledge and 
political interest (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Mondak 
et al. 2007), partisanship (e.g., Huddy et al. 2005; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Rudolph 2003a), 
ideology and policy attitudes (e.g., Carlin and Singer 2011; Davis and Silver 2004; Krosnick and 
Kinder 1990), economic perceptions (e.g., Criado and Herreros 2007; Hetherington and Globetti 
2002; Rahn and Rudolph 2005), perceived threat and negative experiences with crime and 
bribery (e.g., Booth and Seligson 2009; Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2001), previous 
political participation (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2014; 
Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), and other forms of political support (e.g., Bratton et al. 2005; 
Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Rahn and Rudolph 2005).  
This dissertation focuses on personality, a factor that has received an inadequate level of 
attention in the political support literature. Two considerations, in my view, merit a thorough 
examination of personality traits. First, many of the factors listed in the previous paragraph could 
have an endogenous relationship with political support. Consider political interest as an example. 
Do people support the political system because they are interested in public affairs, or are 
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citizens more attracted to politics when they already support the status quo? In contrast to a 
chicken-and-egg argument, the relationship between personality traits and political support 
should be fairly clear, for personality is highly heritable and manifests itself before individuals 
become engaged in politics as adults.
5,6
 Personality traits thus may exert a causal influence on 
political support. Second, traits could constitute an important and persistent antecedent of 
political support due to the longitudinal stability of psychological factors. Rantanen et al. (2007), 
for example, report nine-year test–retest correlations as high as 0.81 for the Big Five trait 
dimensions of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
emotional stability, and Bloeser and his colleagues (2015) have identified high levels of 
longitudinal stability in the effects of personality on political attitudes and behavior. In sum, the 
exogenous and long-term influences of psychological characteristics indicate the utility of a 
comprehensive examination of personality, support attitudes, and citizen behavior.  
Such an overview, however, does not exist. To be sure, scholars have investigated the 
impact of personality on political support (e.g., Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Marcus et al. 1995; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008) and the impact of support attitudes on participation (e.g., Birch 
2010; Klesner 2009; Norris 1999b). Nevertheless, more work remains to be done to link traits to 
political support and to demonstrate that the personality–support relationship matters for political 
engagement and, as a result, citizen competence.    
To achieve theoretical progress, researchers must develop a general model of the link 
between personality and attitudes toward the political system. Such a broad theoretical 
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 By “heritable,” I mean that a substantial amount of the variation in traits is attributable to genetic variation across 
individuals. In a twin study, for instance, Riemann and his colleagues (1997) find heritability estimates for the Big 
Five traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability that 
range from 0.57 to 0.81 for calculations based on peer reports alone and from 0.66 to 0.79 for calculations based on 
self- and peer reports. For other studies of personality and heritability, see Heath et al. (1992) and Pilia et al. (2006). 
6
 Ehrler and his colleagues (1999), for example, report significant relationships between personality traits and the 
behavior of children. 
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framework would account for existing and novel findings in the personality and support 
literature (Lave and March 1975) and thereby achieve integrative and additive cumulation 
(Zinnes 1976). With this model, we would be able to explain whether the effect of personality 
differs across (e.g., views about political actors versus views about democracy) or within (e.g., 
views about the trustworthiness versus responsiveness of political actors) levels of political 
support. Existing studies, by contrast, tend to consider one or two support attitudes and therefore 
gravitate toward more focused hypothesis development and empirical testing.
7
 
The benefits of a general model extend to resolving disputes in the personality and 
support literature. By incorporating contextual factors, such the level of threat from political 
corruption, a broad framework could explain why the direct effect of personality differs from one 
survey to another. Perhaps different surveys were administered in divergent political, economic, 
or social environments.  
With these goals in mind, I turn to trait activation theory (TAT) as a general model of the 
relationship between personality and political support. Originally developed in the field of 
occupational psychology, trait activation theory (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 
2000) expects personality to influence outcomes only when traits are activated by relevant cues 
in the environment. These cues indicate the utility of individual differences in personality for the 
political support opportunity at hand. For example, news about a strong national economy might 
activate a person’s level of conscientiousness because of this trait dimension’s connection to 
achievement-striving. Given their attraction to success, highly conscientious citizens may be 
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 An exception is the study by Mondak and Halperin (2008), who examine the impact of personality on four support 
attitudes in the United States: presidential job approval, trust in local political actors, external political efficacy, and 
support for democratic values. Following Mondak and Halperin’s example, this dissertation will seek to add to our 
knowledge of the antecedents of political support through a comprehensive account of the relationship between 
personality and attitudes toward the political system. I also will build on their study by incorporating cross-national 
public opinion data. 
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more likely to support incumbent politicians who preside over robust economic growth. Formal 
interactions are not the only application of TAT, as various objects of political support may send 
trait-relevant cues and thereby produce direct effects of personality. Opportunities to trust 
political actors, for instance, pertain directly to the trust facet of agreeableness (John et al. 2008) 
and are likely to yield a positive trait effect on this form of political support.  
The utility of trait activation theory extends beyond the study of personality and attitudes 
about the political system. To my knowledge, no political scientist has associated his or her 
research directly with trait activation theory.
8
 This scenario fails to tap the full potential of the 
model, as its basic logic encompasses not just political support, but also other political attitudes, 
political behaviors, health behaviors, and workplace outcomes, such as the ones in the 
occupational psychology literature (e.g., Colbert and Witt 2009; Lievens et al. 2006). Moreover, 
the theory provides a broad explanation about how personality interacts with contextual factors 
to influence attitudes and behaviors. In addition to formal statistical interactions, scholars can 
draw on TAT to understand how the direct effects of personality depend on characteristics of the 
dependent variable. Researchers have been calling for the personality literature to incorporate 
environmental factors (e.g., Funder 2008; Mondak et al. 2010), and some studies have 
investigated person–situation interactions in an ad hoc fashion (e.g., Freitag and Ackermann 
2016; Mondak 2010). But TAT has the potential to ground research on conditional personality 
effects in a general theoretical framework that guides the development and specification of 
hypotheses and accounts for observations across numerous fields of research.
9
 
                                                 
8
 This does not mean that all TAT research has been inapplicable to the world of politics, as studies have reported on 
results from government workers (e.g., Haaland and Christiansen 2002; Hirst et al. 2011). The point, however, is 
that (1) none of these researchers are political scientists and (2) extant work has not extended to political attitudes 
and behavior in the mass public. 
9
 For example, the mechanism by which conscientiousness affects workplace outcomes (e.g., Colbert and Witt 2009) 
could resemble the mechanism by which the same trait dimension influences political support. 
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In addition to the link between personality and political support, I investigate the entire 
chain from traits to support attitudes to citizen behavior. Following extant work on political 
interest and other non-support attitudes (e.g., Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 
2012), I examine whether views about the political system mediate the relationship between 
personality and citizen participation. I incorporate behavioral outcomes in order to demonstrate 
the practical utility of the personality–support relationship. Had I omitted participation from my 
analysis, I could not directly address concerns about citizen competence and the low rates of 
political engagement mentioned above. Studying participation thus allows me to explore 
behavioral differences across individuals.  
A study connecting personality, political support, and behavior also may suggest practical 
ways to encourage citizens to participate in public life. The findings could indicate that political 
elites are able to influence citizen levels of political support and promote political engagement 
through messages tailored to the personality traits of their audience. Due to higher participation 
rates, citizens may be more likely to use collective action to address social problems, represent 
their interests, and hold politicians accountable, thus contributing to the quality of democracy.  
To explore the impact of personality on political support and citizen behavior, this 
dissertation offers a theoretical account that integrates all three factors. I develop this model in 
the next chapter and test its implications in subsequent chapters. In the rest of the introduction, I 
review extant research on personality and political support in order to clarify terminology and 
identify limitations in the literature addressed by my theory and research design. Finally, I 





Background: Personality and Political Support 
Personality and political support constitute two of the key factors in this dissertation, but 
scholars have defined these terms in different ways over the years. Therefore, I clarify my own 
conceptualizations before turning to the limitations in previous work on the relationship between 
individual differences and attitudes toward the political system.  
Conceptualizing Personality  
Personality represents a psychological source of individual differences. Just as people 
vary in such physical attributes as height and eye color, individuals also differ in their 
psychological characteristics. Some people are extraverted while others are introverted, and 
some embrace new experiences while others prefer to follow a routine. More generally, I define 
personality as a relatively stable and internal psychological structure that encourages observable 
patterns in behaviors and attitudes (Mondak 2010). 
Four points about this definition deserve comment. First, scholars have disputed the 
malleability of personality, with some reporting change over time (e.g., Bühler 1935; 
Constantinople 1969; Whitbourne and Waterman 1979) and others emphasizing consistency 
(e.g., Digman 1989; McCrae and Costa 2003; Rantanen et al. 2007).
10
 Recent trends in 
scholarship, however, tend to favor the stability of personality (McCrae and Costa 2008). 
Second, personality is an internal psychological structure and therefore cannot be directly 
observed (McCrae and Costa 2008; Tett and Burnett 2003). To measure personality, scholars 
typically administer survey batteries that tap basic psychological orientations, such as the traits 
of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability assessed by 
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al. 2003). Third, personality researchers 
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 In their research, Roberts and his colleagues (Caspi and Roberts 2001; Roberts et al. 2001; Roberts et al. 2008; 
Robins et al. 2001a) highlight both continuity and change in personality, with an emphasis on the former.  
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sometimes understand the term “psychological structure” as referring to mood (Voortman 2009), 
temperament (Tost et al. 2010), and values (Caprara et al. 2006; Caprara and Vecchione 2013), 
but most would include traits as basic aspects of personality (e.g., John et al. 1988; Kreitler and 
Kreitler 1990; Mondak et al. 2010). Traits refer to such general behavioral tendencies as 
extraverts being inclined to converse with strangers and introverts being hesitant to engage in 
public speaking. Due to the prominence of the Big Five trait dimensions in current personality 
research (John et al. 2008),
11
 this dissertation focuses on traits. Fourth, although traits and other 
personality characteristics promote tendencies in actions and expressed attitudes, this 
relationship is certainly not perfect (Mischel 1968; Mondak 2010).
12
 Random and situational 
factors can cause individuals to act out of character, as would occur if an unexpected physical 
ailment prevented an extravert from engaging in conversation or a public speaking class forced 
introverts to talk for the same amount of time as extraverts. The point, however, is that 
personality influences general patterns in observable behaviors and attitudes.  
As implied above, this dissertation utilizes the Big Five personality traits of openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability.
13
 Tupes and Christal 
(1958, 1961) first employed the five-factor framework in the 1950s and 1960s with their research 
on U.S. Air Force Officer Candidate School subjects, but the Big Five did not gain prominence 
in the personality literature until the 1980s and 1990s through the research of such scholars as 
Digman (1989), Goldberg (1990, 1992), and McCrae and Costa (1987, 1997).  
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 As noted by John et al. (2008), in recent years psychology publications utilizing the five-factor framework have 
vastly outnumbered publications using alternative models of personality. 
12
 The realization that personality and behavior are imperfectly correlated hindered the progress of personality 
research in the 1960s and 1970s as scholars questioned the utility of personality traits for psychological research 
(Digman 1990; Mondak 2010).  
13
 With emotional stability referring to its opposite, neuroticism, the order of personality traits spells the acronym 
OCEAN. I utilize this order for the presentation of my findings because other scholars have done the same (e.g., 
Mondak et al. 2011; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016).  
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Due to the importance of the Big Five to this dissertation, a brief description of each trait 
dimension is in order.
14
 Openness to experience refers to an individual’s receptivity to 
innovation, new activities, and novel ideas; individuals scoring high in this trait dimension tend 
to be intellectual in demeanor and value adventure and aesthetics. Meanwhile, conscientiousness 
pertains to a person’s inclination toward order, achievement-striving, and dutifulness, and high 
levels of extraversion capture not only gregariousness and social confidence but also 
assertiveness and positive emotions. Similarly, agreeable people tend to exhibit prosocial 
attributes such as warmth, affection, trust, generosity, and compliance. The final trait dimension, 
emotional stability, is rooted in an individual’s avoidance of such negative attributes as anxiety, 
impulsiveness, and irritability. 
Conceptualizing Political Support 
At its simplest, political support refers to an individual’s views of the political system. 
Some citizens trust politicians to act in the public interest while others automatically assume that 
the government’s actions are intended to benefit societal elites. Support for democratic principles 
also varies from individual to individual, with some embracing free elections and political rights 
and others adopting a more skeptical attitude toward such matters. These examples assume an 
attitudinal conceptualization of political support, rather than a behavioral one characterized by 
voter turnout and other actions that perpetuate status quo institutions (Booth and Seligson 2009). 
Canache (2002) notes that most of the political support literature adopts the opinion-based 
approach, and I do the same in this dissertation.
15
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 The account in this paragraph is based on the facets listed by John and his colleagues (2008, 126). 
15
 For examples of attitudinal studies, see Birch (2010), Booth and Seligson (2009), and Norris (1999b). In spite of 
the consensus in the literature, it is important to note that not all conceptualizations of political support are 
unidimensional. In his classic study on political support, Easton (1965, 159) incorporates both attitudes and behavior 
in the following definition: “We can say that A supports B when A acts favorably on behalf of B or when he orients 
himself favorably toward B.” Yet Easton (1975) recognizes that researchers often associate political support with the 
attitudinal half of that definition. 
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In addition to the basic definition, researchers have considered alternative classification 
schemes for political support. One option is to distinguish between specific and diffuse support 
(Easton 1965). The former pertains to public opinion about policy outputs, whereas the latter 
refers to the public’s “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept 
or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their 
wants” (Easton 1965, 273). Diffuse support, in other words, denotes an individual’s basic views 
about the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the political object at hand (Canache 2002; Easton 
1975), such as the national legislature, whereas specific support pertains to such short-range 
evaluations as an individual’s reaction to the economic impact of government policy. The 
consequences of diffuse and specific support could be profound, as high levels of support in one 
domain may facilitate political stability by compensating for low levels in the other domain 
(Easton 1975). For example, strong diffuse support for political institutions may ensure the 
persistence of the system even if citizens oppose incumbent politicians due to an economic 
recession. 
Although separating diffuse and specific support may be possible in theory, scholars have 
questioned whether survey batteries enable citizens to make such a distinction in practice (e.g., 
Easton 1975; Muller et al. 1982). Items about trust in the executive and legislature, for instance, 
may not clarify whether respondents should provide their long-run evaluations of these 
institutions or their short-run assessments of the job performance of political actors within these 
institutions. Therefore, it should be no surprise that different researchers have classified the same 
questions as examples of diffuse support (Miller 1974) and specific support (Citrin 1974). 
As an alternative to the diffuse–specific framework, scholars have suggested that research 
be organized around the targets of political support, such as political actors and institutions (e.g., 
13 
 
Booth and Seligson 2009; Canache 2002; Easton 1965; Norris 1999a, 2011). Easton did not 
intend for his original identification of support for political actors, the regime, and the political 
community to transcend research on diffuse and specific attitudes, but he later acknowledged the 
relevance of the target of support for long-run and short-run evaluations (Easton 1975). Indeed, 
Canache (2002) notes that recent studies have turned to the object-oriented framework in order to 
avoid the empirical ambiguity associated with the diffuse–specific approach (Kornberg and 
Clarke 1992) and take advantage of the multiple types of support indicated by such diverse 
objects as political actors and the political community (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).
16
  
The particular targets analyzed by researchers have differed from study to study, but 
Easton’s (1965) initial identification of political actors, the regime, and the political community 
remains foundational to the object-oriented framework. In his classification, political actors refer 
to the current occupants of political offices, whereas the regime constitutes a broad category that 
includes political offices or institutions as well as the basic principles and procedures of the 
regime. These principles range from democratic values such as free elections and political rights 
to nondemocratic values such as government control of the political sphere, and procedures 
denote the de facto protection of free speech and other processes by which demands are 
translated into political outputs. Finally, a political community in Easton’s framework refers to 
the overall collectivity aimed at conducting political affairs, rather than the particular actors, 
institutions, procedures, or principles within that society. Support for the political community 
could be measured with items for national identification and patriotism.  
Responding to Easton’s (1965) classification scheme, Norris (1999a, 2011) has proposed 
a five-tier framework of political support that ranges in generality from the political community 
at the top to political actors at the bottom. In the middle, Norris divides the regime into regime  
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institutions, regime performance (i.e., procedures), and regime principles. According to Norris, 
researchers should account for the fact that citizens may possess a high level of support for one 
of these regime objects but low levels of support for the others. An individual, for instance, 
might identify strongly with democratic principles but disapprove of the procedures or 
institutions designed to implement those principles. Of the three regime objects, Norris ranks 
regime principles as the most general, followed by regime performance and regime institutions. 
The order recommended by Norris accounts for the fact that institutions engage in the real-world 
implementation of procedures, and procedures are designed to implement broader ideals, or 
principles. The five levels of Norris’ framework are depicted in Table 1.1. 
Like Norris (1999a, 2011), other studies have focused on support for particular aspects of 
the regime. Booth and Seligson (2009) also consider regime principles and institutions, as well as 
the political community and political actors. Canache (2002), meanwhile, studies attitudes 
toward democracy and regime institutions, along with support for political actors.  
Following these studies, I utilize Norris’ (1999a, 2011) object-oriented framework for my 
dissertation. In addition to avoiding the empirical challenges of the diffuse–specific approach, 
the five-level classification scheme captures a broad range of political support and therefore 
allows me to offer a comprehensive account of the personality–support relationship. As I detail 
below, scholars have not adequately examined the extent to which the effects of personality on 
support vary within or across the levels of Norris’ framework. Additional research could improve 




Least General Political Actors
Table 1.1
Five Objects of Political Support
Source: Norris  (1999a, 10)
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our understanding of how personality effects depend on the situation encountered by individuals 
(Funder 2008; McCrae and Costa 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Tett and Burnett 2003). 
Connecting Personality and Political Support 
Having clarified the concepts of personality and political support, I now review previous 
research on the relationship between these factors in order to highlight current limitations in the 
literature. I start with scholarship on support for the political community and then move toward 
support for political actors, the least general level in Norris’ (1999a, 2011) classification scheme.    
Research on attitudes toward the political community typically examines strength of 
national identity (Jenkins et al. 2012; Sagiv et al. 2012) and patriotism (Dalton 1999; Norris 
1999a, 2011), but scholars rarely connect the five-factor personality framework and these two 
measures of political support. Altogether, I have identified only two such studies on national 
identification (Jenkins et al. 2012; Sagiv et al. 2012), each of which has its own limitations.
17
 In 
particular, Sagiv et al. (2012) collect data from only 77 high school students in Israel, and 
Jenkins et al. (2012) rely on an unrepresentative college sample from the United States. 
Therefore, the generalizability of the results beyond students (Gordon et al. 1986; Reynolds 
2010; Sears 1986) or populations outside of the United States (Jenkins et al. 2012) or Israel 
(Sagiv et al. 2012) is unclear.
18
 The lack of empirical studies on patriotism also suggests that 
personality researchers have not investigated all domains of community support in order to 
determine whether trait effects are consistent for patriotism and national identification. 
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 In addition to the articles by Jenkins et al. (2012) and Sagiv et al. (2012), Curtis (2016) utilizes a 2012 British 
survey to investigate the impact of the Big Five on identification with Europe, a supranational political community. 
Given my attention to domestic political support, I do not discuss Curtis’ findings here. (The United Kingdom has 
been a member of the European Union and its predecessor organizations since 1973, although a June 2016 
referendum began the process of UK withdrawal from the EU.) 
18
 Cooper et al. (2011) also recognize concerns associated with using student samples and find with data from the 
United States that students and non-students differ on their scores for the Big Five, but these authors also report that 
the effects of personality traits on two policy attitudes are similar for these groups. Neither of the policy items refers 
to political support, so it is an open question whether the impact of personality on attitudes toward the political 
system is similar in student and non-student samples. 
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Support for regime principles constitutes the next most general tier in Norris’ (1999a, 
2011) classification system. Norris notes that researchers typically measure democratic support 
by asking whether democracy represents the best political system, but such an approach 
represents only a first step.
19
 Democracy is a multifaceted concept encompassing mass 
participation, political tolerance, checks and balances, and limitations on governmental authority 
(Carlin and Singer 2011; Norris 1999a, 2011).
20
 A comprehensive analysis of personality and 
support for democracy would tap as many regime principles as possible while also including 
abstract preferences for democracy over dictatorship. 
The reality, however, is that the literature on the five-factor personality framework has 
touched only on two closely related democratic attitudes: tolerance of political minorities and 
support for criminal rights (Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak and 
Hurwitz 2012; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Swami et al. 2012).
21
 Although this literature has 
greatly advanced our understanding of how personality shapes attitudes toward criminals and 
disliked political groups, we do not know whether the Big Five exert similar effects on other 
democratic attitudes, such as support for checks and balances. Most of the tolerance and criminal 
rights studies analyze U.S. data,
22
 so we also are unsure whether findings generalize to other 
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 One concern with abstract measures of democratic support is that citizens can support democracy in the abstract 
(e.g., Bratton and Mattes 2001; Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999) but fail to adhere to specific democratic principles 
such as political tolerance (e.g., Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Furthermore, 
abstract measures of democratic support could be invalid because they allow respondents to answer based on their 
personal definition of democracy or their society’s definition of democracy, which may differ across individuals and 
contexts (Bratton et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011; Elkins and Sides 2010). In spite of these issues, I utilize 
abstract measures of democratic support since they are common in the literature (e.g., Bratton and Mattes 2001).  
20
 I should note that scholars have offered different conceptualizations of democracy. Some focus on elections (e.g., 
Cheibub et al. 2010) and others on a greater array of principles, such as political tolerance and checks and balances 
(e.g., Carlin and Singer 2011). I follow the latter approach in light of my goal to offer a comprehensive account of 
personality and support. 
21
 It is important to note that other studies have explored the impact of alternative personality characteristics, such as 
self-esteem (Peffley et al. 2001; Sniderman 1975), on democratic support. I compare my Big Five results to some of 
this other research in Chapter 3. 
22
 The one exception is a study by Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016), who examine political tolerance in a city in 
India and a city in Pakistan. 
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countries. I address both concerns by analyzing other democratic attitudes and by using data 
from Latin America and the Caribbean.  
In addition to the political community and regime principles, Norris (1999a, 2011) 
recognizes a third target of support: the performance of the regime. As indicated above, support 
for regime performance refers to the procedures utilized by political actors and institutions to 
implement democratic principles. Broad items for this level of support might focus on a citizen’s 
satisfaction with the performance of democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003), and more fine-grained assessments could pertain to the trustworthiness of 
elections or the extent to which citizen rights are protected. 
Researchers have debated the utility of measures of support for regime performance. On 
one hand, scholars acknowledge the potential of such items to tap an attitude that is more general 
than support for regime institutions but more specific than support for regime principles 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999a, 2011). In theory, people should be able to assess the 
extent to which government institutions (e.g., courts) implement democratic principles (e.g., fair 
trials) without allowing their opinions about these organizations and values to cloud their 
judgment (Norris 1999a, 2011). On the other hand, citizens may find it difficult to be objective 
because the items tapping these evaluations may directly refer to regime principles and 
institutions (Canache et al. 2001; Norris 1999a, 2011). Different interpretations of “satisfaction 
with democracy” across nations and individuals also could diminish the validity of items 
measuring support at the regime performance level (Canache et al. 2001).  
My response to the debate is practical. I readily understand the concerns associated with 
items tapping assessments of regime performance, but I proceed with an examination of the 
impact of personality on procedural support. In the end, it is an empirical question whether the 
18 
 
impact of personality on regime performance attitudes resembles the effects for the regime 
principle level or the regime institution level. If the procedural results are similar to one level but 
distinct from another, we might conclude that individuals viewed support for regime 
performance just as they viewed assessments of regime institutions or principles. Meanwhile, if 
the results for regime performance are a combination of the findings at the other two levels, then 
we might think that individuals acknowledged the intermediate position of this level of political 
support, or perhaps some responded as they did for institutional support and others as they did 
for democratic support. It is also possible for the regime performance results to resemble the 
findings for neither regime values nor regime institutions. 
The regime performance level represents a new field of empirical research, as no 
published studies, to my knowledge, have investigated the connections between personality and 
support for regime performance. Therefore, this dissertation offers new insights about the impact 
of personality on political support by considering this level in Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework. 
I examine overall evaluations of regime performance as well as assessments about the 
application of particular democratic principles in society. 
Regime institutions constitute the next object of political support. Rather than the rules of 
political interaction (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; North 1990), institutions in Norris’ (1999a, 
2011) framework refer to political parties and government agencies. The list of public 
institutions is quite extensive and includes the national legislature, the justice system, the 
military, and local government. Support for these institutions encompasses the domains of 
political trust, job evaluations, political affect, and external efficacy. Each dimension captures a 
different mode of assessment, with trust items focused on institutional fairness (Miller and 
Listhaug 1990), job evaluations referring to institutional effectiveness, items on political affect 
19 
 
measuring a person’s emotional reactions to political institutions, and external efficacy questions 
pertaining to the perceived level of institutional responsiveness to public opinion and activism 
(Miller and Listhaug 1990).
23
 
Using data mostly from economically affluent democracies, several scholars have 
explored the impact of the Big Five personality dimensions on institutional trust (Freitag and 
Ackermann 2016; Swami et al. 2012; Sweetser 2014; Voortman 2009) and external efficacy 
toward institutions (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.; Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013).
24
 No study of which I am aware has examined institutional affect or job 
evaluations. This dissertation utilizes data from North America, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean to explore all four domains of institutional support and determine whether personality 
influences trust, external efficacy, affect, and effectiveness evaluations in the same way. 
The final objects of support in Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework are the party officials, 
politicians, and government employees who interact with the public and make decisions that 
influence societal well-being. In contrast to such targets as the political community and regime 
principles, political actors are hardly abstract and instead constitute the human face of the 
political system (Easton 1975). Political actors also differ from regime institutions in that the 
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 External efficacy is a distinct concept from internal efficacy, the latter of which refers to people’s evaluation of 
their own understanding of politics. Internal efficacy does not constitute a form of political support since individuals 
are appraising the extent to which they comprehend the political system, rather than their approval of the status quo. 
In my view, however, external efficacy does constitute a form of political support because individuals are evaluating 
the political system in terms of governmental responsiveness to public opinion and mobilization. Likewise, Norris 
(2011, 30) explicitly refers to external efficacy toward political actors as a form of political support. Such a 
classification easily could apply to political institutions as well. In addition, Miller and Listhaug (1990) consider 
political efficacy and political trust as the two primary aspects of political support, with the former focused on 
political inputs (i.e., an individual’s impact on the political process) and the latter focused on the fairness of officials 
and other political outputs. Studies also have identified low external efficacy and low trust as components of 
political alienation (Finifter 1970; Mason et al. 1985). Based on my argument and the supporting evidence in the 
literature, this dissertation considers external efficacy to be a form of political support. I must acknowledge, 
however, that other scholars have omitted external efficacy from the concept of support (e.g., Anderson and 
Tverdova 2001; Easton 1975).  
24
 An exception to this pattern is a study by Mondak and his colleagues (2017), who investigate the impact of 
personality on trust in 24 countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
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latter refer to government agencies and political parties and the former to the individuals who fill 
roles within those organizations (Easton 1965). Although the two levels are conceptually distinct, 
citizens may conflate their attitudes toward actors and institutions in their responses to survey 
items (Norris 1999a, 2011). It is an empirical question, however, whether personality influences 
both levels in the same way. The comprehensive approach pursued in this dissertation enables 
me to address the consistency of personality effects across levels of support. 
One similarity between institutional and actor support is a common set of domains across 
levels. These particular domains refer to political affect, political trust, job evaluations, and 
external efficacy. Citizens can view political actors and regime institutions as likeable or 
unlikeable in character, fair or unfair to citizens, effective or ineffective in their handling of the 
economy or their overall job performance, and responsive or unresponsive to public opinion and 
mobilization. In theory, these domains of support are distinct from one another. Citizens, for 
example, could view local political actors as unkind and unlikeable people who nevertheless 
perform their duties effectively. 
The extant personality literature has engaged with many of the four domains of actor 
support, but not all. Anderson (2010a, 2010b), Cawvey et al. (n.d.), Mondak (2010), Mondak and 
Halperin (2008), and Wang (2016) have considered the effects of the Big Five on efficacy, trust, 
and job approval in the United States, and Voortman (2009) has considered the relationship 
between personality and perceptions of job performance in the Netherlands. I extend this 
research by including affect toward political actors as well as issue-specific evaluations of job 
effectiveness (e.g., approval of the executive’s handling of the economy).
25
 This dissertation also 
broadens the geographic scope of inquiry to economically developing democracies. 
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 Wang (2016) also examines the impact of personality on the difference between 2012 U.S. presidential candidate 
feeling thermometers. The latter measure closely resembles the concept of political affect but fails to qualify as such 
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Two general points emerge from the preceding discussion. First, we could characterize 
the personality and political support literature as disconnected and incomplete. We know that 
personality influences various views about the political system, but we are unsure whether the 
results apply consistently within or across the levels of political support. Because we lack a 
general theoretical framework for understanding personality and attitudes toward the political 
system, studies rarely consider multiple levels simultaneously, nor have scholars investigated all 
domains within a single level. A comprehensive approach, therefore, could promote additive 
cumulation by identifying new personality effects on political support and integrative cumulation 
by accounting for previous findings and explaining in general terms how personality traits 
influence attitudes toward the political system (Zinnes 1976).
26
 It is one thing, for example, to 
propose a theory that accounts for the empirical relationship between extraversion and job 
evaluations of political actors, but it is another thing to explain how extraversion influences trust, 
affect, and external efficacy for politicians and bureaucrats or even how this trait dimension 
affects attitudes at other levels of political support, such as regime principles. The same could be 
said for the other trait dimensions of the Big Five. Of the explanations mentioned thus far, Lave 
and March (1975) would prefer the more general ones because they account for more 
observations and enable researchers to understand how personality influences similar classes of 
dependent variables, such as the various domains of actor support as well as attitudes at other 
levels. A general approach calls us to move beyond studying personality and trust separately 
from personality and external efficacy and instead favors the development of explanations and 
the testing of hypotheses about personality and actor support or personality and support at all 
                                                                                                                                                             
since the focus is not on positive emotions toward political actors but instead on the difference in emotions between 
two political candidates. 
26
 The matter of integrative cumulation is relevant to all subfields in political science. For example, 41 years ago 
Zinnes (1976) viewed the quantitative international politics literature as overly focused on data analysis and sounded 
a call for integrative cumulation.  
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five levels. In sum, two primary goals of this dissertation are to accumulate new empirical 
evidence about personality and political support and to offer a general theory that explains the 
observed relationships between these two factors. 
The fulfillment of these objectives would facilitate understanding about when personality 
traits encourage, discourage, or exert no effect on political support. At present, the disconnected 
state of the literature prevents scholars from knowing how personality traits (e.g., extraversion) 
interact with the characteristics of particular modes of support (e.g., attitudes toward political 
actors versus the political community) to influence opinions about the political system. The 
status quo in prior support research conflicts with the consensus in the broader personality 
literature that psychological traits work in conjunction with features of the situation to influence 
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Funder 2008; McCrae and Costa 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Tett 
and Burnett 2003). To integrate the latter point, I theorize and test hypotheses about the 
differential effects of personality on various attitudes toward the political system. The effect of 
some personality traits may be uniformly favorable toward political support within a particular 
level and even across levels, but it is more likely that the effects will vary in meaningful ways for 
different attitudes toward the political system. Extraversion, for instance, may have a different 
effect on support for political actors than it has on support for the political community. In the 
next chapter, I outline a theory that accounts for such heterogeneous effects. 
A second limitation noted thus far concerns the geographic scope of previous research. 
Much of the literature has concentrated on personality effects in economically developed 
democracies,
27
 so existing findings are of limited generalizability. Data from other countries 
would enable scholars to evaluate the applicability of the existing literature on personality and 
                                                 
27
 Of the studies mentioned above, the only exceptions are Mondak et al. (2017), who study political trust in the 
Caribbean, Latin America, and North America, and Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016), who examine political 
tolerance in India and Pakistan. 
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political support. Therefore, I analyze survey data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer, which 
includes more than 20 low-income and middle-income countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
28
 All of these countries also hold elections, but their levels of democracy in recent 
years vary according to Freedom House from free (e.g., Chile and Costa Rica) to not free (i.e., 
Venezuela). 
This review also points to two additional gaps in the literature on personality and 
attitudes toward the political system. One limitation pertains to the fact that scholars rarely 
employ formal interactions between psychological traits and aspects of a person’s environment.
29
 
Individuals evaluate the political world in vastly different contexts. Some citizens live in robust 
economies marked by high levels of democracy and low levels of corruption while others 
encounter anemic financial conditions, autocratic governments, and rampant corruption. Threat 
levels such as these may influence political support directly as well as indirectly through their 
interaction with personality traits and other individual characteristics. The general theory I 
propose in the next chapter incorporates context in order to understand when environmental 
factors will and will not produce personality effects on political support. Through my model on 
person–situation interactions, I address some of the puzzles in the personality and support 
literature by arguing that inconsistent results in past work on direct trait effects are due to 
surveys being administered in divergent contexts.
30
 The data utilized in this dissertation are 
especially suited to testing hypotheses on conditional personality effects because one survey 
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 Among these 22 countries, the 2010 gross domestic products per capita in constant 2005 U.S. dollars range from 
$1,169 in Guyana to $14,204 in Trinidad and Tobago (World Bank 2015). 
29
 I am aware of only two exceptions in the literature on political support: Freitag and Ackermann (2016) and 
Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016).  
30
 For example, Rasmussen and Nørgaard (n.d.) find a positive, direct relationship between openness to experience 
and external efficacy, but Anderson (2010a, 2010b) reports the opposite effect. Perhaps the different results are due 
to contextual differences between Rasmussen and Nørgaard’s national Danish sample and Anderson’s local sample 
from the Tallahassee, Florida, area. 
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includes respondents from more than 20 countries. Most of the studies in the political support 
literature, by contrast, analyze data from only one country.
31
 
Incorporating context not only expands our theoretical knowledge of personality’s impact 
on political support, but it also avoids a problematic assumption in the study of psychological 
traits. Without integrating the political, economic, or social context, personality researchers 
imply that the relationship between personality and support is the same for all citizens in every 
context. Scholars from outside the political support literature have questioned this assumption. 
Mondak and his colleagues (2010), for instance, find that the effects of extraversion and 
agreeableness on exposure to political disagreement depend on the size of an individual’s 
discussion network. As one might expect given their assertiveness and conflictive demeanors, 
individuals high in extraversion and low in agreeableness tend to experience dissent in their 
discussion networks, but only when they communicate with a sufficiently high number of 
people.  
Another omission in the literature refers to the connections between personality, political 
support, and citizen behavior. Although some scholars have explored the impact of the Big Five 
on political support and others have examined the effect of support on outcomes such as political 
participation, I am aware of only two studies that have investigated the extent to which political 
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 The only exceptions are the studies by Mondak et al. (2017) and Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016). 
32
 At least four other studies have incorporated political efficacy mediating variables, but none of these have solely 
measured evaluations of governmental responsiveness. In two studies, governmental responsiveness evaluations are 
combined with internal efficacy items (Ribeiro and Borba 2016; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), and two other 
studies draw on items about perceived effectiveness in performing a set of political activities (Russo and Amnå 
2016, n.d.).  
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 The paucity of mediation analyses involving political support is somewhat surprising. 
First, several studies have utilized non-support attitudes to test the mediation hypothesis (e.g., 
Gallego and Oberski 2012; Mondak et al. 2010; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), which states that 
personality influences behavior through its effect on attitudes. Second, the path from personality 
to support appears to be reasonable, for traits are highly heritable (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; 
Riemann et al. 1997) and apparent prior to a person’s first involvement with the political world 
in late adolescence or early adulthood (e.g., Ehrler et al. 1999; Mervielde et al. 1995). Third, the 
path from political support to political behavior is sensible: Prior studies have reported 
significant links between support attitudes and political behavior (e.g., Norris 1999b; Remmer 
2010), and attitudes (e.g., support for current actors and institutions) may be necessary for people 
to overcome the temptation to stay home because of the low probability of being the decisive 
participant (Muller and Opp 1986; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).  
Based on the aforementioned considerations, I incorporate the mediation hypothesis into 
the theoretical argument in the next chapter and then empirically examine the extent to which 
support attitudes mediate the impact of personality on known consequences of political support, 
namely political participation. My work thus addresses the low rates of citizen involvement that 
hinder political accountability, the expression of interests, and collective efforts to resolve 
societal problems. By tracing the path from personality to support to behavior, I examine why 
some individuals are more likely than others to participate in public life.  
Organization of Chapters 
 As indicated above, Chapter 2 offers an integrated model that accounts for the impact of 
personality on political support and the relevance of the personality–support relationship for 
citizen behavior. My goal with this model is to address the theoretical and empirical gaps in the 
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literature mentioned earlier in this introduction. To understand the relationship between 
personality and political support, I turn to trait activation theory, a model that originated in the 
occupational psychology literature and is relevant for personality research in general. After 
explaining the general logic of TAT, I apply the model to political support and offer testable 
hypotheses about the direct and conditional effects of personality. I then introduce citizen 
behavior to the model by considering the general logic of the mediation hypothesis and its 
applicability to attitudes toward the political system. In sum, my model examines the 
psychological roots of political support attitudes, which in turn are expected to influence political 
participation and therefore have implications for citizen competence. 
The next four chapters test implications of the model. In Chapter 3, I explore the direct 
effects of personality on political support. Using trait activation theory as a guide, I offer specific 
hypotheses regarding the impact of the Big Five on each of the levels of Norris’ (1999a, 2011) 
framework. The chapter tests my expectations with multiple data sources from the United States 
and with cross-national survey data from the Western Hemisphere. I find that personality traits 
influence attitudes toward political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, regime 
principles, and the political community. Furthermore, discernible patterns emerge within and 
across the levels of Norris’ framework. Personality effects are generally similar for political 
actors, regime institutions, and regime performance, and the complexity of democratic support is 
reflected in the heterogeneous impact of personality at the regime principle level. Personality 
traits also influence support for the political community in predictable ways. My findings suggest 
how politicians and nongovernmental organizations could tailor messages to the personality 




I build on the study of personality and political support by incorporating contextual 
factors in the fourth and fifth chapters. Consistent with TAT, I expect personality to influence 
support only when traits are activated by relevant cues in the environment. The specific cues I 
consider pertain to the political, economic, and social environment, with Chapter 4 focused on 
subjective measures of context and Chapter 5 on objective measures of context. Previous 
research has considered the direct impact of personality on political support, but I harness trait 
activation theory to examine conditional trait effects. Once again, I utilize survey data from the 
United States and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere and find support for my hypotheses. 
Moreover, my results indicate additional ways for political elites and nongovernmental 
organizations to promote political support and thereby to encourage citizens to be engaged in 
public life. 
The sixth chapter considers the relevance of the personality–support relationship for 
citizen behavior. Drawing on the results from Chapter 3 as well as past research on traits, 
attitudes, and behavior, I use the mediation hypothesis to develop specific expectations about the 
path from personality to political support to political participation. Chapter 6 then employs cross-
national survey data to test these hypotheses through mediation analysis. I find that personality 
influences individual participation partially through its effect on political support, and my results 
complement and challenge previous findings about the impact of personality on political 
behavior. Furthermore, the mediation analyses in Chapter 6 reveal the potential utility of elite 
communications tailored to the dominant personality traits of an audience; such messages could 
raise political support levels and the probability of participation, thus influencing a key indicator 
of citizen competence, namely engagement in community life. 
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I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 7. After summarizing the discussion, I consider the 


























CONNECTING PERSONALITY, SUPPORT, AND BEHAVIOR:  
AN INTEGRATED MODEL 
 
This chapter outlines a general theory explaining how personality influences political 
support and how these factors in turn affect citizen behavior. Such a model is necessary due to 
the incomplete and disconnected state of the literature on personality, support, and the 
consequences of support. As the previous chapter emphasized, researchers have not offered a 
general theoretical framework that accounts for existing and new findings on the relationship 
between personality and political support, nor has existing scholarship explored whether 
contextual factors moderate the influence of psychological traits on support attitudes. By 
ignoring contextual factors, scholars implicitly assume that trait effects are homogeneous in all 
environments and ignore the possibility that inconsistent findings are due to surveys being 
administered in different settings. Moreover, the real-world importance of the personality–
support relationship remains uncertain, for few studies have explored the path from traits to 
support to behavioral outcomes such as political participation.
33
 The theoretical model offered in 
this chapter addresses each of the aforementioned limitations in the literature. 
In my model, I employ two arguments from the personality literature to explain how 
psychological traits, political support, and citizen behavior connect. The first is trait activation 
theory (TAT) (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000), which investigates the 
interaction between personality and situational characteristics, and the second perspective, 
known as the mediation hypothesis (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012), 
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 Current research on personality and democratic support illustrates each of these issues. Thus far, scholars have 
examined the direct impact of personality on political tolerance and support for criminal rights (e.g., Marcus et al. 
1995; Swami et al. 2012), to the neglect of other domains of democratic support. Without such evidence, we cannot 
be sure whether personality traits influence attitudes toward checks and balances or other forms of democratic 
support in the same way as they affect political tolerance and support for criminal rights. Likewise, I am aware of 
only one study that has incorporated context in order to examine the conditional effect of personality on democratic 
support (Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016). Finally, no studies, to my knowledge, have explored whether democratic 
support mediates the relationship between personality and citizen behavior.  
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contends that personality influences citizen behavior through its effect on attitudes. In other 
words, TAT explains how personality affects political support while the mediation hypothesis 
reveals the practical relevance of the personality–support relationship for behavioral outcomes 
such as political participation. My model thus pertains to citizen competence and reveals some of 
the psychological and attitudinal roots of the low participation rates observed in modern 
societies. Due to the broad scope of TAT and the mediation hypothesis, I discuss each in general 
terms before moving to its application to political support. I start with trait activation theory and 
then turn to the mediation hypothesis. 
Overview of Trait Activation Theory 
Developed by Tett and his colleagues in the early 2000s (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and 
Guterman 2000),
34
 trait activation theory and its extensions seek to understand how personality 
interacts with the environment to influence attitudes and behaviors.
35
 In particular, the TAT 
literature focuses on two basic characteristics of the environment: situational strength and trait-
relevant cues. I consider each in turn.  
Individuals encounter a variety of situations in their daily lives. Under some conditions, 
people are free to select from at least two choices, but other environments eliminate all viable 
options except one. The amount of available time in one’s schedule, for example, influences the 
extent to which an individual may consider socializing with others during a trip to the gym. 
Unconstrained patrons are free to chat with others before, during, and after their exercise routine, 
but busy patrons may feel compelled to complete their workout and continue with the day’s 
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 Tett and Burnett (2003) and Tett and Guterman (2000) constructed their theory by building on previous 
observations about the connections between personality, the situation, and individual outcomes (e.g., Allport 1966; 
Bem and Funder 1978; Murray 1938). 
35
 As noted by Tett and his colleagues (2013) in a recent review, TAT was originally intended to apply to behavioral 
outcomes, but additional research (e.g., Fletcher et al. 2008; Ilies et al. 2011; Yang and Diefendorff 2009) has 
applied the model to attitudinal dependent variables. I follow the latter approach by using trait activation theory to 
explain attitudes toward the political system. 
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agenda without engaging in unnecessary conversations. Psychologists would classify the former 
scenario as a weak situation and the latter as a strong situation due to the range of choice 
available to the decision-maker (e.g., Mischel 1973; Monson et al. 1982; Tett and Burnett 2003). 
Weak situations allow for personality effects because individuals are free to select the option that 
best enables them to fulfill their psychological needs through trait-consistent behavior (Murray 
1938; Tett and Burnett 2003), but strong situations minimize the impact of personality by 
obliging people low and high in a particular trait to hold the same attitude or engage in a similar 
behavior. Sources of strong situations include legislation, the presence or threat of pain, and 
monetary incentives (Mischel 1973; Tett and Burnett 2003). We thus would expect a busy 
schedule to produce a much weaker relationship between personality and socializing at the gym 
as individuals low and high in a trait dimension confront financial considerations associated with 
their job or the threat of emotional pain associated with the failure to spend time at home with 
their family. In sum, TAT expects the impact of personality on attitudes and behaviors to be 
minimal in relatively strong situations and possible in relatively weak situations. 
Evidence for this hypothesis is surprisingly limited. Cooper and Withey (2009) claim that 
researchers have not adequately tested or found supportive results for the situational strength 
hypothesis, and some studies identify insignificant trait–situation interactions (Mischel et al. 
1973; Schutte et al. 1985). Other scholarship, however, finds more favorable evidence (Beaty et 
al. 2001; Monson et al. 1982; Withey et al. 2005). For example, Monson and his colleagues 
(1982) randomly assigned subjects to receive highly extraverted, highly introverted, or neutral 
treatment by a confederate. The expectations were that the neutral situation would allow 
personality effects to occur while the other situations could be so strong as to eliminate effects of 
subject-rated extraversion on perceived talkativeness and the perceived level of extraversion 
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during the exchange. As expected, subject-rated extraversion exerts a significantly more positive 
effect on both dependent variables in the neutral condition than the other conditions. 
Weak situations may allow personality effects to occur, but trait activation theory views 
such information as insufficient. According to Hochwarter and his colleagues (2006), the 
presence of agency does not guarantee that personality will influence an outcome, nor does it 
specify which trait(s) will be important. TAT responds to the inadequacy of situational strength 
by turning to another aspect of the environment: situational cues.  
Situational cues refer to features of a weak environment that signal the relevance of 
particular traits for the dependent variable at hand (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 
2000). If weak situations provide individuals with the freedom to express their personality traits, 
trait-relevant cues make the expression of certain traits particularly attractive. Suppose we were 
interested in signals for the trait dimension of extraversion in our gym example. Given their 
sociable tendencies, a trait-relevant cue for unconstrained extraverts could be the presence of a 
smoothie bar or other place at the gym where people could meet and engage in conversation. The 
expected relationship between extraversion and speaking with others at the gym would be 
positive when individual schedules are free (i.e., a weak situation) and when the gym offers a 
hub for socializing (i.e., a trait-relevant cue). By contrast, incentives for extraverts to express 
their personality would be absent in gyms without central meeting places (i.e., no trait-relevant 
cue), ceteris peribus, and unconstrained extraverts would be no more likely than unconstrained 
introverts to converse with other patrons. 
Trait activation theory therefore expects personality to influence behavioral and 
attitudinal outcomes but only in the presence of trait-relevant cues received in weak situations. 
This hypothesis generally receives support in the TAT literature. For example, Colbert and Witt 
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(2009) examine how conscientiousness and trait-relevant signals interact to influence job 
performance. One of the cues in their analysis is perceived goal-focused leadership,
36
 which 
refers to the extent to which supervisors specify objectives and enable workers to achieve these 
objectives. According to Colbert and Witt, a high level of goal-focused leadership should 
activate conscientiousness because it facilitates the effective expression of such trait-relevant 
attributes as efficiency, responsibility, and discipline. Highly conscientious employees in this 
situation understand the requirements for success and are able and motivated to exert the 
requisite effort to achieve organizational objectives. The relationship between conscientiousness 
and job performance, therefore, should be quite strong when leaders clarify the firm’s goals. 
When leaders do not, employees have no objectives toward which to strive, and attributes useful 
to achieving goals, such as reliability and discipline, lose their utility in determining job 
performance. Colbert and Witt thus expect a weaker relationship between conscientiousness and 
job evaluations in the latter scenario. The results are consistent with their hypothesis. When 
perceived goal-focused leadership is high, shifting from low to high in conscientiousness 
increases an employee’s job performance evaluation by nearly one point on a five-point scale, 
but the effect of conscientiousness is essentially zero when goal-focused leadership is low.
37
 
Thus far, I have considered the utility of trait activation theory for understanding formal 
interactions between personality traits and situational features, but the model is also helpful for 
the study of direct personality effects. In their original TAT article, Tett and Guterman (2000) 
argue that personality effects will be consistent (inconsistent) across various life domains when 
behaviors contain trait-relevant (trait-irrelevant) cues. For example, the authors expect sociable 
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 Empirical applications of TAT have considered situations perceived and not perceived by the respondent. For 
examples of the former, see Botero and Van Dyne (2009) and Sung and Choi (2009); for examples of the latter, see 
Tett and Guterman (2000) and Tett and Murphy (2002). 
37
 For other applications of TAT using trait-relevant cues, see De Hoogh et al. (2005), Hirst et al. (2009), and 
Hochwarter et al. (2006). 
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people to prefer participating in sociable behaviors at the store and in the workplace but to be no 
more likely than unsociable people to prefer empathetic behaviors in either setting. The argument 
thus anticipates that personality will influence the outcome only when trait-relevant cues of the 
dependent variable activate the personality trait. This constitutes the basic expectation of TAT as 
discussed above. In their results, Tett and Guterman find evidence for cross-situational 
consistency in trait expression, with the trait relevance of the situation measured by 26 judges. 
Meanwhile, a similar study (Haaland and Christiansen 2002) finds the Big Five to be more 




In my view, trait activation theory holds great promise for psychological research in 
occupational psychology, political psychology, and beyond due to the model’s general ability to 
explain how personality effects depend on situational factors. Such assistance is clearly needed 
due to the predominant empirical focus of personality research on direct effects, as noted by 
Mondak and his colleagues (2010). The literature review in Chapter 1 of this dissertation 
concludes that the state of research on personality and political support is no different. If scholars 
are going to move beyond direct effects, what will be required? One key innovation, according to 
Funder (2008, 577), will be to identify “which aspects of situations (specifically) affect which 
behaviors” (emphasis in original). In my view, TAT’s attention to trait-relevant cues can assist 
researchers in determining which environmental signals would be salient for particular traits and 
useful for translating personality characteristics into specific attitudes and actions. TAT therefore 
builds on McCrae and Costa’s (2008) five-factor theory (FFT), which posits that personality 
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 More specifically, the experts were asked if the behavior provided a good opportunity for inferring about a 
person’s level of a given trait. 
39
 For other studies on cross-situational consistency in the TAT literature and beyond, see Bem and Allen (1974), 
Kenrick et al. (1990), Lance et al. (2007), Lievens et al. (2006), and Shoda et al. (1993). As the list of studies 
indicates, the concept of cross-situational consistency predates and helped to shape the development of TAT. 
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interacts with the environment to influence attitudes and other characteristic adaptations. FFT 
does not specify how such interactions occur, but trait activation theory provides a mechanism. 
Furthermore, the mark of a high-quality general theory is its ability to account for a 
variety of observations (Lave and March 1975), and I would suggest that trait activation theory 
can explain past findings on workplace, political, and other outcomes. Let us consider two 
examples, one applying to direct effects and one to conditional effects. In the first example, 
Mondak and his colleagues (2010) find that extraversion does not automatically increase the 
probability of political behavior, for the personality effect depends on the opportunity for social 
interaction inherent in the particular form of participation. When political engagement entails 
interpersonal interaction (e.g., attending a campaign rally), extraversion exerts a positive and 
significant effect, but the relationship between this trait dimension and behavior is insignificant 
for individualistic forms of political activity (e.g., donating to a candidate). Interpreted in the 
language of TAT, both modes of participation constitute weak situations because citizens in 
electoral regimes are generally free to be engaged or unengaged with the political process, but 
only social activities contain trait-relevant cues for extraversion.  
The second example pertains to a study on U.S. voter turnout by Gerber and his 
colleagues (2013). Given the absence of compulsory voting in the United States, Americans 
operate under a weak situation in deciding whether to come to the polls. In their study, Gerber et 
al. examine the interactions between personality traits and randomly assigned get-out-the-vote 
(GOTV) appeals. Previous research in the American context (Gerber et al. 2011a; Mondak 2010) 
had found little evidence that openness increases or decreases the probability of casting a 
ballot,
40
 perhaps because voter turnout does not require the exchange of ideas between 
individuals (Gerber et al. 2011a) and therefore fails to activate this personality trait dimension. 
                                                 
40
 For an exception, see Mondak et al. (2010). 
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Gerber and his colleagues (2013), however, report that citizens high in openness are more likely 
to vote when presented with persuasive appeals.
41
 To explain their finding, the authors do not 
cite trait activation theory but nonetheless indicate that GOTV appeals constitute trait-relevant 
cues associated with the attraction of people high in openness to new ideas and information. 
Furthermore, voting may become a trait-consistent behavior as individuals high in openness seek 
to express their political ideas at the ballot box. Trait activation, however, fails to occur for 
subjects who do not receive persuasive appeals, as openness exerts an insignificant effect for the 
control groups.
42
 The insignificant finding is consistent with previous results reported by Gerber 
et al. (2011a) and Mondak (2010). 
TAT Applied to Political Support 
In addition to workplace outcomes and political participation, trait activation theory 
provides insight into the relationship between personality and political support. Key TAT 
concepts include situational strength and trait-relevant cues, but I focus on the latter because 
respondents generally operate under weak situations during survey questions about views on the 
political system.
43
 Although societal norms may encourage positive or negative attitudes toward 
particular objects of support (Citrin 1974; Klingemann 1999), individuals remain free to report 
any of the response options for a question. A survey administrator does not coerce or even 
persuade a respondent but instead records his or her answers to political support items. 
Meanwhile, I expect personality to exert direct and conditional effects on political 
support in response to trait-relevant cues. To study direct effects, I begin with the observation 
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 The significant finding applies to two of the three treatments in a survey experiment, as well as to some of the 
results from a field experiment.  
42
 For other instances of person–situation interactions in political science, see Ackermann (2017), Gerber et al. 
(2010), Hibbing et al. (2011), Mondak (2010), and Mondak et al. (2010). 
43
 The limited number of responses on survey items does constrain individual choice, but questions are designed to 
offer a reasonable range of options. Respondents on the 2010 AmericasBarometer, for example, could answer that 
they trusted a political institution on a 1-to-7 scale that ranged from “[n]ot at all” to “[a] lot.” 
37 
 
that political support is multifaceted. When citizens think about the political system during a 
survey or during their day-to-day lives, they are considering more than whether they feel 
positively or negatively about government in general. They also are paying attention to the 
particular objects of support, such as political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, 
regime principles, and the political community (Norris 1999a, 2011). The characteristics of 
support objects differ both across (e.g., legislative institutions versus democratic principles) and 
within (e.g., support for checks and balances versus political tolerance) the levels of Norris’ 
(1999a, 2011) framework, and citizens will likely take these differences into account in forming 
their attitudes about the political system. In other words, each object of support creates a unique 
situation to which individuals respond, and trait-relevant cues in the target could activate 
personality traits and produce personality effects. Figure 2.1 depicts trait activation via object-
specific signals.  
Every support opportunity may be unique, but each connects in some way to a person’s 
approval of the political system. Moreover, some political support items within or across the 
levels of Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework bear strong resemblances to one another, such as 
actor trust and institutional trust or overall and issue-specific evaluations of executive job 
effectiveness. Items such as these send similar trait-relevant cues, and the result should be 
consistent personality effects. Put more generally, TAT’s emphasis on cross-situational 
consistency (e.g., Haaland and Christiansen 2002; Lance et al. 2007; Tett and Guterman 2000) 
implies that personality effects will be more stable for comparable forms of political support that 































 In particular, I anticipate that many individuals will evaluate political actors, 
regime institutions, and regime performance in similar ways due to the fact that these levels of 
support all pertain to instrumental evaluations of the status quo (Klingemann 1999). Citizens 
prefer leaders and institutions that meet their expectations for governmental trustworthiness, 
effectiveness, likeability, and responsiveness,
45
 and poor evaluations by the public could 
influence elections or provoke institutional reform.
46
 Although the domains of political trust, job 
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 As discussed in the next chapter, I test the hypothesis of cross-situational consistency by examining the patterns of 
trait effects for comparable forms of political support and contrasting these results with the patterns for other, less 
comparable forms of political support. 
45
 Regime performance relates most directly to the domain of effectiveness since citizens assess the extent to which 
political actors and regime institutions put democratic principles into practice.   
46
 The opening anecdote in Chapter 1 illustrates the possibility of low levels of support producing anti-incumbent 
electoral results and institutional reform, as Venezuela abandoned the Democratic Action Party and Social Christian 
Party and switched from a bicameral legislature to a unicameral one in the aftermath of negative attitudes toward the 






Figure 2.1 Applying Trait Activation Theory to Direct Effects 
Large Impact 
of Trait on 
Support for 
Target z  
Small Impact 
of Trait on 
Support for 
Target z  
 
Characteristics 
of Target z 
Personality 
Trait x 
Note: Figure 2.1 assumes that a weak situation exists and personality effects are possible. 
“Target” refers to a target of political support, such as a political actor. Figure 2.1 was adapted 
from Tett’s work on trait activation theory (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000). 
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effectiveness, political affect, and external efficacy may send unique signals to citizens, all 
pertain to instrumental evaluations and contain broadly similar trait-relevant cues. I thus expect 
to observe fairly consistent personality effects within and across the first three levels of support. 
Meanwhile, the impact of personality may be different for attitudes toward regime principles and 
the political community because of alternative trait-relevant cues. In particular, I expect signals 
for democratic support to relate to personal ideals and national norms about abstract democratic 
preferences and about specific principles such as political tolerance and checks and balances, 
whereas relevant messages for community support may center on norms for patriotism and 
national identification as well as the act of self-expression inherent in answering questions about 
national affection and affiliation (Klingemann 1999). The unique trait-relevant cues for 
democratic and community support may activate different personality traits or produce trait 
effects in the opposite direction from the results for actor, institutional, and procedural attitudes.  
My application of TAT to direct effects thus pursues two of the goals discussed earlier 
for a general theory. First, I promote integrative cumulation (Zinnes 1976) by providing an 
explanation that accounts for previous and new observations in the study of personality and 
political support (Lave and March 1975). In particular, I examine the influence of personality 
within and across the levels of Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework. Second, I investigate how 
personality interacts with specific aspects of the support decision to influence attitudes toward 
the political system. I do not assume, for example, that extraversion affects support for political 
actors in the same way that it influences attitudes toward democratic principles. 
Moreover, I previously noted that political support researchers rarely consider formal 
interactions between traits and the environment. Such an approach encourages the assumption of 
                                                                                                                                                             
election results, see Anderson et al. (2005), Craig et al. (2006), Hetherington (1999), and Wang (2016). See 
Southwell (2012) for contrary evidence on the relationship between external efficacy and pro-incumbent voting.   
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homogenous personality effects, but trait activation theory recognizes that trait effects can be 
minimal due to the presence of strong situations or the absence of trait-relevant cues in weak 
situations (Hochwarter et al. 2006), or heterogenous due to divergent trait-relevant cues across 
different weak situations (Tett and Burnett 2003). Because conditional trait effects are possible, I 
also apply TAT to formal person–situation interactions in the study of political support. 
To study the role of context, I turn to political, economic, and social threat. The 
justification for this theme is threefold. First, the political support literature often considers the 
direct effects of such factors as levels of political corruption (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; 
Booth and Seligson 2009) and economic growth (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Criado and 
Herreros 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001), and I build on prior research by investigating 
whether threats influence attitudes toward the political system indirectly by activating 
personality traits. Second, workplace applications of trait activation theory often examine 
environmental factors pertaining to threat. Hochwarter and his colleagues (2006), for instance, 
discuss the interaction between perceived supervisor support and an individual’s social skills, a 
concept that combines aspects of personality and learning.
47
 As one might expect, high levels of 
social skills assist individuals in achieving strong job evaluations; however, the strength of this 
relationship depends on the level of perceived managerial support. Strong social skills enable 
individuals in threatening situations to compensate for the low level of employer support and 
achieve high job ratings, but the influence of this trait is more muted in more supportive—or less 
threatening—workplaces that facilitate success for employees regardless of their level of social 
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 As this example indicates, the TAT literature uses contextual measures as perceived by the respondent, but other, 
more objective measures are employed as well. Tett and Guterman (2000), for instance, consider consistency in 
personality effects across situations rated by experts, rather than the respondents. I consider both perceived and 





 Third, we should expect threat levels in the social, economic, and political environments 
to activate personality traits due to the salience of such emotions and feelings as fear and pain or 
relief and pleasure. Individuals are likely to notice these signals, which in turn may trigger 
personality and produce trait effects. 
This dissertation tests several hypotheses pertaining to trait-relevant cues in the 
environment, but let me provide one example in order to make the discussion more concrete. I 
turn to the interaction between openness and corruption. As noted by Anderson and Tverdova 
(2003), high levels of malfeasance violate democratic norms of governmental openness, 
procedural fairness, and political accountability. Such violations hinder the free expression of 
ideas between citizens and their elected representatives and therefore should raise concerns from 
individuals high in openness, who value ideas and idealism (John et al. 2008). As a result, high 
levels of corruption could activate openness and produce a negative relationship between this 
trait dimension and political support. The reverse process could occur in low-corruption 
environments, as highly open citizens may be more supportive of the political system in response 
to compliance with democratic norms. The interaction effect, therefore, will be negative: 
Openness will exert an increasingly negative effect on political support as the level of 
malfeasance rises. This interaction is depicted in Figure 2.2. 
Heterogeneous trait effects such as the one in Figure 2.2 raise the possibility that TAT 
could enable researchers to solve puzzles in the personality and support literature. For example, 
past studies have observed positive (Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.) and negative (Anderson 
2010a, 2010b) effects of openness on external efficacy. Such divergent results could be due to 
contextual differences across samples. The positive direct effect originates from Denmark, one of  
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 For other workplace TAT applications that refer to threat levels in the environment, see Botero and Van Dyne 
































the least malfeasant countries according to the World Bank.
49
 Meanwhile, the negative effects 
come from a local survey in Florida, which ranked as the tenth worst state in a recent index of 
illegal corruption as perceived by journalists (Dincer and Johnston 2014).
50,51
   
I use TAT to explore this puzzle on openness as well as other puzzles in the personality 
and political support literature, such as divergent findings for the relationship between 
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 For example, Denmark received a 2015 percentile ranking of 98.08 for control of corruption (World Bank 2016). 
50
 According to Dincer and Johnston (2014), illegal corruption refers to public officials benefitting private groups or 
individuals in exchange for private gains for themselves. 
51
 Meanwhile, Florida ranks in the middle of the pack in a more objective measure of state-level corruption based on 
public corruption convictions in federal court (United Stated Department of Justice 2013). According to either 
measure, however, Florida likely possesses a higher level of corruption than Denmark. For more details on the 
conviction-based measure, see Chapter 5. 




































Figure 2.2 Possible Interaction between 
Openness and Corruption 
Note: This figure expects low and high levels of corruption to activate openness and 
result in positive and negative trait effects, respectively. Because the impact of 
openness becomes more negative as the level of corruption rises, the interaction 
effect is expected to be negative. This figure is based on trait activation theory (Tett 
and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000).  
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conscientiousness and attitudes toward political actors and regime institutions (e.g., Freitag and 
Ackermann 2016; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2017). 
Overview of the Mediation Hypothesis 
The second half of my model is the mediation hypothesis. According to the mediation 
hypothesis, personality influences attitudes, which in turn affect citizen behavior. For example, 
Blais and St-Vincent (2011) show that civic duty and political interest mediate the relationship 
between altruism and expected voter turnout. The causal order promoted by the mediation 
hypothesis deserves further comment. First, personality is heritable (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; Pilia 
et al. 2006; Riemann et al. 1997) and manifests itself long before individuals first engage with 
the political world in late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., Asendorpf and van Aken 2003; 
Ehrler et al. 1999; Mervielde et al. 1995). Likewise, empirical evidence indicates that personality 
mediates the relationship between biology and attitudes, both in the political (Dawes et al. 2010) 
and nonpolitical (Hiraishi et al. 2008; Oskarsson et al. 2012) domains. It is sensible, in other 
words, for personality to precede and cause political support. Second, attitudes tend to influence 
behavior because citizens may have few other reasons to engage in public affairs.
52,53
 Because of 
the time and monetary costs of participation as well as the infinitesimal probability of being the 
decisive contributor to a collective action effort (Muller and Opp 1986; Riker and Ordeshook 
1968), people may choose to participate only when they are motivated to invest in the political 
system through such attitudes as political interest and civic duty (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; 
Gallego and Oberski 2012; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013).  
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 Easton (1975) makes this point with respect to political support attitudes. 
53
 This is not to say that behaviors never influence attitudes. Researchers, for example, have found some evidence 
that participation affects political support (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2014; 
Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). 
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To apply the mediation hypothesis, researchers must understand two relationships: the 
connection between personality and attitudes and the connection between attitudes and behavior. 
As an example, consider the causal chain from agreeableness to civic duty to electoral turnout 
analyzed by Schoen and Steinbrecher (2013). The authors expect a positive relationship between 
agreeableness and civic duty in Germany because individuals high in this trait dimension are 
sociable and would be especially attentive to their country’s emphasis on good citizenship. Civic 
duty, in turn, is anticipated to predict turnout because previous research has shown that high 
levels of the attitude are associated with a high probability of going to the polls. The causal chain 
indicates that agreeableness will be positively associated with turnout via the attitude of civic 
duty, and Schoen and Steinbrecher find that this attitude partially mediates the relationship 
between agreeableness and voting. 
The Mediation Hypothesis Applied to Political Support 
As with trait activation theory, the mediation hypothesis constitutes a general model that 
political support scholars can utilize in their work. Applied research has considered several 
potential mediating attitudes, including civic duty (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and 
Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), political interest (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; 
Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), internal efficacy (Gallego and 
Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), and identification 
with Europe (Gallego and Oberski 2012). I propose that research on the mediation hypothesis 
add political support to the list. 
My recommendation is based on three observations. First, the support literature has 
begun to explore the relationship between personality and attitudes toward the political system 
(e.g., Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Sagiv et al. 2012), and I build on prior 
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research by examining the effects of traits on objects of support at all levels of Norris’ (1999a, 
2011) framework. Second, scholars have found that political support influences behavior (e.g., 
Klesner 2009; Norris 1999b, 2011; Remmer 2010). The logic for a positive connection between 
political support and behavior is fairly simple: Positive evaluations of the political system 
indicate favorable views of the current system’s legitimacy and encourage citizens to consider 
engagement in public life as a worthwhile opportunity to promote and invest in the status quo 
(Booth and Seligson 2009; Norris 1999b, 2011). Third, the political behavior literature has 
already accumulated an impressive array of findings on personality effects from several 
countries, including Denmark (Dinesen et al. 2014), Germany (Schoen and Schumann 2007; 
Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), Italy (Caprara et al. 2006; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), 
Mexico (Moreno and Wals 2014), Spain (Gallego and Oberski 2012), the United States (Gerber 
et al. 2011a, 2013; Hibbing et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et 
al. 2010), Uruguay (Mondak et al. 2010, 2011), and Venezuela (Mondak et al. 2010, 2011). My 
mediation analyses can build on past research about the effects of personality traits on political 
participation.  
I discuss my specific expectations in Chapter 6, but for now I outline my general 
approach to crafting hypotheses. One key is to consider multiple consequences of political 
support, including turnout, campaigning, and contact with public officials between elections. 
Furthermore, as indicated above, I develop expectations by drawing on extant research and my 
own work on personality and support as well as previous studies on the connections between 
support and behavior. Past research, for example, has identified positive effects of openness on 
democratic support (e.g., Marcus et al. 1995; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016), and democratic 
support on political behavior (e.g., Karp and Milazzo 2015; Norris 2011). Based on such 
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evidence, I expect attitudes toward regime principles to mediate the relationship between 
openness and political participation.
54
  
 My application of the mediation hypothesis builds on the extant literature in three ways.
55
 
One contribution is to identify unconventional paths from personality to political participation 
via political support. Past studies, for example, have reported positive total and indirect effects of 
openness and extraversion on citizen engagement (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010; Schoen 
and Steinbrecher 2013), but I expect both trait dimensions to exert negative effects on behavior 
through political trust. This expectation derives from prior research on the personality–trust link 
(e.g., Cawvey et al. n.d.; Mondak et al. 2017), prior research on the support–participation link 
(e.g., Hooghe and Marien 2013; Karp and Milazzo 2015), and my own work on the personality–
trust link. In addition, I build on extant research by examining the mediational role of democratic 
support. Past work on the mediation hypothesis and political support has been confined to the 
actor and institutional levels (Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013; Wang 2016).
56
 Thirdly, I consider a 
wider array of behavioral outcomes than previous mediation studies in the political support 
literature. Wang has investigated candidate vote choice, a behavior closely related to political 
support attitudes, and Schoen and Steinbrecher’s study focuses on turnout. By contrast, I 
incorporate multiple forms of conventional political participation, such as voting and contacting 
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 Of course, the connection between democratic support—or any other measure of political support—and behavior 
could be reciprocal or reversed, but attitudes such as political support and civic duty may constitute the only 
motivations for citizens to participate in politics due to the time and monetary costs of involvement and the low 
probability of playing the decisive role in an outcome.  Another concern would be that the relationship between 
political support and behavior is spurious. Appendix I accounts for such a possibility by controlling for known 
correlates of participation—including sociodemographic information and political interest (e.g., Brady et al. 1995; 
Valentino et al. 2013)—in models that focus on the relationship between political support and political participation.   
55
 I should note that scholars have emphasized the difficulty of conducting mediation analyses on experimental and 
nonexperimental data (e.g., Bullock et al. 2010). Such concerns are less pertinent for personality traits given their 
high levels of heritability (e.g., Riemann et al. 1997) and early manifestation in life (e.g., Ehrler et al. 1999), which 
indicate that psychological characteristics precede and influence attitudes such as political support. 
56
 The particular forms of support in these two studies are executive job approval (Wang 2016) and external efficacy 
toward political institutions (Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). As mentioned in a previous footnote, other studies 
have incorporated external efficacy mediators but have not exclusively measured evaluations of governmental 





 Non-support research on the mediation hypothesis also has included 
conventional actions such as turnout, working for a party, and donating money (e.g., Blais and 
St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). I examine a wide 
range of behavioral outcomes in order to address the general psychological and attitudinal roots 
of the low rates of participation (e.g., Booth and Seligson 2009; Gerber et al. 2011) that threaten 
the ability of citizens to address societal problems, represent their interests, and hold elected 
officials accountable (Norris 2011; Putnam 2000; Schedler 1999; Tocqueville 2013).  
The Integrated Model 
In response to empirical gaps in the personality and support literature, this chapter has 
offered a theoretical framework connecting traits and support attitudes and highlighting the 
practical relevance of this relationship for participation in public life. Figure 2.3 depicts the 
model, which combines trait activation theory and the mediation hypothesis. Consistent with 
TAT, weak situations may send trait-relevant cues and thereby activate personality traits, which 
then influence political support. In turn, attitudes toward the political system affect behavior and 
mediate the relationship between personality and outcomes such as citizen participation.
58,59
  
The model in Figure 2.3 suggests several implications, which I address in the next four 
chapters. Chapter 3 examines the direct effects of personality on attitudes toward the political 
system. The goal of that chapter is to demonstrate the utility of TAT for understanding the  
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 Other mediation studies related to political support have examined various conventional and unconventional 
behaviors (Ribeiro and Borba 2016; Russo and Amnå 2016, n.d.; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), but none uses a 
mediating variable that solely measures political support. I limit my attention to conventional activities in order to 
test all of the hypotheses in Chapter 6. 
58
 I concentrate on political participation in the interest of simplicity and due to the political focus of the mediation 
hypothesis (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012). Nevertheless, future research could consider 
alternative behavioral outcomes, for studies have investigated the relationship between political support and 
compliance with the law (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999b; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tankebe 2009; Tyler 1990, 2005) 
and the relationship between political support and participation in civil society (Norris 1999b). 
59
 It is also possible for political support to mediate the relationship between a trait–situation interaction and citizen 



























impact of personality within and across the levels of political support. Therefore, I offer and test 
hypotheses about the effects of the Big Five on attitudes toward political actors, regime 
institutions, regime performance, regime principles, and the political community.  
Meanwhile, the next two chapters investigate how personality interacts with political, 
economic, and social threat to affect political support. Much of the TAT literature relies on 
perceptual measures of one’s context,
60
 so Chapter 4 examines how subjective contextual factors 
moderate the influence of personality on support. Then, in Chapter 5, I show that the Big Five 
also interact with objective contextual variables to influence attitudes toward the political 
system.
61
 Both chapters specify and empirically examine hypotheses derived from trait activation 
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 Examples include Botero and Van Dyne (2009), Colbert and Witt (2009), and Premeaux and Bedeian (2003). 
61
 There are reasons to consider both the objective and subjective contexts. As I note below, objective contextual 
factors avoid the possibility of contextual measures simply being a function of one’s personality traits; such a 






Figure 2.3 Integrated Model for Personality, Support, and Behavior 
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Note: “Target” refers to a target of political support, such as a political actor. Figure 2.3 was adapted from Tett’s 
work on trait activation theory (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000). 
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theory about political support at multiple levels of Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework. My results 
suggest that inconsistent direct effects of personality on support in previous studies are 
attributable to samples being drawn from distinct contexts. I thus demonstrate the utility of trait 
activation theory for studying formal interactions between personality characteristics and aspects 
of an individual’s environment. 
Finally, Chapter 6 considers the relevance of the personality–support relationship for 
citizen behavior. Building on current applications of the mediation hypothesis, I show that 
personality influences support attitudes, which in turn affect various modes of conventional 
political participation. I thus document some of the mechanisms by which personality promotes 
citizen competence. My results also indicate the potential of political elites and political 
organizations to raise support levels and increase participation rates by targeting messages to the 












                                                                                                                                                             
personality traits and personality traits influencing behaviors and attitudes. Citizens, however, may not obtain 




THE DIRECT LINK FROM PERSONALITY TO POLITICAL SUPPORT 
 
As noted in previous chapters, the personality literature has not offered a comprehensive 
account of the psychological roots of political support. Researchers typically hypothesize about 
specific attitudes, such as political tolerance (Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016) and external 
efficacy (Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). Although such studies provide meaningful answers to 
particular questions about political support, the best theories explain a variety of observations 
about the social world (Lave and March 1975).
62
 Research exclusively on personality and 
political tolerance, for example, would miss the opportunity to determine whether results 
generalize to other democratic attitudes or attitudes at other levels of support, such as regime 
institutions. Without a general theory, scholars cannot achieve integrative cumulation by 
incorporating existing findings into a coherent framework that identifies when trait effects will 
be consistent and inconsistent within as well as across levels of political support (Zinnes 1976).  
Interesting questions also go unanswered in the absence of a comprehensive model 
encompassing multiple attitudes toward the political system. More than 15 years ago, Norris 
(1999a) identified a group of citizens who embrace democratic principles but remain skeptical of 
regime institutions and performance. Who exactly are these “disenchanted democrats” or 
“critical citizens”? Which personality characteristics do these individuals tend to have? 
Conversely, why would some citizens trust democratic institutions but nevertheless be open to 
transitions to authoritarianism?
63
 Could the same personality trait be linked to both attitudes?  
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 I should note that some of the work on personality and support is not primarily interested in attitudes toward the 
political system, so pursuing a general theory of political support is not always appropriate for particular studies. 
Schoen and Steinbrecher (2013), for instance, focus on the impact of personality, external efficacy, and other 
political attitudes on electoral turnout. 
63
 Individuals with such seemingly contradictory attitudes constitute a sizeable portion of the public. For example, of 
all respondents in the 24 countries under analysis in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, 22.27 percent expressed a 
positive level of presidential trust but felt that a military coup would be permissible in at least one of three scenarios: 
a high level of unemployment, crime, or corruption.  
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Answers to these questions are more than academic, for they carry important implications 
for the communication strategies of political elites. Armed with knowledge of the personality–
support relationship, politicians and nongovernmental organizations could tailor messages to 
voters with particular personality characteristics in order to counteract the tendencies of the 
traditionally disaffected or reinforce the views of individuals who are inclined to support 
political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, regime principles, and the political 
community. By influencing support levels, targeted communications could facilitate political 
participation and enable more citizens to work together to address societal problems, represent 
their interests, and hold elected officials accountable. 
In this chapter I begin to answer these questions and fill this theoretical gap by applying 
trait activation theory (TAT) (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000) to the study of 
personality and political support. As Chapter 2 emphasized, TAT provides a general model for 
understanding personality effects on a variety of outcomes,
64
 including attitudes toward the 
political system. The model claims that traits influence attitudes and actions only in the presence 
of trait-relevant cues in weak situations.
65
 Such signals originate from numerous sources, 
including the political and economic context as well as the political support opportunity itself. 
Examples in the former category include the level of corruption and national economic 
performance, and I will explore formal interactions between traits and the environment in 
Chapters 4 and 5. For now I concentrate on trait-relevant cues contained within the support 
opportunity in order to study the direct effects of personality on attitudes toward the political 
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 Personality constitutes an important antecedent of political support and other outcomes because of the high levels 
of heritability (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; Riemann et al. 1997) and longitudinal stability (e.g., Costa and McCrae 1988; 
Rantanen et al. 2007) associated with psychological traits. 
65
 As noted in the previous chapter, most survey items present individuals with weak situations due to the range of 
choice in the survey question and the absence of coercion by the survey administrator. I thus focus on trait-relevant 
cues in the present chapter. 
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system. Targets within the same level of support (e.g., commitment to the democratic principles 
of political tolerance and checks and balances) and across levels of support (e.g., regime 
principles and regime performance) differ from one another in meaningful ways and may send 
alternative signals to individuals. At other times, objects may communicate similar trait-relevant 
cues (e.g., actor trust and actor job approval), and cross-situational consistency (Tett and 
Guterman 2000) would predict homogenous direct effects for personality. The goal of this 
chapter, then, is to utilize TAT in order to understand when personality effects will be consistent 
and inconsistent across different targets of support. 
I pursue this goal for a comprehensive number of targets. To date, published research has 
not examined the impact of personality on regime performance, nor has the personality literature 
investigated the full range of the other levels of support. I examine all levels of support and 
multiple domains within each level.   
My case selection also contributes to scholarship on personality and political support. 
Most researchers in the literature concentrate on economically affluent countries (e.g., Marcus et 
al. 1995; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013; Voortman 2009), but I employ a cross-national dataset 
of developing and developed countries to assess the generalizability of previous findings as well 
as my own findings from three U.S. surveys.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I utilize trait activation theory to 
specify my expectations for each of the Big Five both within and across the levels of Norris’ 
(1999a, 2011) framework. Second, I introduce the various data sources and discuss the 
operationalization of key concepts. Third, I report my empirical results connecting personality 
and political support. Fourth, I conclude by summarizing the discussion and highlighting the 
implications of my findings for elite political communication.  
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The Big Five and Political Support: Expectations 
Trait activation theory recognizes that personality traits are tendencies that operate within 
contextual environments. Two aspects of the situation are especially vital for TAT: the strength 
of the situation and the presence of trait-relevant cues. When the situation is strong due to 
legislative restrictions and other limitations in the environment (Mischel 1973; Tett and Burnett 
2003), individuals high and low in a trait generally will respond in similar ways. Political support 
opportunities, however, tend to generate weak situations because respondents are offered a range 
of choices and because survey administrators rarely coerce individuals to select a particular 
response option. At the same time, characteristics of the political support opportunity may or 
may not contain relevant cues for a particular trait dimension, and trait-relevant cues—and trait 
effects—can differ from one political support opportunity to another due to fundamental 
dissimilarities in the characteristics of a level of support or domain of support.  
Consider two examples of the unique characteristics of political support opportunities. 
First, democratic support differs from procedural support because the former refers to the 
endorsement of ideals and the latter to the effectiveness with which those ideals are implemented 
(Klingemann 1999). Secondly, the democratic creed promotes political tolerance as well as 
checks and balances, but the former deals with unpopular groups in society and the latter with 
branches of government. Consequences associated with the two democratic principles also could 
differ. Supporting checks and balances can preserve order among political elites, but the results 
of political tolerance are more indeterminate. Many citizens may be concerned about political 
dissidents becoming violent, but the peaceful exercise of democratic rights also could stifle 
efforts for more aggressive forms of protest behavior.  
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At the same time, not all political support opportunities are different from one another. 
Some support attitudes share similar characteristics, such as the same target (e.g., actor trust and 
actor affect) or domain (e.g., actor trust and institutional trust).   
Given such differences and similarities, we should expect divergent situations to emit 
divergent trait-relevant cues and produce heterogeneous trait effects, and analogous situations to 
send analogous signals and result in homogeneous trait effects. In other words, we should 
observe cross-situational consistency (Tett and Guterman 2000). For political support, I expect 
personality effects to be similar both within and across the actor, institutional, and performance 
levels because of the connection between these levels and instrumental evaluations of the status 
quo (Klingemann 1999). Political actors and institutions can be fair or unfair in the 
administration of the law, kind or unkind to the public, receptive or unreceptive to citizen input, 
and effective or ineffective in performing such duties as implementing democratic principles or 
promoting economic growth.
66
 Members of the public observe the level of trustworthiness, 
likeability, responsiveness, and effectiveness of the political status quo for the instrumental 
purpose of deciding how to vote or whether to support changes to the country’s institutions and 
procedures.
67
 The common connection to instrumental evaluations indicates that individuals may 
receive the same trait-relevant cues from actor, institutional, and procedural support 
opportunities. Consistent trait effects across levels, therefore, should be the norm. Meanwhile, 
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 Examples of job effectiveness were apparent in a recent Freedom House (2015) report on Brazil. On the issue of 
economic performance, the report noted that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff won re-election in 2014 in spite of 
poor economic conditions. Regarding democratic performance, Freedom House praised the passage of a law 
protecting Internet rights but criticized Brazilian officials for abusing citizens and journalists during protests 
connected with the 2014 World Cup. 
67
 For example, Venezuela switched from a bicameral to unicameral legislature in the aftermath of low levels of 
political support in the 1990s. In addition, studies have reported lower levels of pro-incumbent voting when citizens 
have low levels of political trust (Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 2006; Hetherington 1999), less affect for the 
incumbent than the challenger (Wang 2016), negative views about the incumbent’s job effectiveness (Wang 2016), 
and negative views about external efficacy (Craig et al. 2006). See Southwell (2012) for opposing evidence on the 
relationship between external efficacy and vote choice. 
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the domains for each level of support all revolve around instrumental evaluations of the target 
and thus should produce consistent trait effects within each level of support. Citizens can assess 
actors and institutions in terms of their trustworthiness, effectiveness, likeability, and 
responsiveness, and regime performance attitudes consist of overall and principle-specific 
evaluations of democratic effectiveness.
68
  
Meanwhile, regime principles and the political community contrast with political actors, 
regime institutions, and regime performance in fundamental ways. The purpose of support at the 
more general levels is not instrumental but idealistic and expressive. Attitudes toward democracy 
entail a moral endorsement or rejection of regime principles, and patriotism and national 
identification require citizens to express their level of national affection and affiliation 
(Klingemann 1999). An individual also encounters different societal norms for democratic and 
community support than for attitudes toward the status quo, with the public strongly favoring the 
political community and democracy in the abstract (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2012; Klingemann 1999); 
inconsistently endorsing specific democratic principles (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 1991; Oskarsson 
and Widmalm 2016); and anemically approving of actors, institutions, and procedures (e.g., 
Citrin 1974; Dalton 1999).
69
  
The distinct norms and purposes of democratic and community support indicate that these 
levels contain unique trait-relevant cues that could activate different personality traits or produce 
results in the opposite direction from the findings for actors, institutions, or procedures. A 
potential case in point is conscientiousness: This trait dimension is sensitive to issues of order 
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 Procedural support thus relates most strongly to the actor and institutional domain of job effectiveness. 
69
 Many of these norms are documented by Klingemann (1999), who reports in a cross-national study of mid-1990s 
survey data that (1) community support ranged from a national average of 62 percent in Asia to a national average of 
73 percent in Africa and Oceania, (2) abstract support for democracy ranged from a national average of 81 percent 
in Eastern Europe to a national average of 90 percent in Western Europe, and (3) support for regime performance 
ranged from a national average of 20 percent in Eastern Europe to a national average of 38 percent in Asia. 
56 
 
and duty (John et al. 2008) and may be activated in response to community support opportunities 
due to societal norms in favor of patriotism and national identification. I would expect a positive 
relationship between conscientiousness and community support. Meanwhile, order and duty may 
be less important for actor, institutional, and procedural support because of the sustainability of 
democracy amid socially approved criticism of the status quo (Citrin 1974; Dalton 1999; 
Klingemann 1999).  
Finally, I apply the hypothesis of cross-situational consistency within the regime 
principle level and within the community level. The democratic creed consists of political 
tolerance, checks and balances, and other ideals (Carlin and Singer 2001; Norris 1999a, 2011), 
which could convey heterogeneous trait-relevant cues and produce heterogeneous trait effects for 
democratic support. For example, facets of conscientiousness include orderliness, so this trait 
dimension could be negatively related to political tolerance because of the possibility of violent 
demonstrations by political dissidents and positively related to support for checks and balances 
because of the orderly decision-making associated with inter-branch accountability.  
In contrast to heterogeneous trait effects within the regime principle level, I expect to 
observe consistent results for national identification and patriotism because of commonalities 
between these two community attitudes. Both domains involve self-expression (Klingemann 
1999) regarding a person’s national affiliation or love for country. In addition, patriotism is an 
emotion-laden concept by definition, and national identification requires affective commitment 
to one’s country (Roccas et al. 2008). The affective and expressive character of patriotism and 
national identification imply that the two domains will send comparable trait-relevant cues, 





Table 3.1 summarizes my expectations for cross-situational consistency. Having 
reviewed the impact of personality in general terms, I now discuss specific hypotheses for the 
Big Five by taking into account the trait-relevant cues associated with the level of support and 
domain of support under consideration. I begin with attitudes toward actors, institutions, and 
procedures and then examine democratic support and community support. 
Connecting the Big Five with Actor, Institutional, and Procedural Support 
Citizens evaluate the political status quo on the basis of trustworthiness, effectiveness, 
affect, and responsiveness. Each of these domains could communicate distinctive trait-relevant 
cues to the public, but they all involve instrumental assessments (Klingemann 1999) that 
influence whether citizens vote for incumbent political actors or endorse changes to regime 
institutions or procedures. I thus expect a large—but not universal—degree of homogeneity in 
trait effects across and within these levels of support. The rest of this subsection reviews my 
hypotheses for the Big Five in general terms and notes when a domain might convey unique 
trait-relevant cues and produce divergent personality effects on support at the three most 
concrete levels in Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework. I anticipate the most consistent signals and 
results for agreeableness and emotional stability, so I start with these two trait dimensions. 
Level Trait Effects within Level Trait Effects across Levels
Political Actors Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects
Regime Institutions Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects
Regime Performance Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects
Regime Principles Heterogeneous Trait Effects Different Trait Effects Than 
Other Levels of Support 
Political Community Homogeneous Trait Effects Different Trait Effects Than 
Other Levels of Support 
Table 3.1
Hypotheses on Cross-Situational Consistency
Trait Effects Broadly Similar for 
Actor, Institutional, and 
Performance Levels of Support
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For agreeableness, the opportunity to support the political status quo should activate 
facets such as trust, warmth, sympathy, and generosity and produce positive trait effects. 
Political trust items are especially relevant for the first facet on this list, and extant research has 
identified a positive link between agreeableness and confidence in political actors and 
institutions (Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Cawvey et al. n.d.; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et 
al. 2017; Sweetser 2014). Given the results on political trust and facets such as sympathy and 
generosity (John et al. 2008), we might expect highly agreeable citizens to interpret news about 
political actors, regime institutions, and regime performance in the best possible light and to 
express high levels of support in the domains of job effectiveness, external efficacy, and 
likeability. The agreeableness facet of warmth further suggests a positive relationship between 
this trait dimension and political affect. Consistent with my argument about non-trust domains, 
researchers have found that citizens high in agreeableness tend to express greater levels of 
external efficacy (Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Mondak and Halperin 2008) and presidential 
approval (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Wang 2016). I extend this research by examining the 
impact of agreeableness on regime performance, affect toward political actors and institutions, 
and perceived job effectiveness on particular issues. 
Likewise, I expect homogeneous effects for emotional stability on actor, institutional, and 
procedural attitudes. These support opportunities should activate emotional stability facets 
pertaining to a person’s level of insecurity and anxiety due to the basic uncertainty of the 
political status quo. Politicians may present themselves as trustworthy, effective, likeable, and 
responsive during a political campaign, but citizens do not know how challengers will govern 
until they take office or how incumbents will behave if they are re-elected.
70
 And between 
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 Scholars have examined several questions pertaining to voter uncertainty, such as whether incumbents are more 
corrupt in their final term in office (Ferraz and Finan 2010) and whether incumbents eligible for re-election preside 
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elections, questions will arise about the fairness of bureaucrats, the amiability of the executive 
during press conferences, the sensitivity of legislators to their constituents, and the competence 
of incumbents to manage the economy or implement democratic principles. Uncertainties such as 
these constitute trait-relevant cues for emotional stability and should facilitate a positive 
relationship between this trait dimension and actor, institutional, and procedural support as 
individuals low in this trait worry about ongoing and potential problems and individuals high in 
this trait express their positive, relaxed outlook about the political status quo. Extant research, 
mostly on trust, generally supports my hypothesis of a positive effect for emotional stability 
(e.g., Cawvey et al. n.d.; Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Mondak et al. 2017).
71,72 
In contrast to agreeableness and emotional stability, I expect heterogeneity in the impact 
of openness and extraversion on actor, institutional, and procedural support. For openness, trait-
relevant cues could center on the tension between the status quo and ideal preferences. Idealism 
and imagination constitute facets of openness (John et al. 2008), and people high in this trait 
dimension seek to improve the status quo in their personal life by, for example, changing jobs 
(Timmerman 2006) and emigrating to another country (Canache et al. 2013). Based on such 
tendencies, we might expect the highly open to be disappointed with the extent to which 
governmental trustworthiness, likeability, and effectiveness often fall short of ideal preferences 
(Mondak et al. 2017). Citizens high in openness also value ideas and therefore may be 
disappointed when regime performance falls short of democratic principles such as the free 
                                                                                                                                                             
over stronger economies  (Alt et al. 2011). The answer to both questions is yes, but that does not mean the 
relationship between term limits and trustworthiness or the relationship between term limits and job effectiveness is 
perfect.  
71
 Two exceptions are Schoen and Steinbrecher (2013), who study external efficacy, and Mondak and Halperin 
(2008), who study political trust, external efficacy, and overall job evaluations. No study of which I am aware has 
examined the impact of emotional stability on political affect or issue-specific evaluations of job effectiveness. 
72
 The personality literature also supports my expectation for emotional stability and likeability evaluations of 
political actors and institutions, as studies outside of political science have found that individuals low in emotional 
stability are less likely to exhibit positive affect and more likely to exhibit negative affect (Costa and McCrae 1980; 
David et al. 1997; Schimmack et al. 2002a, 2002b).  
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exchange of information. Consistent with my argument, several studies have reported a negative 
relationship between openness and political trust (Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Cawvey et al. n.d.; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2017; Sweetser 2014). Research on other forms of 
support is fairly minimal, although Mondak and Halperin (2008) find negative openness effects 
for presidential approval. I thus expect a negative relationship between openness on one hand 
and political trust, perceived job effectiveness, and political affect on the other. 
The main exception for the relationship between openness and support pertains to 
perceived governmental responsiveness to public opinion and activism. We know that highly 
open citizens tend to participate in politics (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010), so external 
efficacy opportunities may activate not only the idealism, innovation, and ideas facets, but the 
adventurousness and action facets as well. With the latter characteristics at work, individuals 
high in openness may hold that democratic progress is possible not with elite actors and 
institutions alone but instead with the involvement of concerned citizens. A positive relationship 
between openness and external efficacy, therefore, may occur.  
Meanwhile, I expect opportunities to support actors, institutions, and procedures to 
activate extraversion because of trait-relevant cues pertaining to a citizen’s relationship with the 
political status quo. In many cases, this connection will seem distant, impersonal, and therefore 
undesirable for the highly extraverted, who value warmth and social interaction (John et al. 2008; 
Mondak et al. 2017). Citizens rarely socialize with political elites, and the public’s relationship 
with institutions and procedures is even more remote. In the absence of a strong, personal link to 
the political status quo, extraverts could express less political trust and lower evaluations of job 
effectiveness. Consistent with my argument, studies have reported negative effects for 
extraversion on political trust (Cawvey et al. n.d.; Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Mondak et al. 
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2017; Sweetser 2014) and perceived job effectiveness (Wang 2016). I also expect a negative 
relationship between extraversion and issue-specific job approval ratings. 
As with political trust and job effectiveness attitudes, survey items on external efficacy 
could prompt citizens to consider their connections with political actors and institutions. The 
unique aspect of external efficacy, however, is the role of citizen input in evaluations of the 
status quo. Questions on governmental responsiveness thus could activate the extraversion facets 
of energy and activity, each of which may be required to change the political status quo. Indeed, 
political behavior research reveals that extraverts are more likely to engage in such activities as 
contacting officials and attending rallies (e.g., Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). The 
involvement of citizens inherent in external efficacy thus could override any negative attitudes 
harbored by extraverts toward political actors and institutions. In sum, I expect a positive 
relationship between extraversion and external efficacy, as reported in studies with U.S. and 
European data (Anderson 2010a; Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). 
I build on prior work by examining a cross-national sample as well as three U.S. samples. 
In addition to external efficacy, unique trait-relevant cues could influence the impact of 
extraversion on political affect. Previous studies have reported a positive relationship between 
extraversion and non-political affect (Costa and McCrae 1980; David et al. 1997; Schimmack et 
al. 2002a, 2002b). Costa and McCrae (1980) explain this connection by emphasizing the warmth 
associated with the extraversion facet of sociability and the elation associated with the 
extraversion facet of activity, and John and his colleagues (2008) identify positive emotions and 
warmth as two of the facets of extraversion. If results travel to the political realm, extraverts may 
be able to overlook their distrust and low job evaluations of actors and institutions and instead 
express their tendencies toward positive emotions, elation, and warmth by focusing on the 
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affective aspect of pertinent survey questions. A positive relationship between extraversion and 
political affect, therefore, is possible.  
At this point, a brief discussion about extraversion and procedural support is in order. 
Survey questions about regime performance refer to overall evaluations and principle-specific 
assessments about the implementation of democratic principles (e.g., checks and balances). If 
respondents receive principle-specific questions, then I expect a negative effect for extraversion 
as citizens attend to the effectiveness with which distant political actors and institutions 
implement regime ideals. However, questions about overall regime performance allow 
individuals to utilize their own criteria to define democracy (Canache 2012) and decide how 
democratic their country is. This evaluation could be based on the implementation of particular 
regime principles, but citizens also could assess other aspects of the status quo if they expect 
political actors and institutions to be more trustworthy, competent, likeable, and responsive in a 
democracy (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Canache et al. 2001). If citizens concentrate on political 
trust, the implementation of regime principles, and job effectiveness on the economy and other 
nondemocratic issues, then I anticipate a negative relationship between extraversion and overall 
democratic satisfaction based on the reasons discussed above. But extraversion could exert a 
positive impact on global support for regime performance if citizens attend to political affect or 
external efficacy. The logic underpinning the latter possibility also is mentioned above. Because 
of these contrary expectations, I am uncertain about the relationship between extraversion and 
overall democratic satisfaction. 
Finally, I offer no expectations for the impact of conscientiousness on attitudes toward 
political actors, regime institutions, and regime performance. Extant results are mixed, with a 
combination of positive, negative, and insignificant results (Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Cawvey et 
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al. n.d.; Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2017; 
Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013; Swami et al. 2012; Sweetser 
2014; Voortman 2009). In addition, there are few theoretical reasons to expect trait activation in 
a direct effects model. Although individuals high in conscientiousness value dutifulness and 
order (John et al. 2008; Mondak et al. 2017), facets such as these may be irrelevant for actor, 
institutional, and procedural attitudes since modern democracies have persisted in spite of 
societal norms critical of the status quo (Citrin 1974; Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999). Weak or 
inconsistent conscientiousness effects would be a natural result. 
Connecting the Big Five with Democratic Support 
The next step is to consider the impact of personality on attitudes toward regime 
principles. Because democracy is a multifaceted concept and because some individuals embrace 
all aspects of democracy while others are more selective (Carlin and Singer 2011; Norris 1999a), 
we should not be surprised to find heterogeneous trait effects within this level of support, which 
encompasses one’s basic preference for democracy as well as specific opinions on governmental 
authority, checks and balances, mass participation, and political tolerance (Carlin and Singer 
2011; Norris 1999a). In addition, the direction of personality effects for democratic support may 
differ substantially from results for the actor, institutional, and procedural levels since attitudes 
toward regime principles focus on ideals instead of instrumental evaluations (Klingemann 1999) 
and since individuals encounter different societal norms for democratic attitudes than status quo 
attitudes. In other words, trait-relevant cues for democratic support may diverge substantially 
from the signals conveyed at more concrete levels.  
I begin with openness and emotional stability because I anticipate homogeneous effects 
for these traits on democratic support. Individuals high in openness are attracted to ideas, 
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idealism, and intellectual pursuits and therefore should consistently value the unfettered 
exchange of political ideas in a democracy. Unchecked executive power, military coups during 
turbulent societal circumstances, and suppression of minority rights and mass participation all 
undermine the free-expression goals of highly open citizens. I thus expect democratic support 
opportunities to convey trait-relevant cues that activate openness and thereby produce a positive 
and consistent personality effect on all domains of support at the regime principle level. Existing 
evidence is limited to political tolerance and support for criminal rights, but results clearly 
support my hypothesis about openness and democratic support (Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and 
Halperin 2008; Mondak and Hurwitz 2012; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Swami et al. 2012).  
Like openness, I anticipate a consistently positive relationship between emotional 
stability and democratic support. Individuals high in this trait dimension tend to be calm and 
exhibit low levels of anxiety and generally positive affect (Costa and McCrae 1980; David et al. 
1997; Schimmack et al. 2002a, 2002b)—attributes that should encourage receptiveness to 
democracy even during a crisis. The emotionally stable should not worry about minority groups 
becoming violent or mass participation leading to societal chaos, nor should they be susceptible 
to elite arguments about the need for authoritarian “solutions” to societal problems. In other 
words, the positive anticipated relationship between emotional stability and pro-democracy 
attitudes should apply to all domains within the regime principle level of support. Empirical 
evidence remains focused on attitudes toward criminals and political minority groups, with 
mixed results (Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak and Hurwitz 2012; 
Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Swami et al. 2012). 
In contrast to openness and emotional stability, I expect the other trait dimensions to 
exert heterogeneous effects on attitudes toward democracy. For conscientiousness, trait-relevant 
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cues for democratic support are likely to appeal to a citizen’s sense of duty or order. Highly 
conscientious citizens value group norms (e.g., Bakker et al. 2016; Gallego and Oberski 2012; 
Moreno and Wals 2014; Weinschenk 2014) and therefore could support democracy in the 
abstract and embrace mass participation as well as checks and balances if such attitudes are 
popular with the public.
73
 The latter two regime principles on this list also should promote social 
cohesion and order as citizens convey their preferences to elected officials and as checks and 
balances offer political elites with peaceful outlets to settle disagreements and make decisions. 
Conscientiousness, therefore, should be positively related to some forms of democratic support.  
Meanwhile, conscientiousness may be negatively related to democratic support under 
three conditions. First, regime ideals could be unpopular with the majority of citizens, leading 
highly conscientious individuals to oppose democracy on normative grounds. One such principle 
is political tolerance. In theory, a majority of citizens could support the right of political 
minorities to express their views, but such attitudes do not always prevail in the real world (e.g., 
Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Second, the highly 
conscientious are likely to reject democratic principles in response to threats to social stability, as 
would occur if peaceful demonstrations by dissident groups become disruptive or if dissidents 
challenge status quo public policies. Concerns such as these are consistent with the tendency of 
individuals to perceive their least-liked political organization as belligerent and untrustworthy 
(Marcus et al. 1995). Such perceptions could be fueled by a negativity bias that prioritizes 
negative group characteristics over positive group characteristics (Lau 1982, 1985). A similar 
argument could be offered with regard to the rights of another minority group: criminals. Third, 
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 A majority of respondents in the 2010 AmericasBarometer endorsed democracy in the abstract, approved of mass 
participation, and supported checks and balances. In particular, the mean scores for democracy as the best system, a 
mass participation index, and a checks-and-balances index are 5.31 on a scale from 1 to 7, 22.10 on a scale from 3 to 
30, and 15.00 on a scale from 3 to 21, respectively. 
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additional information conveyed in the support opportunity could indicate a conflict between 
democratic principles and social cohesion, and highly conscientious citizens may opt for the 
latter due to their sensitivity to orderliness. Antidemocratic arguments, for example, could 
promise stable military rule as a solution to turbulent political times. Extant research on 
conscientiousness and democratic support remains focused on political tolerance and support for 
criminal rights, and results suggest a negative relationship, as expected (Mondak and Hurwitz 
2012; Swami et al. 2012).
74
 I build on prior work by examining the impact of conscientiousness 
on attitudes toward military coups, checks and balances, mass participation, and abstract 
preferences for democracy.  
Similarly, trait-relevant cues for extraversion could vary across the domains of 
democratic support. On one hand, extraverts may be more likely to endorse popularly held 
attitudes toward regime principles, such as abstract preferences for democracy and specific 
attitudes about checks and balances and mass participation.
75
 The normative component of these 
attitudes should activate the sociability facet of extraversion and produce positive trait effects on 
democratic support as extraverts seek to avoid social sanctions and maintain good relationships 
with their network of family and friends. On the other hand, extraverts are assertive and therefore 
may support military coups during difficult circumstances and forceful, authoritarian responses 
to political dissidents and criminals. Consistent with my argument, studies have identified 
negative effects of extraversion on political tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995; Oskarsson and 
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 A majority of respondents in the 2010 AmericasBarometer supported democracy in the abstract; mass 
participation; and checks and balances between the executive on one hand and opposition parties, the legislature, 





 I expand on past research by examining abstract democratic support and other 
specific regime principles, such as mass participation and checks and balances.  
Lastly, I anticipate that agreeableness will exert heterogeneous effects on democratic 
support. Individuals high in this trait dimension tend to be sociable, compliant, and trusting and 
thus may be receptive to popular democratic principles as well as democratic ideals that promote 
problem-solving and public order. Meanwhile, an agreeable person’s penchants for compliance 
and consensus could increase susceptibility to elite arguments that subvert democratic principles 
in order to avoid crisis and preserve societal unity. The key question, then, is whether the support 
opportunity touches on cohesion and popular democratic ideals or whether the item refers to 
compliance in order to avoid societal chaos. The first option should facilitate a positive 
relationship between agreeableness and democratic support while the second option likely would 
have the opposite effect if individuals are asked to exchange nondemocratic measures for public 
tranquility. For example, agreeable individuals may oppose the rights of potentially violent 
political dissidents but endorse civil rights for the majority as well as abstract (and popular) 
measures of democratic support. Past work on agreeableness and democratic support focuses on 
political tolerance and criminal rights (Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016; Swami et al. 2012) but 
uncovers a positive relationship that contradicts my hypothesis. I revisit this relationship with 
data from two surveys and add to the literature by examining the other domains of democratic 
support. 
Connecting the Big Five with Support for the Political Community 
The most general level in Norris’ (1999a) framework is the political community. Trait-
relevant cues for this level of support likely center on societal norms in favor of patriotism and 
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national identification as well as the opportunity for citizens to express their affection and 
affiliation with their country (Jenkins et al. 2012; Klingemann 1999). Such signals diverge from 
the inconsistent norms and idealistic purpose for democratic attitudes and the anti-status quo 
norms and instrumental purpose for actor, institutional, and procedural attitudes (Klingemann 
1999; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Unique trait-relevant cues for community support would 
indicate that the impact of the Big Five on patriotism and national identification will differ in 
meaningful ways from the patterns discussed for the other levels. Moreover, I expect consistent 
within-level effects for community support since patriotism and national identification refer to a 
citizen’s emotional attachment to his or her country (Roccas et al. 2008). 
 I anticipate effects for each of the Big Five on community support. First, I expect 
openness to exert a negative impact on patriotism and national identification. The emotional and 
expressive character of community support may appeal to the feelings facet of openness, but a 
negative trait effect should occur because highly open individuals are also imaginative, 
innovative, and adventurous and therefore may be hesitant to express traditional, popular 
attitudes on love for country and national affiliation. Instead, people high in openness might 
develop an interest in supranational or global identification (Jenkins et al. 2012) due to their 
greater acceptance of risk (Booth-Kewley and Vickers 1994; Schmitt et al. 2004) and more 
favorable intercultural attitudes (Dinesen et al. 2016; Gallego and Pardos-Prado 2014; Stürmer et 
al. 2013).
77
 Extant results in favor of this argument, however, are minimal: Although openness 
increases the probability of identifying as a global citizen, studies with student samples have 
found an insignificant relationship between this trait and national identification (Jenkins et al. 
2012; Sagiv et al. 2012). I utilize nationally representative samples to examine the impact of 
openness on both national identification and patriotism. 
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 See Dahlen and White (2006) for contrary evidence on the impact of openness on risk-taking. 
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Meanwhile, high levels of conscientiousness should promote favorable attitudes toward 
the political community because of societal norms in support of patriotism and national 
identification. Trait activation is highly probable given that community support entails 
submission to political norms (Roccas et al. 2008) and given that highly conscientious 
individuals value duty and are sensitive to group expectations (e.g., Bakker et al. 2016; Gallego 
and Oberski 2012; Moreno and Wals 2014; Weinschenk 2014). In addition, national 
identification constitutes a traditional form of political identity and therefore may appeal to the 
conscientiousness facet of order in the current age of globalization (Norris 2011). In line with my 
argument, researchers have shown that conscientiousness is positively related to national 
identification (Jenkins et al. 2012; Sagiv et al. 2012), and I would expect the same result for 
patriotism.  
The next trait is extraversion, which I expect to be positively related to community 
support. This hypothesis is based on social norms, opportunities for expression, and political 
affect. Public opinion polls have documented high levels of community support throughout the 
world (Jenkins et al. 2012; Klingemann 1999), and everyday conversations as well as elite 
rhetoric reinforce the values of patriotism and national identification.
78
 Signals about norms may 
be especially relevant for the extraversion facet of gregariousness as individuals high in this trait 
dimension seek to avoid interpersonal sanctions by articulating high levels of community 
support. In addition, opportunities to express one’s level of national identification and patriotism 
could appeal to the gregariousness facet if extraverts enjoy communicating their pro-community 
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challenger John F. Kerry. For a transcript of Obama’s speech, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-




attitudes in conversations with family and friends. Finally, community support involves an 
affective component (Roccas et al. 2008), which could appeal to the positive emotions facet of 
extraversion and contribute to extraverts reporting greater levels of patriotism and national 
identification than introverts. Consistent with this explanation, Jenkins et al. (2012) find 
extraversion to be positively correlated with national identification.
79
 I may obtain a similar 
result for patriotism. 
For agreeableness, I again anticipate a positive relationship between this trait dimension 
and community support. Two characteristics of patriotism and national identification could 
activate agreeableness and produce the positive expected effect. First, the affective component of 
community support (Roccas et al. 2008) could appeal to an individual’s sense of warmth and 
thereby signal the relevance of agreeableness for national identification and patriotism. Second, 
community support entails submission to group norms, including the expectation to love and 
affiliate strongly with one’s country (Roccas et al. 2008), and the agreeableness facet of 
compliance could encourage a positive relationship between this trait dimension and attitudes 
toward the national community (Sagiv et al. 2012). Evidence from Jenkins et al. (2012) and 
Sagiv et al. (2012) supports this hypothesis.
80
 
Lastly, emotionally stable individuals are likely to embrace the political community. I 
expect the affective component of patriotism and national identification (Roccas et al. 2008) to 
signal the relevance of emotional stability for community support, and individuals high in this 
trait dimension will express their low level of anxiety by embracing the national community, of 
which they know only a part. The foregoing argument is consistent with previous findings on 
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 The result for Jenkins et al. (2012) is not significant in a multivariate regression, however. 
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emotional stability and national identification (Jenkins et al. 2012; Sagiv et al. 2012),
81
 as well as 
studies on this trait dimension and non-political affect (Costa and McCrae 1980; David et al. 
1997; Schimmack et al. 2002a, 2002b). 
The Overall Picture 
My hypotheses and the empirical evidence documented above point to interesting 
patterns in the impact of personality on political support. First, citizens high in openness are 
expected to be more critical of political actors, regime institutions, and regime performance but 
more respectful of democratic principles. Highly open individuals correspond with Norris’ 
(1999a, 2011) “critical citizens,” as they are loyal to democracy but disappointed about the 
current state of political affairs. Their hope is for the democratic performance of actors and 
institutions to improve. Second, conscientiousness may not influence actor, institutional, and 
procedural attitudes, but the more scrupulous are more likely to support the political community 
and—in some cases—democratic principles. Third, extraverts should be responsive to group 
norms due to their sociability. As a result, they will be more supportive of the political 
community and popularly held democratic principles, but they are free to criticize impersonal 
and controversial actors, institutions, and procedures unless political affect or perceived 
responsiveness were to add unique trait-relevant cues to the equation. Extraverts also may 
oppose democratic principles when provided with opportunities to express their tendency toward 
assertiveness. Fourth, highly agreeable citizens are trusting, generous, and compliant and will 
support the current political system except when democratic principles threaten social order and 
consensus. Individuals high in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extraversion thus may be 
susceptible to arguments that promise societal tranquility or assertive leadership at the expense 
of democratic principles. Fifth, I expect the most consistently supportive citizens to be the  
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emotionally stable, for high levels of this trait dimension should minimize anxiety about political 
actors, institutions, and procedures; promote perseverance with democracy even during troubled 
times; and facilitate high levels of affect toward the political community. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the hypotheses for the Big Five discussed above. 
Investigating the Direct Link: Data and Research Design 
The argument in the previous section is general in scope and therefore should apply to 
surveys conducted in multiple countries as well as surveys from the same country that utilize 
Actor, Institutional, and 
Procedural Attitudes
Regime Principle Attitudes Community 
Attitudes
Openness Negative if trust, job 
effectiveness, or affect
Positive for all domains Negative for 
both domains
Positive if external 
efficacy
Conscientiousness No expectations Positive (negative) if domain 




Extraversion Negative if trust or job 
effectiveness




Positive if affect or 
external efficacy
Negative if domain allows for 
assertive, nondemocratic 
behavior
No expectations if 
overall procedural 
support
Agreeableness Positive for all domains Positive (negative) if domain 
promotes (opposes) popular 




Emotional Stability Positive for all domains Positive for all domains Positive for 
both domains
Table 3.2
Hypotheses for the Big Five
Note: Domains  for actors  and insti tutions  cons is t of pol i tica l  trust, perceived job effectiveness , pol i tica l  affect, and 
external  efficacy. Regime performance domains  refer to overa l l  and principle-speci fic evaluations  of democratic 
performance. For regime principles , domains  include abstract democratic support as  wel l  as  atti tudes  toward 
speci fic ideals , such as  pol i tica l  tolerance and civi l ian governance of the mi l i tary. Fina l ly, community support 
refers  to the domains  of patriotism and national  identi fication.
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different interview formats and question wordings or are conducted at different points in time. 
Consistent results from diverse data sources would indicate the ability of trait activation theory to 
offer a comprehensive account of the direct relationship between personality and political 
support, so I turn to four surveys containing Big Five items and questions about attitudes toward 
the political system. First, I incorporate the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) into 
my empirical analysis. Items in the ANES include a Big Five personality battery and questions 
about support for political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, and the political 
community. The dataset consists of individuals interviewed before and after the November 2012 
elections in the United States. A total of 5,510 individuals from all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia completed pre-election and post-election interviews, with 3,581 submitting their 
answers online and 1,929 receiving the survey in a face-to-face format. The face-to-face data 
collection effort divided the population into strata and primary sampling units (PSUs), whereas 
the entire online sample constituted its own strata and each web respondent his or her own PSU. 
To account for its complex design, the ANES recommends that analysts employ the Taylor series 
method for calculating significance tests for the full sample (DeBell 2010). I follow this method 
by specifying the full-sample variables for weight, statum, and PSU. Along with the number of 
strata and PSUs for each regression, the Taylor series method in Stata reports explained variance 
statistics for ordinary least squares regression models. Pseudo R-squared statistics are not 
reported, however. 
Second, I turn to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). This 
survey was fielded completely online before and after the 2012 U.S. elections. A total of 54,535 
individuals from all 50 states and the District of Columbia answered a core set of questions while 
subsets of individuals responded to items supplied by various researchers. The full sample 
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received items on actor and institutional support, but democratic support and personality 
questions were fielded to a subgroup of 1,000 individuals.
82
 My empirical analyses thus 
concentrate on the subsample of the CCES. The CCES does not specifically recommend the 
Taylor series method, so I employ a weight variable to estimate a nationally representative 
sample, cluster the standard errors by state, and use state fixed effects to account for state-level 
similarities and influences in respondents’ answers.
83
 State-level contextual influences may have 
been especially relevant when CCES respondents evaluated their local member of the House of 
Representatives, as opposed to more national objects of support, namely the president and 
Congress.  
Third, I employ data from the fall 2015 Department of Political Science Subject Pool at 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). Subject pool respondents were UIUC 
undergraduate students enrolled in political science courses, and instructors offered extra credit 
to incentivize participation. Subjects responded online to a series of surveys, which began with a 
background questionnaire on demographics, personality, and political attitudes and later included 
projects submitted by UIUC researchers. I submitted my own survey and have access to data 
from my questionnaire and the background questionnaire. A total of 206 students responded to 
questions on both waves about personality and political support. The empirical analyses for the 
subject pool data do not include a weight variable or cluster standard errors around a geographic 
contextual variable because neither of these variables is available.  
Although the subject pool is not representative of the U.S. population, I utilize the data 
for three reasons. First, I can compare results from a student sample to results from national 
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samples in order to estimate the generalizability of non-representative findings for the study of 
personality and support. Second, the youthfulness of my student sample does not eliminate the 
potentially causal influence of psychological traits on political attitudes, as the high recorded 
levels of heritability (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; Riemann et al. 1997) and longitudinal stability (e.g., 
Costa and McCrae 1988; Rantanen et al. 2007) for personality would suggest. The Big Five thus 
could exert a meaningful influence on political support among college students. Third, the 
subject pool contained questions on all five levels of support and thus constitutes an excellent 
data source for testing my hypotheses. 
Fourth, I examine the 2010 AmericasBarometer, a cross-national survey fielded in Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Canada, and the United States as part of the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University.
84
 The survey included a total of 43,990 respondents in 
26 countries, but the Haitian and Honduran questionnaires did not ask about the Big Five. I thus 
have data on personality and all five levels of political support from 40,642 individuals in 24 
countries.
85
 Most of the national surveys include approximately 1,500 respondents per country, 
but oversamples occurred in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador.
86
 I address the differences in 
sample size by weighting the data so that each nation’s sample contributes a value of 1,500 
individuals. I also include country fixed effects and cluster the standard errors by country in 
order to account for contextual influences and similarities in responses. 
Incorporating the AmericasBarometer enables me to assess the generalizability of my 
argument and compare my results from the United States to a more diverse set of countries. The 
nations in the AmericasBarometer differ from each other in numerous respects, such as their 
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 Surveys were conducted face-to-face except for the web-based studies in Canada and the United States. 
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 These countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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 These surveys featured 3,018, 2,482, 1,965, and 3,000 respondents, respectively. 
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level of economic development and experience with democracy. Some are affluent (e.g., Canada) 
while others possess middle-income (e.g., Brazil) or low-income (e.g., Guyana) economies.
87
 
Some emerged from dictatorship in the latter half of the twentieth century (e.g., Chile), others 
constitute longstanding democracies (e.g., the United States), and still others have adopted 




Each of the four surveys included questions about the Big Five. The shortest batteries 
occurred on the ANES and AmericasBarometer, which used the original Ten-Item Personality 
Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling et al. 2003) and a revised version of the TIPI, respectively. Each 
survey asked respondents a series of 10 questions about the extent to which a pair of words 
described their personality.
89
 The adjectives for one item focused on the socially desirable pole 
of a trait (e.g., “dependable” and “self-disciplined” for conscientiousness) while the other 
question pertained to the socially undesirable pole (e.g., “disorganized” and “careless” for 
conscientiousness).
90
 All questions utilized seven-point scales. 
The CCES, meanwhile, measured the Big Five with four questions per trait.
91
 Depending 
on the trait, one or two of these items referred to the socially undesirable pole while the others 
focused on the socially desirable pole. Individuals rated their personality on seven-point scales.  
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 In particular, the 2010 gross domestic products per capita in constant 2005 U.S. dollars for these countries were 
$36,466, $5,678, and $1,169, respectively (World Bank 2015). 
88
 According to the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2016), the United States has maintained the top democracy 
score of 10 since 1871, Chile has received a score of 8 or better since 1989, and Venezuela’s score declined from 9 
in 1991 to -3 between 2009 and 2012. 
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 Psychologists measure the Big Five with as many as 240 items in order to maximize validity and reliability, but 
lengthy batteries are not economical on surveys focused on politics (Gosling et al. 2003; Canache et al. 2013). 
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 Alternation from one pole to the other is intended to minimize the influence of acquiescence bias (Gosling et al. 
2003), which refers to the tendency to agree with a statement regardless of the substantive content. 
91
 The CCES items were selected from the Big Five Inventory (John and Srivastava 1999) by Matthew V. Hibbing 
of the University of California, Merced.   
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Finally, the subject pool measured personality in the background and project waves. I 
decided to combine data from both waves due to the longitudinal stability of personality (e.g., 
Digman 1989; Rantanen et al. 2007) and the noticeable increases in reliability for three of the 
five traits in the subject pool data. In particular, shifting from three items per trait in the 
background wave to five items per trait between both waves raised the Cronbach’s alphas from 
0.44 to 0.62 for conscientiousness, 0.55 to 0.65 for openness, and 0.56 to 0.64 for agreeableness. 
The other traits experienced relatively minor reductions in reliability: 0.79 to 0.74 for 
extraversion and 0.68 to 0.67 for emotional stability.
92
  
With regard to measurement, the subject pool presented respondents with an 11-point 
scale anchored on one end with a socially desirable adjective and on the other end with a socially 
undesirable adjective. The pole with the socially desirable adjective differed from question to 
question.  
Question wordings for the personality items in this study are located in Appendix A. 
The four datasets reveal a tendency toward socially desirable responding. Individuals 
prefer to portray themselves as open to new experiences, conscientious, sociable, agreeable, and 
emotionally stable, and a majority of respondents placed themselves on the socially desirable 
side of the scale for 52 of the 65 total personality questions in the ANES, CCES, subject pool, 
and AmericasBarometer. The evidence indicates that simple, additive personality scales would 
not place adequate weight on shifts away from the most preferred response (Mondak 2010). 
Given social pressures, the willingness to answer “6” instead of “7” on an item about sympathy 
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and warmth, for example, probably indicates a much greater reduction in agreeableness than 
moving from “2” to “1” on a seven-point scale.   
I followed a multistep procedure to address socially desirable responding. I first reverse-
coded the personality items referring to high levels of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability. Secondly, I logged all of the personality items for a 
particular trait. These two steps increased the importance of shifts at the socially desirable 
extreme (i.e., a difference of 0.69 in all surveys) and minimized the magnitude of changes at the 
socially undesirable extreme (i.e., a difference of 0.15 on a seven-point scale and 0.10 on an 
eleven-point scale). After logging the variables, I added the items for each trait, reversed the 
coding, and finally rescaled the variables to run from approximately 0 to approximately 1.
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Higher values for the personality indices refer to greater levels of openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability. 
The aforementioned procedure resulted in moderately reliable personality indices. As 
noted above, the Cronbach’s alphas for the five-item subject pool variables range from 0.62 to 
0.74. For the CCES, the Cronbach’s alphas for the logged Big Five items all exceed 0.69. The 
reliability estimates are noticeably lower for the logged items in the ANES and 
AmericasBarometer, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.57 or below, but the correlations between the 
logged items for each trait dimension range from 0.16 to 0.37 and are all significant at the 0.001 
level.
94
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 I use the word “approximately” in part because the minimum observed score is actually 0.00000000197. In 
addition, two personality scales in the CCES and all personality scales in the subject pool failed to range from the 
minimum possible score to 1. The greater number of personality items in the CCES and subject pool may have 
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et al. (2012) indicates that brief personality scales such as these could cause scholars to underestimate the impact of 
personality on the outcome of interest. However, Credé and his colleagues identify one-item personality measures as 
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Overall, descriptive statistics show that most individuals in my data saw themselves as 
conscientious and agreeable people, with a mean above 0.50 in all surveys except the subject 
pool. In addition, the mean surpassed 0.50 for openness on the CCES and AmericasBarometer, 
extraversion on the AmericasBarometer, and emotional stability on the ANES and 
AmericasBarometer. Additional descriptive statistics for personality are located in Appendix B.  
Operationalizing Political Support 
The four surveys contain dozens of questions about political actors, regime institutions, 
regime performance, regime principles, and the political community. Past research, however, has 
explored the direct link between personality and only some support attitudes. To date, scholars 
have not examined the impact of personality on issue-specific evaluations of actor job 
effectiveness, actor affect, institutional job evaluations, institutional affect, regime performance, 
non-tolerance and non-criminal rights forms of democratic support, and patriotism. Certainly, 
more work on personality and political support remains to be done. 
As noted previously, the best theories are consistent with a broad array of phenomena 
(Lave and March 1975), and I pursue such a standard by testing my hypotheses derived from 
trait activation theory with dependent variables from all levels of support and multiple domains 
within each level of support. For political actors and regime institutions, I examine the domains 
of political trust, perceptions of job effectiveness, political affect, and external efficacy. For 
regime performance, I study overall democratic satisfaction as well as assessments about the 
implementation of specific democratic ideals. For regime principles, I investigate abstract views 
about democracy and attitudes toward specific ideals, namely political tolerance, support for 
criminal rights, support for mass participation, support for checks and balances, and opposition 
                                                                                                                                                             
the least desirable, whereas all of my personality measures incorporate at least two items. See Mondak (2010) for 
more information on the reliability and validity of brief personality scales.  
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to military coups. And for the political community, I include both national identification and 
patriotism. If the results from my comprehensive approach are consistent with my hypotheses, I 
will be able to achieve integrative and additive cumulation (Zinnes 1976) by using TAT to 
account for past findings as well as previously unexplored relationships between personality and 
political support.  
A secondary goal of my empirical approach is replication. Since similar measures of 
political support appeared in multiple surveys, I have the opportunity to examine whether results 
from one U.S. survey apply to other U.S. surveys or to a cross-national survey. Consistent results 
across samples would bolster our confidence in TAT as a general framework for understanding 
the impact of personality on attitudes toward the political system. 
I organize my discussion of variable operationalization based on the level and domain of 
support, beginning with actor and institutional trust. The ANES and subject pool both asked a 
series of questions about the trustworthiness of political actors, with items pertaining to the 
extent to which politicians and bureaucrats are corrupt and wasteful and the extent to which they 
seek the public good, do the right thing,
95
 and care about citizens.
96
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 This particular trust item on the ANES was asked in different ways to different people, with some respondents 
allowed to answer 1 (“Just about always”), 2 (“Most of the time”), 3 (“Only some of the time”), or 4 (“Never”) and 
others allowed to answer 1 (“Always”), 2 (“Most of the time”), 3 (“About half the time”), 4 (“Some of the time”), or 
5 (“Never”). Most of these response options are similar across questions, so I combined these into a single item so 
that higher scores referred to more trust. Therefore, scores of 5 corresponded to responses of “Always” or “Just 
about always,” scores of 4 corresponded to responses of “Most of the time,” scores of 3 corresponded to responses 
of “About half the time” on the five-option version, scores of 2 corresponded to responses of “Some of the time” or 
“Only some of the time,” and scores of 1 corresponded to responses of “Never.”  
96
 All of these questions were asked in both surveys, except for the final item on the extent to which political elites 
care about the public. The subject pool included the final item, whereas the ANES did not. 
81 
 
I used factor analysis to construct an actor trust index for each survey because the number 




For institutional trust, I utilize data from the subject pool and AmericasBarometer. Both 
surveys included a battery of questions on citizen confidence in political institutions. Each asked 
about the national legislature, the Supreme Court, and political parties, and additional items in 
the AmericasBarometer referred to local government, the national police, the justice system, the 
national government, and the presidency. The Cronbach’s alphas for these indices are 0.69 for 
the subject pool and 0.88 for the AmericasBarometer. 
Next, I examine measures of perceived job effectiveness for political actors and 
institutions. Such attitudes include overall job approval ratings as well as evaluations on the 
economy and other specific issues. I have data on overall actor approval from the ANES, CCES, 
and AmericasBarometer. All three surveys asked about global executive evaluations,
98
 and the 
ANES and CCES both fielded a question on approval of a respondent’s congressperson in the 
House of Representatives. The ANES, CCES, and AmericasBarometer also included questions 
on overall institutional job effectiveness, and I focus on approval of the national legislature in 
order to examine the extent to which personality results are consistent for approval of particular 
representatives and parliaments as a whole. 
For issue-specific job evaluations, I utilize data from the ANES, subject pool, and 
AmericasBarometer. All three surveys asked about actor approval on a range of issues, such as 
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 I should note that many of the trust questions do not directly refer to politicians, but Norris (1999a) considers 
these questions to refer to political actors. I follow her approach in this dissertation. 
98
 The ANES included two global executive approval items, one fielded to all respondents and another to web-only 
respondents. I focus on the former question in order to apply my findings to as many respondents as possible. 
Results with the web-only item are noted below. For web-only ANES analyses, I do not use the Taylor series 
method because all respondents are in the same stratum and the number of PSUs is the same as the number of 




the economy, foreign policy, and public safety.
99
 I created additive indices for each dependent 




The AmericasBarometer also included two items on issue-specific evaluations of 
institutional effectiveness. One pertained to the ability of the justice system to punish individuals 
who are guilty of crimes, and the other focused on the quality of local government services. Both 
items were recoded so that higher values refer to greater levels of political support. 
I now turn to actor and institutional political affect. The ANES and subject pool both 
used feeling thermometers that allowed respondents to convey their emotional reactions to 
incumbent political actors, opposition political actors, and government institutions. For the 
ANES, I employ post-election feeling thermometers because the personality battery was fielded 
during the same time period. Incumbent Democratic actors consist of the president, first lady, 
and vice president, and opposition actors are the Republican presidential candidate, the 
Republican candidate’s spouse, the Republican vice presidential candidate, and the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court, who had been nominated by a Republican president. The ANES 
institutions consist of the federal government, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the military. 
Cronbach’s alphas for the ANES are 0.94 for incumbent actors, 0.82 for opposition actors, and 
0.69 for institutions. 
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 More specifically, the ANES items covered attitudes on the economy, health care, foreign relations, and the war in 
Afghanistan. For the subject pool, items referred to health care, public safety, corruption, the economy, and foreign 
relations, and the AmericasBarometer questions covered corruption, safety, poverty, unemployment, and the 
management of the economy. An AmericasBarometer item on the democratic performance of the current 
administration was omitted in order to avoid conflation with regime performance attitudes. An additional battery of 
13 issue-specific questions was fielded only to web respondents on the ANES; results for this battery are noted 
below.  
100
 It may seem superfluous to measure global job evaluations and multi-item indices of job evaluations on specific 
issues since the latter may resemble the former from a conceptual standpoint. However, it is an open question 
whether the impact of personality on support will be empirically consistent for global and issue-specific dependent 
variables. In addition, politicians may care strongly about public evaluations on particular issues (e.g., economic 
approval during an economic crisis). 
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Meanwhile, the subject pool included an institutional feeling thermometer for the state 
legislature and multiple thermometers for incumbent Democratic actors and opposition 
Republican actors.
101
 Items in the former category include President Barack Obama and 
Democrats in Congress, and the Republican actors consist of Republicans in Congress, the 
Illinois Republican governor, and the respondent’s federal representative. Congressmen Rodney 
Davis and John Shimkus, both Republicans, represented parts of Champaign County in 2015. 
Exploratory analysis also showed that items on bureaucrats in Washington, D.C., and local 
officials belong in the Democratic category, so the additive incumbent index includes these 
actors as well. Cronbach’s alphas are 0.62 for the Democrats and 0.64 for the Republicans. 
Feeling thermometers are not the only way to measure political affect. The ANES also 
asked a series of questions on the likeability of the two major political parties in 2012.
102
 Since 
the actor thermometer indices incorporate people from both parties, I use both the Democratic 
and Republican likeability items. 
The final domain of support for actors and institutions is external efficacy. The ANES, 
subject pool, and AmericasBarometer all inquired about the responsiveness of political actors, 
and I present the ANES results for the post-election measurement of external efficacy because 
the personality battery was fielded during the same time period.
103
 In addition, the ANES asked 
respondents two basic questions about institutional responsiveness, one on the extent to which 
citizens can influence governmental action and another on whether elections encourage 
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 Here, I use the word “incumbent” to refer to the party in control of the White House because non-presidential 
elected Republicans technically are incumbents in their current positions. 
102
 Respondents also answered likeability questions about the major party presidential candidates, but these have 
been omitted in the interest of space. A second reason to exclude the presidential likeability questions is the broader 
range of public figures in the ANES actor feeling thermometer indices.   
103
 The actor efficacy item for the ANES actually combines two versions of the same question about whether public 
officials care about citizen opinion. Both versions have the same number of response options, but one needed to be 
reverse-coded so that higher values refer to more external efficacy.  
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government to pay attention to the public.
104
 Factor analysis of the two institutional efficacy 
items did not produce a sufficiently large eigenvalue, so I consider each measure separately.  
Turning to regime performance, I examine both overall democratic satisfaction and 
evaluations about the effectiveness with which specific democratic principles are implemented. 
Data for global attitudes come from the ANES, subject pool, and AmericasBarometer. The 
ANES included one question on the topic, whereas two such items appeared on the subject pool 
and AmericasBarometer. Cronbach’s alphas for these indices are 0.64 for the subject pool and 
0.65 for the AmericasBarometer. With regard to specific evaluations, all three surveys asked 
about the extent to which citizen rights are protected, and the ANES and AmericasBarometer 
included items on the trustworthiness of the electoral process. I thus have the opportunity to 
examine cross-situational consistency for global and specific evaluations of regime performance.  
For democratic support, I incorporate both abstract attitudes and specific ideals. Items for 
the first category come from the subject pool and AmericasBarometer. Both surveys asked about 
the extent to which respondents agreed that democracy represents the best political system even 
with its problems, and another item in the AmericasBarometer allowed individuals to express 
indifference toward democracy, a solid preference for democracy, or openness to an authoritarian 




The subject pool and AmericasBarometer, along with the CCES, also asked questions 
about particular regime principles. Political tolerance questions come from the CCES and the 
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 As with actor efficacy, the first institutional item was asked before and after the election. I focus on the post-
election variable because the personality battery was fielded during the same time period. In addition, the first 
institutional efficacy item combines two versions of the same question. Both versions have the same number of 
response options, but one needed to be reverse-coded so that higher values refer to more external efficacy. 
105
 As needed, items for other outcome variables were reversed so that higher scores denote more political support. 
However, no other items were reordered so that a middle response option was moved to the minimum or maximum.  
85 
 
AmericasBarometer. Each survey measured political tolerance in a different way. In the CCES, 
respondents answered yes or no whether they would outlaw a self-selected disliked group, 
whether they would allow the group to make a speech, and whether they would ban a member of 
the group from being president of the United States. Most respondents expressed intolerance for 
the presidential question and tolerance for the other two questions. I coded these items so that 
higher scores refer to more tolerance and then generated an additive index. The Cronbach’s alpha 
for the scale is 0.80. The AmericasBarometer, meanwhile, asked respondents whether citizens 
who are only critical of their country should be permitted to vote, protest peacefully, run for 
political office, and make speeches on television. The average score for the 24 countries under 




A related, but distinct concept to political tolerance is opposition to extralegal policing in 
the fight against crime. Criminals represent a minority, and AmericasBarometer respondents had 
the opportunity to support or oppose criminal rights by stating whether they think legal 
authorities always should follow the law or can cross the line on occasion. 
Democratic principles pertain not just to minority groups but to the masses as well. In 
particular, the health of democracy hinges on the extent to which citizens engage in such 
activities as voting, campaigning, and organizing to solve problems. The right to participate 
belongs to all citizens but may be especially effective for the majority given the re-election 
incentives of politicians (Mayhew 2004). To measure the concept of support for mass 
participation, I generated an additive index that includes items from the AmericasBarometer 
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 The AmericasBarometer measurement of political tolerance could evoke concern because the dissident group was 
not selected on the basis of the respondent’s personal affinity for that group (Sullivan et al. 1979). Therefore, I 
limited the analysis only to individuals with positive levels of institutional trust who are likely to disagree with 
political dissidents; the personality coefficients adhered to the same pattern as the main results reported below. 
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about approval of campaigning, organizing, and peaceful protesting.
107
 The Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.74.   
The next set of dependent variables measures the principle of checks and balances. The 
first constitutes a three-item index from a battery in the AmericasBarometer in which 
respondents stated whether they believe executives should be able to ignore obstinate legislatures 
and courts and overpower opposition parties in order to benefit the country. Responses are coded 
so that higher scores refer to more support for checks and balances. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
AmericasBarometer index is 0.79. Subject pool respondents also received three items on checks 
and balances, but these are examined separately because factor analysis revealed an eigenvalue 
well below 1. One question largely copied the wording for the Supreme Court item, whereas the 
others include information that may contain unique trait-relevant cues. An item on presidential–
legislative relations allowed respondents to consent to a relatively benign and easy response to 
inter-branch disagreement: executive orders. Such information may encourage individuals high 
in conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness to comply with assertive leadership in 
order to promote societal order. Similarly, another question asked whether the president should 
ignore other government branches in the event of a foreign invasion. Responses for the subject 
pool items are coded so that higher scores refer to greater support for checks and balances. 
Civilian versus military control of government constitutes another regime principle that 
pertains to the interaction of political elites. Unlike the relatively equal status of government 
branches under checks and balances, the democratic ideal of elected, civilian control clearly 
signifies the superiority of some elites over others. Data for the concept of civilian control come 
from the AmericasBarometer, which asked a series of three questions about whether a military 
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 The last item may appear to measure political tolerance, but the question refers to the general right to demonstrate 
and does not ask respondents whether they agree with a particular protest’s political goals.  
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coup could be justified in the event of high levels of unemployment, crime, and corruption. 
Scores were recoded so that 1 refers to support for civilian rule and 0 to support for a proposed 
military coup.
108
 I combined the three items into an additive index. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78. 
Finally, I have items on national identification and patriotism, the two domains of 
community support. Two of my surveys asked about national identification, with one item in the 
subject pool and two in the ANES. I combined the ANES items into a single index, which has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77. Meanwhile, the ANES and subject pool included the same two items 
to measure patriotism: one on love for country and another on one’s emotions at seeing his or her 
national flag. Items were combined into additive indices; the Cronbach’s alphas are 0.66 for the 
ANES and 0.73 for the subject pool. In addition, the AmericasBarometer measured patriotism by 
asking about the extent to which individuals were proud to be citizens of their country.
109
  
Many of the political support dependent variables range between three and seven 
response options. I utilize ordinal logistic regression for those outcome variables. Logistic 
regression is reserved for dichotomous measures of political support, and I employ ordinary least 
squares regression for dependent variables with more than seven response options.  
Descriptive statistics for the political support dependent variables are available in 
Appendix B. 
Operationalizing the Controls 
Numerous factors may be related to personality and political support, but it would be a 
mistake to control for all of them. In some cases, controls can minimize trait effects by mediating 
the relationship between personality and attitudes in a manner consistent with my theory. Extant 
                                                 
108
 The original variables were coded in the same order, but a score of 2 referred to the more democratic response 
and a score of 1 to the less democratic response. 
109
 One might consider the AmericasBarometer question an example of national identification because of the use of 
the verb “to be,” but Klingemann (1999) classifies the item as a measurement of patriotism. 
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research has shown, for example, that openness encourages high levels of political interest 
(Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008), which in turn could promote democratic support 
due to a desire to protect one’s rights and achieve political progress. Including political interest 
thus could reduce the observed effect of openness on attitudes toward regime principles.  
Instead, I control for factors that are largely unrelated to my theory. The preceding 
argument pays no attention to demographics, but gender, age, race, and education are standard 
fare in studies of political support (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Criado and Herreros 
2007; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Jamal and Nooruddin 2010; Rahn and Rudolph 2005). 
Omitting demographics also could produce illusory personality effects. Without education, for 
example, we would not know whether openness influences political tolerance and support for 
criminal rights because of a person’s inherent attraction to ideas or because of the greater levels 
of schooling pursued by individuals high in this trait dimension.
110
 I thus account for 
demographic factors in all of my regression models. 
I also considered whether I should control for political ideology. On one hand, this 
variable could attenuate observed personality effects by minimizing the relationship between 
personality and support in a way that is consistent with my arguments. For example, studies have 
shown that individuals high in openness are more likely to be ideologically leftist or liberal and 
therefore are more interested in political innovation (e.g., Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; 
Mondak 2010; Sibley et al. 2012). The connection to ideology could help explain why people 
high in openness may be disappointed with the stalled democratic performance of political actors 
and regime institutions or why open individuals are less likely to embrace a traditional political 
identity such as national identification.   
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 Mondak and Hurwitz (2012), for example, show that both factors influence attitudes toward civil liberties, and 
Mondak (2010) finds that openness is positively associated with a person’s level of education.  
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On the other hand, political ideology could mediate the relationship between personality 
and support in a manner unexpected by my arguments. In particular, the observed connection 
between personality traits such as openness and attitudes toward the political system could 
simply be a function of the ideological orientation of the incumbent government. For example, 
openness could be negatively related to political support because a country is governed by a 
conservative party and not, as I expect, because individuals high in this trait dimension are 
generally frustrated with the democratic performance of political actors and regime institutions. 
Studies also have found that the other Big Five traits can be related to political ideology (e.g., 
Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Sibley et al. 2012), so results for 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability could be problematic if 
ideology is omitted from the regression models. 
To address both concerns, I ran the regressions with and without a control for political 
ideology. Most of the significant results from the personality-and-demographics models remain 
significant when conservative ideology is included in the regressions,
111
 so I opted for the 
simpler models for my main findings. The next section also discusses some of the rare, but 
notable, changes in personality coefficients when political ideology is added to the model.
112
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 To be specific, the personality-and-demographics models resulted in a total of 121 personality coefficients that 
are significant at the 0.10 level or better across all four datasets and all five levels of political support, and only 21 of 
these become insignificant when conservative ideology is added to the model. Of these 21 changes in personality 
coefficients, just 14 occur when the personality trait in question is significantly related to political ideology and 
when political ideology is significantly related to political support. I determined the significance of the ideology–
trait connection by regressing conservatism on the Big Five and the demographic controls. (The totals in this note do 
not include the conscientiousness coefficients for actor, institutional, and procedural support, nor do they include the 
extraversion coefficient in Model I of Table 3.8. I omitted these coefficients because I offered no hypothesis for the 
impact of conscientiousness on status quo support and no hypothesis for the impact of extraversion on overall 
democratic satisfaction.) 
112
 In the results section I refer to instances in which personality coefficients cease to be significant or become 
significant with the inclusion of political ideology. As mentioned in the previous footnote, few coefficients become 
insignificant when I control for conservative ideology, and changes in the opposite direction are also rare. Across all 
datasets, just 13 coefficients become significant with the addition of political ideology. (The total of 13 does not 
include the conscientiousness coefficients for the actor, institutional, and procedural levels for the same reason 
mentioned in the previous footnote.) 
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With regard to operationalization, all four surveys include measures of gender, age, race 
or ethnicity, education, and ideology. Female is coded so that scores of 1 correspond to women 
and 0 to men, age is measured in years,
113
 white is an indicator for race and ethnicity with scores 
of 1 for self-identified white respondents and scores of 0 for other individuals,
114
 education is a 
variable ranging from 0 (lowest possible response in the survey) to 1 (highest possible response 
in the survey),
115
 and conservative ideology ranges from 0 (highly left-wing) to 1 (highly right-
wing).
116,117
 All controls are coded in the same manner for each survey. For descriptive statistics 
of the controls, see Appendix B. 
Evidence for a Direct Link: Results 
I now present my findings for personality and political support. I start with actors, 
institutions, and performance and then turn to regime principles and the political community. 
The final step is to tie together the results across levels by testing my hypotheses on cross-
situational consistency. In particular, I assess cross-situational consistency by comparing the 
effects of a trait dimension on comparable political support opportunities and contrasting the 
patterns with trait effects for less comparable political support opportunities. 
Findings for Actor, Institutional, and Procedural Support 
For actor and institutional support, citizens evaluate the status quo in terms of 
trustworthiness, job effectiveness, likeability, and responsiveness. Regime performance, 
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 For the CCES, age is an approximate variable because I subtracted the respondent’s birth year from 2012. 
114
 The white respondents classified by the race–ethnicity variable do not identify as Hispanic in the U.S. surveys, 
nor do they describe themselves as mestizo or from another non-white racial or ethnic background in the 
AmericasBarometer. 
115
 The lowest and highest responses for education referred to different levels of schooling across surveys. For 
example, the range in the subject pool was freshmen to seniors, whereas the variable in the ANES ran from less than 
a high school degree to a graduate degree.  
116
 The ANES asked about political ideology before and after the election, but I use the pre-election measure for the 
sake of causal order since some of my dependent variables consist of post-election questions. 
117
 The CCES fielded two pre-election political ideology items, one of which used a seven-point scale and another of 
which used a five-point scale. I opted for the seven-point scale in order to be consistent with the ideology variables 
for the other U.S. surveys. 
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meanwhile, is primarily concerned about the effectiveness with which politicians, bureaucrats, 
and institutions implement democratic principles. Within the procedural level, voters can provide 
overall assessments of regime performance as well as assessments about the implementation of 
specific democratic ideals. I use the domains of support to organize my findings for actor, 
institutional, and procedural attitudes. First, I cover each of the four domains of actor and 
institutional attitudes. Cross-situational consistency would lead us to expect similar trait-relevant 
cues and similar trait effects for the same domain across levels (e.g., actor trust and institutional 
trust). I account for possible cross-situational consistency by placing the results for actor support 
side-by-side with the results for institutional support for a particular domain. Second, I compare 
overall evaluations of regime performance with perceptions of the implementation of specific 
democratic principles. I expect the intra-level results for regime performance to be similar 
because of cross-situational consistency.
118
 
Table 3.3 presents the results for actor and institutional trust. Consistent with 
expectations, we observe positive and significant effects for agreeableness and emotional 
stability on political trust. The positive results for actor and institutional support also comport 
with the hypothesis of cross-situational consistency. I thus obtain evidence that political trust 
opportunities activate agreeableness facets such as trust and generosity and emotional stability 
facets such as low anxiety and low insecurity and produce positive trait effects. 
In addition, Table 3.3 shows that openness and extraversion are negatively related to 
institutional trust, as expected given the emphases of these trait dimensions on innovation and 
sociability, respectively. Of the hypothesized relationships, the most significant personality 
effect in Table 3.3 is the openness coefficient in Model IV. In terms of substantive impact,  
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 The only exception to this statement would be for extraversion, for I offer no hypothesis for the impact of 




moving from 0 to 1 in openness reduces a respondent’s institutional trust score by 2.72 points on 
a scale from 8 to 56 (i.e., 5.66 percent of the range).  
The results for openness also are more consistent across levels than Table 3.3 would 
indicate. If political ideology is added to Model I, the openness coefficient increases in absolute 
magnitude to -0.19 and becomes significant at the 0.05 level. The changes for openness are 
sensible given the leftist ideology of highly open citizens in the ANES and the left-leaning 
ANES Subject Pool Subject Pool AB














Openness -0.11                                  
(0.07)
-0.28                           
(0.49)
-2.17+                     
(1.11)
-2.72***                       
(0.44)
Conscientiousness -0.24***                 
(0.06)
0.33                               
(0.37)
1.42                   
(0.86)
0.20                     
(0.33)
Extraversion 0.05                        
(0.07)
-0.53                                 
(0.40)
0.88                      
(0.91)
-2.02**                     
(0.57)
Agreeableness 0.18**                         
(0.07)
0.17                            
(0.45)
1.83+                          
(1.04)
1.72**                   
(0.46)
Emotional Stability 0.12+                           
(0.07)
0.63                    
(0.45)
-0.68                          
(1.08)
1.46**                          
(0.50)
Female 0.04                                  
(0.03)
0.10                       
(0.13)
0.17                            
(0.30)
0.07                                
(0.20)
Age -0.00*                                        
(0.00)
0.02     
(0.04)
0.08                           
(0.09)
0.01                         
(0.01)
White -0.30***                             
(0.03)
0.24+                   
(0.13)
0.46                        
(0.29)
0.67+                   
(0.39)
Education 0.14**                          
(0.05)
-0.65**                        
(0.23)
-1.14*                               
(0.52)
-2.31*                     
(0.87)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.11
Number of Cases 5,150 171 205 34,261
Number of Countries 1 1 1 24
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . 
Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted due to variation in the number 
of thresholds  for some dependent variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for 
detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to each survey and for an explanation about 
any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for 
"AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Institutions
Table 3.3




orientation of the Obama administration in 2012.
119
 Accounting for the role of ideology “frees” 
highly open individuals to be distrustful of the political system.  
One final point on Table 3.3 concerns replication across datasets. The similar results for 
openness and agreeableness in Models III and IV suggest that findings from the United States 
travel to a cross-national sample.  
Next, I examine overall evaluations of job effectiveness in Table 3.4. I again find that 
agreeableness exerts a positive impact on political support, but this time on executive approval 
and approval of the national legislature.
120
 I thus observe evidence of cross-situational 
consistency given the different levels of support and the different branches of government. With 
regard to executive approval, Table 3.4 indicates that the agreeableness results from the United 
States generalize to 24 countries included in the AmericasBarometer. The impact of 
agreeableness is especially strong in the AmericasBarometer, as moving from 0 to 1 in this trait 
dimension increases the probability of maximum executive approval from 0.06 to 0.07 (i.e., an 
increase of 26.12 percent).
121
 Overall, the agreeableness results are consistent with my argument 
that individuals high in agreeableness interpret information about actor and institutional job 
effectiveness in a positive light. 
Table 3.4 also provides some support for my expectation about positive effects for 
emotional stability. Individuals high in this trait dimension appear to be unconcerned about their 
legislative representative and about the national legislature as a whole.
122
 Meanwhile, emotional  
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 The correlation between openness and conservative ideology is -0.16 (p < 0.001). 
120
 The CCES result for agreeableness is not significant if state fixed effects are omitted from Model II. 
121
 All other variables were held at their mean (non-dichotomous variables and country fixed effects) or modal 
(dichotomous variables) values. I used a similar approach for all other predicted probabilities in this chapter, 
although I include fixed effects only if they are part of the main model. 
122
 The emotional stability coefficient in Model V becomes insignificant if state fixed effects are omitted, but state 
fixed effects may be preferable for this model because of potential state-level influences on different groups of 
respondents as they evaluate their particular member of the House of Representatives. By contrast, state-level 




stability exerts a negative effect in Models I and II, but both results become insignificant once 
conservative ideology is added to the model.
123
 Individuals high in emotional stability tended to 
be more conservative in the ANES and CCES, which may have contributed to the negative trait 
effects on President Obama’s job approval in Models I and II. 
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 This statement also applies if state fixed effects are removed from Model II and if the dependent variable in 
Model I is replaced with an executive approval item asked to web-only ANES respondents.  
ANES CCES AB ANES CCES ANES CCES AB
Model I:    
Executive 
Approval
Model II:    
Executive 
Approval























Openness 1.28***                     
(0.20)
1.46*                        
(0.73)
-0.12                         
(0.10)
0.08                
(0.21)
-0.65                        
(0.74)
-0.70***                       
(0.21)
-0.42                    
(1.01)
-0.47***                  
(0.09)
Conscientiousness -0.71***                  
(0.17)
-0.61                
(0.69)
0.00                   
(0.08)
0.54**                  
(0.18)
-0.66                
(0.62)
0.06                       
(0.18)
0.48                       
(0.61)
-0.02                  
(0.07)
Extraversion -0.23                         
(0.18)
-0.11                    
(0.54)
-0.18*                            
(0.08)
-0.18                
(0.20)
0.24                 
(0.44)
0.31+                            
(0.18)
-1.10+                     
(0.56)
-0.34***                 
(0.09)
Agreeableness 0.35*                         
(0.18)
1.04+                 
(0.57)
0.25***                  
(0.06)
0.08                     
(0.19)
0.84                    
(0.71)
0.24                            
(0.20)
1.08                       
(0.86)
0.28***                 
(0.08)
Emotional Stability -0.34+                      
(0.17)
-1.62*                
(0.72)
0.07                            
(0.09)
0.19              
(0.19)
1.77*               
(0.90)
0.02                        
(0.18)
0.19                    
(0.64)
0.17***                 
(0.05)
Female 0.25***                    
(0.07)
0.37                       
(0.25)
0.03                          
(0.05)
0.15+               
(0.08)
0.00                             
(0.21)
0.34***                          
(0.08)
-0.08             
(0.19)
0.14***                
(0.04)
Age -0.00                      
(0.00)
-0.01                             
(0.01)
0.00                     
(0.00)
0.01**                    
(0.00)
0.01                           
(0.01)
-0.03***                
(0.00)
-0.03***                  
(0.01)
-0.01**                      
(0.00)
White -1.43***            
(0.08)
-1.06**                  
(0.33)
-0.04                       
(0.11)
0.04                                  
(0.09)
-0.20                  
(0.34)
-0.51***                           
(0.09)
-0.80***               
(0.23)
0.06                         
(0.06)
Education 0.00                           
(0.13)
-0.38                  
(0.40)                           
-0.06                         
(0.13)
-0.04                            
(0.13)
-0.67                        
(0.41)
-1.22***                    
(0.14)
-1.14*                         
(0.57)
-0.30*                               
(0.12)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A 0.10 0.06 N/A 0.08 N/A 0.13 0.04
Number of Cases 5,247 913 36,887 4,323 738 4,998 867 32,786
Number of Countries 1 1 24 1 1 1 1 22
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 3.4
Personality and Overall Job Evaluations
Actors Institutions
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are 
omitted due to variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on 
the methodology speci fic to each survey and for an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" 
s tands  for "AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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For extraversion, the results in Table 3.4 largely reveal a negative impact of this trait 
dimension on job effectiveness ratings for executives and legislatures.
124
 Coefficients are 
negative and significant, as expected, for executive approval in Model III and legislature 
approval in Models VII and VIII.
125
 The sole exception is the positive and marginally significant 
extraversion coefficient in Model VI, but that coefficient becomes insignificant if conservative 
ideology is added to the regression. The similar findings across levels of support constitute 
evidence of cross-situational consistency and support my argument that job effectiveness 
opportunities activate the sociability facet of extraversion and produce negative trait effects 
because of the more impersonal character of political actors and institutions, compared with an 
extravert’s network of friends and family. In addition, Table 3.4 suggests that findings on 
extraversion and legislature approval from the United States apply to a cross-national sample.  
Lastly, I observe positive effects for openness on actor approval and negative effects for 
openness on institutional approval. The first set of findings is contrary to expectations, but 
adding ideology reduces the significance of openness in Model I and eliminates all significance 
for openness in Model II.
126
 The openness coefficient also becomes insignificant in Model II 
with the omission of state fixed effects. Meanwhile, the negative impact of openness on 
institutional approval is consistent with my argument about individuals high in this trait 
dimension being disappointed about the lack of innovation in the political status quo. I also find 
in Models VI and VIII that openness results from the United States travel to other countries in 
the Western Hemisphere.  
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 The negative extraversion coefficient in Model VII becomes even more significant (i.e., at the 0.05 level) if state 
fixed effects are excluded from the regression. 
125
 Extraversion is also negatively and significantly related to the ANES web-only item on executive approval. 
126





Table 3.5 transitions to issue-specific evaluations of actor and institutional job 
effectiveness. The pattern of agreeableness being positively related to job approval continues, 
with significant results in Model III for political actors and in Model IV for political 
institutions.
127
 Executive approval is similar but not identical to perceptions of justice system 
effectiveness, so the agreeableness results in Table 3.5 provide evidence of cross-situational 
consistency. 
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 Agreeableness is also positively and significantly related to an ANES web-only index of executive approval on 
13 issues. 
ANES Subject Pool AB AB AB
Model I:    
Executive 
Approval on 4 
Issues
















Openness 2.81***                  
(0.44)
-0.60                     
(1.51)
-1.86***                  
(0.34)
-0.49***              
(0.07)
-0.15*                  
(0.07)
Conscientiousness -1.57***                  
(0.37)
0.39                      
(1.17)
-0.16                             
(0.30)
0.01                          
(0.06)
-0.05                     
(0.07)
Extraversion -0.88*                               
(0.40)
-1.11                   
(1.24)
-1.27**                         
(0.39)
-0.33***                 
(0.06)
-0.17**                   
(0.06)
Agreeableness 0.60                    
(0.42)
1.19                           
(1.41)
0.91**                   
(0.29)
0.22**                          
(0.08)
0.08                    
(0.06)
Emotional Stability -0.19               
(0.40)
1.18                    
(1.47)
0.27                            
(0.29)
0.17*                           
(0.09)
0.13+                        
(0.07)
Female 0.49**                     
(0.17)
0.10                              
(0.41)
-0.10                
(0.17)
-0.03                       
(0.03)
0.07**                   
(0.02)
Age -0.01                 
(0.01)
0.25*                                 
(0.13)
-0.01+              
(0.01)
0.00                           
(0.00)
-0.00***                 
(0.00)
White -3.36***                     
(0.18)
-0.78*                     
(0.39)
0.16                    
(0.28)
0.13**                  
(0.04)
0.13***                    
(0.04)
Education 0.86**                       
(0.29)
-1.40*                   
(0.70)
-2.03**                    
(0.55)
-0.43**                         
(0.15)
0.21*                     
(0.10)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.15 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.02
Number of Cases 4,954 205 34,390 35,553 33,906
Number of Countries 1 1 24 24 24
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS Ordinal Ordinal
Table 3.5
Personality and Issue-Specific Job Evaluations
Actors Institutions
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or 
threshold parameters  are omitted due to variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent 
variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to each survey and for 
an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for 
"AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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For emotional stability, I find positive trait effects for both evaluations of institutional job 
effectiveness. Again, the results reveal cross-situational consistency, given the fact that 
municipal services include but are not limited to the prosecution of crime. These results are also 
consistent with my findings in Table 3.4 for emotional stability and global legislature approval 
ratings. 
Extraversion exerts the most consistent effect on issue-related job evaluations in Table 
3.5, with negative and significant results in four of five models. These results are consistent with 
the impact of extraversion on global job approval. The substantive impact of this trait dimension 
is especially meaningful in Model V, with an effect larger in absolute magnitude than the other 
personality variables, gender, and race.
128
 Only 2.68 percent of AmericasBarometer respondents 
expressed maximum support for local government services, but moving from 0 to 1 in 
extraversion reduces the probability of a “very good” evaluation from 0.03 to 0.02 (i.e., a 
decrease of 15.47 percent).  
With regard to openness, the results in Table 3.5 indicate that this trait dimension exerts a 
negative impact on actor support as well as institutional support. For actor approval in Model III, 
moving from 0 to 1 in openness reduces support by 1.86 points on a scale from 5 to 35 (i.e., 6.20 
percent of the range). The other significant openness result for actor approval runs in the 
unexpected positive direction, but the coefficient becomes less significant when ideology is 
added to the model.
129
 Meanwhile, I observe that openness reduces perceptions of institutional 
job effectiveness on crime evaluations and local government services. These results are 
consistent with the negative impact of this trait dimension on global job evaluations.  
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 The education coefficient is larger in absolute magnitude than extraversion, and the same would be true for age if 
it were coded to range from 0 to 1. With that coding, the coefficient for age would be -0.32. 
129




An additional point about Table 3.5 is the similar results across datasets for extraversion. 
These results indicate that the extraversion hypothesis derived from trait activation theory is 
applicable in the United States and in other countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
I shift to political affect in Table 3.6. Again, I observe positive agreeableness and 
emotional stability results both for actor and institutional attitudes. The results in Models I 
through VI indicate that the positive impact of agreeableness is limited to Democratic actors and 
institutions and the positive impact of emotional stability is limited to Republican actors and 
institutions. However, such a concern is minimized by the positive impact of both trait 
dimensions on affect toward government organizations that are less associated with one 
particular political party, namely the federal government, the Supreme Court, the military, and 
ANES Subject Pool ANES Subject Pool ANES ANES ANES Subject Pool
































Openness 63.89***                      
(8.94)
42.65                         
(31.94)
-59.87***                     
(8.67)
-60.63*                              
(26.81)
2.32***                             
(0.32)
-2.07***                            
(0.29)
3.68                                   
(6.09)
-12.79                        
(8.85)
Conscientiousness -28.02***                         
(7.67)
-50.58*                           
(24.23)
28.20***                      
(7.38)
53.16*                        
(20.75)
-0.33                      
(0.27)
0.65**                           
(0.25)
-3.80                           
(5.06)
-0.21                     
(6.85)
Extraversion -10.56                              
(8.02)
-76.10**                     
(25.84)
32.00***                       
(7.69)
61.68**                                   
(22.07)
-0.13                   
(0.29)
1.50***                
(0.26)
24.10***                       
(5.52)
-4.54                    
(7.29)
Agreeableness 22.66**                       
(8.28)
50.70+                                   
(29.21)
11.33                   
(7.82)
1.28                                   
(24.95)
0.88**                           
(0.29)
0.22                    
(0.26)
22.59***                          
(5.81)
9.75                 
(8.24)
Emotional Stability -10.18                               
(8.03)
29.30                          
(29.39)
18.86*                               
(7.57)
-11.10                                 
(25.97)
-0.36                       
(0.26)
0.55*                            
(0.24)
12.63*                           
(5.35)
6.42              
(8.58)
Female 16.35***                       
(3.34)
20.74*                          
(8.42)
-2.16                    
(3.27)
-6.61                                     
(7.24)
0.36**                   
(0.12)
-0.11                           
(0.10)
8.51***                 
(2.42)
4.62+                      
(2.39)
Age -0.04                       
(0.09)
2.88                                 
(2.51)
0.60***                   
(0.10)
2.01                                   
(2.23)
0.01                      
(0.00)
0.00                                 
(0.00)
0.13+                  
(0.07)
2.04**                          
(0.74)
White -66.65***                   
(3.69)
-24.48**                          
(8.09)
32.99***                             
(3.64)
9.73                                   
(6.95)
-1.94***                       
(0.14)
1.29***                        
(0.11)
-23.73***                      
(3.16)
-2.59                                   
(2.29)
Education 13.95*                      
(6.01)
-43.03**                       
(14.42)
4.08                        
(6.05)
-1.74                                       
(12.42)
-0.24                 
(0.22)
-0.46*                         
(0.19)
-21.95***                   
(4.01)
-6.84+                                    
(4.10)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.04
Number of Cases 5,203 189 4,636 204 5,294 5,295 5,259 204
Number of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 3.6
Personality and Affective Support
Actors Institutions
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted due to variation in the 
number of thresholds  for some dependent variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to each survey and for an 





 My results indicate that affect opportunities activate agreeableness facets such as 
sympathy and emotional stability facets such as low anxiety and produce positive effects on 
political support, regardless of the partisan background of the political actor or regime 
institution. The similar results for political actors, parties, and government institutions also 
indicate a high level of cross-situational consistency. 
Meanwhile, Table 3.6 offers some evidence that high levels of openness reduce levels of 
political affect, as anticipated. Of the five significant results for openness, three are in the 
negative direction and are thus consistent with the findings for political trust and job evaluations.  
Not all of the openness results in Table 3.6 are consistent with expectations, for I observe 
positive and significant openness coefficients for Models I and V. The openness coefficient in 
each model, however, becomes less significant with the inclusion of ideology.
131,132 
In contrast to political trust and job evaluations, I expected a positive relationship 
between extraversion and political affect because support opportunities for affect may activate 
the trait facet of positive emotions. The bulk of the evidence supports my hypothesis. Although 
extraversion exerts a negative effect on affect toward Democrats in the subject pool, the impact 
of this trait dimension is positive for Republican actors on two surveys and for the Republican 
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 Other results also indicate that significant agreeableness and emotional stability results are not limited to partisan 
actors and institutions from one party. In particular, the agreeableness coefficient becomes significant in Model III 
when ideology is added to the model and in Model VI when a measure for partisanship is added to the model; at the 
same time, however, emotional stability becomes insignificant in Models III and VI with the inclusion of ideology 
or partisanship. On the more positive side, the coefficient for emotional stability becomes significant when ideology 
and partisanship are added to Model II. Partisanship in both surveys is a seven-point item coded to range from 0 
(highly Democratic) to 1 (highly Republican). Descriptive statistics for the partisanship variables are located in 
Appendix B. 
131
 The coefficients remain significant at the 0.001 level, but adding ideology reduces the t-value from 7.15 to 3.32 
in Model I and from 7.31 to 3.75 in Model V. 
132
 One could critique the openness findings in Table 3.6 by noting the ideological slant of the significant findings. 
In particular, coefficients are negative for right-leaning actors and institutions and positive for left-leaning actors and 
institutions. One coefficient that breaks the mold in Table 3.6 is the openness effect on affect toward the Illinois 
state legislature. If ideology and a seven-point measure of partisanship are added to Model VIII, openness becomes 
negative and significant at the 0.10 level. Such a result is unlikely to be due to the ideological composition of the 
state legislature because the body was controlled by the Democratic Party in 2015. 
100 
 
Party likeability item and the government agencies thermometer index on the ANES. In fact, the 
coefficient for extraversion is larger than any other coefficient in the government agency model. 
Moving from 0 to 1 in this trait dimension raises a person’s rating of government institutions by 
24.10 points on a scale from 0 to 400 (i.e., 6.03 percent of the range). The similar results for 
extraversion across levels of support also constitute evidence of cross-situational consistency. 
The extraversion and agreeableness results in Table 3.6 indicate that personality 
influences political affect in a similar way for college students and a nationally representative 
sample. I would expect to obtain similar results from a cross-national sample if such data on 
political affect were available.  
Table 3.7 reports the impact of personality on external efficacy, the fourth domain of 
actor and institutional support. As with the previous domains, I find that agreeableness and 
emotional stability exert a positive impact on external efficacy. Although the results are weak in 
Models I through III, both the agreeableness and emotional stability coefficients become 
significant in Model I if I switch the dependent variable to an identical variable fielded before the 
election.
133
 The emotional stability coefficients in Model I and III are also significant if ideology 
is added to each regression. 
For extraversion and openness, I expected positive trait effects. My hypotheses are based 
on the following argument and evidence: Individuals high in these traits may not believe that 
political actors and institutions are trustworthy or effective on their own, but the perceived 
quality of the status quo improves once highly extraverted and open citizens consider their own 
role in spurring progress. External efficacy refers to governmental responsiveness to public 
opinion and activism, and the idea of political engagement may trigger the extraversion facets of 
energy and activity and the openness facets of adventurousness and action. The activation of  
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these trait dimensions and the positive anticipated effects are especially likely since extraversion 
and openness have been shown to be positively related to political participation (e.g., Ha et al. 
2013; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).  
These hypotheses receive support in the ANES, with consistent results in Table 3.7 
across levels of support. The substantive effects of both openness and extraversion are especially 
meaningful in Model IV. If the scores for both traits simultaneously increase from 0 to 1 in that 
ANES Subject Pool AB ANES ANES














Model IV:    
People Have 







Openness 0.34+                                  
(0.18)
-0.33                           
(1.10)
-0.43***                        
(0.07)
0.55**                   
(0.19)
0.50*                                       
(0.20)
Conscientiousness -0.69***                              
(0.16)
0.47                            
(0.81)
-0.10+               
(0.06)
-0.40**                              
(0.15)
-0.10                                             
(0.17)
Extraversion 0.63***                                 
(0.18)
-0.44                   
(0.85)
-0.38***                       
(0.07)
0.59***                             
(0.17)
0.14                                         
(0.19)
Agreeableness 0.28                                  
(0.18)
0.31                            
(0.98)
0.09                       
(0.08)
0.24                       
(0.19)
0.44*                                 
(0.21)
Emotional Stability 0.27                                    
(0.17)
0.22                           
(1.02)
0.04                        
(0.08)
0.55**                                  
(0.19)
0.25                               
(0.20)
Female 0.01                          
(0.08)
0.31                                    
(0.28)
-0.02                              
(0.02)
0.02                        
(0.07)
0.01                                   
(0.08)
Age 0.00                                 
(0.00)
-0.05                                    
(0.08)
0.00                        
(0.00)
0.00                        
(0.00)
0.01*                                
(0.00)
White -0.24**                           
(0.08)
-0.37                                
(0.27)
0.03                        
(0.08)
-0.46***                        
(0.08)
-0.43***                         
(0.08)
Education 0.77***                       
(0.12)
-0.49                            
(0.47)
-0.10                             
(0.11)
0.83***                       
(0.11)
0.49***                          
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A 0.01 0.02 N/A N/A
Number of Cases 5,345 205 35,114 5,344 5,339
Number of Countries 1 1 24 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 3.7
Personality and External Efficacy
Actors Institutions
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or 
threshold parameters  are omitted due to variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent 
variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to each survey and 
for an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for 
"AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
102 
 




Meanwhile, I observe opposite trends in the AmericasBarometer results in Table 3.7. 
Openness and extraversion are negatively related to external efficacy. This result from a cross-
national survey suggests that contextual factors may be affecting the activation of openness and 
extraversion. I explore conditional effects of both trait dimensions on external efficacy in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
Having covered the domains of actor and institutional support, I consider the impact of 
personality on attitudes toward regime performance. At its core, regime performance pertains to 
the effectiveness with which political actors and regime institutions implement democratic 
principles, so the hypotheses for perceived job effectiveness are especially relevant for 
procedural support. I thus expect positive effects for agreeableness and emotional stability and 
negative effects for openness and extraversion, although I expressed uncertainty about the impact 
of extraversion on global attitudes toward regime performance.
135
 
Results for regime performance are reported in Table 3.8. The first three models focus on 
global measures of procedural support and the next five on principle-specific evaluations. 
Consistent with expectations, I find support across multiple datasets for the positive anticipated 
effect of agreeableness on overall evaluations of regime performance. These findings indicate 
that results from a student sample apply to a representative U.S. sample, which in turn 
generalizes to a cross-national sample. I also show that agreeable citizens are more likely to  
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 The ANES results for openness and emotional stability also address a potential concern about cross-situational 
consistency. The efficacy items in Models I and IV were asked in the same series of questions, so we might be 
worried about personality effects being consistent across levels due to a battery effect instead of similar trait-
relevant cues. If a battery effect were in play, we might expect identical personality results for all of the Big Five, 
but the openness and emotional stability coefficients are clearly stronger in Model IV than Model I.  
135
 As I stated above, extraverts could expect democracies to be marked by higher levels of responsiveness and 





believe that citizen rights are protected and that votes are counted fairly during elections. In 
addition, the agreeableness coefficient in Model VIII becomes significant if political ideology is 
added to the model. Collectively, the agreeableness results for global and principle-specific 
support offer evidence of within-level cross-situational consistency. 
Likewise, I find that emotional stability exerts a positive and consistent effect on overall 
evaluations in the ANES and evaluations of electoral integrity in the ANES and 
AmericasBarometer. These findings indicate the cross-national applicability of U.S. results and 
support my argument that regime performance opportunities activate a person’s level of anxiety 
and produce positive effects for emotional stability. 
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Model IV:    
Government 


















Openness 0.12                                 
(0.19)
-1.71                            
(1.05)
-0.14+                                
(0.08)
-0.07                        
(0.19)
-0.87                           
(1.09)
-0.34***                              
(0.07)
-0.06                   
(0.20)
-0.13*                             
(0.06)
Conscientiousness -0.28                             
(0.19)
-0.13                               
(0.83)
0.06                         
(0.04)
-0.16                             
(0.16)
1.01                             
(0.85)
-0.05                      
(0.05)
0.39*                         
(0.18)
0.07                          
(0.07)
Extraversion 0.41*                                  
(0.19)
1.19                                
(0.90)
0.01                     
(0.08)
0.11                                     
(0.19)
0.03                               
(0.92)
-0.34***               
(0.07)
0.09                                   
(0.18)
-0.11                                        
(0.08)
Agreeableness 0.47*                       
(0.21)
1.76+                         
(1.04)
0.26***                     
(0.07)
0.21                                    
(0.18)
0.61                               
(0.98)
0.16+               
(0.09)
0.60**                         
(0.19)
0.10                               
(0.09)
Emotional Stability 0.46*                          
(0.19)
-1.03                              
(1.07)
0.16                          
(0.10)
0.01                                   
(0.17)
1.53                                  
(1.06)
0.13                     
(0.09)
0.35+                       
(0.19)
0.17+                    
(0.09)
Female 0.01              
(0.08)
0.05                          
(0.28)
-0.05                            
(0.04)
0.21**                           
(0.07)
-0.48                            
(0.30)
0.04                             
(0.03)
-0.34***                      
(0.08)
-0.09***                       
(0.03)
Age 0.01***                                    
(0.00)
0.01                       
(0.08)
0.00                             
(0.00)
-0.00                                    
(0.00)
0.07                      
(0.09)
-0.00                                
(0.00)
0.01***                  
(0.00)
0.01**           
(0.00)
White -0.57***                                 
(0.08)
0.52+                              
(0.28)
0.07                       
(0.06)
-0.71***                       
(0.08)
0.81**                            
(0.28)
0.11+                     
(0.06)
0.19*                      
(0.08)
0.08*                 
(0.04)
Education 0.23+                                       
(0.13)
0.07                   
(0.48)
-0.06                         
(0.12)
0.58***                            
(0.12)
-0.03                      
(0.50)
-0.20                  
(0.13)
1.19***                     
(0.13)
0.11                        
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A 0.02 0.03 N/A 0.04 0.01 N/A 0.03
Number of Cases 5,304 205 34,430 5,190 205 36,532 5,303 34,092
Number of Countries 1 1 24 1 1 24 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 3.8
Personality and Regime Performance Attitudes
Overall Support Principle-Specific Support
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted due to 
variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to 
each survey and for an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for "AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001      
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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The results in Table 3.8 for extraversion, meanwhile, are a combination of insignificant, 
negative, and positive effects. The one positive effect suggests that ANES respondents focused 
on political efficacy and affect in evaluating overall regime performance, rather than the 
implementation of democratic principles, such as citizen rights and electoral integrity. When the 
questions shift to specific regime principles, however, Model VI suggests that 
AmericasBarometer respondents consider the effectiveness with which distant political actors 
and institutions protect citizen rights, resulting in a negative effect for extraversion. In fact, 
extraversion exerts the largest substantive effect in the model in absolute magnitude. Moving 
from 0 to 1 in this trait dimension decreases the probability of maximum support from 0.07 to 
0.05 (i.e., a reduction of 27.58 percent).  
Consistent with expectations, I also find in the AmericasBarometer that respondents high 
in openness tend to express less overall and principle-specific support for regime performance. In 
addition, the ANES openness coefficient in Model IV becomes significant with the inclusion of 
political ideology, so Models IV and VI offer some evidence that trait effects for the United 
States generalize to other countries. 
Overall, the results for regime performance resemble the personality effects for 
perceptions of job effectiveness at the actor and institutional levels. Agreeableness and emotional 
stability continue to exert positive effects, and the impacts of openness and extraversion are often 
negative. In addition, I observed similar patterns for the trait effects at other domains of actor and 
institutional support, with some exceptions for openness and extraversion. I thus obtain evidence 
of cross-situational consistency for different levels of support and different domains within the 
same level.   
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For conscientiousness, however, Tables 3.3 through 3.8 indicate that I had little need to 
offer a hypothesis for the direct impact of this trait dimension on actor, institutional, and 
procedural support. In the 22 CCES, subject pool, and AmericasBarometer models in Tables 3.3 
through 3.8, the conscientiousness coefficient is statistically significant on only three occasions, 
which barely surpasses what would be expected by chance. In the same tables, the 
conscientiousness coefficients for the ANES are significant in 10 of 16 models, but the results 
tend to follow an ideological and partisan pattern, with negative coefficients for evaluations of 
left-leaning incumbent actors and institutions and positive coefficients for evaluations of right-
leaning opposition actors and institutions. I also find that 6 of these 10 coefficients drop at least 
one significance level or become entirely insignificant when conservative ideology is added to 
the model. Such results contrast with the ideology- and partisan-free theoretical arguments 
offered in this chapter.  
Findings for Democratic Support 
Following the empirical analyses for actors, institutions, and procedures, I examine the 
two major domains of democratic support: abstract preferences for democracy and attitudes 
toward specific regime principles, such as political tolerance and checks and balances. Table 3.9 
reports my results for abstract democratic support. I find, as expected, that individuals high in 
openness and emotional stability tend to endorse democracy over dictatorship. These are the two 
trait dimensions anticipated to exert consistently positive effects on democratic support because 
of the relevance of ideals and the free exchange of ideas to openness and the relevance of 
persistent support for democracy—even during uncertain social circumstances—to emotional 





I also expected to observe positive effects for conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
agreeableness on abstract democratic support given societal norms in favor of elections and the 
relevance of duty, sociability, and compliance to these three trait dimensions, respectively. 
Previous studies of public opinion have reported high levels of abstract democratic support (e.g., 
Bratton and Mattes 2001; Klingemann 1999), and subject pool and AmericasBarometer 
respondents followed suit. For democracy as the best system, the average scores are 3.86 on a 
scale from 1 to 5 for the subject pool and 5.31 on a scale from 1 to 7 for the AmericasBarometer, 
Subject Pool AB AB
Model I:    
Democracy 
Best System
Model II:    
Democracy 
Best System





Openness -0.84                   
(1.03)
0.77***                   
(0.08)
0.41***                           
(0.07)
Conscientiousness 0.16             
(0.84)
0.47***             
(0.07)
-0.10                            
(0.09)
Extraversion 1.00                    
(0.86)
0.40***               
(0.08)
0.11                             
(0.08)
Agreeableness 2.17*                       
(1.01)
0.12                                
(0.11)
-0.00                          
(0.09)
Emotional Stability -1.67                  
(1.06)
0.54***                  
(0.10)
0.25**                   
(0.08)
Female -0.75**              
(0.29)
-0.15***                     
(0.03)
-0.03                          
(0.04)
Age -0.07               
(0.08)
0.02***                     
(0.00)
0.02***                           
(0.00)
White 0.53+                  
(0.27)
0.08                             
(0.06)
0.10                              
(0.08)
Education -0.10                    
(0.47)
0.75***                 
(0.10)
0.71***                     
(0.14)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.03
Number of Cases 205 36,323 35,675
Number of Countries 1 24 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 3.9
Personality and Abstract Democratic Support
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in 
parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted due to 
variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent variables  in 
this  chapter. See the main text for deta i l s  on the methodology speci fic to 
each survey and for an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for 
expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for "AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001     
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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and AmericasBarometer respondents averaged 2.65 on a scale from 1 to 3 for the item on 
democracy over authoritarianism. The positive results for conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
agreeableness in Table 3.9 thus conform to my hypotheses for abstract democratic support. 
Table 3.10 transitions to support for specific regime principles, beginning with attitudes 
toward political dissidents and criminal rights. Consistent with the openness facets of ideas and 
idealism, empirical studies from the United States have reported positive effects of openness on a 
person’s willingness to extend rights to political minorities and criminals (Marcus et al. 1995; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak and Hurwitz 2012; Swami et al. 2012), and the openness 
coefficients in Models I and II replicate those findings in a different U.S. sample and extend the 
results to countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. Aside from education, openness exerts 
the largest effect in both political tolerance models. Switching from 0 to 1 in this trait dimension 
raises the probability of maximum tolerance in the CCES from 0.18 to 0.49 (i.e., an increase of 
170.79 percent), and the same change in openness increases an AmericasBarometer respondent’s 
political tolerance score by 3.11 points on a scale from 4 to 40 (i.e., 8.64 percent of the range). 
Openness does not exert a significant effect on support for criminal rights, however. 
Meanwhile, the results for emotional stability are mildly consistent with the expectation 
of positive trait effects on attitudes toward political dissidents and criminals. Although the trait 
dimension is insignificantly related to political tolerance,
136
  I do observe a positive and 
significant effect of emotional stability on support for criminal rights.  
Next, I anticipated that highly conscientious and agreeable citizens would express less 
democratic support in response to perceived threats to societal order and cohesion from political 
dissidents and criminals. Only the political tolerance models are consistent with my hypotheses;  
                                                 
136
 The insignificant results in Models I and II of Table 3.10 are reflective of the inconsistent findings in previous 






















































































































   
   
   
   
   

































































   
   














































































































































































































































   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




















   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   














   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   




















   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   












   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   














   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































conscientiousness in Model I and agreeableness in Model II are negatively associated with 
extending rights to political minorities.
137
 The direction of the relationship is reversed in Model 
III. Rather than being concerned about criminals, individuals high in conscientiousness and 
agreeableness appear to be afraid of the violation of legal norms and the disruption of societal 
cohesion by unchecked legal authorities.
138
 
Finally, Table 3.10 reports the impact of extraversion on political tolerance and support 
for criminal rights. I expected negative effects due to the possible attraction of extraverts to 
assertive and authoritarian leadership, but the results are mixed. On one hand, extraversion exerts 
a negative effect on adherence to rights for criminals in Model III. On the other hand, extraverts 
in the AmericasBarometer are significantly more likely than their introverted counterparts to 
extend rights to political dissidents. Perhaps extraverts are simply responding to societal norms, 
as we might expect them to do. Citizens do not always endorse political tolerance (Oskarsson 
and Widmalm 2016; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), but the average score in the 
AmericasBarometer was 24.32 on a scale from 4 to 40. Extraverts, therefore, may support 




                                                 
137
 The negative effect of agreeableness on political tolerance contradicts the findings of previous research 
(Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016) but comports with my hypothesis. More research, therefore, is needed to determine 
the exact nature of the relationship between agreeableness and political tolerance. Caution is especially warranted 
because my results in Model II of Table 3.10 could be attributable to the unique measurement of political tolerance 
in the AmericasBarometer. Instead of asking respondents to name their own disliked political group (e.g., Oskarsson 
and Widmalm 2016), the survey asked everyone to consider extending rights to the same group of political 
dissidents. Replication studies are needed to determine whether the impact of agreeableness on political tolerance is 
positive or negative and whether the trait effect is dependent on the measurement of political tolerance.  
138
 The positive effect of conscientiousness on criminal rights attitudes may be surprising given the high concerns 
about crime in my 24-country sample for the AmericasBarometer. (On a scale from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating more perceived threat of crime to the nation, the mean was 0.83.) However, the positive impact could be 
due to the low level of support for the justice system in the Americas: Only about 40 percent of respondents held a 
positive view of the judicial system being able to punish someone who was guilty of a crime. Such a dim perspective 
of law enforcement could reduce the perceived ability of extralegal policing to achieve order. 
139
 Apparently, however, extraverts are willing to contradict the majority of their fellow citizens on the issue of 
support for criminal rights. The average score for that dependent variable is 0.61 on a dichotomous scale from 0 to 1. 
Perhaps the disconnect between political tolerance and support for criminal rights is based on the rise in crime and 
concerns about crime in recent years in Latin America (Cruz 2009; Krause 2013). In the 16 Latin American 
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Future work should investigate the relationship between extraversion and political 
tolerance given the inconsistency between my results and previous findings (Marcus et al. 1995; 
Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016). Yet even prior studies offer support for my normative 
explanation. Marcus et al. report that extraversion is negatively associated with political 
tolerance, but their results are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls (Marcus et al. 
1995). In addition, average levels of political tolerance are above the midpoint in the Marcus et 
al. study. Meanwhile, average political tolerance levels fall well below the midpoint in 
Oskarsson and Widmalm’s research,
140




In addition to political minorities and criminals, I consider attitudes toward majority 
rights and mass participation in Table 3.10. I expect positive effects from all of the Big Five for 
approval of mass participation. For openness, mass participation constitutes one means by which 
citizens express their ideas to government officials. Individuals high in emotional stability also 
should be unconcerned about the impact of citizens utilizing their rights to protest, campaign, or 
organize. For their part, conscientious and agreeable citizens may feel a duty to comply with 
societal norms in favor of mass participation, and extraverts may approve of such behavior since 
they are more likely to participate in politics and since they prefer to avoid social sanctions. 
Scores from AmericasBarometer respondents indicate a normative climate in favor of mass 
participation in the Western Hemisphere, as the average score for the dependent variable in 
Model IV is 22.10 on a scale from 3 to 30.  
                                                                                                                                                             
countries included in my study of the AmericasBarometer, 28.78 percent of citizens identified crime and 
delinquency, security, violence, drug trafficking, gangs, or terrorism as the most important national problem. 
140
 Respondents in Oskarsson and Widmalm’s (2016) study had the opportunity to tolerate two actions by a disliked 
group, but less than 25 percent were willing to permit at least one activity.  
141
 In their study of personality and democratic support, Swami et al. (2012) report low means on an index of 
political intolerance and opposition to criminal rights. These means would indicate that extraversion would be 
negatively related to antidemocratic attitudes, and this is what Swami et al. find, although the significant correlation 
is not robust in a multivariate regression.  
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The results in Table 3.10 comport with expectations. Higher levels of openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability all facilitate greater 
approval of mass participation. Simultaneously moving from 0 to 1 on all five trait dimensions 
would increase one’s mass participation score by 6.75 points on a scale from 3 to 30 (i.e., 24.99 
percent of the range). 
Support for democracy encompasses not just the relationship between citizens and 
government but also the connections between political institutions. The next four dependent 
variables in Table 3.10 focus on checks and balances between the executive and other 
government branches. As expected, high levels of openness and emotional stability are positively 
related to support for inter-branch balance. The emotional stability result in Model V likely 
stems from individuals high in that trait dimension being relatively unconcerned about minor 
inter-branch disagreements, and the openness results in Models V and VIII are consistent with 
the preference of highly open individuals for the free exchange of ideas among political elites 
and government institutions.  
Table 3.10 also shows that individuals high in conscientiousness and extraversion are 
more supportive of checks and balances in the AmericasBarometer. Social norms in favor of 
orderly elite decision-making could have influenced the results, as the average score for the 
dependent variable in Model V is 15.00 on a scale from 3 to 21. 
Meanwhile, in Model VII highly extraverted and agreeable citizens express less 
opposition to executive orders. The coefficient for extraversion is not significant in Table 3.10 
but gains significance if ideology is added to the model.
142
 The results for extraversion and 
agreeableness could be attributable to three factors at work in subject pool respondents. First, 
highly extraverted and agreeable individuals may be less opposed to executive orders because 
                                                 
142
 Extraversion also becomes negative and significant in Model VIII if ideology is added to the regression. 
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they understand that issuing executive orders is more socially acceptable than ignoring the 
Supreme Court. The mean levels of democratic support are 3.92 for the Supreme Court item and 
3.24 for the executive order item on a possible 1-to-5 scale with higher scores indicating more 
positive attitudes toward checks and balances. Second, highly agreeable respondents may have 
perceived executive orders as a fairly benign solution to bring order to inter-branch disagreement 
and unity to government decision-making. Third, the mention of executive orders could have 
triggered the extraversion facet of assertiveness because issuing these orders would be more 
aggressive for the president than policy inertia or acquiescence to Congress.  
The final regime principle in Table 3.10 continues to focus on political institutions. In 
Model IX, the dependent variable is opposition to military coups during difficult times in society. 
Consistent with the findings for other regime principles, individuals high in openness and 
emotional stability express more support for civilian government. After education and age,
143
 
openness and emotional stability exert the greatest positive substantive impact on opposition to 
military coups.
144
 Moving from 0 to 1 in both trait dimensions collectively raises the probability 
of maximum democratic support from 0.43 to 0.57 (i.e., an increase of 32.08 percent). The 
proposed mechanism for the openness result again pertains to the activation of the ideas and 
idealism facets, for the military option undercuts freedom of expression in the selection of rulers 
and therefore would be unappealing to individuals high in this trait dimension. For emotional 
stability, individuals high in this trait will be less likely to worry about the ultimate ability of 
elected officials to address problems like corruption, crime, and unemployment. Suspending 
democracy would be unnecessary in response to such issues.  
                                                 
143
 The coefficient for age in Model IX exceeds the coefficient for education if age is coded from 0 to 1.  
144




Meanwhile, conscientiousness and agreeableness are negatively associated with 
opposition to military coups in response to unsettling societal conditions. The results are 
consistent with expectations because both trait dimensions are sensitive to violations of order. 
Individuals high in conscientiousness and agreeableness appear willing to sacrifice democratic 
governance in order to achieve social stability and temporary consensus.  
Three general findings emerge from my results for democratic support. First, the 
openness coefficient is positive and significant in 8 of the 12 democratic support regressions in 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10. These results suggest consistency in trait-relevant cues for openness for 
abstract attitudes and multiple regime principles. Moreover, the evidence for democratic 
support—coupled with the results for actors, institutions, and procedures—indicates that high 
levels of openness encourage people to be “critical citizens” who endorse democracy but express 
dissatisfaction with the political status quo (Norris 1999a, 2011). 
Second, high levels of emotional stability facilitate abstract democratic support and 
positive views toward most regime principles. Again, I obtain evidence of similar trait-relevant 
cues and cross-situational consistency for the various domains of democratic support. 
Furthermore, my results for emotional stability speak to Sniderman’s (1975) research on the 
related concept of self-esteem.
145
 Sniderman observes that high levels of self-esteem promote 
political tolerance and support for procedural rights in the fight against crime. Although my 
findings for political tolerance are insignificant, I do show that emotionally stable citizens 
express significantly greater support for criminal rights and for other democratic attitudes. I thus 
apply Sniderman’s work to the predominant personality framework in contemporary psychology 
research: the Big Five. In addition, the AmericasBarometer results generalize Sniderman’s 
findings from the United States to a cross-national sample. 
                                                 
145
 Robins et al. (2001b) find a positive and significant relationship between emotional stability and self-esteem. 
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Third, trait effects are more heterogeneous for conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
agreeableness. When social norms favor democracy, individuals high in these trait dimensions 
exhibit greater endorsement of regime principles than individuals low in these trait dimensions. 
But when norms begin to turn against democracy (i.e., executive order attitudes in the subject 
pool) or when support opportunities emphasize assertive leadership and threats to order, highly 
conscientious, extraverted, and agreeable citizens retreat from regime principles. Individuals 
high in these trait dimensions thus appear to be susceptible to antidemocratic arguments that 
appeal to preferences for strong leadership and political stability.   
Findings for Community Support 
 The final level in Norris’ (1999a, 2011) framework is the political community. Extant 
research has utilized student samples to examine the impact of personality on national 
identification (Jenkins et al. 2012; Sagiv et al. 2012). I build on prior work by incorporating 
nationally representative samples and by studying patriotism, the other domain of community 
support. Furthermore, I expect similar trait-relevant cues and consistent trait effects for both 
domains of community support since patriotism and national identification involve self-
expression (Klingemann 1999), relate to a person’s emotions (Roccas et al. 2008), and receive 
high normative endorsement by the public (Jenkins et al. 2012; Klingemann 1999).
146
 Indeed, 




                                                 
146
 I also would expect consistent trait-relevant cues across domains because all of the community support questions 
are asked at the same point in the subject pool and because three of the four questions are asked at the same point in 
the ANES. At the same time, I should note that the patriotism items in the subject pool are more strongly correlated 
with each other than either is with the national identification item, and the correlation between the patriotism items 
in the ANES is stronger than the correlation between either of the patriotism items and the national identification 
item asked at a different point in the survey. (The correlations between each of the ANES patriotism items and the 
contemporaneously asked national identification item, however, are higher than the correlation between the two 
patriotism items.)     
147




 Table 3.11 reports my findings for both domains of community support. I expected 
negative effects for openness as individuals high in this trait dimension hesitate to endorse 
traditional attitudes such as patriotism and national identification. As anticipated, openness 
exerts a negative and significant effect in three of five models.
148
 The results apply across 
                                                 
148
 The main contrary result is the positive and significant openness coefficient in Model V, but this coefficient 
ceases to be significant if I control for a person’s general tendency to provide extreme responses to opinion 
questions on the AmericasBarometer. Openness tends to promote extreme responding to survey questions (Hibbing 
ANES Subject Pool ANES Subject Pool AB

















Openness -0.38*                     
(0.18)
-1.40                            
(1.06)
-0.31*                     
(0.16)
-2.98**                       
(0.93)
0.27*                     
(0.12)
Conscientiousness 1.08***                   
(0.15)
-0.12                        
(0.82)
0.54***                    
(0.13)
1.11                      
(0.72)
0.83***                         
(0.09)
Extraversion 1.09***                      
(0.19)
0.20                        
(0.85)
0.94***                      
(0.16)
1.44+                    
(0.76)
0.66***                       
(0.11)
Agreeableness 0.86***                             
(0.18)
2.58**                       
(0.99)
0.66***                       
(0.15)
1.21                     
(0.87)
1.08***                       
(0.09)
Emotional Stability 0.11                                
(0.16)
0.21                          
(1.02)
0.27*                       
(0.13)
0.24                      
(0.91)
0.19                        
(0.17)
Female -0.01                      
(0.06)
-0.67*                              
(0.28)
0.02                            
(0.06)
-0.57*                           
(0.25)
-0.12***               
(0.03)
Age 0.03***                      
(0.00)
0.09                        
(0.09)
0.02***                      
(0.00)
0.02                   
(0.08)
0.01***                      
(0.00)
White 0.12                   
(0.08)
0.77**                     
(0.26)
0.32***                         
(0.07)
0.71**              
(0.24)
-0.03                                 
(0.05)
Education -0.28*                            
(0.11)
-0.32                           
(0.48)
-0.27**                      
(0.10)
0.49                              
(0.43)
-0.69***                 
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.07
Number of Cases 5,339 205 5,318 205 37,588
Number of Countries 1 1 1 1 24
Method of Estimation OLS Ordinal OLS OLS Ordinal
Table 3.11
Personality and Political Community Support
National Identification Patriotism
Note: Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or 
threshold parameters  are omitted due to variation in the number of thresholds  for some dependent 
variables  in this  chapter. See the main text for detai l s  on the methodology speci fic to each survey 
and for an explanation about any "N/A" entries  in the row for expla ined variance. "AB" s tands  for 
"AmericasBarometer." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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domains of community support and for the subject pool and ANES in Models III and IV, 
implying that similar psychological processes are at work in college students and in the U.S. 
population as a whole. The impact of this trait dimension is especially strong in Model IV, where 
the coefficient for openness exceeds all others in absolute magnitude by nearly 1.54 points on a 
scale from 2 to 10. Moving from 0 to 1 in openness would reduce a person’s level of reported 
patriotism by 2.98 points, which amounts to 37.19 percent of the range of the scale. 
 The other results in Table 3.11 are also consistent with my hypotheses. Social norms in 
favor of community support played a major role in my theoretical arguments for 
conscientiousness due to the facet of dutifulness, extraversion due to the facet of sociability, and 
agreeableness due to the facet of compliance. In addition, highly conscientious individuals may 
find order in attaching themselves to traditional political attitudes such as national identification 
and patriotism, highly extraverted individuals may express their tendency toward positive 
emotions by communicating positive feelings about the political community, and highly 
agreeable individuals may love and identify with their country because of the activation of the 
warmth facet of this trait dimension. Consistent with these arguments, I observe positive and 
significant effects for conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness for both domains of 
community support and for at least two different surveys.  
 Likewise, Table 3.11 offers some evidence for the positive expected relationship between 
emotional stability and community support. In particular, Model III shows that individuals high 
in emotional stability tended to express more patriotism in the ANES. This finding is consistent 
with my argument that community support opportunities would activate a person’s level of 
anxiety and produce a positive effect for emotional stability as individuals high in this trait 
                                                                                                                                                             
et al. n.d.), and perhaps social norms in favor of patriotism led to more extreme positive answers than extreme 
negative answers. Indeed, the coefficient for extreme response style is positive and highly significant. For more on 
the implications of the personality–response style relationship for this chapter, see Appendix C. 
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dimension choose not to worry about a national community about which they know only a part. 
The muted results for the other models, however, suggest that additional research is needed to 
clarify the relationship between emotional stability and community support. 
 The results in Table 3.11 reveal the following points. First, the findings mostly comport 
with my expectations for all five dimensions of the Big Five. Second, I observe evidence of 
within-level cross-situational consistency in the effects of personality on national identification 
and patriotism. Except for emotional stability, results are generally similar across the domains of 
community support.  
Combining the Evidence across Levels 
 Table 3.12 summarizes the evidence across levels for cross-situational consistency. I 
expected broadly homogeneous trait effects within and across the actor, institutional, and 
procedural levels of support. Results from the ANES, CCES, subject pool, and 
AmericasBarometer generally comport with my hypotheses, as the effects for openness and 
extraversion tend to be negative and the effects for agreeableness and emotional stability tend to 
be positive. Patterns generally hold for each level of political support. The most consistent results 
both within and across levels are for agreeableness and emotional stability: In the 38 actor, 
institutional, and procedural models, the agreeableness coefficient was positive and significant 
19 times but negative and significant 0 times, and the emotional stability coefficient was positive 
and significant 13 times but negative and significant only 2 times. Meanwhile, the openness 
coefficient was negative and significant in 14 of 38 models and positive and significant in just 8 
of 38 models, and the extraversion coefficient was negative and significant in 11 of 35 models 
and positive and significant in only 7 of 35 models.
149
 Using the 0.10 level of statistical  
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 The lower number of models is due to my uncertainty about the impact of extraversion on overall support for 




significance as a guide, we might only expect 10 percent of the coefficients (i.e., about 4 
coefficients) to be statistically significant by chance in either the positive or negative direction, 
so the number of significant coefficients in the expected direction is fairly substantial.  
 Compared with the results for actor, institutional, and procedural support, some of the 
trait effects for democratic support are noticeably different. The fourth panel of Table 3.12 shows 
that openness is positively and consistently associated with support for regime principles in 8 of 
12 models, whereas the trait effect tends to be negative in the first three panels. Likewise, the 
modal effects for extraversion (agreeableness) shift from negative (positive) in the status quo 
models to positive (neutral) in the democratic support models. The significant results for 
conscientiousness and democratic attitudes in the AmericasBarometer and CCES also contrast 
with the largely insignificant trait effects on actor, institutional, and procedural support in the 
same two surveys.  
 The unique findings for democratic support comport with expectations, as I hypothesized 
that opportunities to endorse regime principles convey different trait-relevant cues than 
opportunities to embrace current political leaders, government agencies, and regime 
performance. In particular, regime principles pertain to ideals as opposed to instrumental 
evaluations of contemporary public affairs (Klingemann 1999), and social norms differ for the 
two sets of attitudes. Citizens understand that criticism of actors, institutions, and procedures is 
+/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs
Openness 5 4 17 3 7 13 0 3 8 8 0 12 1 3 5
Conscientiousness --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 2 12 3 0 5
Extraversion 3 5 17 4 5 13 0* 1* 5* 4 1 12 4 0 5
Agreeableness 7 0 17 7 0 13 5 0 8 3 3 12 4 0 5
Emotional Stability 3 2 17 7 0 13 3 0 8 6 0 12 1 0 5
Table 3.12
Evidence of Cross-Situational Consistency: Significant Coefficients across Levels of Political Support
A. Political Actors B. Regime Institutions C. Regime Performance D. Regime Principles E. Political Community
Note: Entries  are based on Tables  3.3 through 3.11. The fi rs t two columns  in each panel  are the number of coefficients  for a  particular level  of pol i tica l  
support that are pos i tive/s igni ficant and negative/s igni ficant, respectively. The third column is  the total  number of dependent variables  for a  level  of 
support. Conscientiousness  results  are omitted for actor, insti tutional , and performance levels  because no hypotheses  for this  tra i t dimens ion were 




socially acceptable (e.g., Citrin 1974; Dalton 1999), but negative norms do not apply to all 
domains of democratic support (e.g., Dalton 1999; Kulkinski et al. 1991).  
 In spite of these differences across levels, one common theme is the importance of 
personality as a predictor of political support. The first three panels of Table 3.12 reveal that 
traits are more significant than would be expected by chance in models of actor, institutional, and 
procedural attitudes. We could make the same observation for personality and democratic 
support in the fourth panel of Table 3.12. Of the five trait dimensions, openness and emotional 
stability are the most consistent for democratic support, with 75 percent and 50 percent of 
coefficients being positive and significant, respectively.  
 Within the democratic support level, I also find evidence of heterogeneous trait effects. 
The number of positive and significant agreeableness coefficients equals the number of negative 
and significant agreeableness coefficients, and results for conscientiousness and extraversion 
also are somewhat mixed.
150
 Such diverse findings for personality correspond with recent 
observations that different attitudinal and demographic characteristics predict support for various 
attitudes toward democracy (Canache 2012; Carlin and Singer 2011). Democratic support, 
therefore, is a multifaceted concept, and distinct opportunities to endorse regime principles will 
convey unique trait-relevant cues. 
 Finally, Table 3.12 summarizes my results for the link between personality and attitudes 
toward the political community. Personality effects are generally consistent for national 
identification and patriotism, with the sole exception of openness in the AmericasBarometer. The 
number of significant coefficients for each trait dimension is also greater than would be expected 
by chance.  
                                                 
150
 This point is truer for extraversion when we remember that the effects on opposition to executive orders are 
negative and significant when ideology is included in Models VII and VIII of Table 3.10. If we add these negative 
effects to Table 3.12, the ratio of positive-to-negative extraversion results would be 4–3. 
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 Across levels, I expected trait effects for community support to differ from trait effects 
for other attitudes toward the political system. Again, I based my reasoning on the distinct 
purpose and norms associated with patriotism and national identification. In particular, trait-
relevant cues could originate in the self-expressive nature of community support or the social 
expectation that people would love and identify with their country. The other levels of support, 
by contrast, are centered on instrumental or idealistic purposes (Klingemann 1999) and are 
subject to different norms (e.g., Dalton 1999; Mondak and Hurwitz 2012; Oskarsson and 
Widmalm 2016).  
 As anticipated, some of the trait effects for community support diverge sharply from 
results for the other levels. For openness (agreeableness), the negative (positive) coefficients in 
the patriotism and national identification models resemble the pattern for actor, institutional, and 
procedural support, rather than the positive (mixed) results in the nearby level of democratic 
support. The impact of conscientiousness on community attitudes, meanwhile, is no longer 
insignificant as was often observed at the actor, institutional, and performance levels, nor is it 
somewhat mixed as was observed for the regime principle level. Instead, conscientiousness 
exerts a consistently positive effect on patriotism and national identification. Consistently 
positive effects for extraversion are also unique in the political community models, for the 
coefficients are no longer negative in the first three panels of Table 3.12 or somewhat mixed in 
the fourth panel of Table 3.12. Only the positive coefficient for emotional stability resembles the 
positive results for all previous levels of support.  
 In sum, the evidence generally comports with the hypothesis of cross-situational 
consistency across levels. With the actor and institutional levels, however, openness and 




as much due to unique trait-relevant cues associated with external efficacy and political affect. 
Because of the citizen influence component of external efficacy, I anticipated that the effects of 
openness and extraversion might be positive, and extraversion could have a positive impact on 
political affect because of the connection between this trait dimension and positive emotions. In 
short, the domains of external efficacy and political affect could convey distinct trait-relevant 
cues for openness and extraversion. 
 To explore heterogeneous effects, I conducted separate examinations of cross-situational 
consistency for the four domains of actor and institutional support. Table 3.13 reports the results. 
As expected, openness tends to be positively related to external efficacy but negatively related to 
political trust, job evaluations, and affective support.
151
 The number of significant and expected 
coefficients in each domain is greater than would be expected by chance. We also observe the 
expected pattern for extraversion. This trait dimension tends to exert a positive effect on 
affective support and external efficacy but a negative effect on political trust and job evaluations.  
                                                 
151
 In contrast to actor and institutional support, I expected to observe consistent openness effects for both domains 
of regime performance support. As noted in the discussion of Table 3.8 above, at least one openness coefficient is 
negative and significant for overall and principle-specific procedural attitudes. The same pattern emerges for 
emotional stability but with positive trait effects, and at least two of the agreeableness coefficients are positive and 
significant in both domains. By contrast, extraversion is positively related to overall support and negatively related 
to principle-specific support. Such inconsistency is not unexpected given the indeterminate nature of my hypothesis 
for extraversion and overall procedural attitudes. I should note that all of the within-level cross-situational 
consistency results for regime performance are more frequent than would be expected by chance. 
+/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs +/Sig -/Sig # of DVs
Openness 0 2 4 3 5 13 2 3 8 3 1 5
Conscientiousness --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Extraversion 0 1 4 1 7 13 4 1 8 2 1 5
Agreeableness 3 0 4 6 0 13 4 0 8 1 0 5
Emotional Stability 2 0 4 4 2 13 3 0 8 1 0 5
Table 3.13
Note: Entries  are based on Tables  3.3 through 3.7. The fi rs t two columns  in each panel  are the number of coefficients  for a  
particular domain of actor and insti tutional  support that are pos i tive/s igni ficant and negative/s igni ficant, respectively. The 
third column is  the total  number of dependent variables  for a  domain of support. Conscientiousness  results  are omitted 
because no hypotheses  for this  tra i t dimens ion were offered for actor and insti tutional  support. 
Evidence of Cross-Situational Consistency: Significant Coefficients across Domains of Actor and 
Institutional Support




Again, the number of significant and expected coefficients in each domain is greater than what 
we would expect by chance.  
 Meanwhile, the agreeableness and emotional stability results in Table 3.13 are much 
more consistent across the domains of actor and institutional support. In all domains, the positive 
and significant coefficients outnumber any negative and significant coefficients, and the number 
of significant and expected coefficients in each domain is always greater than what would be 
expected by chance. Trait-relevant cues for agreeableness and emotional stability thus appear to 
be similar for the various domains of actor and institutional attitudes.  
 Table 3.14 summarizes the evidence for my hypotheses on cross-situational consistency. 
Overall, I observe similar trait effects for comparable forms of political support and dissimilar 
trait effects for less comparable forms of political support. Results are generally consistent with 
expectations. 
 In addition, Table 3.15 reviews the evidence for my hypotheses on the Big Five. Results 
generally comport with expectations. Individuals high in openness tend to criticize the political 
status quo, support democracy, and express less patriotism and national identification. Highly 
open people are the quintessential “critical citizens” (Norris 1999a, 2011). Conscientiousness 
matters more for democratic and community attitudes than for attitudes toward actors, 
institutions, and procedures. For opinions on regime principles, the driving factor is the  
Level Trait Effects Within Level Supported? Trait Effects Across Levels Supported?
Political Actors Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects Yes
Regime Institutions Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects Yes
Regime Performance Broadly Homogeneous Trait Effects Yes
Regime Principles Heterogeneous Trait Effects Yes Different Trait Effects Than 
Other Levels of Support 
Yes
Political Community Homogeneous Trait Effects Yes Different Trait Effects Than 
Other Levels of Support 
Yes
Table 3.14
Hypotheses on Cross-Situational Consistency: Summary of Evidence
Trait Effects Broadly Similar for 
Actor, Institutional, and 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































implications of the support opportunity for the conscientiousness facets of order and dutifulness, 
but this trait dimension is consistently and positively related to community support. Meanwhile, 
the impact of extraversion is somewhat heterogeneous for actor, institutional, procedural, and 
democratic attitudes, as expected, but the effect is more consistent for community support. The 
story is somewhat simpler for agreeableness. Consistent with my hypotheses, I show that 
agreeable individuals are more supportive of actors, institutions, procedures, and the political 
community, but the effect on regime principles depends on the support opportunity’s connection 
to norms, societal consensus, and order. The account is even more straightforward for emotional 
stability. Although the effects of this trait dimension on community attitudes are fairly weak, I 
find that citizens high in emotional stability, compared with citizens low in emotional stability, 
express more support for the political system at each level.  
 A final point pertains to the generalizability of my findings across studies. As noted 
above, the surveys differ in terms of variable operationalization, interview format, timing, and 
geographic location. Consistent findings across studies would minimize concerns about survey-
specific factors being responsible for my results. In addition, few studies on personality and 
political support expand beyond economically developed democracies,
152
 so it is empirically 
important to demonstrate that my results from the United States travel to the diverse set of 
countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer.  
 Therefore, I have identified 12 AmericasBarometer dependent variables in this chapter 
with conceptual matches in at least one U.S. survey. An example would be the global executive 
approval items in the ANES, CCES, and AmericasBarometer.
153
 In the 12 AmericasBarometer 
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 The two exceptions of which I am aware are Mondak et al. (2017) and Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016). 
153
 The other AmericasBarometer dependent variables with a conceptual match to my U.S. survey data are the 
institutional trust index (subject pool), approval of the national legislature (ANES and CCES), issue-specific 
executive approval (ANES and subject pool), actor external efficacy (ANES and subject pool), democratic 
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models, a total of 38 personality coefficients are statistically significant,
154
 and 13 of these 38 
coefficients have at least one match in the ANES, CCES, or subject pool that is significant and in 
the same direction. For instance, agreeableness is positively and significantly related to global 
executive approval in the AmericasBarometer, ANES, and CCES. I thus conclude that findings 
from the United States are applicable in a cross-national sample.  
 I adopted a similar approach with the subject pool in order to determine whether results 
from a student sample in the United States apply to the country as a whole. In total, I identified 
10 subject pool dependent variables with a conceptual match in the ANES; an example would be 
the two indices of actor trust in Table 3.3.
155,156
 A total of 10 personality coefficients in the 10 
subject pool models are significant,
157
 and 9 of these 10 coefficients correspond with their ANES 
coefficient in significance and direction. Results from a student sample thus appear to be 
generalizable to a broader national sample.
158
 
                                                                                                                                                             
satisfaction (ANES and subject pool), citizen rights being protected (ANES and subject pool), trust in the electoral 
process (ANES), democracy as the best system (subject pool), the political tolerance index (CCES), support for 
checks and balances (Supreme Court and executive order items in subject pool), and patriotism (ANES and subject 
pool). 
154
 The total of 38 refers to all personality coefficients, even if I have not offered a hypothesis for a particular trait–
support relationship. 
155
 The 10 matches are as follows: the index of actor trust, issue-specific executive approval, the feeling 
thermometer index for Democrats, the feeling thermometer index for Republicans, institutional affect, actor external 
efficacy, democratic satisfaction, citizen rights being protected, national identification, and the patriotism index. 
156
 There were no conceptual matches between the dependent variables for the subject pool and those for the CCES. 
157
 The total of 10 refers to all personality coefficients, even if I have not offered a hypothesis for a particular trait–
support relationship. 
158
 I reviewed the results in this chapter with two additional robustness checks. In one robustness check, I examined 
whether the personality results for actor support change when respondents affiliate with the incumbent party or 
voted for the current incumbent in the most recent election. I focused on actor support because the impact of partisan 
bias can change from election to election depending on which politicians from which parties obtain office, whereas 
other aspects of the political system are less related to the current party in power. Political institutions, regime 
principles, and the political community exist regardless of the party of the current government. Different parties may 
hold different priorities for regime performance, but even these differences may be limited in practice because of 
institutional constraints (e.g., a recalcitrant bureaucracy). Regarding the results of this robustness check, very few 
personality coefficients changed from significant to insignificant or vice versa with the addition of a political bias 
variable. In the second robustness check, I investigated whether the personality results could be due not to 
substantive considerations but instead to the relationship between personality traits and survey response styles, 
namely the tendencies to provide extreme responses to opinion questions and to acquiesce on agree–disagree or 
approve–disapprove items. I examined the issue by controlling for survey response styles in models in which the 
dependent variable could be subject to extreme response style or acquiescence response style. Few personality 
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Conclusions and Implications 
This chapter has addressed the disconnected state of the personality and support 
literature. Extant research normally concentrates on particular attitudes and thereby ignores 
questions about a broader theory that could explain trait effects within and across multiple forms 
of support. To fill the gap, I have emphasized trait activation theory as a comprehensive model of 
the impact of personality on attitudes toward the political system. I developed expectations for 
the influence of each trait dimension within as well as across the five levels of Norris’ (1999a, 
2011) framework, and then I tested these expectations with novel and traditional political support 
outcomes. Across four different surveys and multiple forms of political support, I found broadly 
consistent results in support of my model. Trait activation theory thus appears to function as a 
comprehensive framework capable of achieving integrative and additive cumulation by 
accounting for past and new observations (Lave and March 1975; Zinnes 1976). This chapter 
also makes an empirical contribution to the personality literature by studying political support in 
a cross-national setting and by generalizing my results from the United States to the diverse set 
of countries surveyed in the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Most studies on personality and support 
utilize data solely from economically developed countries (e.g., Freitag and Ackermann 2016; 
Swami et al. 2012). 
The results from the ANES, CCES, subject pool, and AmericasBarometer provide 
evidence of cross-situational consistency. I expected citizens to receive similar trait-relevant cues 
from actor, institutional, and procedural support opportunities because of the association of these 
levels with instrumental evaluations of the status quo (Klingemann 1999), and I found broadly 
consistent personality effects across these three levels of political support. High levels of 
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficients changed from significant to insignificant or vice versa. Details and results for both robustness checks are 
available in Appendix C. 
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agreeableness and emotional stability tend to promote more positive attitudes, whereas high 
levels of openness and, to some extent, extraversion encourage more pessimistic evaluations.  
Meanwhile, conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness exert positive and 
negative effects on democratic support, as expected. In some cases, individuals high in these trait 
dimensions may be susceptible to antidemocratic arguments favoring assertive leadership and 
societal order and unity. The positive effects of openness and emotional stability, meanwhile, are 
more consistent across the domains of democratic support. 
The final object of support is the political community. I find strong evidence for positive 
effects for conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness and some evidence for a negative 
openness effect and a positive emotional stability effect. These findings are generally consistent 
for both national identification and patriotism attitudes. 
Collectively, my findings suggest ways in which political elites could tailor their 
communications to appeal to individuals with particular personality characteristics. Because 
messages that appeal to citizens at one pole of a trait dimension are likely to repel citizens at the 
other pole, politicians and nongovernmental organizations must target their communications 
based on the personality traits of their audience. Gerber and his colleagues (2011b) report, for 
example, that Americans high in openness are more likely to obtain their news online and watch 
political satire shows on television, and individuals low in openness tend to prefer local news. 
Therefore, to increase support for incumbent candidates, institutions, and procedures among 
individuals high (low) in openness, politicians could emphasize the administration’s adherence to 
democratic principles (adherence to longstanding party policies) in interviews with online outlets 
and political satire hosts (local television networks). Messages such as these should appeal to 
citizens generally predisposed to oppose (support) current actors, institutions, and procedures. 
128 
 
Likewise, political elites could increase support for democratic principles among highly open 
citizens by stressing the free exchange of ideas in online and satire forums and among less open 
citizens by highlighting the country’s democratic longevity on local news.  
Communication strategies apply to more trait dimensions than openness. For example, 
Gerber et al. (2011b) find that high levels of conscientiousness increase the probability of 
watching political talk shows on television but decrease one’s interest in political satire. To 
reinforce (counteract) the relatively strong (weak) levels of patriotism among individuals high 
(low) in conscientiousness,
159
 political elites could appear on political talk (satire) shows, 
discussing the national loyalty of citizens in the political community (the diverse racial and 
ethnic backgrounds of citizens in the political community). Messages about loyalty (diversity) 
should resonate with the high (low) level of dutifulness (orderliness) that is characteristic of 
individuals who are high (low) in conscientiousness.  
Such targeted messaging has implications for citizen competence. By communicating 
with audiences based on their personality traits, politicians and nongovernmental organizations 
can influence political support levels in the population and thereby increase rates of political 
participation, enhancing the ability of the public to address collective problems and hold elected 
officials accountable.  
Elite messaging invokes the vital role of trait-relevant cues in one’s media context. In this 
chapter, I largely have ignored the political environment in order to concentrate on the role of 
trait activation theory for understanding the direct impact of personality on political support, but 
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 Mean levels of patriotism are high in the ANES, subject pool, and AmericasBarometer, but there is still room for 
growth among individuals low and high in conscientiousness. In the ANES, for example, more than 56 percent (67 




my model also accounts for the interaction of personality and context. I turn to conditional 


























THE CONDITIONAL LINK FROM PERSONALITY TO POLITICAL SUPPORT—PART 1: 
INCORPORATING CONTEXTUAL PERCEPTIONS 
 
 Individuals receive trait-relevant cues from multiple sources. As Chapter 3 noted, one 
origin of such signals is the political support opportunity; I found, for example, that political trust 
and job approval items activate extraversion and produce negative trait effects. My results 
indicate that extraverts are responding to the impersonal aspects of the political status quo, for 
political actors, institutions, and procedures are more distant to citizens than their interpersonal 
networks of family, friends, and acquaintances. 
 But the political support opportunity is not the only originator of trait-relevant 
information. The broader political, economic, and social environment may facilitate personality 
effects by emphasizing the extraversion facet of sociability, the openness facet of ideas, or other 
facets of the Big Five trait dimensions. Social norms, for instance, may attract the attention of 
extraverts because of their interest in the opinions of other people. 
 Trait-relevant cues differ across time and space due to contextual differences from one 
sample to another. To continue with the previous example, cross-survey variation in the 
compliance of public officials with social norms could produce positive extraversion effects on 
actor support in one study, negative extraversion effects in a second study, and insignificant 
extraversion effects in a third study. Unique information across contexts, therefore, can yield 
inconsistent direct effects of personality.  
 Such divergent results can appear puzzling in the absence of a model on person–situation 
interactions. Trait activation theory (TAT) (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000), 
however, promises to account for heterogeneous personality effects by emphasizing the trait-
relevant cues emitted by low, medium, or high levels of a contextual variable. In this chapter, I 
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respond to four empirical puzzles in the extant literature on the direct effects of personality on 
attitudes toward the political system. The inconsistent trait effects pertain to multiple dimensions 
of the Big Five and to multiple levels of political support, and the environmental factors under 
consideration are based on actual contextual differences across surveys in previous research. For 
example, two studies have identified divergent effects of conscientiousness on status quo 
attitudes by drawing on U.S. survey data collected in two noticeably distinct economic contexts: 
2005 during a period of reasonably strong economic growth (Mondak and Halperin 2008) and 
2012 during the aftermath of the Great Recession (Cawvey et al. n.d.). Using TAT, I explain how 
levels of economic growth interact with conscientiousness to produce heterogeneous trait effects. 
I follow the same approach for the other three puzzles and formally test my hypotheses on 
conditional trait effects with U.S. and cross-national survey data. 
 The present chapter represents a first step in resolving empirical puzzles on the direct 
effects of personality on political support. I also explore inconsistent trait effects in the next 
chapter by examining person–situation interactions. The primary difference between chapters is 
that the current one relies on perceptual measures of a person’s context and the next one utilizes 
objective measures of a person’s context. 
 This dissertation incorporates both perceptual and objective measures in order to 
capitalize on their advantages and offset their disadvantages. Because of their external character, 
objective factors avoid the possibility that perceptions are simply a function of an individual’s 
personality traits. Such a scenario would violate the causal order proposed by TAT, with cues 
activating traits and traits influencing attitudes and behavior. Meanwhile, contextual perceptions 
avoid the possibility of individuals ignoring objective information. Extant applications of TAT in 
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occupational psychology also have utilized subjective contextual measures (e.g., Botero and Van 
Dyne 2009; Colbert and Witt 2009; Premeaux and Bedeian 2003). 
 My empirical tests in this chapter and the next one carry implications for citizen 
competence. By studying person–situation interactions, I can identify which individuals are most 
likely to respond to information from their political environment. Only some members of the 
public function as ideal democratic citizens who observe governmental performance and then 
reward and punish the political status quo accordingly in their level of political support. 
Democratic principles, meanwhile, encourage citizens to embrace regime norms such as political 
tolerance in spite of environmental conditions, but not everyone follows democratic ideals, 
perhaps due in part to trait–environment interactions.  
 Information about which individuals are most receptive to political information could 
have practical relevance for the messaging of elites. Political activists, for example, could tailor 
their communications about economic performance based on the personality traits of their 
audience, influencing levels of political support and, as a result, the frequency of citizen 
engagement and the ability of the public to express its interests, address societal problems, and 
hold government accountable. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I first articulate the value of a 
general theory of trait–situation interactions to the study of personality effects. Then, I identify 
four puzzles in the personality and support literature and demonstrate how trait activation theory 
can explain inconsistent trait effects; using TAT, I develop a series of expectations regarding 
person–situation interactions. Third, I review my measures of contextual perceptions. The fourth 
section reports the results, and I conclude by summarizing the discussion and the practical 
implications of my findings. 
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Moving from Direct to Conditional Trait Effects 
 Few studies on personality and support investigate person–situation interactions; most are 
focused on direct trait effects. The only exceptions of which I am aware are Freitag and 
Ackermann’s (2016) study of institutional trust in Switzerland and Oskarsson and Widmalm’s 
(2016) study of political tolerance in India and Pakistan. I build on their work by using TAT as a 
general guide to develop hypotheses about conditional personality effects. Freitag and 
Ackermann, by contrast, generate their hypotheses in an ad hoc fashion suited for their study on 
personality, direct democracy, and political trust. Meanwhile, Oskarsson and Widmalm consider 
general theoretical arguments on situational strength, but TAT scholars would view such an 
approach as insufficient because the level of situational strength does not guarantee that 
personality effects will occur. Trait-relevant cues must be present in weak situations. 
 A general model of conditional effects can advance personality and support research in 
three key ways. First, scholars can draw on a broad theory for inspiration in developing their 
specific hypotheses on person–situation interactions, rather than starting from square one for 
each project.
160
 Second, a common model can assist researchers in using the same terminology 
(e.g., “situational strength” and “trait-relevant cues” in TAT research) and avoiding speaking 
past one another across different studies.  
 Third, scholars can capitalize on the broad scope of a general theory by examining 
whether findings or specific theoretical mechanisms for one aspect of political support apply to 
other attitudes toward the political system. For instance, Freitag and Ackermann (2016) argue 
that high levels of direct democracy could denote the unresponsiveness of public officials in 
Switzerland, reducing levels of political trust among highly conscientious citizens who value 
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 The process outlined here could allow a general theory to achieve integrative cumulation (Zinnes 1976) by 
offering a unifying explanation for a large number of observations. By contrast, ad hoc approaches would account 
for fewer observations and therefore would be less preferable according to Lave and March (1975).  
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success. Freitag and Ackermann’s empirical results are consistent with their explanation. 
Building on their study via trait activation theory, I argue that other contextual factors pertaining 
to achievement-striving (e.g., economic performance) activate conscientiousness and produce 
trait effects not just on political trust, but also on job approval ratings and other evaluations of 
the political status quo. Results consistent with such a hypothesis would indicate the value of 
TAT as a general theory and also would enable me to account for heterogeneous direct effects of 
conscientiousness in the literature on actor and institutional attitudes. 
 In addition to benefitting research on political support, TAT could fill a gap in the 
personality literature more generally. Numerous personality researchers have acknowledged the 
importance of trait–situation interactions for explaining attitudes and behavior (e.g., Funder 
2008; Mischel 1973; McCrae and Costa 2008; Mondak et al. 2010), but few general theories 
have specified exactly how traits and contextual factors interact.
161
 Without a broad framework 
for guiding hypothesis development for conditional personality effects, many personality 
researchers have focused on the direct relationship between traits and the outcome of interest 
(Mondak et al. 2010).
162
 Of the studies that do consider conditional trait effects, many develop 
their hypotheses in an ad hoc fashion based on the particular contextual factors and dependent 
variables under consideration (e.g., Gerber et al. 2013; Mondak et al. 2010). 
 If trait activation theory functions as a general model of person–situation interactions, the 
innovations listed above for the political support literature could apply to other domains of 
psychological research. Health psychologists, for example, could draw on the general insights 
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 McCrae and Costa’s (2008) Five-Factor Theory, for instance, presents a broad theory of personality concerned 
with person–situation interactions but also with the maintenance of self-concepts, the influence of individuals on the 
environment, and other concepts and relationships. The theory, therefore, does not explicate how traits and 
contextual factors interact.  
162
 Examples of direct effects research in political science include studies on participation (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a; 
Mondak et al. 2011) and support for the political system (e.g., Anderson 2010a; Mondak and Halperin 2008), and 
applied research in other fields also has examined direct trait effects (e.g., Booth-Kewley and Vickers 1994; 
Dohmen et al. 2008; Siddiqui 2012).  
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and terminology of TAT to develop and specify their hypotheses. The potential reach of TAT 
also should motivate scholars in one field to consider theoretical mechanisms developed in other 
applied fields of personality research. One such domain is occupational psychology, the home 
territory of trait activation theory. Consistent with my discussion of achievement-striving and 
political support, Colbert and Witt (2009) find that highly conscientious employees exhibit 
greater job performance when they work in an environment where management clarifies goals 
and responsibilities. Workplaces such as these may activate the achievement-striving facet of 
conscientiousness and enable individuals high in this trait dimension to be successful. Highly 
conscientious individuals also may respond to other contextual signals of achievement in their 
personal (e.g., the level of efficacy of a dieting program) and social (e.g., change over time in 
community life expectancy or economic conditions) lives.  
 In sum, there are several benefits to utilizing a general model to study conditional 
personality effects. 
Empirical Puzzles: Theory and Hypotheses 
 To explore trait–situation interactions in this chapter, I turn to four inconsistencies in past 
research on the direct relationship between personality and political support. Each empirical 
puzzle, in my view, can be attributable to samples being drawn from distinct contexts.
163
 In this 
section, I recount each inconsistency; describe some of the diverse political, economic, and 
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 To be sure, I could have examined conditional effects for all five trait dimensions for each dependent variable 
under examination. To narrow my focus, I limited the hypothesis testing to empirical puzzles that logically could be 
due to samples coming from different contexts. For democratic support, I focused on contexts highly related to the 
political tolerance and criminal rights dependent variables: perceived threats from political dissidents and crime, 
respectively. For status quo support, I concentrated on two contexts: corruption and economic performance, both of 
which are prominent in contemporary politics. Two examples corroborate my claim about the current importance of 
corruption and economic performance: the 2016 impeachment of South Korean President Park Geun-hye amid a 
corruption scandal (Kim and Grimson 2017) and the renewed emphasis of the U.S. Democratic Party on economic 
issues after the 2016 election (Burns and Martin 2016). 
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social environments in extant studies; and use trait activation theory to explain the interaction 
between a particular trait dimension and contextual factor. 
Openness to Experience and External Efficacy 
 In Chapter 3, I expected to observe a positive effect of openness on perceived 
governmental responsiveness to public opinion and activism. My explanation emphasized the 
links between citizen engagement and democratic progress, as well as the openness facets of 
adventurousness and action (John et al. 2008). Because highly open citizens tend to participate 
more in public affairs (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak et al. 2010), they would be more likely to 
have first-hand experience with encouraging a strong accountability relationship between 
citizens and elected officials.  
 Nevertheless, past research, as well as my own, reveals an inconsistent relationship 
between openness and external efficacy. Chapter 3 reported positive trait effects in the American 
National Election Study, which are consistent with Rasmussen and Nørgaard’s (n.d.) results from 
Denmark. Meanwhile, my analysis of the AmericasBarometer revealed a negative relationship 
between openness and external efficacy, and Anderson (2010a, 2010b) obtained the same finding 
in a survey of residents in Tallahassee, Florida. 
 The discordant results could be attributable to the samples being drawn from divergent 
contexts. Undoubtedly, the four samples differ in numerous ways, but I focus on the extent of 
political corruption because of the salience of malfeasance to citizens and to the news media.
164
 
The two positive openness effects come from relatively clean political contexts—that is, 
representative samples from Denmark (Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.) and the United States 
(Chapter 3). Both countries rank among the top 15 percent of countries in terms of their control 
                                                 
164
 Consider, for example, the anticorruption protests in South Korea against the administration of President Park 
Geun-hye, as well as the associated media coverage. A March 2017 Google News search of “Park Geun-hye” and 
“corruption” yielded approximately 105,000 results.  
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of corruption according to the World Bank (2016).
165
 The negative results, meanwhile, are drawn 
from a local survey in Florida (Anderson 2010a, 2010b) and a cross-national survey mostly in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Chapter 3). Within the United States, Florida had the tenth 
highest score in a recent index of illegal corruption (Dincer and Johnston 2014),
166,167
 and many 
of the countries in the AmericasBarometer have received some of the worst corruption scores in 
the world from the World Bank.
168
 
 Levels of political malfeasance, therefore, could activate openness and produce positive 
trait effects in relatively clean contexts and negative trait effects in relatively corrupt contexts. 
Because of their interest in democratic values and political innovation,
169
 I expect open 
individuals to value strong accountability relationships in which elected officials are responsive 
to the mass public.
170
 Such relationships are possible in low-corruption environments and 
virtually impossible in high-corruption environments, where overbearing government officials 
engage in arbitrary bribery and eschew the rule of law.
171
 Highly open citizens, then, are likely to 
criticize a corrupt political system and endorse a clean political system. Based on my argument, I 
expect high (low) levels of malfeasance to activate openness and produce negative (positive) trait 
effects. I thus anticipate a negative interaction effect: As the level of corruption rises, the effect 
of openness should become more and more negative. 
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 In particular, the 2015 percentile rankings for Denmark and the United States were 98.08 and 89.90, respectively 
(World Bank 2016). 
166
 Dincer and Johnston (2014) define illegal corruption as government officials receiving private gains for 
benefiting private individuals or groups. 
167
 Another measure of corruption, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, places Florida in the middle in terms 
of public corruption convictions per million (United Stated Department of Justice 2013). Nevertheless, it is still the 
case that Florida does not rank as one of the least corrupt U.S. states.  
168
 More specifically, 18 of the Caribbean and Latin American countries in this study ranked in the bottom 50 
percent in terms of their control of corruption in 2015. 
169
 Values and innovation are two facets of the trait dimension of openness (John et al. 2008). 
170
 As noted by Anderson and Tverdova (2003), corruption violates norms for accountable, democratic governance. 
171
 A reversed accountability relationship between citizens and government also occurs when incumbent parties 
engage in clientelism—that is, trading electoral support for material rewards to citizens, many of whom may depend 
on such benefits due to their relatively low socioeconomic status (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2005). 
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Extraversion and External Efficacy 
 As with openness to experience, I anticipated a positive relationship between extraversion 
and external efficacy in Chapter 3. Items about perceived governmental responsiveness to citizen 
input may activate the extraversion facets of activity and energy; indeed, compared with 
introverts, extraverts are more likely to utilize their high levels of activity and energy to 
participate in public affairs and effect political change (e.g., Mondak 2010; Weinschenk 2013).  
 Empirical evidence tends to support my direct effects hypothesis, but not unanimously. 
Multiple studies of U.S. and European survey data, including my analysis of the ANES, have 
obtained the positive expected relationship between extraversion and external efficacy (e.g., 
Rasmussen and Nørgaard n.d.; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). Nevertheless, the 
AmericasBarometer analysis in Chapter 3 revealed a negative effect for extraversion. 
 Once again, the discordant results could be due to samples being drawn from contexts 
that vary in the levels of political corruption. I already have noted the relatively high levels of 
corruption in many AmericasBarometer countries as well as the relative lack of corruption in the 
United States and Denmark. Likewise, Germany—the country under analysis by Schoen and 
Steinbrecher (2013)—has ranked in the top 10 percent in the world in terms of control of 
corruption since the World Bank (2016) first issued data for the year 1996. 
 The logic connecting corruption and extraversion centers on the trait facet of sociability 
(John et al. 2008). Individuals high in extraversion build and maintain expansive social networks, 
in part through sensitivity to group norms and group welfare. For extraverts, ignoring 
(supporting) group norms or group welfare can provoke ostracism (acceptance) from potential 
social contacts and estrangement (appreciation) from current ones. Extraverts are also an 
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assertive bunch and therefore may defy convention on occasion, but consistently antisocial 
behavior could eliminate virtually all nodes in an individual’s interpersonal network. 
 Corruption violates group norms and group welfare. In modern democracies, citizens 
expect public officials to treat all individuals and organizations equally, regardless of their ability 
to pay a bribe (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). When services are nominally offered for free, 
bribery also harms the financial well-being of people in one’s social network.
172,173
  
 Therefore, extraverts should be disappointed when political actors engage in corruption 
and pleased when political actors refrain from corruption. The interaction effect, in other words, 
should be negative: As the level of political corruption increases, the impact of extraversion on 
external efficacy should become more and more negative. 
Conscientiousness and Support for the Political Status Quo 
 In contrast to the first two puzzles, I offered no hypothesis in Chapter 3 for the direct 
relationship between conscientiousness and attitudes toward actors, institutions, and procedures. 
Highly conscientious individuals value duty and order (John et al. 2008), but such characteristics 
would not necessarily translate to support for the political status quo because of social norms 
about the acceptability of criticizing the current government (Citrin 1974; Dalton 1999; 
Klingemann 1999). Instead, the direct effect of conscientiousness may be insignificant. 
 Empirical results, including my own, do not indicate a clear, direct relationship between 
conscientiousness and status quo attitudes. Many of the extant findings are statistically 
insignificant (e.g., Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Mondak and Halperin 
2008; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), and effects are also mixed between positive (Anderson 
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 By contrast, a bribe could function as a “discount” for a fee-based service by illicitly funneling money to a public 
official instead of the government proper. Such discounts, however, reduce the incomes of government agencies, 
which in turn harms the public welfare through the attenuated ability to provide public goods.   
173
 Meanwhile, a firm bidding for a public contract could benefit from paying a bribe, but the unsuccessful 
businesses would suffer.  
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2010a; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2017) and negative results (Cawvey et al. n.d.; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008; Sweetser 2014).  
 Perhaps the inconsistent results for conscientiousness are again attributable to samples 
being drawn from distinct contexts. One such environmental factor is the level of economic 
performance. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, an analysis of a 2005 national 
U.S. survey reported a positive conscientiousness effect (Mondak and Halperin 2008), but 
another obtained a negative result with the 2012 ANES (Cawvey et al. n.d.). The two time points 
differed in multiple ways, not least of which was the state of the economy. According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017), the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate remained below 
5.5 percent at the time of the 2005 survey but hovered around 8 percent during the 2012 survey. 
Insignificant conscientiousness results might occur in between the two extremes in economic 
context. 
 In more general terms, I expect high and low levels of economic performance to activate 
conscientiousness. Key to my argument is the conscientiousness facets of achievement-striving 
and competence (John et al. 2008). In public affairs, economic performance refers to the extent 
to which incumbents achieve their goal of successful policymaking. Positive economic growth 
signals the competence of government officials, whereas negative growth conveys the opposite 
information (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Because highly conscientious individuals value 
achievement and competence, I would expect citizens high in this trait dimension to reward or 
punish the government based on the level of economic performance. The result would be a 
positive interaction effect: As economic conditions improve, the impact of conscientiousness on 




Conscientiousness and Democratic Support 
 For my fourth and final puzzle, I transition from status quo attitudes to attitudes about 
regime principles. With regard to conscientiousness, Chapter 3 expected negative direct effects 
of this trait dimension on political tolerance and support for criminal rights because individuals 
high in this trait may be concerned about threats to social order from political dissidents and 
criminals. Some extant work is consistent with my hypothesis (Mondak and Hurwitz 2012; 
Swami et al. 2012), but other studies report insignificant direct effects (Mondak and Halperin 
2008; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016). Moreover, my findings in Chapter 3 revealed a negative 
and significant relationship between conscientiousness and political tolerance in the CCES and a 
positive and significant relationship between conscientiousness and support for criminal rights in 
the AmericasBarometer. 
 The discordant results for conscientiousness could be due to samples coming from 
distinct environments. The negative effects all occur with democratic support questions that may 
have raised threat perceptions because of references to a least liked group, terrorism, or “serious 
crime.” Meanwhile, the positive effect of conscientiousness in the AmericasBarometer could be 
due to the survey item’s explicit focus not on criminals, but on extralegal powers for the justice 
system, which is perceived as less trustworthy than the national or local government in general.  
 The two prior studies with insignificant trait effects, by contrast, occur in more neutral 
environments. Mondak and Halperin (2008) measure democratic support by asking if individuals 
of all political beliefs deserve the same legal rights. The items refer neither to “serious crime” 
nor terrorism. Meanwhile, Oskarsson and Widmalm (2016) analyze a sample that combines 
individuals from a relatively low-conflict city in India and a relatively high-conflict city in 




moderate level of threat in the two contexts. Indeed, Oskarsson and Widmalm interact each trait 
dimension with a country dummy variable and find that conscientiousness exerts a negative and 
significant effect only among Pakistani respondents. I test the trait–situation interaction more 
thoroughly by directly measuring the level of social threat. 
 In the terms of trait activation theory, I expect threat levels to send cues pertaining to the 
conscientiousness facets of orderliness and duty. Serious concerns about social stability may 
enable highly conscientious citizens to ignore the rights of political dissidents and criminals in 
favor of the norm of law and order; according to Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs, material 
needs such as social stability precede post-material needs such as free expression. Low threat 
levels, however, rebalance the equation in favor of democratic rights, for no serious hindrances 
to the material need of social cohesion are present. If threat levels are low, highly conscientious 
citizens are free to embrace the democratic norms of political tolerance and criminal rights. I thus 
expect a negative interaction effect: As the level of social threat increases, the impact of 
conscientiousness on political tolerance and support for criminal rights will become less and less 
positive. 
Interaction Dependent Variable Prediction
Openness x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative









Threats from Crime and 
Political Dissidents




Hypotheses on Conditional Personality Effects
Note: *The prediction is  pos i tive i f the dependent variable refers  to pol i tica l  
support objects  related to the incumbent party; the expected interaction effect i s  
negative i f the dependent variable perta ins  to the pol i tica l  oppos ition.
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Summary of Hypotheses 
 Table 4.1 provides an overview of the conditional effects hypotheses discussed above. 
For corruption, I expect negative interaction effects for openness and extraversion in models of 
external efficacy. Meanwhile, conscientiousness should interact positively with economic 
performance to influence support for political actors, regime institutions, and regime 
performance. Finally, in models of political tolerance and support for criminal rights, I anticipate 
that conscientiousness will interact negatively with the level of social threat.  
Investigating the Conditional Link: Data and Research Design 
 I draw on three datasets to test my hypotheses on conditional personality effects: the 2010 
AmericasBarometer, the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), and the 2012 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The previous chapter employed each of 
these surveys, as well as a questionnaire of students at the University of Illinois. My student 
sample did not include questions on contextual perceptions, so I examine the other three surveys. 
 Of the three surveys, I focus on the AmericasBarometer because none other contains all 
of the items necessary to assess each of my hypotheses on the conditional effects of personality 
on political support. More specifically, political support questions in the AmericasBarometer 
include an actor external efficacy item, which is essential for the corruption hypotheses; political 
tolerance and support for criminal rights items, which are needed for the societal threat 
hypothesis; and 10 items for actor, institutional, and procedural support, which are useful for the 
economic performance hypothesis. I utilize all 10 of these items except for national legislature 
approval because of the lack of a clear basis for an expectation. On one hand, conscientious 
citizens may respond to positive economic conditions by rewarding the national legislature for its 
hand in successful policymaking; on the other hand, the presence of the political opposition in 
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the legislature could prompt conscientious citizens to focus their praise on the executive branch 
of government that oversaw the economic growth. 
 In addition to political support items, the 2010 survey included a Big Five personality 
battery and items pertaining to corruption perceptions, perceived national economic 
performance, concerns about political dissidents, and perceived threats from crime. Since the 
previous chapter documented my operationalization of political support and personality, this 
section highlights my contextual measures.  
 To measure corruption perceptions, I utilize an AmericasBarometer item about the 
prevalence of malfeasance among public officials. Respondents could select options ranging 
from “[v]ery common” to “[v]ery uncommon.” I have recoded the variable so that higher values 
refer to greater perceived corruption. Scores range from 0 to 1. 
 My primary measure of economic performance, meanwhile, is an AmericasBarometer 
item about retrospective national economic assessments over the past year. Responses varied 
from “[b]etter” to “[w]orse.” I reverse-coded the variable to range from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
pertaining to more positive perceptions. 
 Retrospective evaluations are not the only possible measure of a citizen’s perceptions of 
the national economy. Numerous political support studies have employed retrospective 
evaluations (e.g., Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Rudolph 2003b), but researchers also have 
incorporated contemporary and prospective economic perceptions (e.g., Chanley et al. 2000; 
Criado and Herreros 2007). Retrospective, contemporary, and prospective measures are all 
available in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, but I focus on the retrospective item in order to be 
consistent with previous studies and with such objective economic variables as growth over time 
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in gross domestic product per capita.
174
 Nevertheless, I ran a robustness check with an economic 
perceptions item that combines all three variables into a single index.
175
 The pattern for the 




 I operationalize social stability in two ways for my models of democratic support. For the 
political tolerance regression, I use an item from the AmericasBarometer about perceived threat 
from citizens “who disagree with the majority” in the country. The original question includes 
seven response options, and I have recoded this variable to range from 0 to 1, with higher values 
referring to greater perceived threat. 
 For my criminal rights model, I utilize an item from the AmericasBarometer about 
perceived threat from crime. Three perceptual items about crime are available in the 
AmericasBarometer, with one question about national well-being and two about safety in one’s 
neighborhood. Continuing with the pattern in this chapter, I focus on the item pertaining to the 
national context.
177
 Respondents were asked about the extent to which the level of crime 
threatens national well-being.
178
 Options ranged from “[v]ery much” to “[n]one,” and I have 
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 I use this particular objective variable in the next chapter. 
175
 The three items in the index all come from the same battery near the start of the AmericasBarometer survey. This 
index was produced via factor analysis because a different scale was used for one of the economic perceptions items. 
Factor analysis, with rotation, revealed a single factor with an eigenvalue of 0.95, which is very close to the goal of 
1. To be consistent with the other perceptual items, the economic index was recoded to range from approximately 0 
to 1. 
176
 To be more precise, all eight of the significant conscientiousness–economic perceptions interactions in Table 4.3 
remain significant if the economic perceptions index is used.  
177
 This approach differs from Krause’s (2013) attention to the neighborhood level, but national perceptions about 
crime should be salient because of the issue’s prominence in national elections in Latin America (Krause 2013) and 
because of the overall importance of crime-related issues in the 24 AmericasBarometer countries. A plurality of 
respondents on the 2010 survey named delinquency/crime as the most important problem in their country. 
Nevertheless, I conducted a robustness check by replacing the national measure with the neighborhood measures. 
None of the interactions were statistically significant, which contrasts with the significant results reported below. 
The robustness check, therefore, suggests that trait-relevant cues for crime perceptions do not originate at the 
neighborhood level. 
178
 The neighborhood items, meanwhile, inquired about the probability of being assaulted or robbed in one’s 
neighborhood, as well as the extent to which one’s neighborhood is influenced by gangs. 
146 
 
recoded the variable to run from 0 to 1. Higher values now refer to greater levels of perceived 
threat. 
 After testing my hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer, I briefly turn to the ANES and 
CCES in order to replicate my findings for the interactions involving corruption perceptions and 
economic perceptions. None of the other contextual measures are available in the ANES and 
CCES.  
 My measurement of corruption perceptions is less than ideal. The CCES does not refer to 
corruption, and the only ANES items on malfeasance are associated with political trust in the 
pre-election and post-election questionnaire documents. Although I prefer not to operationalize 
corruption perceptions with a measure of political support, the ANES leaves me with no other 
option. Therefore, I utilize the pre-election item about the prevalence of corruption among public 
officials.
179
 I have recoded this item to range from 0 to 1; higher scores refer to greater perceived 
corruption. 
 For economic perceptions, I again focus on retrospective measures. My main results 
employ a single retrospective item from the CCES and a two-item index from the ANES about 
retrospective evaluations of unemployment and the national economy as a whole. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for this index is 0.81. Both variables range from 0 to 1, with higher scores 
indicating more positive economic perceptions.
180
 
 Regarding the dependent variables, I incorporate all three external efficacy variables in 
the ANES for my analyses involving corruption perceptions and 15 ANES and CCES actor, 
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 For the purposes of temporal order, I prefer for my independent variables to originate in a pre-election survey 
because some of my dependent variables also were asked before the election. Therefore, I do not examine the post-
election item on the prevalence of corruption in government. 
180
 For the significant interactions between conscientiousness and retrospective perceptions in the ANES, I have 
assessed the robustness with an economic perceptions index that combines the general retrospective item, a 
contemporary item, and a prospective item. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.74. Differences between the reported results 
and the ANES robustness checks are noted below. Meanwhile, the conscientiousness–retrospective perception 
interaction is not significant in the CCES, so there is no need to comment on the robustness of that interaction. 
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institutional, and procedural variables from the previous chapter for my analyses involving 
economic perceptions.
181
 For the latter analyses, I include all Chapter 3 support variables from 
each level except for national legislature approval and House incumbent approval because of the 
uncertainty about conscientious citizens rewarding successful legislative policymaking versus 
preferring to credit the president rather than Congress. The opposition party controlled the House 
of Representatives in 2012. 
 Instead of displaying the results for all 15 models for the economic perceptions 
interactions, the tables below focus on the models in which the conditional effect for 
conscientiousness is statistically significant. 
 Descriptive statistics for all contextual perceptions are located in Appendix D.    
Evidence for a Conditional Link: Results 
I now present my findings for the conditional effects of personality on political support. I 
begin with the openness–corruption and extraversion–corruption interactions in the 
AmericasBarometer before turning to the conscientiousness–economic performance interaction 
and then the conscientiousness–social stability interactions in the same survey. I conclude this 
section by using the ANES and CCES to conduct replication tests of my hypotheses involving 
corruption and economic perceptions.  
Personality Effects Conditioned by Corruption Perceptions: AmericasBarometer 
For the first step in my empirical analysis, I examine how corruption perceptions interact 
with openness and extraversion to influence external efficacy. Extant results in the direct effects 
                                                 
181
 For the ANES, these dependent variables are an index of actor trust, global presidential job approval, issue-
specific presidential approval, feeling thermometers for Democratic and Republican actors, a feeling thermometer 
index for government agencies, likeability measures for the Democratic Party and Republican Party, one external 
efficacy measure for political actors, two external efficacy measures for regime institutions, a democratic 
satisfaction item, and procedural support items on citizen rights and electoral integrity. The outcome variable for the 
CCES, meanwhile, consists of an approval item for the president.  
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literature are mixed, perhaps because samples are drawn from contexts with varying levels of 
malfeasance. As I argued in the theory section of this chapter, I expect high and low levels of 
corruption to activate openness and extraversion and produce negative interaction effects on the 
perceived responsiveness of the political system: Openness and extraversion should exert a more 
negative effect on external efficacy as the level of perceived corruption rises. In response to high 
levels of malfeasance, individuals high in openness will be disappointed by the lack of 
democratic accountability between citizens and elected officials, and extraverts will be frustrated 
by the violation of anticorruption norms and the negative effects of bribery on one’s social 
network. 
Table 4.2 reports the results of these interactions based on AmericasBarometer data. As 
expected, both interaction terms are negative and statistically significant.
182,183
 The substantive 
effects of openness and extraversion are particularly strong.
184
 For individuals who view 
corruption as “[v]ery common,” moving from 0 to 1 in openness (extraversion) reduces the 
probability of maximum external efficacy from 0.09 to 0.05 (0.09 to 0.05), which amounts to a 
decrease of 41.07 percent (40.52 percent). At the other extreme, among individuals who perceive 
malfeasance as “[v]ery uncommon,” the same change in openness (extraversion) raises the  
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 Both interactions remain significant if corruption perceptions are allowed to interact with all five personality 
variables. 
183
 The personality coefficients in Table 4.2 are largely insignificant, which might raise concerns that perceptions are 
simply a function of personality traits, rather than a source of trait-relevant cues that activate the Big Five and 
produce personality effects in accordance with trait activation theory. We must remember, however, that the 
openness and extraversion coefficients could appear insignificant because they are interacting with corruption 
perceptions in Table 4.2. Instead, we can address the issue by examining a direct effects model with corruption 
perceptions added to the regression. If personality traits remain significant with the inclusion of corruption 
perceptions, then we can conclude that perceptions may contain trait-relevant cues that signal the relevance of 
personality traits for external efficacy. Indeed, openness and extraversion, as well as conscientiousness, are 
significant in a direct effects model that includes corruption perceptions. These results are located in Appendix E, 
and they resemble the perception-free model in Table 3.7 of the previous chapter.  
184
 Predicted probabilities in this chapter were calculated by holding all other variables in a model at their modal 











Openness x Greater Perceived 
Corruption
-0.71**                   
(0.24)
Extraversion x Greater 
Perceived Corruption
-0.85***                  
(0.21)
Greater Perceived Corruption 0.05                             
(0.16)
Openness 0.14                           
(0.19)
Conscientiousness -0.10+                          
(0.06)
Extraversion 0.29                                
(0.18)
Agreeableness 0.09                                  
(0.08)
Emotional Stability 0.00                       
(0.08)
Female -0.03                            
(0.02)
Age 0.00+                         
(0.00)
White 0.02                            
(0.08)
Education -0.03                         
(0.11)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.02
Number of Cases 33,861
Number of Countries 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal
Note: Data  come from the 2010 
AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion 
coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . 
Threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. 
Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, 
and s tandard errors  are clus tered by country. Data  
are weighted so that each nation’s  sample 
contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. *** p < .001         
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Table 4.2
Conditional Effects of Openness and 












Figure 4.1 Conditional Effects of Personality on External Efficacy 
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probability of maximum external efficacy from 0.13 to 0.15 (0.13 to 0.16), or an increase of 
13.07 percent (28.30 percent).  
These interactions are displayed in Figure 4.1. The figure indicates that high levels of 
corruption activate openness and extraversion, and low levels of corruption activate extraversion. 
However, openness does not appear to exert a strong effect in response to low levels of 
corruption. The results are fully in line with my expectations for extraversion activation and 
partially in line with my expectations for openness activation.
185
 I revisit my conclusions in 
Appendix E by reporting the effects of openness and extraversion at the minimum and maximum 
levels of malfeasance. The effects of both trait dimensions are significant in response to 
pervasive corruption, and the extraversion coefficient is nearly significant at the 0.10 level for 
respondents with minimum perceptions of malfeasance.  
In sum, the results in Table 4.2 are consistent with my hypotheses of negative interactions 
between openness and corruption perceptions and between extraversion and corruption 
perceptions. Based on my analysis, divergent trait results in the direct effects literature could be 
attributable to samples coming from contexts that differ in the level of malfeasance. 
Personality Effects Conditioned by Economic Perceptions: AmericasBarometer 
Next, I consider whether positive and negative economic perceptions activate 
conscientiousness to influence citizen attitudes toward political actors, regime institutions, and 
regime performance. The direct effects of conscientiousness in previous research have been 
positive, negative, and insignificant, perhaps due to samples being drawn from different 
economic environments. Given their emphasis on achievement-striving and competence, highly 
conscientious individuals are likely to view robust (anemic) economic growth as an indication of 
policy effectiveness (ineffectiveness) and respond with favorable (unfavorable) views of the 
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 I expected openness to be activated in response to both low and high levels of corruption. 
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political status quo. I thus expect to observe a positive interaction effect: The impact of 
conscientiousness on support should become more and more positive as perceptions of the 
national economy improve. 
Using the AmericasBarometer, I interacted conscientiousness and retrospective economic 
perceptions in 9 models of actor, institutional, and procedural support.
186
 Table 4.3 presents the 




Two observations about Table 4.3 are noteworthy. First, the interaction effect is 
consistent across all three levels of support and for a variety of attitudes, from job approval 
ratings to political trust items to external efficacy opinions to global and issue-specific 
evaluations of regime performance. My hypothesis, in other words, explains a variety of 
observations (Lave and March 1975) and suggests the broad explanatory power of TAT for 
accounting for person–situation interactions in models of political support (Zinnes 1976). 
Second, the significant interaction terms for conscientiousness contrast with the largely 
insignificant direct effects of this trait dimension that we observed in Chapter 3. My findings 
indicate that conscientiousness matters for political support, but the effect depends on the 
economic context perceived by the respondent. If we ignore the interaction between  
 
                                                 
186
 Although prior personality studies have not examined procedural attitudes, I include them in order to assess the 
generalizability of my hypothesis on conditional conscientiousness effects and to account for the fact that economic 
perceptions have been shown to be significantly related to democratic satisfaction (Bratton and Mattes 2001).    
187
 If economic perceptions are allowed to interact with all five trait dimensions, then 4 of the 8 significant 
interactions for conscientiousness remain significant, with at least one significant interaction for each level of 
support. 
188
 An additional observation about Table 4.3 is the large number of significant personality coefficients, even with 
the inclusion of corruption perceptions in the regression. The significant personality results indicate that economic 
perceptions are not simply a function of traits but instead may contain trait-relevant cues that activate such 
personality traits as conscientiousness. Table E.2 in Appendix E reports the direct effects of personality and 
economic perceptions with no interaction terms; a total of 24 personality coefficients are significant in that table. 
Such an amount is nearly identical to the 26 personality coefficients in the AmericasBarometer that are significant 




























































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   





























   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   















   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




















   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   















   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   









   
   
   









   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   


















   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   



















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   














   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   









   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2 Direct and Conditional Effects of Conscientiousness 




conscientiousness and economic context, we may obtain the mixed and insignificant direct 
effects in the extant literature. 
To emphasize the substantive value of interacting conscientiousness and economic 
perceptions, I turn to regime performance attitudes in Model VIII of Table 4.3. Results are 
depicted in Figure 4.2. By itself, conscientiousness exerts a minimal effect on attitudes toward 
the protection of citizen rights in one’s country (Panel A); moving from 0 to 1 in this trait 
dimension reduces the probability of maximum support from 0.059 to 0.056, which amounts to a 
decrease of only 4.13 percent. We should not be surprised, therefore, that the direct effect of 
conscientiousness on regime performance attitudes was insignificant in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, if 
both conscientiousness and economic perceptions shift from 0 to 1, the trait effects are more 
substantial (Panel B). Among citizens with negative economic perceptions, moving from 0 to 1 
in conscientiousness reduces the probability of maximum support from 0.05 to 0.04 (i.e., a 
decrease of 19.80 percent). For individuals with positive perceptions, though, shifting from 0 to 1 
in this trait dimension increases the probability of maximum support from 0.08 to 0.09 (i.e., an 
increase of 21.15 percent). 
Finally, I obtain support for my expectation that favorable and unfavorable economic 
perceptions would activate conscientiousness and produce positive and negative trait effects, 
respectively. The five negative and significant conscientiousness coefficients in Table 4.3 denote 
the expected trait effects for individuals with economic perceptions equal to 0. To understand the 
trait effects for citizens with positive views, I ran the same regressions with a reverse-coded 
economic perceptions variable and recorded the conscientiousness coefficients. Seven of the nine 
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coefficients are positive and significant. These results are located in Appendix E and occur more 
frequently than would be expected by chance.
189
 
Personality Effects Conditioned by Social Stability: AmericasBarometer 
My final hypothesis concerns democratic support. More specifically, I expect threats to 
political and social stability to activate conscientiousness because of this trait dimension’s 
emphasis on orderliness and dutifulness to norms; when the threat level is high, highly 
conscientious individuals may be less likely to tolerate political dissidents or ensure criminal 
rights in order to promote societal cohesion and adhere to the norm of law and order. Normative 
considerations about democratic principles may be of secondary concern in such contexts 
because material needs of security are prioritized prior to post-material needs of citizen rights 
(Maslow 1943). However, when the threat level is low, conscientious citizens may feel 
compelled to tolerate political minorities and support criminal rights because material needs have 
been met and because they perceive no conflict between democratic norms and social stability. I 
thus expect a negative interaction effect: As threats to stability rise, the effect of 
conscientiousness should become more and more negative. My hypothesis could explain some of 
the divergent direct effects of conscientiousness on democratic support in the extant literature, 
for samples have originated from environments that vary in the level of threat to social stability. 
Table 4.4 reports my results for the interactions between conscientiousness and perceived 
threat. As anticipated, both interaction terms are negative and statistically significant.
190,191,192
  
                                                 
189
 Using the 0.10 level of significance as a guide, we might expect 1 of 10 coefficients to be significant by chance. 
190
 The result in each model is robust to the inclusion of interaction terms for all of the Big Five. 
191
 The significant trait effects in Table 4.4 suggest that threat perceptions are not simply a function of personality 
traits but instead may contain trait-relevant cues that activate conscientiousness and other trait dimensions. Table E.3 
in Appendix E also reports several significant trait effects in models that exclude interaction terms; each of the 
significant personality coefficients in Table E.3 also is significant in Table 3.10 of the previous chapter. 
192
 The interaction in Model I remains significant if the data are limited to individuals who score above the midpoint 
in the institutional trust index. As might be expected, the correlation between institutional trust and threat 





                                                                                                                                                             
quo citizens would be consistent with Sullivan et al.’s (1979) argument that political tolerance is not political 
tolerance unless a disliked political group is involved. During the administration of the AmericasBarometer, all 
respondents were provided with the same group about which to make political tolerance judgments. 










-2.69*                          
(1.15)
-0.65**                                 
(0.24)
Perceived Threat from 
Political Dissidents or Crime
-1.49                      
(1.19)
0.33                         
(0.22)
Openness 2.60***                    
(0.36)
-0.00                    
(0.09)
Conscientiousness 1.42*                      
(0.63)
0.75***                   
(0.21)
Extraversion 1.34***                           
(0.35)
-0.19***                   
(0.05)
Agreeableness -2.04***                              
(0.40)
0.33***              
(0.08)
Emotional Stability 0.63                                   
(0.51)
0.23**                      
(0.08)
Female -1.10***                  
(0.18)
0.10***                            
(0.03)
Age 0.00                          
(0.01)
0.01***                       
(0.00)
White 0.11                             
(0.28)
-0.00                             
(0.05)
Education 3.43***                        
(0.63)
-0.00                           
(0.14)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.11 0.03
Number of Cases 32,696 35,070
Number of Countries 24 24
Method of Estimation OLS Logit
Table 4.4
Conditional Effects of Conscientiousness on 
Democratic Support: AmericasBarometer
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Threat 
perceptions  perta in to pol i tica l  diss idents  in Model  I  and to 
crime in Model  I I . Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with 
s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  are omitted from 
the table. Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, 
and s tandard errors  are clus tered by country. Data  are 
weighted so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of 

















Figure 4.3 depicts each interaction in substantive terms. For political tolerance (Panel A), 
the effect of conscientiousness is substantial for individuals who perceive political dissidents as 
especially threatening or unthreatening. These observations are consistent with my expectations 
for trait activation. Among citizens with maximum threat perceptions, conscientiousness exerts a 
negative effect: Moving from 0 to 1 in this trait dimension reduces the expected level of political 
tolerance by 1.27 points on a dependent variable that varies from 4 to 40 (i.e., 3.52 percent of the 
range). Appendix E further reveals that the effect of conscientiousness is negative and 
statistically significant for citizens with maximum threat perceptions. Meanwhile, for individuals 
with minimum threat perceptions, shifting from 0 to 1 in conscientiousness actually raises the 
expected level of political tolerance by 1.42 points (i.e., 3.95 percent of the range). In other 
words, when threat levels are low, highly conscientious citizens perceive little conflict between 
the norms of democratic support and social order, resulting in a positive trait effect. The 
conscientiousness coefficient in Model I of Table 4.4 also shows that the trait effect at minimum 
threat perceptions is positive and statistically significant. 
Panel B of Figure 4.3 displays the interaction between conscientiousness and perceived 
threat from crime. As expected, conscientiousness is activated for individuals with minimum 
threat perceptions: Moving from 0 to 1 in this trait dimension increases the probability of support 
for criminal rights from 0.53 to 0.70, which amounts to an increase of 33.39 percent. The 
coefficient for conscientiousness in Table 4.4 also shows that the effect of this trait dimension is 
positive and significant at minimum threat perceptions. At maximum threat perceptions, 
however, I observe little evidence of trait activation: Shifting from 0 to 1 in conscientiousness 
slightly increases democratic support from 0.61 to 0.63. Appendix E also indicates that the trait 
effect on support for criminal rights is not significant at maximum threat perceptions. 
160 
 
Overall, then, I obtain evidence that threat perceptions activate conscientiousness and 
produce negative interaction effects on democratic support attitudes. 
Personality Effects Conditioned by Corruption Perceptions: ANES 
Having obtained support for all four hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer, I revisit 
the first three expectations through a series of replication tests with U.S. survey data. My 
investigations begin with the interaction effects involving corruption perceptions. Malfeasance 
hinders democratic accountability and violates norms of governance (Anderson and Tverdova 
2003). Because of their emphasis on democratic ideals (group norms and group welfare), I 
expect highly open (extraverted) citizens to become less and less supportive of the political status 
quo as the level of corruption rises. The interaction effects on external efficacy should be 
negative. Such results would indicate that inconsistent results in the direct effects literature on 
perceived governmental responsiveness are attributable to samples being drawn from contexts 
that vary in the pervasiveness of bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption. 
Table 4.5 reports the interaction effects for all three of my ANES measurements of 
external efficacy. Although none of the extraversion–corruption perceptions interactions are 
statistically significant, one of the openness–corruption perceptions interactions is negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
193
 In substantive terms, for citizens with minimum 
(maximum) corruption perceptions, moving from 0 to 1 in openness raises (reduces) the 
probability of maximum external efficacy from 0.33 to 0.66 (0.104 to 0.098), or a change of 
100.12 percent (6.27 percent). This interaction is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
My ANES analyses thus yield evidence of openness activation in response to perceptions 
of minimum corruption but not in response to perceptions of maximum corruption. Along with  
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Figure 4.4, the significant openness coefficient in Model III of Table 4.5 indicates that low levels 
of corruption perceptions can activate this trait dimension. Meanwhile, I found the effect of 
openness on external efficacy to be significant in the AmericasBarometer only in response to 
high levels of perceived malfeasance. Put together, the results bolster my expectation that 
openness would be activated by high and low levels of perceived corruption. 
Political Actors




Model II:    
People Have 
Say in What 
Government 
Does




Openness x Greater Perceived 
Corruption
-0.10                          
(0.78)
0.88                             
(0.80)
-1.44+                         
(0.79)
Extraversion x Greater 
Perceived Corruption
0.87                        
(0.82)
0.42                   
(0.76)
0.27                            
(0.89)
Greater Perceived Corruption -3.21***                  
(0.43)
-2.38***                   
(0.41)
-1.53***                        
(0.42)
Openness 0.59                              
(0.41)
0.24                         
(0.42)
1.37**                           
(0.43)
Conscientiousness -0.74***                    
(0.15)
-0.43**                         
(0.16)
-0.06                        
(0.17)
Extraversion 0.32                           
(0.44)
0.42                         
(0.41)
-0.01                     
(0.47)
Agreeableness 0.10                              
(0.18)
0.13                         
(0.19)
0.28                      
(0.21)
Emotional Stability 0.21                                  
(0.18)
0.50**                             
(0.19)
0.24                    
(0.20)
Female 0.04                             
(0.08)
0.03                                   
(0.07)
0.03                 
(0.08)
Age -0.00                                  
(0.00)
0.00                                  
(0.00)
0.00                        
(0.00)
White -0.12                     
(0.08)
-0.40***                         
(0.08)
-0.35***                            
(0.09)
Education 0.52***                  
(0.13)
0.66***                    
(0.11)
0.25+                               
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A N/A N/A
Number of Cases 5,258 5,253 5,257
Number of Countries 1 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 4.5
Conditional Effects of Openness and Extraversion on External Efficacy: 
ANES
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with 
s tandard errors  in parentheses . Threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. The 
Taylor series  method was  used for ca lculating s igni ficance tests ; Stata  does  not report 
pseudo R-squared s tatis tics  for the Taylor series  method. *** p < .001 ** p < .01  * p < .05 





Personality Effects Conditioned by Economic Perceptions: ANES 
My final set of analyses concerns the interaction between conscientiousness and 
economic performance. Because of the trait facets of competence and achievement-striving, I 
expect individuals high in this trait dimension to reward or punish the political status quo in 
response to the state of the economy. The interaction effect will be positive: As economic 
perceptions become more favorable, conscientiousness will exert an increasingly positive impact 
on status quo attitudes. If the dependent variable refers to the opposition party, the interaction 
effect will be negative because of the motivation to reward or punish the incumbent party for 
economic outcomes. Results consistent with my hypothesis could explain the combination of 
positive, negative, and insignificant direct effects of conscientiousness on support for actors and 
institutions in previous research. 
163 
 
Instead of reporting the results for all 15 ANES and CCES status quo attitudes, I focus on 
the six ANES models for which the interaction between conscientiousness and economic 
perceptions is statistically significant. Although a higher rate of success would have been 
preferable, a total of six significant interactions exceeds the number we would expect by chance. 
The results are reported in Table 4.6. In each case, the interaction effect is consistent with 
expectations.
194,195,196
 For Models I, II, III, V, and VI, individuals high in conscientiousness 
become more and more likely than individuals low in conscientiousness to reward the status quo 
as economic perceptions improve. Likewise, in Model IV, conscientious citizens who perceived 
the economy in favorable terms are more inclined to turn away from opposition political actors. 
The results in Table 4.6 apply to the actor, institutional, and procedural levels of support. 
Figure 4.5 depicts the interaction for Model VI on beliefs about the government not 
posing a threat to individual freedoms. As with the citizen rights model in the 
AmericasBarometer, I obtain evidence of trait activation for ANES respondents with negative 
and positive perceptions of the national economy. For individuals with unfavorable views, 
moving from 0 to 1 in conscientiousness reduces the probability of maximum support for regime 
performance from 0.24 to 0.13 (i.e., a decrease of 44.61 percent), whereas the same change in 
conscientiousness for individuals with favorable views raises the probability of maximum 
support from 0.74 to 0.86 (i.e., an increase of 16.11 percent).  
                                                 
194
 I should note that only the interaction in Model III continues to be significant at conventional levels if economic 
perceptions are allowed to interact with all five personality trait dimensions. The interactions in Models I, II, and VI, 
however, would remain significant at the 0.20 level. 
195
 If we replace the retrospective economic perceptions index with an index combining retrospective, current, and 
prospective economic perceptions, the coefficients for the interactions in Models III, IV, and V would remain 
significant. 
196
 Table 4.6 also includes a number of significant personality coefficients, and Table E.5 of Appendix E contains 15 
significant trait coefficients in models that include economic perceptions but exclude person–situation interactions. 
Of these 15 effects, 13 are also significant in the perception-free models in Chapter 3. My results indicate that 
economic perceptions are not simply a function of personality and instead may contain trait-relevant cues for 




As I expected, Figure 4.5 indicates that conscientiousness will be activated in response to 
negative and positive economic perceptions. Additional evidence in favor of my hypothesis is the 
significant conscientiousness coefficients in Table 4.6, which refer to the trait effects when 
economic perceptions are equal to 0. In Appendix E, I also show that one conscientiousness 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.10 level and two other coefficients are positive and 

























Government Not a 





1.85*                 
(0.84)
1.71+                    
(0.90)
71.39***       
(21.43)
-47.60*                     
(24.21)
1.50+                     
(0.80)




4.86***                    
(0.57)
9.72***          
(0.66)
157.91***           
(15.44)
-110.08***            
(17.38)
5.14***        
(0.56)
2.18***                      
(0.49)
Openness 1.31***                
(0.20)
1.97***                  
(0.31)
49.72***             
(6.90)
-49.21***                   
(7.45)
1.88***              
(0.25)
-0.36+                                
(0.20)
Conscientiousness -1.69***                 
(0.48)
-1.87***           
(0.53)
-52.90***              
(12.78)
44.40***               
(13.16)
-0.83+                         
(0.44)
-0.72*                          
(0.36)
Extraversion -0.03                       
(0.18)
-0.24                        
(0.30)
-0.03                    
(6.30)
24.28***                    
(6.77)
0.19                      
(0.25)
0.31                             
(0.20)
Agreeableness 0.27                                  
(0.19)
0.18                    
(0.31)
15.83*             
(6.62)
18.62**                 
(6.95)
0.63**                 
(0.24)
0.12                              
(0.20)
Emotional Stability -0.31                         
(0.19)
-0.07                  
(0.29)
-8.27                    
(6.29)
15.88*                   
(6.72)
-0.24               
(0.22)
0.10                         
(0.18)
Female 0.38***                
(0.08)
0.61***                    
(0.13)
18.00***        
(2.67)
-3.83                            
(2.97)
0.41***              
(0.10)
0.26**                             
(0.08)
Age -0.00                         
(0.00)
0.00                     
(0.00)
0.08                              
(0.08)
0.53***                  
(0.09)
0.01**                 
(0.00)
0.00                                 
(0.00)
White -1.37***             
(0.09)
-2.36***              
(0.15)
-48.06***                
(3.21)
20.12***                  
(3.50)
-1.39***                 
(0.12)
-0.48***                        
(0.09)
Education -0.88***                      
(0.14)
-0.72**                     
(0.22)
-15.22**               
(4.93)
24.77***              
(5.47)
-1.10***              
(0.19)
0.16                                   
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A 0.50 0.44 0.26 0.35 N/A
Number of Cases 5,207 4,933 5,161 4,608 5,246 5,154
Number of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordinal
Conditional Effects of Conscientiousness on Actor, Institutional, and Procedural Support: ANES
Table 4.6
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or 
threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. The Taylor series  method was  used for ca lculating s igni ficance tests ; Stata  does  not 





Reviewing the Evidence 
Overall, the results from the AmericasBarometer and ANES are consistent with my 
hypotheses on conditional personality effects.
197
 Both the AmericasBarometer and ANES 
indicate that the effects of conscientiousness on support for actors, institutions, and procedures 
become more positive as economic perceptions become more favorable. My analyses from the 
AmericasBarometer and, to a lesser extent, the ANES also reveal that openness exerts a more 
negative effect on external efficacy as the level of perceived corruption rises. Furthermore, the 
AmericasBarometer results suggest that (1) extraverts, compared with introverts, become more 
and more pessimistic about governmental responsiveness as the level of perceived malfeasance 
increases and (2) highly conscientious citizens, compared to their less conscientious  
                                                 
197
 My results conflict with the idea that extreme levels of corruption perceptions, economic perceptions, and social 
threat perceptions constitute strong situations that inhibit trait effects (e.g., Tett and Burnett 2003). Instead, my 





counterparts, express less political tolerance and support for criminal rights as the levels of 
perceived threat from political dissidents and crime rise.  
Table 4.7 summarizes the evidence. For all four hypotheses, the number of significant 
interactions exceeds what would be expected by chance.     
Conclusions and Implications 
The literature on personality and political support is filled with inconsistent direct effects 
from one survey to another. Public opinion questionnaires are completed in particular places and 
at particular times, so inconsistent trait effects might be attributable to contextual differences 
across surveys. In this chapter, I have investigated four empirical puzzles and attempted to 
resolve them by identifying cross-survey differences in the political, economic, and social 
environments. Using trait activation theory, I developed hypotheses about how the contextual 
factors and personality traits interact to influence attitudes toward political actors, regime 
institutions, regime performance, and regime principles. I then tested my hypotheses with cross-
national survey data and, if possible, with U.S. survey data. Consistent with expectations, my 
Interaction Dependent Variable Prediction Number of Significant and 
Expected Interactions
Openness x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative 1 of 1 (AB); 1 of 3 (ANES)
Extraversion x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative 1 of 1 (AB); 0 of 3 (ANES)
Conscientiousness x 
Economic Performance
Support for Actors, 
Institutions, & Procedures
Positive* 8 of 9 (AB); 6 of 15 (ANES 
and CCES)
Conscientiousness x 
Threats from Crime and 
Political Dissidents
Support for Criminal Rights 
and Political Tolerance
Negative 2 of 2 (AB)
Table 4.7
Results for Hypotheses on Conditional Personality Effects
Note: *The prediction is  pos i tive i f the dependent variable refers  to pol i tica l  support objects  related to the 
incumbent party; the expected interaction effect i s  negative i f the dependent variable perta ins  to the pol i tica l  
oppos ition. "AB" refers  to "AmericasBarometer." The 15 models  for the ANES and CCES cons is t of the same 
dependent variables  from Chapter 3, except for the ones  noted in the text.
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results showed that corruption perceptions condition the effects of openness and extraversion on 
external efficacy; economic perceptions condition the effects of conscientiousness on actor, 
institutional, and procedural support; and perceived threats from political dissidents and crime 
condition the effects of conscientiousness on political tolerance and support for criminal rights.  
In addition to addressing empirical puzzles, this chapter has demonstrated the value of 
trait activation theory as a general model of trait–situation interactions. Few studies have utilized 
a broad framework to study conditional personality effects, but I have applied TAT to person–
situation interactions for multiple traits, multiple contextual factors, and multiple forms of 
political support. All of my hypotheses have received empirical support. Each of my theoretical 
arguments draws on the logic and terminology of TAT and therefore may be useful to other 
scholars interested in studying the interplay between personality traits and contextual factors 
through TAT. Moreover, the broad scope of TAT and the potential of insights across studies are 
apparent in the connection of each of the following to the relevance of the conscientiousness 
facet of achievement-striving: my work on conscientiousness and economic perceptions, Freitag 
and Ackermann’s (2016) work on conscientiousness and direct democracy, and Colbert and 
Witt’s (2009) work on conscientiousness and job performance.  
Theoretical considerations aside, the findings in this chapter have practical implications 
for the rhetorical strategies of political elites. Incumbent parties, opposition parties, and 
nongovernmental organizations should understand that citizens respond in different ways to the 
same information. Highly conscientious individuals, for example, are more likely than their less 
conscientious counterparts to support the political system when politicians preside over 
improvements in economic performance.
198
 Higher levels of openness and extraversion also are 
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 At the same time, I cannot claim that individuals low in conscientiousness are completely unresponsive to their 
economic perceptions. Among individuals scoring 0 in conscientiousness, more positive economic perceptions are 
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associated with greater responsiveness to information on political corruption.
199
 Although these 
examples of good citizenship pertain to political attitudes, activists could employ targeted 
messaging to translate opinions into action. In contexts of high (low) corruption, opposition 
(incumbent) parties and nongovernmental organizations could recruit citizens by contacting news 
organizations with audiences high in openness to experience, such as online outlets and 
television satire shows (Gerber et al. 2011b). Messages about economic performance, likewise, 
should appeal to audiences of television political talk programs, which tend to be high in 
conscientiousness (Gerber et al. 2011b). Conversely, appearances on local news (political satire) 
programs to discuss corruption (economic performance) could waste the resources of political 
elites because these programs tend to attract audience members who are less receptive to such 
information, namely individuals low in openness (conscientiousness) (Gerber et al. 2011b).  
Similar pieces of advice could be offered to promote political tolerance or support for 
criminal rights, which are influenced by an interplay of threat perceptions and conscientiousness. 
To activate conscientiousness, democratic activists could appear on television political talk 
programs and other shows with high concentrations of orderly audience members (Gerber et al. 
2011b).
200
 Tailored messages for such programs could emphasize the disciplined, yet peaceful 
tactics of dissident groups and thereby produce greater political tolerance among the public.  
                                                                                                                                                             
associated with greater support for (opposition toward) status quo (opposition) actors, institutions, and procedures in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.6. Nevertheless, the significant interactions show that individuals high in conscientiousness are 
more responsive to their environment than individuals low in conscientiousness.   
199
 In addition to the significant interactions, we can assess responsiveness by examining the coefficient for 
corruption perceptions. Because of the interaction, the corruption perceptions coefficient denotes the impact of the 
variable when openness and extraversion are equal to 0. If less open and less extraverted citizens are unresponsive to 
their environment, the coefficient for corruption perceptions should be insignificant. Indeed, this is what we observe 
in Table 4.2 (AmericasBarometer), but not in Table 4.5 (ANES). Highly open and extraverted citizens, meanwhile, 
are quite responsive to their environment. If reverse-coded openness and extraversion variables replace their 
normally coded counterparts, the corruption perception coefficient would be negative and significant in all models 
of Tables 4.2 and 4.5. That coefficient would refer to the impact of corruption perceptions for individuals with the 
maximum levels of openness and extraversion. 
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 Individuals with high levels of conscientiousness tend to be more responsive to the level of social threat, as the 
significant interactions in Table 4.4 would attest. In addition, we can assess responsiveness by replacing the 
169 
 
Political activists are not limited to information about the personality profiles of various 
television audiences. Targeted communications could be directed to any group high or low in 
particular personality traits. Cross-national as well as subnational differences in average 
personality traits (e.g., McCrae et al. 2005; Rentfrow 2010) indicate that some rhetorical 
strategies could be more effective in some locations than others. 
Finally, this chapter represents a first step to understanding how contextual factors 
condition the effect of personality on political support. I have focused on contextual perceptions, 
but individuals can misinterpret information from their surroundings.
201
 Good citizenship 
requires accurate information reception as well as an appropriate response. Thus far, I have 
assumed the first step while focusing on the second one to address empirical puzzles in the 
personality and support literature. The next chapter continues to consider inconsistent trait 
effects but turns to objective contextual factors to determine whether my results with perceptual 













                                                                                                                                                             
normally coded conscientiousness variable with a reverse-coded conscientiousness variable. With this replacement, 
the threat perception coefficients in Table 4.4 would become negative and significant, indicating that threat 
perceptions reduce the level of democratic support among individuals high in conscientiousness. By contrast, the 
threat perception coefficients are insignificant in Table 4.4; these coefficients denote the impact of threat perceptions 
on democratic support for individuals who score 0 in conscientiousness. Individuals low in conscientiousness are 
less responsive to the level of threat. 
201
 In addition, contextual perceptions are potentially problematic because I cannot eliminate the possibility of 





THE CONDITIONAL LINK FROM PERSONALITY TO POLITICAL SUPPORT—PART 2: 
INCORPORATING OBJECTIVE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 
 According to my model, personality traits exert significant effects on attitudes toward the 
political system in response to trait-relevant cues in the political support opportunity and the 
broader economic, social, and political context. Chapter 3 investigated the direct impacts of 
personality due to trait-relevant cues about the level and domain of support under consideration, 
and Chapter 4 turned to the interactions between traits and an individual’s perceptions of his or 
her environment.  
 The current chapter responds to two limitations in the previous chapter. First, we could be 
concerned that contextual perceptions are simply the function of an individual’s personality 
traits. Such a directional relationship would violate the causal order in trait activation theory 
(TAT) (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000) of contextual factors sending trait-
relevant cues, trait-relevant cues activating personality traits, and personality traits influencing 
the outcome of interest (e.g., political trust). Second, exclusive attention to contextual 
perceptions raises concerns about the practical and normative implications of my research. Will 
political elites strive for more economic growth, less corruption, and less crime in reality if they 
can increase political participation merely by citizen perceptions of societal progress? To what 
extent do individuals with particular psychological characteristics (e.g., high in 
conscientiousness) exercise democratic competence by supporting or opposing the political 
system based on actual outcomes?  
 Incorporating objective contextual factors can alleviate both concerns. An individual’s 





 and public officials will have a reason to promote actual societal well-being if objective 
contextual factors interact with personality traits to influence political support attitudes. 
 Therefore, this chapter revisits each of the hypotheses in the previous chapter, but with 
objective measures of the political, economic, and social context. Specific contextual factors 
consist of the level of political corruption, the extent of economic performance, and the rate of 
crime. 
 To test my hypotheses, I combine individual-level public opinion data with objective 
contextual data. The environmental information primarily originates from the World Bank, the 
U.S. government, and aggregations of mass survey data to the subnational or national level.  
 The rest of this chapter is organized in the following manner. First, I recount the logic of 
the hypotheses tested in the previous and current chapters. Second, I describe the data and 
research design; I pay particular attention in the methodology section to two factors: my 
objective measures of context and the multilevel modeling employed for each of the tests in the 
current chapter. Third, I report my results from cross-national and U.S. survey data. Fourth, I 
summarize the findings and discuss their practical implications. 
Four Puzzles Revisited 
 In the previous chapter, I documented four inconsistent direct relationships between 
personality and political support: the impact of openness on external efficacy, the impact of 
extraversion on external efficacy, the impact of conscientiousness on status quo support, and the 
impact of conscientiousness on attitudes toward political dissidents and criminals. Referring to 
existing studies and my own research, I identified environmental factors that could interact with 
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 I also addressed the issue of causal order in Chapter 4 by examining whether the impact of personality on 
political support remains significant after contextual perceptions are added to the model. 
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personality traits to influence citizen views of the political system. I then utilized trait activation 
theory to explain my hypotheses on conditional personality effects. 
 First, I expect levels of political corruption to activate openness and produce a negative 
interaction effect on external efficacy. Individuals high in openness value democratic ideals and 
therefore should be concerned about the corrosive impact of corruption on political 
accountability. Instead of politicians responding to citizens, corruption often involves members 
of the public complying with a government employee’s demand for a bribe.
203
 The effect of 
openness on external efficacy, therefore, should become increasingly negative as the level of 
corruption rises.  
 Second, corruption levels also should signal the relevance of extraversion for external 
efficacy attitudes. Because of their sociability (John et al. 2008), extraverts seek to preserve and 
expand their networks of family and friends by avoiding the criticism that results from ignoring 
group norms and group welfare. High (low) levels of corruption violate (comply with) standards 
of democratic governance and harm (benefit) the financial well-being of one’s fellow citizens.  
Therefore, extraverts will reward or punish the political system based on the level of 
malfeasance. I expect the impact of extraversion to become more and more negative as the 
prevalence of corruption increases. The interaction effect, in other words, should be negative. 
 Third, I anticipate conscientiousness to interact with economic performance to influence 
opinions on political actors, regime institutions, and regime performance. Robust and sluggish 
economies should activate the conscientiousness facets of achievement-striving and competence 
(John et al. 2008), producing a positive interaction effect: As economic performance improves, 
the impact of conscientiousness should become more and more positive. 
                                                 
203
 The logic of my argument resembles Stokes’ (2005) point about clientelism—that is, electoral support traded for 




 Fourth, levels of political and criminal threat could activate conscientiousness and 
influence attitudes toward disliked political groups and criminals. Because of their penchant for 
regulation and their dutifulness to the norm of law and order (John et al. 2008), highly 
conscientious citizens might be willing to sacrifice democratic principles such as minority rights 
in response to high levels of perceived threat from political dissidents and criminals. Tipping the 
balance in favor of the norm of law and order could be the priority assigned by most individuals 
to material needs (e.g., security) over post-material needs (e.g., self-expression) (Maslow 1943). 
Tradeoffs between law and order and democratic norms become moot as serious threats subside, 
so the impact of conscientiousness on democratic support in unthreatening scenarios could be 
positive. I thus expect a negative interaction effect: The impact of conscientiousness on 
democratic support will become more and more negative as the threat level rises.  
 This chapter tests all four hypotheses with objective contextual factors. Each hypothesis 
received support in Chapter 4, so consistent results will bolster our confidence that 
environmental factors activate personality traits, which in turn raise or lower levels of political 
support. 
 A summary of hypotheses is offered in Table 5.1. 
Interaction Dependent Variable Prediction
Openness x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative









Threats from Crime and 
Political Dissidents




Hypotheses on Conditional Personality Effects
Note: * The prediction is  pos i tive i f the dependent variable refers  to pol i tica l  
support objects  related to the incumbent party; the expected interaction effect i s  
negative i f the dependent variable perta ins  to the pol i tica l  oppos ition.
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Investigating the Conditional Link: Data and Research Design 
 To test my hypotheses, I again utilize data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer, 2012 
American National Election Study (ANES), and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES).
 204
 All three surveys contain items on personality traits and political support. For 
personality, I utilize the Big Five indices described in Chapter 3; for political support, I employ 
all of the items and indices from Chapter 4, with two exceptions. For the conscientiousness–
economic performance hypothesis tests, I omit the ANES dependent variable about government 
not being a threat to rights and freedoms because multilevel regressions failed to converge for 
this outcome variable. Meanwhile, I add House incumbent approval to my economic 
performance analyses, for conscientious citizens may hold their legislative representative 
responsible for the economic conditions in their state.
205,206
 
 Objective contextual measures also are required for the present chapter. I incorporate 
subnational contextual measures for all three surveys and country-level contextual measures for 
the AmericasBarometer, which is cross-national in scope. In some cases, I create the contextual 
variable by aggregating survey data to the subnational or national level; in others, I draw on 
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 Meanwhile, this chapter does not examine the University of Illinois student questionnaire because of the lack of 
variance in potential contextual variables; all respondents shared the same basic environment as students in the 
Champaign–Urbana area. 
205
 The previous chapter omitted House incumbent approval due to my attention to national economic conditions. 
Although national economic well-being could be attributed to successful legislative policymaking, conscientious 
citizens may have been hesitant to reward members of Congress due to the presence in the two-chamber body of the 
opposition (i.e., non-presidential) party, which controlled a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in 
2012.  
206
 Therefore, the AmericasBarometer dependent variables in this chapter consist of global executive approval, 
executive approval on five issues, actor external efficacy, an index of institutional trust, perceived justice system 
effectiveness, perceived effectiveness of local government, a democratic satisfaction index, beliefs about citizen 
rights being protected, trust in elections, and support for criminal rights. The ANES dependent variables consist of 
an index of actor trust, global executive approval, approval of the House incumbent, executive approval on four 
issues, a feeling thermometer index for Democratic political actors, a feeling thermometer index for Republican 
political actors, Democratic Party likeability, Republican Party likeability, a feeling thermometer index for 
government institutions, actor external efficacy, institutional external efficacy, beliefs about elections making 
government pay attention, democratic satisfaction, and beliefs about votes being counted fairly. And the CCES 
dependent variables consist of executive approval and approval of the House incumbent. 
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academic, U.S. government, and World Bank data sources. Consistent results across multiple 
contextual variables will bolster our confidence in the empirical support for this chapter’s 
hypotheses.  
Operationalizing Corruption 
 I have obtained cross-national and subnational variables for corruption. For the 
AmericasBarometer, I utilize four measures of malfeasance. The first item is the World Bank’s 
2009 estimate of control of corruption, reversed and recoded to range from 0 to 1.
207
 As a 
Worldwide Governance Indicator, the control of corruption estimate draws on multiple data 
sources, such as mass surveys and country experts, to determine the perceived level of 
governance in a country (Kaufmann et al. 2009). With the recoded variable, higher scores now 
refer to greater levels of malfeasance. Canada ranks as the least corrupt country in my sample, 
and Venezuela as the most corrupt. 
 The second measure of political corruption is also available from the World Bank. 
Businesses in all 24 AmericasBarometer countries, except for Canada and the United States, 
provided information on the occurrence of firm-related bribery in 2009 and 2010. Data from only 
one of these years are available for all 22 countries. The contextual measure in this study refers 
to the proportion of firms in a country reporting bribery. Scores range from 0.01 in Chile to 0.32 
in Paraguay. 
 Meanwhile, the final two measures of contextual corruption are aggregated from 
AmericasBarometer survey data. Individuals responded to a battery of questions about their 
bribery experiences over the previous year; specific questions asked whether the individual paid 
a bribe to a police officer, the municipal government, the court system, the public health system, 
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 As a general rule, for non-aggregated contextual variables, I prefer to use data from at least the year before a 
particular survey was administered. 
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or any government employee.
208
 Because of the potential overlap of the first four items with the 
final item on this list, I coded the individual-level bribery variable so that citizens with at least 
one bribery experience receive a score of 1 and all others receive a score of 0. Finally, I designed 
the subnational bribery rate and national bribery rate by calculating the average bribery score for 
all individuals in the respective collectivity.
209
 The subnational bribery rate spans from 0.02 in 
Central Panama to 0.38 in the northern Bolivian department of Beni. At the national level, 
bribery rates range from 0.04 in Canada to 0.32 in Mexico. 
 Each of the country-level corruption measures should, according to the ideals of construct 
validity, correlate significantly with the other two national variables. Indeed, the correlations 
range from 0.44 to 0.56, and all are significant at the 0.05 level or better. These observations 
attenuate my concerns about the self-generated national aggregated bribery measure.
210
 
 To explore the interactions of personality and corruption in the ANES, I turn to two state-
level measures of corruption. Dincer and Johnston (2014) recently surveyed journalists about the 
extent of corruption at the executive, legislative, and judicial levels in 49 states. Their survey 
distinguished between legal corruption (i.e., campaign contributions to a government official 
traded for benefits to the donor) and illegal corruption (i.e., illicit bribes to a government official 
traded for benefits to the donor).  
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 The bribery battery also inquired about malfeasance in one’s work and one’s interaction with his or her child’s 
school. I do not include either item in my bribery measures because the items do not explicitly refer to interaction 
with government. 
209
 The AmericasBarometer determined the subnational regions based on local tradition within the country. Regions 
in the United States, for instance, consist of the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Overall, I possess data for 118 
regions across the 24 countries under analysis. 
210
 Because subnational regions are nested within countries, the validity of the national aggregated bribery variable 
can bolster our confidence in the validity of its subnational counterpart. 
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 Given the more natural association of corruption and bribery,
211
 I focus on illegal 
corruption for the first state-level measure. My variable sums the corruption scores at the 
executive, legislative, and judicial levels and then recodes them to range from 0 to 1, with higher 
scores denoting greater malfeasance. Arizona ranked as the most corrupt state in the country, 
whereas Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Vermont all received the lowest corruption score in the Dincer and Johnston (2014) measure. 
 The second state-level corruption measure is more objective than perceptions by 
journalists. Using data from the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Census Bureau, I 
calculated the average number of federal corruption convictions in a state from 2007 to 2011 
divided by the average population in the state over the same time span. The conviction rate per 
million population spans from 0.77 in Idaho to 65.94 in Washington, D.C. Besides the score for 
the District of Columbia, the next highest score of 10.56 belongs to Alaska. The extreme score 
for Washington, D.C., prompted me to take the natural log of this variable and recode the 
variable to range from 0 to 1. Scores for Alaska and the District of Columbia—0.59 and 1, 
respectively—are now more comparable.  
 Construct validity for the two state-level measures is not ideal. The correlation of 0.14 is 
positive, as expected, but not significant at conventional levels.  
Operationalizing Economic Performance 
 As with corruption, one may utilize multiple approaches to measure economic 
performance. Prominent objective indicators include growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 
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 As noted by Treisman (2007, 211), “The quintessential corrupt transaction envisioned is the gift of a bribe by a 
private citizen to a public official in return for some service that the official should either provide for free (e.g., 
registering a firm) or not provide at all (e.g., inside information).” 
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unemployment rates, and inflation.
212
 For the AmericasBarometer, I also can aggregate 
individual-level survey items about economic well-being to the subnational or national level. 
 For this chapter, I have selected growth in GDP per capita,
213
 change in the 
unemployment rate,
214
 and aggregate measures of change in economic well-being. I opted 
against inflation because of the low or negative inflation rates that occurred in the aftermath of 
the 2008–2009 economic crisis. In the United States, for example, inflation based on consumer 
prices decreased by 0.36 percent in 2009 while the country experienced economic growth of       
-3.62 percent in 2009 and a rise in unemployment from 5.8 percent in 2008 to 9.3 percent in 
2009. Across the 24 AmericasBarometer countries, inflation based on consumer prices does not 
correlate significantly with either GDP per capita growth or change in unemployment, and an 
alternative measure of inflation (i.e., the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator) actually 




 Data for cross-national measures of 2009 GDP per capita growth and 2008–2009 change 
in unemployment are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
217
 In 
2009, Argentina witnessed the greatest decrease in GDP per capita (-6.88 percent), whereas 
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 Powell and Whitten (1993, 391), for instance, refer to “[a] large literature” that has examined the impact of GDP 
growth, inflation, and unemployment on incumbent support. 
213
 I prefer GDP per capita growth over GDP growth because the latter does not account for changes in population 
over time. 
214
 Static levels of unemployment appear to be the more common measure of unemployment (Powell and Whitten 
1993), but I have opted for change in unemployment over time in order to be consistent with the longitudinal 
measure of growth in GDP per capita and the longitudinal character of the aggregate economic performance 
measures discussed below. In addition, citizens may choose to punish the political system in response to increases in 
unemployment, even if they have become accustomed to high unemployment rates. In the 24 AmericasBarometer 
countries, the average unemployment rate rose from 7.42 in 2008 to 8.19 in 2009 and did not drop below 7.42 until 
2012. Furthermore, the U.S. unemployment rate remained above the 2008 level until the 2015 level of 5.3 percent.  
215
 That is, the implicit deflator measure of inflation is positively associated with GDP per capita growth and 
negatively associated with change in unemployment. 
216
 By contrast, the correlation of -0.45 between GDP per capita growth and change in unemployment in the 24 
AmericasBarometer countries is in the expected direction and significant at the 0.05 level.  
217




Uruguay experienced the greatest increase in GDP per capita (3.87 percent). Meanwhile, change 
in the unemployment rate ranged from -5.80 in Suriname to 4.65 in Belize.  
 For U.S. state-level data, I obtained 2011 GDP per capita growth data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and 2010–2011 change-in-unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. A total of 17 (34) states experienced negative (positive) economic growth in 2011,
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with Louisiana (North Dakota) leading the way with a GDP per capita growth rate of -5.9 (9.4) 
percent. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate declined in 48 states from 2010 to 2011, with the 
variable ranging from -2.4 in Michigan to 0.2 in Mississippi. The GDP per capita growth and 
change-in-unemployment items correlate negatively, as expected, at -0.18, although the 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
 For the subnational and national aggregate variables, I have drawn on an 
AmericasBarometer item about change in personal economic situation over the previous year. I 
recoded the variable to range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating better egotropic 
outcomes, and then aggregated the data to the subnational and national levels.
219
 The subnational 
variable ranges from 0.26 in the Cayo region in Belize to 0.66 in region 3 in Guyana, and the 
national variable ranges from 0.30 in Belize to 0.62 in Uruguay.  
 To assess construct validity, I correlated the national aggregated measure with the World 
Bank GDP per capita growth and change-in-unemployment items. As would be expected, the 
national aggregated measure is positively related to GDP per capita growth (0.49) and negatively 
related to change in unemployment (-0.45). Both correlations are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 The number of “states” totals 51 because the District of Columbia is included. 
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 Following the previous chapter, I combined retrospective, current, and prospective egotropic survey items in the 
AmericasBarometer to design alternative subnational and national economic variables. All of the significant 




 The next contextual variables under consideration are threats from political dissidents and 
threats from crime. Due to the difficulty in measuring the former, I focus on the latter. In 
particular, I rely on crime rates generated from survey data because official law enforcement 
statistics can be subject to underreporting by citizens and manipulation by elites (Gottfredson 
1986).  
 Crime data come from the World Bank and the AmericasBarometer. From the World 
Bank, I have obtained data about property crime that were collected in 22 of the 24 
AmericasBarometer countries by Enterprise Surveys during interviews with businesses in 2009 
or 2010.
220
 The specific variable refers to the losses to a firm because of arson, robbery, theft, 
and vandalism, as a percentage of annual sales. Losses range from 0.1 percent in Belize to 2.5 
percent in Brazil. 
 An alternative measure of crime is available from the AmericasBarometer. The cross-
national survey asked respondents if they had experienced “robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, 
blackmail, extortion, violent threats, or any other type of crime in the past 12 months.”
221
 I 
coded the variable so that individuals with at least one crime experience receive a score of 1; all 
other respondents have a score of 0. Because of my interest in the national context, individuals 
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 Data are not available from Canada and the United States for either year. Survey data for the other countries are 
available for 2009 or 2010, but not both. 
221
 The boldface type appears in the official questionnaire. 
222
 In the 24 countries under analysis in the AmericasBarometer, only 34 respondents said that their most recent 
victimization experience occurred in another country. 
223
 The AmericasBarometer included a parallel question about whether a household member had experienced a 
crime in the previous year. I opted against using the household crime item for my main results because crime rates 
pertain to the rates of personal, not vicarious, victimization. Nevertheless, results with the subnational and national 
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 After developing the individual-level variable, I aggregated to the subnational and 
national levels. Subnational crime rates range from 0.02 in region 6 of Guyana to 0.41 in the 
Metropolitan Area of Guatemala City. Guyana, likewise, witnessed the lowest national crime 
rate of 0.09; the highest crime rate of 0.31 occurred in Peru. 
 I assessed the construct validity of the aggregated national crime rate by correlating the 
variable with the business losses variable and other World Bank variables related to crime. The 
additional items are the homicide rate, based on official statistics, as well as the political stability 
and rule of law estimates from the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
224
 I reverse-coded the 
latter two items to range from 0 to 1. Although the aggregated variable correlated negatively and 
insignificantly with the homicide rate (p = 0.74), the aggregated variable was positively related 
to the business losses variable (p = 0.31), the political instability variable (p = 0.05), and low rule 
of law variable (p = 0.06). I thus conclude that the aggregated national crime rate functions as an 
adequate measure of victimization. 
 Descriptive statistics for all contextual variables are located in Appendix F. 
Testing the Hypotheses with Multilevel Regression 
 Previous chapters have tested my hypotheses with single-level regression analyses, but 
the technique becomes inadequate with the introduction of objective measures of corruption, 
economic performance, and crime because all individuals in a particular collectivity are 
responding to the same contextual factors. Since the observations are not independent, neither 
                                                                                                                                                             
household crime measures are similar to the main results reported below, although the interaction between 
conscientiousness and national crime is not significant at the 0.10 level or better (p = 0.18).  
224
 I do not utilize the political stability and rule of law items for my main empirical analyses because neither 
exclusively measures crime. The political stability estimate refers to government destabilization and other forms of 
political violence, and the rule of law estimate concerns the probability of crime as well as the quality of law 
enforcement (Kaufmann et al. 2009). 
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are the errors of a single-level model, which violates a key assumption of the regression 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
 Instead of single-level regression, I employ multilevel regression for the empirical 
analyses in the current chapter. Respondents to the ANES and CCES are nested in states, 
yielding two-level models. To estimate a nationally representative sample, I include the 
appropriate individual-level weight variable for each survey. 
 Meanwhile, I generate three-level models for the AmericasBarometer by nesting 
individuals in subnational regions and nesting subnational regions in countries. The 
AmericasBarometer offers a weight variable that would equalize the effective sample size of 
each country to 1,500 respondents, but I opted against including this weight because of the focus 
of some models on the subnational context, rather than the national context. Instead, I ran a 
robustness check in which I excluded the countries with noticeable deviations from a sample size 
of 1,500—that is, Brazil (N = 2,482), Bolivia (3,018), Chile (1,965), and Ecuador (3,000).
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Nine of the 11 significant AmericasBarometer interactions reported below remain significant 
when these four countries are omitted from the analysis. The two exceptions are noted below.   
 In all multilevel models, I test my hypotheses by generating a cross-level interaction 
between the personality trait(s) of interest and the contextual factor of interest.
226
 In other words, 
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 The other 20 AmericasBarometer countries in this study had samples of approximately 1,500 respondents. In 
particular, sample sizes ranged from 1,410 in Argentina to 1,562 in Mexico. 
226
 However, to calculate an R-squared value, I follow Snijders and Bosker (2012) by running an identical regression 
with no cross-level interaction. For models with continuous dependent variables (i.e., greater than 7 categories), the 
formula for the R-squared value is as follows: (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 112): 1 – (sum of intercept variance 
component and level-1 variance component in a model with independent variables)/ (sum of intercept variance 
component and level-1 variance component in the empty model). For logistic and ordinal models, the formula for 
the R-squared value is as follows (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 306, 311): (estimated variance of the fitted values)/ 





I model the personality trait as a function of the objective environmental variable. The model 
also includes the other Big Five trait dimensions and the sociodemographic controls.
227
    
 I have conducted the multilevel analyses with HLM 6.02 (Raudenbush et al. 2005).  
Evidence for a Conditional Link: Results 
I now report my findings with objective contextual factors. I start with the 
AmericasBarometer and ANES results for the corruption hypotheses and then present my 
findings for the economic performance hypothesis with data from all three surveys. I conclude 
the section by examining how the crime rate moderates the effect of conscientiousness on 
support for criminal rights. 
Personality Effects Conditioned by Corruption  
 First, I examine whether corruption levels interact with openness and extraversion to 
influence external efficacy attitudes. Individuals high in openness value democratic ideals and 
individuals high in extraversion are sensitive to group norms and group welfare, so citizens at the 
high end of each trait dimension will be inclined to reward or punish the political system based 
on its consistency with anticorruption standards for governance. Therefore, I expect negative 
effects for both interactions; in other words, the impact of both trait dimensions should become 
more and more negative as the level of corruption rises. 
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 Therefore, the number of individual-level independent variables in the model far outweighs the number of 
contextual variables. Because the slope of a personality variable could be the function of more than one contextual 
factor, I also ran a robustness check in which I added economic development as a predictor of the personality trait(s) 
of interest. To be more precise, the AmericasBarometer multilevel analyses used the subnational aggregated 
education average to accompany subnational aggregated bribery, economic performance, or crime; the national 
aggregated education average to accompany national aggregated bribery, economic performance, or crime; and 
country-level 2009 GDP per capita in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2017a) to accompany non-aggregated 
bribery, economic performance, or crime. Meanwhile, the ANES and CCES robustness checks employed the natural 
log of the state-level 2011 per capita real GDP in chained 2009 dollars. (I employed the natural log for the U.S. 
analyses because of convergence problems with the unlogged data and because of the substantial gap in income 
between the wealthiest collectivity and second-wealthiest collectivity. In particular, the District of Columbia had a 
2011 GDP per capita of $166,872, whereas Alaska had a 2011 GDP per capita of $70,573.) Of the 20 significant 
interactions in the multilevel regressions reported below, only 2 interactions ceased to be significant with the 
inclusion of GDP per capita or logged GDP per capita. These two exceptions are noted below. I should note that not 
all of the analyses for this robustness check produced results with robust standard errors. 
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 Table 5.2 reports the cross-level interactions between corruption and personality in the 
AmericasBarometer. As anticipated, the extraversion interaction is negative and significant in 
three of four models,
228,229
 and the openness interaction in Model I is also negative and 
statistically significant.
230
 All of the interactions for both trait dimensions, in fact, run in the 
negative direction. The consistent extraversion results for both World Bank corruption measures 
and for the national aggregated corruption measure constitutes strong evidence in favor of the 
expected negative interaction effect. My findings are not simply a function of a particular 
operationalization of malfeasance. 
 To explore the substantive impact of the corruption–extraversion interactions, I turn to 
the conditional effect in Model I. Figure 5.1 depicts this interaction. As anticipated, the effect of 
extraversion on the probability of maximum external efficacy is positive for individuals in 
contexts at the lowest level of observed corruption (i.e., an increase from 0.08 to 0.09); the 
effect, however, is relatively minimal.
231
 Meanwhile, moving from 0 to 1 in extraversion in an 
environment with the highest level of observed corruption attenuates the probability of maximum 
external efficacy by 43.09 percent, from 0.10 to 0.06.
232
 
 A final observation about Table 5.2 pertains to the responsiveness of citizens to 
contextual information. Individuals high in openness and extraversion appear to be more 
responsive to the level of corruption, as indicated by the significant interactions. We also can 
assess responsiveness by turning to the corruption coefficient, which refers to the effect of  
                                                 
228
 In addition, the extraversion interaction in Model IV becomes significant if the countries with oversamples are 
omitted from the regression. 
229
 However, the extraversion interactions in Models I and III become insignificant if GDP per capita is added as a 
predictor for the extraversion and openness slopes. 
230
 This openness interaction is no longer significant if the countries with oversamples are omitted from the model. 
231
 Furthermore, the extraversion coefficient in Model I of Table 5.2 shows that this trait dimension does not exert a 
significant effect when corruption is equal to 0. 
232
 Predicted probabilities in this chapter are based on all variables, except the ones of interest, being fixed to their 











Model II:    
Country-Level 
World Bank      
Firms Receiving 
One or More 
Bribe Requests 












Openness x Greater Corruption -0.47+                              
(0.25)
-0.20                                       
(1.00)
-0.65                           
(0.63)
-0.54                       
(0.58)
Extraversion x Greater Corruption -0.80*                            
(0.31)
-1.74*                                
(0.65)
-2.03*                       
(0.96)
-0.72                                 
(0.88)
Corruption 0.53+                          
(0.29)
-1.29*                              
(0.62)
0.78                              
(0.81)
0.72                                 
(0.72)
Openness -0.11                                
(0.18)
-0.43**                             
(0.14)
-0.34*                      
(0.12)
-0.34**                                              
(0.12)
Conscientiousness -0.10*                                              
(0.05)
-0.09+                            
(0.05)
-0.10*                   
(0.05)
-0.11*                                 
(0.05)
Extraversion 0.19                             
(0.23)
-0.22*                                             
(0.08)
-0.06                      
(0.14)
-0.24+                                          
(0.14)
Agreeableness 0.07                                   
(0.08)
0.05                                      
(0.08)
0.08                               
(0.08)
0.08                                  
(0.08)
Emotional Stability 0.06                                    
(0.07)
0.08                                           
(0.07)
0.06                    
(0.07)
0.07                                           
(0.07)
Female -0.03                                 
(0.02)
-0.04+                               
(0.02)
-0.03                                  
(0.02)
-0.03                                                
(0.02)
Age 0.00                               
(0.00)
0.00                             
(0.00)
0.00                               
(0.00)
0.00                                       
(0.00)
White 0.03                                        
(0.07)
0.08                            
(0.06)
0.03                             
(0.07)
0.04                                         
(0.07)
Education -0.10                                 
(0.11)
-0.10                                    
(0.11)
-0.11                                    
(0.11)
-0.11                                   
(0.11)
R2-value 0.01 0.02 0.01 N/A
Number of Cases 35,114 33,617 35,114 35,114
Number of Subnational Regions 118 111 118 118
Number of Countries 24 22 24 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Personality, Corruption, and External Efficacy Revisited: AmericasBarometer
Table 5.2
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient multi -
level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within regions , and regions  were nested within countries . 
Robust s tandard errors  (in parentheses) are reported; the intercept and threshold parameters  are omitted from 
the table. As  recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012), the R-squared va lue in each model  i s  based on the 
results  of a  random intercept model  with the same individual -level  and contextual  variables ; the formula  used 
for ca lculating the R-squared va lue a lso i s  provided by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012, 306, 311). An "N/A" entry 
occurs  because Sni jders  and Bosker do not offer a  formula  for ca lculating expla ined variance for a  three-level  
ordina l  or logis tic model  in which the only contextual  variables  are present at the second level . For more 




malfeasance when openness and extraversion are equal to 0. If individuals low in both trait 
dimensions are responsive to their environment and comply with anticorruption norms, we 
would observe negative and significant corruption coefficients in Models I through IV. Instead, 
the coefficient for corruption is negative and significant in only one model and actually positive 
and significant in another model.
233
 Individuals low in each trait dimension thus do not appear to 
reward or punish the political system based on the level of corruption.
234
 
 I now assess the generalizability of my AmericasBarometer findings by testing the 
corruption hypotheses in the ANES. In Table 5.3 we observe that none of the  
                                                 
233
 Meanwhile, the corruption coefficients in Models I and II are both negative and significant if we replace the 
normally coded openness and extraversion variables with reverse-coded openness and extraversion variables. These 
replacements mean that the corruption coefficients now refer to the impact of corruption for individuals who score 1 
in openness and extraversion. The significant and negative effects of corruption point to the greater responsiveness 
of individuals high in the two trait dimensions. 
234
 Likewise, the corruption perception coefficient in Table 4.2 is not significant, indicating that perceptions of 
malfeasance are not strongly related to external efficacy attitudes for AmericasBarometer respondents who score at 




extraversion–corruption interactions in the ANES are statistically significant, thus tempering the 
cross-national findings from the AmericasBarometer. The inconsistent results across datasets 
could be attributable to the lower degree of variation in corruption within the United States than 
across North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Among the four U.S. regions in the 


































Openness x Greater Corruption -0.55                         
(0.74)
-3.41**                                  
(1.14)
0.13                                    
(0.68)
-1.71                             
(1.54)
-0.43                                     
(0.52)
-0.46                                            
(1.30)
Extraversion x Greater Corruption -0.02                                   
(0.39)
0.38                               
(1.04)
0.17                                      
(0.39)
0.35                           
(1.31)
0.43                                     
(0.48)
-1.52                                                   
(1.04)
Corruption 0.15                                     
(0.33)
1.04*                               
(0.47)
0.11                                    
(0.28)
0.63                                    
(0.42)
0.12                                               
(0.28)
0.56                              
(0.84)
Openness 0.59                            
(0.44)
1.29***                         
(0.36)
0.41                             
(0.47)
1.05*                                          
(0.43)
0.96*                                     
(0.37)
0.81+                                     
(0.42)
Conscientiousness -0.63***                                         
(0.14)
-0.64***                                   
(0.14)
-0.24*                                  
(0.12)
-0.26*                                            
(0.11)
-0.04                          
(0.14)
-0.02                                                  
(0.14)
Extraversion 0.60*                                              
(0.27)
0.42                                 
(0.32)
0.49                   
(0.32)
0.44                                    
(0.41)
-0.13                                      
(0.32)
0.52                                               
(0.36)
Agreeableness 0.34*                                            
(0.13)
0.30*                                
(0.14)
0.28*                                       
(0.12)
0.24+                                      
(0.13)
0.42*                                
(0.17)
0.40*                                   
(0.16)
Emotional Stability 0.22+                                
(0.13)
0.24+                             
(0.13)
0.44***                          
(0.11)
0.39**                                       
(0.12)
0.22+                                     
(0.12)
0.25*                           
(0.12)
Female 0.02                         
(0.05)
0.03                               
(0.05)
0.02                                     
(0.05)
0.01                           
(0.05)
0.04                                    
(0.04)
0.05                                                
(0.04)
Age 0.00                          
(0.00)
0.00                                 
(0.00)
0.00                         
(0.00)
0.00                                         
(0.00)
0.00*                              
(0.00)
0.00+                                                                    
(0.00)
White -0.25***                              
(0.07)
-0.23***                              
(0.07)
-0.47***                         
(0.09)
-0.50***                          
(0.08)
-0.51***                                                    
(0.06)
-0.51***                                     
(0.06)
Education 0.77***                            
(0.08)
0.80***                                
(0.08)
0.70***                          
(0.11)
0.71***                              
(0.11)
0.45***                                     
(0.10)
0.42***                                                       
(0.11)
R2-value 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Number of Cases 5,236 5,345 5,235 5,344 5,232 5,339
Number of States 49 51 49 51 49 51
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Table 5.3
Personality, Corruption, and External Efficacy Revisited: ANES
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. The number of "s tates" may be 51 because of the inclus ion of Washington, D.C., in the s tudy. The dependent variable 
i s  located at the top of the column in i ta l ics , and the operational ization of corruption context i s  located immediately below the model  number. The 
conviction rate measure ranges  from 0 to 1. Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested 
within s tates . Robust s tandard errors  (in parentheses) are reported; the intercept and threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. The "weight_ful l" 
variable was  employed at the individual  level  of analys is . As  recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012), the R-squared va lue in each model  i s  based on 
the results  of a  random intercept model  with the same individual -level  and contextual  variables ; the formula  used for ca lculating the R-squared va lue a lso 
i s  provided by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012, 306, 311). For more deta i l s  about ca lculating the R-squared va lue, see the main text. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
+ p < .10
Officials Care What People Think
People Have Say in What 
Government Does




an overall national average of 0.05. Of the 23 other AmericasBarometer countries, 21 
experienced greater prevalence of corruption according to the aggregated national bribery rate.  
 In spite of the relatively low level of corruption in the United States, one of the 
openness–corruption interactions in Table 5.3 is negative and statistically significant. I would 
have preferred to observe a greater number of significant interactions; however, I can report that 
the significant interaction in Model II is robust to a number of checks. In particular, the 
interaction remains negative and significant if I remove the collectivity with the highest 
corruption conviction rate (i.e., the District of Columbia) or if I remove Washington, D.C., and 
replace the logged corruption variable with its unlogged counterpart. Likewise, the interaction 
continues to be negative and significant if I add individual-level controls for ideology and 
partisanship or if I add cross-level interactions for openness and a logged measure of GDP per 
capita as well as extraversion and a logged measure of GDP per capita.
235
  
 The AmericasBarometer and ANES results overlap in two respects. First, the significant 
openness interaction in both datasets occurs for efficacy evaluations at the actor level of political 
support. Openness activation thus appears to influence attitudes about the democratic 
relationship between citizens and government officials.
236,237
 Second, consistent with the findings 
                                                 
235
 I logged GDP per capita because of the substantial gap between the two wealthiest collectivities: the District of 
Columbia ($166,872) and Alaska ($70,573). 
236
 Likewise, the interaction between openness and corruption perceptions is negative and significant in the 
AmericasBarometer actor efficacy model in Table 4.2. I should note, however, that in the ANES the only significant 
openness–corruption interaction from Chapter 4 pertained to institutional external efficacy (i.e., elections making 
government pay attention). I classify the pay-attention dependent variable as an example of institutional efficacy 
since political actors are not explicitly mentioned in the question. 
237
 My argument anticipates that low and high levels of corruption will activate both trait dimensions, resulting in 
positive and negative trait effects, respectively. One can consider trait activation at minimum levels of corruption by 
observing the openness and extraversion coefficients if the contextual variable in question is coded to range from 0 
to 1. The same is true for trait activation at maximum levels of corruption, although the contextual variable must be 
reverse-coded. Consistent with expectations, I observe a positive (negative) and significant openness effect at 
minimum (maximum) corruption in Model II of Table 5.3. The openness and extraversion effects also are negative 
and significant at maximum corruption in Models I, II, and III of Table 5.2, as anticipated. Trait effects at minimum 
levels of corruption in the AmericasBarometer, however, do not conform to expectations, for I find negative and 
189 
 
in Table 5.2, the corruption coefficient in Model II of Table 5.3 is actually positive, which 
denotes a lack of traditional responsiveness to contextual information on the part of individuals 
low in openness and extraversion.
238
 Instead, greater levels of corruption are rewarded with 
higher external efficacy evaluations.
239
 
Personality Effects Conditioned by Economic Performance 
 For my next hypothesis, I shift from openness and extraversion to conscientiousness and 
from corruption to economic performance. I expect robust (anemic) sociotropic conditions to 
activate the achievement-striving and competence facets of conscientiousness and produce 
positive (negative) trait effects as individuals high in this trait dimension seek to reward (punish) 
actors, institutions, and procedures for economic outcomes. In other words, as economic 
conditions improve, the impact of conscientiousness on status quo attitudes should become more 
and more positive. The anticipated interaction effect will be positive when the contextual factor 
is measured by GDP per capita growth or aggregated economic situation, and negative when the 
contextual factor is measured by increases in the unemployment rate. 
 I utilize data from all three surveys to test my hypothesis. With multiple contextual 
factors and numerous dependent variables, the number of tests totaled 36 for the 
AmericasBarometer, 28 for the ANES, and 4 for the CCES. I conserve space by presenting only 
the regressions with a statistically significant cross-level interaction between conscientiousness 
and economic performance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
significant openness effects in Models II and III and a negative and significant extraversion effect in Model II. For 
exact results from my analyses of trait activation, see Appendix G.  
238
 The significant interaction, meanwhile, underscores the responsiveness of individuals high in openness. Indeed, 
the corruption coefficient becomes negative and significant if the normally coded openness and extraversion 
variables are replaced by their reverse-coded counterparts; these replacements would cause the corruption 
coefficient to denote the effect of malfeasance among individuals who score 1 in openness and extraversion. 
239
 Meanwhile, the coefficients for corruption perceptions in Table 4.5 indicate that perceptions of malfeasance, as 
expected, are negatively related to external efficacy attitudes for ANES respondents who score at the minimum level 
of openness and extraversion. I should note, however, that corruption perceptions are measured with an item in a 
political trust battery, rather than with an item in a battery focused on malfeasance. 
190 
 
 The AmericasBarometer results are presented in Table 5.4. Of the 36 tests, 5 are 
statistically significant and in the hypothesized positive direction.
240
 Although a higher number 
of significant interactions would be ideal, the total of 5 still exceeds what would be expected by 
chance if we anticipate 10 percent of the coefficients (i.e., about 4) being statistically significant 
in either direction. 
 From a substantive perspective, interesting patterns emerge from the AmericasBarometer 
results. First, I observe positive and significant interactions for political support at the actor (i.e., 
executive approval), institutional (i.e., perceived justice system effectiveness), and procedural 
(i.e., citizen rights protected) levels. Highly conscientious citizens appear willing to respond to 
economic information in their attitudes at all three levels of status quo support. Second, the 
significant interactions with regional and national aggregated economic conditions indicate the 
value of both sources of information as individuals high in conscientiousness assess the political 
system.
241
 Extant research on Argentina, the United States, and other democracies has questioned 
the impact of subnational economic outcomes on electoral results (Remmer and Gélineau 2003; 
Rodden and Wibbels 2010), but my analysis of data from Latin America, North America, and the 
Caribbean suggests that local sociotropic conditions matter once they are interacted with 
conscientiousness.
242
 Third, I find that citizens high in conscientiousness are more responsive to 
economic information than citizens low in conscientiousness. Beyond the significant 
interactions, we can assess responsiveness by considering the economic performance 
coefficients, which refer to the impact of sociotropic conditions for individuals with a score of 0  
                                                 
240
 The interaction in Model V ceases to be significant if the countries with oversamples are omitted. 
241
 For both executive approval and citizen rights being protected, neither the subnational nor national cross-level 
interaction is statistically significant if both aggregated variables are included in the same model. Such a result could 
be due to the nested nature of the two variables. 
242
 The current chapter, of course, attends to political support attitudes, so future work on conscientiousness, 





















Model III:                               
Country-Level 
World Bank 
Growth in 2009 
GDP per Capita














Conscientiousness x Positive 
Economic Performance
1.78+                                   
(0.89)
1.43+                                   
(0.76)
0.04+                               
(0.02)
1.34*                               
(0.54)
1.28*                                
(0.59)
Positive Economic Performance 3.98*                                       
(1.64)
2.53*                           
(1.11)
0.03                            
(0.03)
0.71                        
(0.93)
0.49                                
(0.54)
Openness -0.09                                          
(0.09)
-0.09                                  
(0.09)
-0.49***                       
(0.06)
-0.32***       
(0.06)    
-0.31***                          
(0.06)
Conscientiousness -0.87+                                  
(0.45)
-0.72+                             
(0.39)
0.10+                                   
(0.06)
-0.69*                                            
(0.26)
-0.63*             
(0.28)
Extraversion -0.13+                                     
(0.07)
-0.13+                                     
(0.07)
-0.26***                               
(0.05)
-0.30***                               
(0.06)
-0.29***                            
(0.06)
Agreeableness 0.21***                            
(0.06)
0.21***                            
(0.06)
0.23***                                    
(0.07)
0.14*                                    
(0.07)
0.14*                              
(0.07)
Emotional Stability 0.10                                        
(0.08)
0.10                                        
(0.08)
0.18**                                        
(0.07)
0.15*                                           
(0.07)
0.15*                              
(0.07)
Female 0.02                                       
(0.04)
0.02                                       
(0.04)
-0.03                               
(0.03)
0.04                                      
(0.03)
0.04+                                
(0.03)
Age 0.00                                               
(0.00)
0.00                                               
(0.00)
0.00                 
(0.00)
-0.00                                  
(0.00)
-0.00                           
(0.00)
White -0.05                                                
(0.10)
-0.05                                                
(0.10)
0.14***                            
(0.04)
0.11+                                
(0.06)
0.11+                                 
(0.06)
Education -0.06                                                  
(0.14)
-0.06                                                  
(0.14)
-0.35**                         
(0.12)
-0.14                                   
(0.11)
-0.14                                 
(0.10)
R2-value 0.04 N/A 0.02 0.01 N/A
Number of Cases 36,887 36,887 35,553 36,532 36,532
Number of Subnational Regions 118 118 118 118 118
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Citizen Rights Protected
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  located at the top of the column in i ta l ics , and the 
operational ization of economic context i s  located immediately below the model  number. Coefficients  are the result of a  random 
coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within regions , and regions  were nested within countries . 
Robust s tandard errors  (in parentheses) are reported; the intercept and threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. As  
recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012), the R-squared va lue in each model  i s  based on the results  of a  random intercept 
model  with the same individual -level  and contextual  variables ; the formula  used for ca lculating the R-squared va lue a lso i s  
provided by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012, 306, 311). "N/A" entries  occur because Sni jders  and Bosker do not offer a  formula  for 
ca lculating expla ined variance for a  three-level  ordina l  or logis tic model  in which the only contextual  variables  are present at the 
second level . For more deta i l s  about ca lculating the R-squared va lue, see the main text. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10





in conscientiousness. Only two economic performance coefficients in Table 5.4 are positive and 
statistically significant.
243
 Individuals low in conscientiousness thus may not account for 
economic performance in their attitudes toward the political system, whereas individuals at the 
other end of the spectrum are more likely to reward or punish the political system based on the 
level of economic performance.
244
 
 Next, I report the conscientiousness–economic performance interactions for the ANES in 
Table 5.5. As expected, all of the significant change-in-unemployment (GDP per capita growth) 
interactions are in the negative (positive) direction.
245
 Conscientiousness exerts an increasingly 
positive effect on attitudes toward political actors and institutions as the level of economic 
performance in one’s state improves. Again, my findings question the notion that citizens fail to 
account for subnational economic performance in their political attitudes and behavior (Remmer 
and Gélineau 2003; Rodden and Wibbels 2010). Less conscientious citizens may ignore local 
sociotropic conditions,
246
 but highly conscientious citizens value such information.
247
 
 The interactions in Table 5.5 for House incumbent approval are particularly significant, 
implying that conscientious citizens reward or punish their legislative representative for the  
                                                 
243
 Meanwhile, the greater responsiveness of highly conscientious citizens is apparent if we replace the normally 
coded conscientiousness variable with a reverse-coded conscientiousness variable. Such a change in each model of 
Table 5.4 causes every economic performance coefficient—which now refers to the impact of sociotropic conditions 
for highly conscientious individuals—to be positive and significant. 
244
 Such an observation applies only to the coefficients for objective economic performance. In Table 4.3 we 
observed that the economic perception coefficients are all positive and significant, indicating that among less 
conscientious individuals, positive economic views facilitate greater support for the political status quo.  
245
 The 7 significant interactions in 28 regressions exceed what would be expected based on chance. 
246
 To measure the lack of responsiveness by individuals low in conscientiousness, we can examine the economic 
performance coefficients in Table 5.5. If less conscientious citizens were responding to their economic conditions, 
the economic performance coefficient should be negative for the change-in-unemployment interactions and positive 
for the GDP per capita growth interactions. Instead, the pattern is reverse so that citizens who score 0 in 
conscientiousness actually punish the political system for improved economic performance. I should note, however, 
that such unexpected patterns are not apparent for the ANES economic perception coefficients in Table 4.6, all of 
which are positive (negative) when the dependent variable refers to status quo (opposition) support. 
247
 The greater reactivity of highly conscientious citizens is apparent not only in the significant interactions in Table 
5.5, but also in the impact of economic performance among individuals high in conscientiousness. If we replace the 
normally coded conscientiousness variable with a reverse-coded conscientiousness variable, the economic 




economic climate in their state. Figure 5.2 depicts the interaction for GDP per capita growth.
248
 
As anticipated, I observe evidence of trait activation in response to low and high levels of state 
economic performance. Poor economic conditions trigger a negative trait effect, as moving from 
0 to 1 in conscientiousness reduces the probability of maximum approval from 0.34 to 0.13 (i.e., 
a decline of 60.58 percent). Conversely, conscientiousness effects are positive in U.S. states with 
robust economies: The same change in conscientiousness in contexts of positive economic  
                                                 
248
 I focus on the interaction with GDP per capita growth because of the results of a supplemental analysis in which I 
included interactions for both economic performance variables. Only the interaction for GDP per capita growth 
remained statistically significant. 
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Capita
Conscientiousness x Positive 
Economic Performance
-0.26+                                
(0.13)
0.23**                                 
(0.07)
-0.87***                                                  
(0.24)
-34.67+                       
(17.61)
0.31+                                  
(0.16)
-19.75+                                        
(11.06)
0.12*                              
(0.05)
Positive Economic Performance 0.13                                       
(0.10)
-0.09+                                    
(0.05)
0.53**                                     
(0.16)
7.97                                 
(11.28)
-0.14                            
(0.10)
11.84+                                  
(7.04)
-0.11**                        
(0.04)
Openness -0.11+                           
(0.06)
0.13                                   
(0.18)
0.14                             
(0.18)
64.02***                                    
(7.95)
2.28***                        
(0.35)
3.85                                 
(5.71)
0.64***                   
(0.17)
Conscientiousness -0.44***                              
(0.12)
0.17                                      
(0.15)
-0.31                                           
(0.20)
-59.34***                               
(16.78)
-0.87*                                 
(0.37)
-23.18*                         
(11.27)
-0.38**                    
(0.11)
Extraversion 0.06                         
(0.06)
-0.14                                    
(0.12)
-0.15                                                    
(0.12)
-7.08                         
(6.83)
0.00                          
(0.28)
24.53***                      
(5.16)
0.51***                           
(0.13)
Agreeableness 0.17***                            
(0.05)
0.06                                  
(0.20)
0.05                                            
(0.20)
22.37**                             
(8.44)
0.81**                             
(0.29)
23.10***                              
(5.03)
0.22+                           
(0.13)
Emotional Stability 0.12*                                                     
(0.06)
0.14        
(0.22)
0.14                                        
(0.22)
-9.85                        
(8.18)
-0.34                        
(0.27)
11.23*                                        
(4.83)
0.41**                     
(0.13)
Female 0.04                                        
(0.03)
0.15*                      
(0.06)
0.16*                                             
(0.06)
16.58***                            
(3.22)
0.36***                       
(0.11)
8.27***                   
(2.40)
0.01                                  
(0.05)
Age -0.00+                                           
(0.00)
0.01**                                    
(0.00)
0.01**                                     
(0.00)
-0.01                               
(0.08)
0.01*                              
(0.00)
0.13*                                 
(0.06)
0.00                                
(0.00)
White -0.31***                                 
(0.04)
0.00                                          
(0.11)
0.01                                                
(0.12)
-68.36***                       
(7.35)
-2.00***                             
(0.23)
-22.45***                         
(3.62)
-0.48***                      
(0.09)
Education 0.14**                               
(0.05)
0.00                                     
(0.14)
-0.01                                                     
(0.14)
12.83*                                 
(5.98)
-0.22                              
(0.17)
-21.85***                               
(3.02)
0.69***                         
(0.11)
R2-value 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.05
Number of Cases 5,150 4,323 4,323 5,203 5,294 5,259 5,344
Number of States 51 50 50 51 51 51 51
Method of Estimation OLS Ordinal Ordinal OLS OLS OLS Ordinal
House Incumbent Approval
Table 5.5
Conscientiousness, Economic Performance, and Status Quo Support Revisited: ANES
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. The number of "s tates" may be 51 because of the inclus ion of Washington, D.C., in the s tudy. The dependent variable i s  located at the top of the 
column in i ta l ics , and the operational ization of economic context i s  located immediately below the model  number. Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient multi -level  
model . Individual  respondents  were nested within s tates . Robust s tandard errors  (in parentheses) are reported; intercepts  and any threshold parameters  for a  model  are omitted 
from the table. The "weight_ful l" variable was  employed at the individual  level  of analys is . As  recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012), the R-squared va lue in each model  i s  
based on the results  of a  random intercept model  with the same individual -level  and contextual  variables ; the formulas  used for ca lculating the R-squared va lue a lso are provided 




performance raises the likelihood of maximum approval from 0.11 to 0.56 (i.e., an increase of 
415.32 percent). 
 Finally, I turn to the interaction between economic performance and conscientiousness in 
the CCES. Table 5.6 reports that the effect of conscientiousness on House incumbent approval 
becomes more and more negative as the unemployment rate rises. Furthermore, the insignificant 
economic performance coefficient denotes a low level of responsiveness to economic 
information on the part of citizens low in conscientiousness. Consistent with previous 
observations, individuals high in conscientiousness appear to be rewarding the political system 
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 The significant interaction in Table 5.6 signals the greater responsiveness of highly conscientious citizens. In 




                                                                                                                                                             
normally coded conscientiousness variable. The coefficient for the change-in-unemployment variable now refers to 
the contextual effect among individuals high in conscientiousness, and this coefficient is negative and significant, as 
expected. 
Model I:                            
State-Level 




Conscientiousness x Positive 
Economic Performance
-1.00*                                
(0.45)
Positive Economic Performance 0.45                                                 
(0.36)
Openness 0.08                                                        
(0.59)
Conscientiousness -1.09*                                                      
(0.54)
Extraversion -0.32                                   
(0.42)
Agreeableness 0.94*                                            
(0.44)
Emotional Stability 0.93+                                                
(0.50)
Female 0.16                                              
(0.15)
Age 0.01                                               
(0.01)
White -0.07                                          
(0.18)
Education -0.38                                     
(0.29)
R2-value 0.03
Number of Cases 738
Number of States 51
Method of Estimation Ordinal
Table 5.6
Conscientiousness, Economic Performance, and 
House Incumbent Approval: CCES
Note: Data  come from the 2012 CCES. The number of 
"s tates" i s  51 because of the inclus ion of Washington, D.C., 
in the s tudy. Coefficients  are the result of a  random 
coefficient multi -level  model . Individua l  respondents  were 
nested within s tates . Robust s tandard errors  (in 
parentheses ) are reported; the intercept and threshold 
parameters  are omitted from the table. The "V102" weight 
variable was  employed at the individua l  level  of ana lys is . 
As  recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012), the R-
squared va lue in each model  i s  based on the results  of a  
random intercept model  with the same individua l -level  
and contextua l  variables ; the formula  used for ca lculating 
the R-squared va lue a lso i s  provided by Sni jders  and 
Bosker (2012, 306, 311). For more deta i l s  about ca lculating 
the R-squared va lue, see the main text. *** p < .001                 
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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 In sum, all of the significant interactions reveal, as expected, that conscientiousness 




Personality Effects Conditioned by Crime 
 Shifting to democratic support, I expect conscientiousness to interact with the crime rate 
to influence a person’s willingness to guarantee rights to the accused. Levels of threat from crime 
should activate the orderliness and duty facets of conscientiousness. High crime rates will evoke 
concern for societal stability and the norm of law and order from individuals high in this trait 
dimension; such concerns may overrule adherence to democratic norms because of the 
prioritization of material needs for security over post-material needs for minority rights (Maslow 
1943). Meanwhile, low crime rates will reassure highly conscientious citizens about the 
possibility of securing the peace without violating democratic standards regarding criminal 
rights. Therefore, I anticipate the relationship between conscientiousness and support for 
criminal rights to become more and more negative as the crime rate increases.  
 Table 5.7 reports my findings. As expected, we observe negative conditional effects in all 
three models, and the interactions for the national and subnational aggregated crime rates are 
statistically significant. The insignificant crime coefficients in the table also indicate that the 
crime rate exerted no effect on individuals with the minimum score of conscientiousness. Highly 
conscientious citizens in the AmericasBarometer, therefore, were more responsive to the level of  
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 As Figure 5.2 would indicate, I observe conscientiousness activation at both low and high scores of the economic 
performance variables. One can identify trait activation at the minimum (maximum) values of the contextual 
variables by coding the contextual variables to range from 0 to 1 (0 to 1, reversed) and then examining the 
conscientiousness coefficient. The process thus requires two supplemental regressions per model. Across the 13 
models in Tables 5.4 through 5.6, I ran 26 regressions. Of the 26 conscientiousness coefficients, 16 are significant 
and in the expected direction. My results reveal trait activation at low and high scores of economic performance. For 





















Conscientiousness x Higher 
Crime
-0.14                                     
(0.12)
-2.52**                                    
(0.81)
-2.53**                                   
(0.77)
Higher Crime 0.04                      
(0.17)
-1.49                                       
(1.43)
0.23                     
(0.76)
Openness 0.03                              
(0.07)
0.05                                
(0.07)
0.05                                    
(0.07)
Conscientiousness 0.32*                                  
(0.14)
0.66***                                      
(0.17)
0.69***                          
(0.17)
Extraversion -0.17***                                
(0.05)
-0.18***                                    
(0.05)
-0.18***                                   
(0.05)
Agreeableness 0.25**                             
(0.08)
0.24**                          
(0.07)
0.24**                          
(0.07)
Emotional Stability 0.23**                                    
(0.08)
0.25**                                  
(0.08)
0.25**                                   
(0.08)
Female 0.10***                                  
(0.02)
0.11***                                            
(0.02)
0.11***                                   
(0.02)
Age 0.01***                          
(0.00)
0.01***                                    
(0.00)
0.01***                                   
(0.00)
White 0.03                                
(0.03)
0.01                                  
(0.04)
0.01                           
(0.03)
Education 0.01                               
(0.13)
0.02                               
(0.12)
0.02                               
(0.12)
R2-value 0.01 0.02 0.02
Number of Cases 33,959 35,448 35,448
Number of Subnational Regions 111 118 118
Number of Countries 22 24 24
Method of Estimation Logit Logit Logit
Table 5.7
Conscientiousness, Crime, and Support for Criminal Rights Revisited: 
AmericasBarometer
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Coefficients  are the result of a  random 
coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within regions , and 
regions  were nested within countries . Robust s tandard errors  (in parentheses) are reported;  
intercept parameters  are omitted from the table. As  recommended by Sni jders  and Bosker 
(2012), the R-squared va lue in each model  i s  based on the results  of a  random intercept 
model  with the same individual -level  and contextual  variables ; the formula  used for 
ca lculating the R-squared va lue a lso i s  provided by Sni jders  and Bosker (2012, 306, 311). For 
more deta i l s  about ca lculating the R-squared va lue, see the main text. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 
* p < .05 + p < .10
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robbery, assault, extortion, and other illegal activity in their environment by withholding or 
extending rights to potential criminals.
251,252
 
 Furthermore, the subnational crime rate appears more likely to activate conscientiousness 
than the national crime rate. In a separate analysis with both cross-level interactions, only the one 
for the region-level crime rate was negative and statistically significant. Individuals high in 




 Because of the greater importance of subnational crime, I concentrate my analysis of 
substantive effects on the interaction in Table 5.7 between conscientiousness and the regional 
crime rate. Figure 5.3 depicts the results. We find that both low and high levels of crime activate 
conscientiousness and produce positive and negative trait effects, respectively. At the lowest 
observed crime rate, moving from 0 to 1 in conscientiousness raises the probability of supporting 
criminal rights by more than 13 points, from 0.58 to 0.72 (i.e., an increase of 25.09 percent). But 
in subnational regions with the highest observed crime rate, the same change in 
conscientiousness reduces the probability of democratic support from 0.60 to 0.51 (i.e., a 
decrease of 14.19 percent).
254
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 The two significant interactions in Table 5.7 signal the greater reactivity of highly conscientious individuals. To 
further examine the issue, a supplementary analysis replaced the normally coded conscientiousness variable with a 
reverse-coded conscientiousness variable. This replacement caused the crime variable to refer to the impact of the 
crime rate among highly conscientious respondents, and the coefficients were negative and significant in Models II 
and III, as expected. 
252
 The threat perception variables in Table 4.4 also are insignificant, meaning that among less conscientious 
citizens, concerns about crime and political dissidents do not exert a significant effect on support for criminal rights 
and political tolerance, respectively.  
253
 Furthermore, I have constructed national and subnational crime rates from an individual-level variable about 
household crime victimization. The interaction between conscientiousness and the subnational household crime rate 
is negative and significant, but the interaction between conscientiousness and the national household crime rate is 
not significant. The analysis thus reinforces the greater salience of local crime information for individuals high in 
conscientiousness.  
254
 Consistent with Figure 5.3, the effect of conscientiousness is positive and significant at the minimum observed 




 In short, the effect of conscientiousness on support for criminal rights becomes more and 
more negative as the level of crime rises. The results are especially robust for the local crime 
rate. 
Reviewing the Evidence 
 Using objective contextual factors, I have obtained support for each of my hypotheses on 
conditional personality effects. In both the AmericasBarometer and ANES, I show that openness 
interacts with corruption to influence external efficacy attitudes, and the AmericasBarometer 
analyses also reveal significant interactions between extraversion and corruption. My results 
indicate, as expected, that the effects of openness and extraversion become more and more 
negative as the prevalence of corruption rises. Across the AmericasBarometer, ANES, and 
CCES, I also find that conscientiousness becomes more and more positive  in response to  
                                                                                                                                                             
Conscientiousness also exerts a positive and significant effect on support for criminal rights at the minimum 




increasingly robust economic conditions. Only the AmericasBarometer enables me to test my 
hypothesis on support for criminal rights, but I observe the expected negative interaction 
between conscientiousness and crime. As the crime rate worsens, conscientious individuals are 
more likely to oppose the rights of the accused in an effort, presumably, to promote societal 
stability and the norm of law and order.  
 Table 5.8 summarizes the pattern of results for each hypothesis. In every row, the number 
of significant and expected interactions surpasses the 10 percent threshold that would be 
expected based on statistical chance. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 The central purpose of the present chapter has been to revisit the hypotheses from 
Chapter 4 with objective measures of the political, economic, and social context. Because the 
previous chapter employed contextual perceptions, I could not state definitively whether my 
results were attributable to personality influencing perceptions or whether perceptions send trait-
relevant cues that in turn activate psychological traits.  
Interaction Dependent Variable Prediction Number of Significant and 
Expected Interactions
Openness x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative 1 of 4 (AB); 1 of 8 (ANES)
Extraversion x Corruption External Efficacy toward 
Actors & Institutions
Negative 3 of 4 (AB); 0 of 8 (ANES)
Conscientiousness x 
Economic Performance
Support for Actors, 
Institutions, & Procedures
Positive* 5 of 36 (AB); 7 of 28 
(ANES); 1 of 4 (CCES)
Conscientiousness x 
Threats from Crime and 
Political Dissidents
Support for Criminal Rights 
and Political Tolerance**
Negative 2 of 3 (AB)
Table 5.8
Results for Hypotheses on Conditional Personality Effects
Note: * The prediction is  pos i tive i f the dependent variable refers  to pol i tica l  support objects  related to the 
incumbent party; the expected interaction effect i s  negative i f the dependent variable perta ins  to the pol i tica l  
oppos ition. ** This  chapter did not test the pol i tica l  diss ident/pol i tica l  tolerance component of the fourth 
hypothes is . The total  number of interactions  refers  to a l l  interactions , not only the ones  reported in the tables  
for this  chapter.  "AB" refers  to "AmericasBarometer."
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 The current chapter on objective contextual factors also addresses the issue of accuracy. 
Are trait–situation interactions based on actual levels of corruption, economic performance, and 
crime, or only on the perceptions of citizens? 
 The answer to this question carries implications for the actions and rhetorical strategies of 
public officials. If only contextual perceptions interact with personality traits, then political elites 
do not need to spend their time attempting to improve the economy, minimize corruption, or 
reduce the crime rate. Instead, incumbents could target messages to audiences based on their 
personality traits and present messages about the impressions of the status quo, rather than the 
actual status quo. However, such indolence will be insufficient if many recipients of elite 
messages also obtain, and respond accurately to, objective information about their political, 
economic, or social environment. In that case, political prudence would dictate that public 
officials combine effective governance with tailored communications that improve political 
support levels, which in turn should increase participation rates and the ability of citizens to 
express their interests. 
 Across multiple hypotheses and datasets, I find that objective contextual factors interact 
with personality traits to influence attitudes toward the political system. Individuals high in 
openness and extraversion respond to information about political corruption, rewarding clean 
political systems and punishing malfeasant ones in their external efficacy attitudes. Likewise, 
highly conscientious citizens often react to the level of economic performance and crime in their 
environment. As a result, conscientiousness exerts an increasingly positive effect on actor, 
institutional, and procedural support as economic performance improves, and an increasingly 
negative effect on support for criminal rights as the crime rate rises.  
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 My findings have implications for the personality and support literature, for the academic 
community’s understanding of person–situation interactions, and for the rhetorical strategies of 
political elites. Each of the hypotheses in the current and previous chapters has addressed an 
inconsistency, or empirical puzzle, in past research on the direct effects of personality on 
political support. Across the two chapters, my results for the corruption, economic performance, 
and crime hypotheses indicate that discrepant findings in past research are attributable to surveys 
being administered in divergent contexts. Perhaps different findings on openness and external 
efficacy, for example, are due to cross-survey variation in the level of corruption.  
 With regard to person–situation interactions, the current and previous chapters point to 
the value of trait activation theory (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000) as a general 
framework for understanding how environmental and personality factors influence individual 
attitudes and behavior. I have obtained consistent findings for multiple hypotheses derived from 
TAT. These hypotheses have pertained to multiple levels of political support, and I have tested 
my expectations with as many as three surveys and with perceptual as well as objective 
contextual factors. My findings, along with extant studies in occupational psychology (e.g., 
Colbert and Witt 2009; Hirst et al. 2011), suggest the applicability of TAT to the study of 
conditional personality effects in a variety of substantive fields, including political science. 
 With regard to rhetorical strategies, political elites should understand which citizens are 
most responsive to information in their environment. Individuals high in openness and 
extraversion, for example, are more reactive to corruption levels than their less open and 
extraverted counterparts.
255
 Politicians and nongovernmental organizations interested in raising 
levels of political support and political participation, therefore, could emphasize reductions in the 
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 Because of the insignificant corruption coefficient in Table 4.2, this statement particularly applies to the 
AmericasBarometer interactions in Chapter 4 between (1) openness and corruption perceptions and (2) extraversion 
and corruption perceptions. 
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number of corruption convictions before a highly open or extraverted audience. In the United 
States, research has shown that online and television satire audiences tend to be high in 
openness, and newspaper readers and viewers of television political talk programs tend to be 
high in extraversion (Gerber et al. 2011b). 
 I also reported that highly conscientious citizens tend to respond to economic 
performance and crime information.
256
 Therefore, to raise support for the status quo or to 
improve criminal rights attitudes, political elites can present highly conscientious audiences with 
positive economic news and news about improvements to public safety. Audiences high in 
conscientiousness, at least in the United States, include television viewers of local news and 
political talk programs (Gerber et al. 2011b).   
 After examining the direct and conditional effects of personality on attitudes toward the 
political system, I must examine the final component of my model: the implications of the trait–
support relationship for political behavior. Therefore, the next and final empirical chapter will 
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PERSONALITY, POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND BEHAVIOR:  
TESTING THE MEDIATION HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Thus far, I have shown that personality traits exert direct and conditional effects on 
attitudes toward the political system. Although my findings in previous chapters contribute to our 
knowledge of attitude formation, I have yet to demonstrate the practical relevance of the 
personality–support relationship. If traits fail to work through political support to influence real-
world outcomes such as political participation, then my research carries no implications for such 
responsibilities of democratic citizenship such expressing group interests, working together on 
societal problems, and holding elected officials accountable. My policy recommendations for 
targeted messaging also assume that political support encourages citizen engagement. Otherwise, 
such communications would amount to little more than attitude manipulation by political elites. 
The present chapter addresses the concrete political implications of the personality–support 
linkage by examining the full chain from traits to attitudes to participation. 
 According to the mediation hypothesis (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 
2012), personality influences attitudes and attitudes affect political behavior. Psychological traits 
appear to be a reasonable starting point for the chain due to the genetic roots of personality (e.g., 
Heath et al. 1992; Pilia et al. 2006) and the manifestation of personality early in life (e.g., 
Asendorpf and van Aken 2003; Ehrler et al. 1999). Attitudes, such as civic duty, also can 
motivate individuals to overcome the costs of participation and the low probability of being the 
decisive person in a mobilization effort (Muller and Opp 1986; Riker and Ordeshook 1968), so 
the arrow from attitudes to behavior is sensible. Indeed, several studies of personality and 
participation have reported evidence of mediation with attitudes such as civic duty and political 
interest (e.g., Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012; Mondak et al. 2010). 
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 Mediation research on political support attitudes, however, remains rare. The existence of 
only two mediational studies with clean measures of political support (Schoen and Steinbrecher 
2013; Wang 2016) is puzzling given the impact of personality on support documented in the 
previous three chapters and previous studies as well as the impact of support on behavior 
documented in the extant literature (e.g., Dalton 2004; Norris 1999a; Remmer 2010).
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Therefore, I recommend testing the mediation hypothesis with political support attitudes. 
 This recommendation is based not just on the neglect of political support in the 
personality and participation literature, but also on the opportunity to generate unexpected 
theoretical results. Although past research may indicate that the relationship between personality 
and participation is uniformly positive (negative), some paths from traits to support attitudes to 
behavior could run in the negative (positive) direction (Rucker et al. 2011).
258
 Extant studies, for 
example, reveal a consistently positive total and indirect effect of extraversion on political 
participation (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Gerber et al. 2011a; Mondak 2010; Ribeiro and 
Borba 2016; Weinschenk 2013),
259
  but my attention to political support identifies a path that 
runs in the negative direction. More specifically, extraversion may be negatively linked to 
political trust and other status quo attitudes (e.g., Cawvey et al. n.d.; Freitag and Ackermann 
2016; Mondak et al. 2017),
260
 and lower levels of support could reduce citizen engagement (e.g., 
Hooghe and Marien 2013; Karp and Milazzo 2015; Norris 1999b). Some attitudes, therefore, 
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 Other studies (Ribeiro and Borba 2016; Russo and Amnå 2016, n.d.; Vecchione and Caprara 2009) incorporate 
efficacy items into their analyses but fail to measure only evaluations of governmental responsiveness. 
258
 See Curtis (2016) for an example of a study considering mediation effects even when the total effect is 
insignificant or when the total effect is in one direction (i.e., negative) while the indirect effect is in the other 
direction (i.e., positive). 
259
 In this chapter, I use the term “total effect” to refer to the effect of a variable on the main outcome of interest, 
with all mediators excluded from the model. This is equivalent to the term “direct effect” used in previous chapters. 
“Direct effect” in this chapter refers to the impact of the main variable on the outcome after accounting for the 
mediators in the model. For more on these terms, see Rucker et al. (2011). 
260
 In addition to the cited studies, Chapter 3 indicates that extraversion tends to be negatively related to political 
trust and job approval ratings. 
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could counteract the largely positive effect of extraversion on political engagement. Instead, 
introverts can become involved in the political process through their relatively high level of 
political trust. 
 A brief example indicates the plausibility of extraversion exerting a negative indirect 
effect on participation through political trust. Consider Jeb Bush, a politician and self-described 
introvert (North 2015). Based on his level of extraversion alone, one would expect Bush to avoid 
campaigning for governor of Florida or president of the United States,
261
 but he nevertheless ran 
for both public offices. What explains Bush’s participation, aside from his family name? The 
answer could reside in the Republican politician’s relatively high level of political trust. In early 
2013, Bush crossed party lines by praising Democratic President Barack Obama’s efforts to work 
with Republicans to address the budget crisis (Poor 2013). His comments on CNN, in fact, 
emphasize the value of trust: “It’s important to build trust if you’re trying to deal with big things. 
Big issues require everybody to get outside their comfort zone.” Perhaps high levels of trust have 
propelled Bush and some other introverted citizens into public affairs when few other attitudinal 
factors would.  
 In addition to pursuing theoretical progress about the impact of personality on citizen 
engagement, I assess the utility of tailored communications for improving participation rates. 
Political elites can maximize the effectiveness of their interventions if messages are adjusted to 
the dominant personality traits of an audience, for consistent messages for all audiences can 
alienate individuals on one side of the personality spectrum and appeal to individuals on the 
other side of the personality spectrum. Through targeted messaging, citizens at both ends of the 
spectrum may become more participative, but in response to messages focused on different 
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 Research on political elites complements the positive link between extraversion and participation in the mass 
behavior literature. In their study of U.S. state legislators, Dietrich and his colleagues (2012) report that nearly 84 
percent of respondents described themselves as outgoing, sociable, and extraverted.  
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support attitudes. In other words, the indirect effect of the same trait on political engagement 
could be positive for one support mediator and negative for another support mediator, implying 
the utility of a diverse set of rhetorical strategies for political organizations and political elites 
interested in the mobilization of citizens into the political process.   
 To obtain theoretical innovation and evaluate my policy recommendations, I examine the 
indirect effects of personality on participation via political support attitudes. Using the 2010 
AmericasBarometer, I explore the outcomes of turnout, campaign work, attending political 
meetings, and contacting public officials. The broad range of behavioral outcomes expands upon 
the attention of prior mediation and support studies on turnout (Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013) 
and vote choice (Wang 2016).
262,263
 
 The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Next, I provide an overview of previous 
research on personality and political participation. I then develop a set of hypotheses connecting 
personality, political support, and political engagement. Some of these hypotheses contrast with 
previous findings on psychological traits and political behavior. The subsequent section 
summarizes my measurement of participation and mediation variables and also reviews my 
empirical strategy for testing expectations. I then report my results and conclude by recounting 
my findings and discussing their implications. 
Endpoints of the Chain: Personality and Political Participation 
 I contend in this chapter that paths from personality to support to behavior do not always 
have the same sign as previous studies would suggest. We should not assume that all indirect 
effects for a trait are positive or negative. In some cases, personality traits will work through 
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 I omit the latter from consideration in this chapter because of the close association between vote choice and 
support for current political actors. 
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 Ribeiro and Borba (2016), as well as Russo and Amnå (2016, n.d.) and Vecchione and Caprara (2009), 
investigate the path from personality traits to efficacy attitudes to non-voting forms of political participation. 
However, their efficacy attitudes do not solely refer to evaluations of governmental responsiveness.   
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political support to influence participation in the same way as they operate through other 
mediators in the personality and political behavior literature, but at other times indirect effects 
will contrast with extant findings. 
 Previous research, therefore, informs my investigation and underscores how my attention 
to political support can contribute to our knowledge about the relationship between personality 
and participation. In this section, I summarize past work on the Big Five and a variety of political 
behaviors, namely voting, campaigning, attending political meetings, and contacting public 
officials. 
 I begin with the effects of openness on participation. Individuals high in this trait 
dimension are creative, adventurous, and attracted to ideas (John et al. 2008; Mondak et al. 
2010), so we might expect a positive total effect of openness on nearly all forms of political 
involvement as individuals interact with the political system in order to communicate their 
views. Indeed, the evidence points more in a positive direction than a negative one for each of 
the participation outcomes under consideration (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010; Mondak et 
al. 2010; Ribeiro and Borba 2016), although some of the extant results are insignificant (e.g., 
Mondak et al. 2011; Weinschenk 2013).  
 Several studies also have uncovered positive indirect effects of openness on political 
engagement. Consonant with the mediation hypothesis as well as the attraction of open citizens 
to ideas, scholars have found that high levels of openness are associated with greater political 
interest and internal political efficacy,
264
 which in turn facilitate protest involvement, turnout, 
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 Weinschenk and Dawes (2017) do not incorporate political behavior into their study, but they do find that 
openness and political interest are positively correlated. Furthermore, their results indicate that more than half of the 
association between openness and political interest is due to genetic factors. Such a finding strengthens the link 
between personality and attitudes that is vital for the mediation hypothesis. 
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and other conventional behaviors beyond turnout (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Mondak et al. 
2010, 2011; Vecchione and Caprara 2009).  
 In short, extant research points nearly exclusively to a positive relationship between 
openness and participation. 
 The same tends to be true for extraversion. As noted by Mondak and his colleagues 
(2010), the question for this trait dimension is whether a political activity involves social 
interaction and therefore would appeal to extraverts. Although individualistic campaign activities 
such as donating money or putting a political sign in one’s yard may not be significantly related 
to extraversion (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), studies have reported 
positive relationships between extraversion and such interpersonal modes of participation as 
protesting (e.g., Mondak et al. 2011; Ribeiro and Borba 2016), volunteering for a campaign (e.g., 
Mondak 2010; Weinschenk 2013), attending political meetings (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 
2008; Mondak et al. 2010) and contacting public officials (Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010).
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Turnout on Election Day requires a modicum of social interaction in order to receive a ballot, 
and scholars have observed positive (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a; Moreno and Wals 2014) and 
insignificant (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013) total effects of extraversion on 
voting participation. 
 In addition, some researchers have turned to mediation analysis to examine the indirect 
effects of extraversion on political involvement, and positive results have been reported. Using 
data from Latin America and Europe, several studies have observed that extraversion promotes 
attitudes such as internal efficacy, political interest, and strength of party identification, which 
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 Gerber and his colleagues (2011a) also report positive effects for extraversion on three indices of non-turnout 
participation. Items in the indices mostly include social activities such as attending a campaign rally, but two of 
them incorporate campaign donations and another uses an item for wearing a political button. In some cases, 
therefore, ostensibly individualistic forms of participation could be positively related to extraversion, perhaps 
because of this trait dimension’s emphasis on activity (John et al. 2008). 
210 
 
then motivate individuals to turn out to vote, join a political protest, or engage in a variety of 
activities (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Ribeiro and Borba 2016; Schoen and Steinbrecher 
2013).
266
 Positive indirect effects are quite sensible. The extraversion facet of confidence (John 
et al. 2008) pertains directly to an individual’s perceived level of political understanding, and 
high levels of sociability could predispose extraverts to be interested in public affairs and 
committed to political parties, among other political groups (Mondak 2010; Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013). In turn, efficacious, interested, and partisan citizens are more likely to 
participate due to a greater degree of confidence in their political decisions and a higher level of 
investment in their political communities (Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013).  
 After openness and extraversion, the effects of other Big Five dimensions on political 
participation are more heterogeneous. Perhaps due to conflict between duty to one’s political 
community and to one’s occupation and family (John et al. 2008; Mondak et al. 2010), 
conscientiousness is inconsistently related to turnout (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011; Ha et al. 2013), 
attending local meetings (e.g., Mondak et al. 2011; Weinschenk 2013), and contacting public 
officials (e.g., Mondak et al. 2010; Weinschenk 2013).
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 Meanwhile, studies have identified a 
negative association between conscientiousness and campaigning (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 
2010), perhaps due to the time requirements for such behaviors. With regard to indirect effects, 
fewer studies have reported significant results for conscientiousness and citizen engagement 
(e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013) than for openness or 
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 Although Weinschenk and Dawes (2017) do not examine political participation, they do report a positive link 
between extraversion and political interest, with at least 41 percent of this correlation attributable to genetic factors. 
Such a finding strengthens the link between personality and political attitudes that is part of the mediation 
hypothesis.  
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 In addition to positive (Ha et al. 2013) and negative (Gerber et al. 2011) significant conscientiousness effects on 
turnout, studies have reported an insignificant relationship between this trait dimension and voting (e.g., Moreno and 
Wals 2010; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). Effects of conscientiousness on contacting officials, meanwhile, are 
both positive (Ha et al. 2013; Mondak and Halperin 2008) and negative (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; 
Weinschenk 2013), and many of the associations between conscientiousness and meeting attendance are 
insignificant (Mondak et al. 2011; Weinschenk 2013). 
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extraversion and political behavior. One finding connects high levels of conscientiousness to 
turnout via civic duty attitudes (Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013); 
given the dutifulness facet of conscientiousness, this finding is quite sensible.    
 Meanwhile, agreeableness generally exerts a weak effect on political participation. Extant 
results collectively indicate that voting (e.g., Moreno and Wals 2014; Ha et al. 2013), 
campaigning (e.g., Mondak 2010; Weinschenk 2013), attending local meetings (e.g., Mondak et 
al. 2011; Weinschenk 2013), and contacting officials (Mondak et al. 2010; Ha et al. 2013) are no 
more likely for agreeable than for disagreeable citizens. The muted effects could be due to 
ambivalence on the part of agreeable citizens: Although the highly agreeable may value the 
prosocial aspects of political participation (Mondak et al. 2011), they also could be repelled by 
the conflictual side of public affairs. Moreover, few indirect effects for agreeableness on 
participation have been identified.
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 Finally, emotional stability effects tend to be heterogeneous. On one hand, extant 
research indicates that individuals low in emotional stability are more likely to contact public 
officials and partake in campaign activities (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010). Due to their 
high levels of anxiety (Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010), citizens low in emotional stability may 
perceive an urgent need to address political problems or help a candidate or party take office. On 
the other hand, several studies report a positive link between emotional stability and turnout 
(e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a; Ha et al. 2013; Moreno and Wals 2014; Schoen and Steinbrecher 
2013). These positive results could be attributable to the relatively low levels of anxiety 
experienced by emotionally stable citizens on Election Day (Ha et al. 2013). Finally, relatively 
few studies have shown evidence of indirect effects of emotional stability on participation, with  
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two reporting a positive effect (Anderson 2009; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013) and another 
reporting a negative effect (Russo and Amnå 2016). 
 In sum, this brief review highlights the mobilizing effects of openness and extraversion, 
the heterogeneous effects of emotional stability, and the relatively weak or inconsistent effects of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the effects of personality 
on various modes of participation as reported in past research.  
Completing the Chain: Expectations for Indirect Personality Effects 
 Having reviewed the literature, I now can consider when paths from personality to 
support to participation will be consistent and inconsistent with previous research on the effects 
of psychological traits on citizen engagement. In certain cases, indirect trait effects through some 
political support attitudes could run in the same direction as paths through more traditional 
mediators such as political interest and internal political efficacy. Other indirect effects, 
however, could contradict past findings by revealing countervailing paths from the same traits to 
other attitudes toward the political system to political participation.  
 Developing my hypotheses requires a two-step process. First, I must understand how 
personality relates to political support. Second, I must account for the association between 
political support and political behavior. Because Chapter 3 covered the first link, I turn to the 
connection between support attitudes and citizen engagement.  
Turnout Campaigning Attending Meetings Contacting Officials
Openness Positive Positive Positive Positive
Conscientiousness No expectation Negative No expectation No expectation
Extraversion Positive Positive* Positive Positive
Agreeableness No expectation No expectation No expectation No expectation
Emotional Stability Positive Negative No expectation Negative
Table 6.1
Effects of Personality on Political Participation: Patterns in the Extant Literature
Note: * The relationship between extravers ion and campaigning holds  especia l ly for socia l  forms of campaign 
participation. For s tudies  cons is tent with the class i fications  in this  table, see the main text.
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Connecting Support to Behavior 
 Scholars have developed several arguments to explain the connection between political 
support and political participation. For democratic support, the link is fairly obvious: Democracy 
as a concept and empirical reality cannot exist without political participation,
269
 for citizen 
involvement enables the public to elect government officials, ensure the representation of citizen 
interests, hold politicians accountable, communicate grievances to the government, and resolve 
community problems in accordance with majority rule and minority rights. Such goals are 
attainable through all forms of behavior considered in this chapter, namely voting, campaigning, 
attending meetings, and contacting public officials. Therefore, it is sensible to expect citizens 
who support democratic principles to engage in activities that promote basic democratic 
objectives and perpetuate the current regime (Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; Carlin 2011; 
Dalton 2004; Smith 2009), and extant results are generally consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., 
Dalton 2004; Karp and Milazzo 2015; Norris 2011).
270
 Norris, for example, finds that high levels 
of democratic support significantly increase citizen interest in a 40-country sample. “Citizen 
interest” is an index comprising turnout, political interest, and the perceived importance of 
politics.  
 Likewise, the connection between the other levels of support and individual engagement 
is grounded in one’s willingness to invest in the current political system. If citizens perceive 
actors and institutions as trustworthy, effective, responsive, and likeable or if citizens are pleased 
with democratic performance, they will be more likely to engage in behaviors that perpetuate the 
status quo, such as voting or campaigning (Booth and Seligson 2009). Enthusiasm will expand as 
citizens work with public officials and government agencies to strengthen democracy and 
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 The connection between citizen involvement and democracy is especially strong for individuals who adhere to a 
conception of democracy that emphasizes participation over representation (Bengtsson and Christensen 2016). 
270
 For an exception, see Smith (2009). 
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governmental effectiveness (Norris 1999b). A similar story would occur for attitudes toward the 
political community, as a robust love for country or strong national identification could motivate 
individuals to participate in order to make their society an even better place to live. On the 
flipside, citizens with pessimistic views of actors, institutions, procedures, or the national 
community could develop apathy as they refuse to participate and fail to observe changes in the 
political system (Norris 1999b). Consistent with my argument, several studies have reported 
positive associations between support for the status quo and national community on one hand 
and citizen engagement on the other (e.g., Dalton 2004; Hooghe and Marien 2013; Kaase 1999; 
Norris 1999b, 2011). Hooghe and Marien, for instance, find that political trust is positively and 




 To be sure, alternative arguments linking political support and conventional participation 
are possible. The relationship between support and political action might run in the negative 
direction, for anger could motivate involvement and satisfaction could encourage citizens to stay 
home and defer to public officials (Norris 1999b). Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence 
favors a positive association between support and conventional political behavior. In addition, 
scholars have investigated whether citizens at the extreme levels of political support are more 
likely to participate (Booth and Seligson 2009), or whether attitudes toward democracy interact 
with political trust to influence voter registration (Carlin 2011).  
 I appreciate previous work on the conditional effects of support attitudes on participation 
(Booth and Seligson 2009; Carlin 2011). Future applications of the mediation hypothesis should 
examine whether interactions of the same or different political support variables mediate the 
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 The index of institutionalized participation in Hooghe and Marien’s (2013) study consists of working for a 
political party or action group, being a member of a political party, and contacting government officials.  
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relationship between personality and political behavior. In the interest of simplicity, however, I 
concentrate on the path from personality to political support to political participation without any 
interactions.  
 Therefore, in this chapter I expect both status quo and democratic support attitudes to be 
positively related to political participation. 
Selecting Political Support Mediators 
 Before I develop my hypotheses, one additional task is necessary. Political support 
encompasses a vast number of levels and multiple domains within each level, and the effects of 
personality on support (i.e., the first link in the chain from traits to behavior) are fairly 
heterogeneous. If I considered all potential political support mediators, the rest of this chapter 
would be intractable in terms of the number of hypotheses and the clarity of the empirical 
analysis. Therefore, I have selected two support attitudes from the 2010 AmericasBarometer: 
political trust and approval of mass participation.  
 My decision to focus on these attitudes is threefold. First, I want to study attitudes from 
multiple levels of support, as previous chapters have done. Political trust attitudes encompass 
views about status quo actors, institutions, and procedures, whereas approval of mass 
participation pertains to a core democratic principle.  
 Second, incorporating status quo and democratic attitudes enables me to identify paths 
for openness and extraversion that run in different directions. As I noted in Chapter 3, openness 
and extraversion are positively related to support for mass participation but negatively related to 
political trust. If both trust and mass participation attitudes are positively linked to political 
participation, then indirect effects through mass participation approval will be positive and 
indirect effects through political trust will be negative. The former would be consistent with the 
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positive total and indirect trait effects in the literature, whereas the latter would indicate that the 
effects of openness and extraversion on participation are not uniformly positive. Through their 
relatively high levels of political trust, some less open and less extraverted citizens can become 
involved in the political process.  
 Third, the particular measures of trust and mass participation approval are quite flexible 
and allow me to use support attitudes that are relevant for a particular political behavior. The 
2010 AmericasBarometer includes a diverse battery of political trust questions, such as trust in 
elections and trust in local government. Whereas the former should be more likely to influence 
turnout, the latter should be more pertinent for attending local political meetings.
272
 A broad trust 
index, by contrast, may exert weak effects on a particular mode of participation because relevant 
trust items are paired with irrelevant trust items. 
 Similarly, some mass participation attitudes could be more important than others for the 
political behavior at hand. Approval of campaigning probably will matter more for national 
campaign involvement than approval of local organizing would. More generally, I also would 
expect the relationship between mass participation attitudes and political participation to be 
stronger than the relationship between other forms of democratic support and citizen 
engagement. Attitudes toward checks and balances, for example, pertain to political elites and 
therefore are only indirectly related to citizen participation.
273
  
 The flexibility of my political support measures thus enables me to select attitudinal 
variables that are conceptual cousins to the behavioral dependent variable. Other applications of 
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 Consistent with my argument, Remmer (2010) has found that local governmental support in Costa Rica 
facilitated turnout in a December 2002 local election but not in a February 2002 national election. The index of local 
political support consists of positive assessments of municipal services, positive assessments of municipal 
management, and support for increased municipal funding. The final item in the index is technically a policy 
preference, but nevertheless reflects the extent to which an individual trusts the local government with the handling 
of resources. 
273
 As noted by Carlin and Singer (2011), democracy is a heterogeneous concept, and citizens who endorse one 
democratic principle will not necessarily support the other principles. 
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the mediation hypothesis have investigated attitudes that are closely linked to the political 
behavior under investigation. In particular, researchers have considered whether voting as a civic 
duty mediates the relationship between personality and turnout (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; 
Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). Blais and St-Vincent (2011, 396) 
acknowledge the close connection between their mediating and dependent variables: “The first 
claim that we make is that the two most crucial proximate political attitudes that affect the 
propensity to vote are sense of civic duty and political interest” (emphasis added). 
 In spite of the advantages of my mediating variables, I cannot rule out alternative 
explanations for the relationship between political support and political behavior. It is possible 
for participation experiences to influence attitudes, rather than the reverse.
274
 For example, if an 
individual engages in public affairs due to social pressure, he or she may witness the efficacy of 
involvement and develop higher levels of political trust and greater approval of mass 
participation. The connection between political support and political behavior also could be 
spurious, for personality traits could influence attitudes and participation through separate 
processes. Each of these alternate explanations would violate the order of the mediation 
hypothesis (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012), which expects traits to affect 
attitudes and attitudes to affect behavior.  
 Nevertheless, the order postulated by the mediation hypothesis appears to be reasonable 
due to the heritability (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; Pilia et al. 2006) and early manifestation (e.g., 
Asendorpf and van Aken 2003; Ehrler et al. 1999) of personality traits and to the ability of 
attitudes such as civic duty to enable citizens to overcome obstacles to involvement, including 
the low probability of being the decisive participant (Muller and Opp 1986; Riker and Ordeshook 
1968). 
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 Indeed, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find that nonvoters express less trust in civil servants. 
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Developing Hypotheses on Indirect Effects 
 I now turn to my hypotheses on indirect personality effects, beginning with openness to 
experience and extraversion. As noted above, virtually all previous studies have identified 
positive total and indirect effects of each trait dimension on political participation. The thick 
arrows at the top of Figure 6.1 depict the positive paths from openness and extraversion to 
standard mediators (e.g., political interest) to citizen engagement.  
 Figure 6.1 also adds approval of mass participation to the list of mediators facilitating 
positive indirect effects for openness and extraversion. Open individuals value the democratic 
ideal of the free exchange of ideas, which in turn should motivate the actual expression of 
political views through contacting officials, campaigning, and other political behavior. Likewise, 
extraverts are responsive to social norms, including support for mass participation,
275
 and 
therefore will embrace the principle of political activity for the majority and engage in political 
behavior themselves. The democratic motivations of highly extraverted and open citizens will 
complement their relatively high levels of political interest and internal efficacy, resulting in 
positive paths from these trait dimensions to participation (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; 
Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). I control for interest and internal efficacy in order to determine 
the indirect effects through mass participation approval over and above existing explanations. 
 In short, I expect to observe positive indirect effects for openness and extraversion that 
operate through mass participation approval to encourage political behavior. 
 Nevertheless, we should not assume that all paths from openness and extraversion to 
participation are positive, for the positive total and indirect effects in the literature could obscure 
negative indirect effects that run through other support attitudes, such as political trust. In other 
words, it is possible for some relatively unopen and introverted citizens to become active in 
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public life through their higher level of trust in the political system. Rucker and his colleagues 
(2011) acknowledge the possibility of countervailing forces in an overview of mediation research 
in social psychology, and Schoen and Steinbrecher’s (2013) work on personality and turnout in 
Germany suggests the same point. In their report of total, direct, and indirect effects, Schoen and 
Steinbrecher find that extraversion and openness exert positive indirect effects on turnout, but the 
direct effect of each trait is negative and significant. The “direct effect” in this case refers to a 




Approval of Mass 
Participation 




Note: The thick arrows at the top of Figure 6.1 represent the direction of most paths from openness 
and extraversion to citizen engagement. Political support mediators are bolded; non-support mediators 
appear in previous research (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). The thin 
arrows at the bottom of the figure refer to a negative path: High levels of openness and extraversion 
reduce political trust, but political trust is positively related to political participation. Finally, the dotted 
arrow acknowledges the possibility of a direct relationship between personality and political support, 
although such an association contradicts the route proposed by the mediation hypothesis. The arrow is 
dotted instead of solid because it is uncertain whether a direct relationship between personality and 







 The negative direct effect could have become insignificant if other attitudes were 
added to the model and resulted in negative indirect trait effects for openness and extraversion 
through the additional mediators.  
 One such mediator is political trust. As noted in Chapter 3, both openness and 
extraversion are negatively associated with a person’s confidence in political actors, institutions, 
and procedures. The results for openness would appear to be attributable to dissatisfaction with 
political innovation, and the findings for extraversion could be linked to the distant character of 
the political system, compared with an individual’s personal network of acquaintances, friends, 
and family. Meanwhile, political trust should be positively related to citizen engagement, for 
supportive citizens will be more likely than unsupportive citizens to take action to preserve the 
current political system.  
 If we combine the personality–trust and trust–behavior links, the result would be negative 
indirect effects for openness and extraversion. Each trait dimension will be negatively related to 
political trust, but political trust is positively linked to individual participation. In other words, 
individuals low in each trait dimension would have the higher levels of trust associated with 
greater citizen engagement. A relatively high degree of political confidence will enable some less 
open and less extraverted citizens to participate in politics. The expected negative indirect effects 
stand in contrast to the positive openness and extraversion effects normally identified in extant 
research. The proposed alternate pathway is depicted at the bottom of Figure 6.1.  
 Empirical examples bolster the plausibility of my arguments for positive and negative 
indirect trait effects on participation. As noted in the introduction, Republican politician Jeb 
Bush is an introvert but nevertheless has engaged in high-profile political participation, perhaps 
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 For another example of an indirect effect and a direct effect with opposite signs, see Mondak’s (2010) analysis of 
agreeableness, partisanship, and support for legalized abortion. 
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because of his high level of political trust. Meanwhile, former U.S. President Bill Clinton 
epitomizes the proposed path from extraversion to support for mass participation to political 
participation. A well-known extravert (Cain 2012), Bill Clinton not only ran for his own terms 
for president but also participated in Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2016. 
The former president also has expressed his approval of mass participation by characterizing 
voter identification laws as a restriction on the franchise (Rafferty 2014). At the Lyndon B. 
Johnson Presidential Library in 2014, Bill Clinton remarked that such legislation “is a way of 
restricting the franchise after 50 years of expanding it” (Rafferty 2014). 
 In addition to openness and extraversion, I offer hypotheses for conscientiousness and 
emotional stability. Chapter 3 failed to uncover a clear pattern for the relationship between 
conscientiousness and political trust, so I turn my attention to the path from conscientiousness to 
mass participation approval to political engagement. I identified a strong relationship between 
conscientiousness and support for campaigning, organizing, and legal protesting in Chapter 3, 
presumably because of highly conscientious citizens responding to social norms in favor of the 
principle of mass participation. Approval of mass participation, in turn, could facilitate campaign 
behavior and other forms of engagement. Previous research instead has reported a negative 
relationship between conscientiousness and campaigning. 
 I thus expect to observe a positive indirect effect of conscientiousness through mass 
participation approval. Past mediation work also has identified positive paths from 
conscientiousness to participation that included political interest and internal efficacy (Gallego 
and Oberski 2012; Russo and Amnå 2016; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), so I will control for 





 Meanwhile, for emotional stability I anticipate positive indirect effects on political 
participation. Emotional stability was the only trait dimension in Chapter 3 with a consistently 
positive effect across levels and domains of support, due presumably to low levels of anxiety and 
low levels of insecurity about the political system. Unlike openness and extraversion, emotional 
stability should be positively related to political trust, which in turn will promote political 
behavior. I also expect to observe a positive path from emotional stability to mass participation 
approval to participation.  
 Positive indirect effects of emotional stability would be consistent with some findings in 
the personality and participation literature and inconsistent with others. Research on total and 
indirect effects of emotional stability have reported positive relationships between this trait 
dimension and turnout. Mediators in extant work include internal efficacy (Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013). I account for this mediator and political interest in order to isolate the 
indirect trait effects on turnout through political support. Meanwhile, researchers have found 
negative total effects of emotional stability on campaigning and contacting public officials, 
whereas I anticipate positive indirect effects. 
 In contrast to the other trait dimensions, I offer no hypotheses for the indirect effects of 




Indirect Effect of 
Personality on 
Participation
Is the Indirect Effect Consistent 
with Past Work on Personality 
and Participation?*
Openness → Political Trust → Conventional Participation Negative No
Openness → Approval of Mass Participation → Conventional Participation Positive Yes
Extraversion → Political Trust → Conventional Participation Negative No
Extraversion → Approval of Mass Participation → Conventional Participation Positive Yes
Conscientiousness → Approval of Mass Participation → Conventional Participation Positive No for Campaigning
Emotional Stability → Political Trust → Conventional Participation Positive
Yes for Turnout and No for 
Campaigning and Contacting
Emotional Stability → Approval of Mass Participation → Conventional Participation Positive
Yes for Turnout and No for 
Campaigning and Contacting
Table 6.2
Hypotheses on Indirect Effects of Personality on Political Participation




or indirect effect on citizen engagement, and I have selected my hypotheses with the purpose of 
identifying indirect trait effects that are consistent and inconsistent with past work. I thus refrain 
from hypothesizing about agreeableness.   
 Table 6.2 summarizes my hypotheses for the indirect effects of personality on political 
participation. 
Investigating the Chain: Data and Research Design 
 Previous chapters in this dissertation have utilized as many as four surveys, but data 
limitations prevent me from employing all of them to investigate whether political support 
mediates the relationship between personality and political participation. The 2012 American 
National Election Study lacked democratic support items, the 2012 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study did not include political trust and mass participation approval items, and the fall 
2015 University of Illinois subject pool survey focused on attitudes but omitted items for 
approval of mass participation or previous political behavior. Therefore, I focus on indirect 
personality effects in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, which included a wide range of items on 
political trust, mass participation attitudes, and actual citizen engagement.  
 The 2010 AmericasBarometer does possess one limitation with regard to mediation 
analysis. As a cross-sectional survey, I cannot demonstrate definitively whether personality traits 
cause attitudes, which in turn influence political participation. All of my variables are recorded at 
the same point in time. I should note, however, that most tests of the mediation hypothesis 
employ cross-sectional data (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; Mondak et al. 2010; Russo and 
Amnå 2016), and none of the previous mediation studies with panel data have utilized the ideal 
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 Although I cannot verify the proposed causal order of the mediation hypothesis, the path 
from personality to attitudes to behavior appears to be reasonable on theoretical grounds. 
Psychological traits manifest themselves early in life (e.g., Asendorpf and van Aken 2003; Ehrler 
et al. 1999), prior to one’s attitudinal or behavioral engagement with the political system as an 
adult. Likewise, attitudes such as civic duty enable individuals to overcome the high costs of 
involvement and low probability of being the decisive participant (Muller and Opp 1986; Riker 
and Ordeshook 1968), so the link from opinion to behavior is also plausible.  
 For the remainder of this section, I discuss the operationalization of my participation 
dependent variables and potential mediators, and then review my method of testing the 
hypotheses on indirect trait effects. 
Operationalizing Political Participation 
 To test my hypotheses thoroughly, I utilize a variety of conventional political behaviors 
that previous studies of personality and participation have considered: turnout, campaigning, 
contacting public officials, and attending political meetings.
279
  
 The AmericasBarometer asked respondents about all four modes of conventional political 
behavior. To measure voter turnout, I utilize an item about whether the respondent voted in the 
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 Furthermore, two of the studies with panel data measure attitudes and behavior concurrently (Blais and St-
Vincent 2011; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). Blais and St-Vincent also combine data from two waves to form their 
personality independent variables, attitudinal mediators, and propensity to vote dependent variable. Such an 
approach contrasts with the attitude-to-behavior order postulated by the mediation hypothesis. 
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 Instead of panel studies, researchers could introduce an experimental manipulation to influence the mediator, 
which then exerts an effect on the outcome of interest (Bullock et al. 2010). For an example outside of political 
science, see Bolger and Amarel (2007). 
279
 An item on protest involvement also was available in the AmericasBarometer, but I do not examine this item 
because I would not be testing the hypotheses about openness and extraversion exerting negative indirect effects on 
participation through political trust. In contrast to the positive link between political support and conventional 
participation (e.g., Hooghe and Marien 2013; Karp and Milazzo 2015), past research has identified a negative 




most recent national election. Scores of 1 correspond to self-reported turnout, and scores of 0 
refer to abstention. 
 For campaign participation, I employ an item that asked whether the respondent worked 
for a party or candidate during the most recent national elections.
280
 I have recoded this variable 
so that scores of 1 denote an affirmative response and scores of 0 refer to a negative response. 
 Meanwhile, the AmericasBarometer measured contacting public officials with a battery 
of items about requesting help or cooperation from local officials, the national legislature, or a 
government agency. Each item was recoded so that affirmative responses have a score of 1 and 
negative responses have a score of 0. Because the Cronbach’s alpha for the three variables is 
0.61, I created an additive index that ranges from 0 to 3. 
 AmericasBarometer respondents answered several questions about attending political and 
civic meetings, and I employ two of the political items. For one question, individuals reported 
whether they had attended a local government meeting over the past year; responses have been 
recoded so that scores of 1 refer to affirmative responses and scores of 0 to negative responses. 
The other item, meanwhile, inquired about the frequency of attending political party meetings. 
Responses ranged from “[o]nce a week” to “[n]ever,” and the variable has been recoded so that 
higher scores refer to more frequent participation.
281
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 As indicated by Table 6.1, previous studies suggest that extraversion exerts a positive effect on campaign 
activities that are social in nature, but not necessarily on less interpersonal forms of involvement (e.g., putting a 
political bumper sticker on one’s car). The wording of the AmericasBarometer campaign item is ambiguous but 
leans in the direction of active, social modes of campaign participation. Therefore, I expect to observe positive total 
and indirect effects of extraversion on campaigning. 
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 Instead of examining each of the participation variables separately, one option would be to combine the items 
into a single index of conventional participation. If the questions had all been part of the same battery, it may have 
been possible to develop such an index. That was not the case. Moreover, factor analysis of the constituent items, 
with rotation, revealed that each dependent variable should be analyzed separately. Only the items in the contact 
battery featured factor loadings above 0.51, and only those three items loaded onto a factor with an eigenvalue of 
0.95 or higher. The other items and the other factor had lower factor loadings and a lower eigenvalue, respectively. 




 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are located in Appendix H. Respondents 
reported a turnout level of 77 percent, but scores for the other variables fell well below the 
midpoint of their respective scales. For example, only 11 percent of respondents in the 24 
countries under analysis reported participating in a political campaign in the most recent national 
elections. The discrepancy between high rates of voting participation and comparatively low 
rates of non-voting participation is consistent with prior research (e.g., Booth and Seligson 2009; 
Gerber et al. 2011a). 
 In addition to my main dependent variables, I have run a robustness check with a variable 
for hypothetical turnout. AmericasBarometer respondents were asked about which party or 
candidate would receive their vote if a national election were held that week. I recoded this 
variable so that scores of 1 encompass individuals who would vote for the incumbent party or 
candidate or a non-incumbent party or candidate. Scores of 0, meanwhile, consist of respondents 
who said they would abstain or would leave their ballot blank or intentionally cancel their vote. 
 Although vote intention does not necessarily indicate actual turnout, I examine the 
variable in order to respond to concerns about temporal ordering. My other participation 
variables refer to past behavior, but the attitudinal items pertain to the present. The mediation 
hypothesis argues that attitudes precede behavior, so I must assume that current attitudes 
correlate strongly with previous attitudes. This assumption is quite reasonable according to 
extant research in political science (e.g., Bloeser et al. 2015; Goren 2005).
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 Nevertheless, I 
cannot directly address the issue because of the cross-sectional nature of the AmericasBarometer. 
As an alternative, I allow current attitudes to predict intentions of future voting behavior.  
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 Goren (2005), for example, reports moderate-to-high levels of temporal stability for partisan identification, equal 
opportunity attitudes, and other political opinions.  
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 The hypothetical turnout analyses are reported in Appendix I. In all cases, I observe the 
same pattern of indirect trait effects via political support for hypothetical turnout and previous 
turnout. Such results bolster the plausibility of the temporal order proposed by the mediation 
hypothesis.  
Operationalizing Potential Mediators 
 Based on the considerations in the previous section, I focus on political trust and approval 
of mass participation for my political support mediating variables. The specificity of some of my 
participation variables (e.g., local meeting attendance) suggests that particular mediating 
variables (e.g., local political trust) would be more strongly associated with political engagement 
than broader support indicators. Therefore, I discuss which mediating variables will be employed 
for which dependent variable.  
 For previous turnout, I utilize the seven-point trust-in-elections item and an additive 
index for approval of campaigning and organizing.
283,284
 The connection between turnout and 
trust in elections is obvious, and campaigning and organizing to solve a problem are two 
behaviors that occur prior to Election Day.  
 Meanwhile, for campaign involvement, I utilize a seven-point item for trust in political 
parties and a single item for approval of campaigning. Campaign approval pertains directly to 
campaign involvement, and the campaign participation question inquired about activism on 
behalf of candidates and parties. Trust in political parties would encompass all parties in the 
previous election, not just the victorious one. 
 I also employ distinct political support mediators for the two meeting attendance items. 
For local meeting attendance, I rely on a seven-point local political trust item and a single item 
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 The Cronbach’s alpha for the approval index is 0.67. 
284
 I use the same mediation variables for the robustness check for hypothetical turnout in Appendix I. 
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for approval of organizing to solve a community problem. The local character of the mediating 
variables indicates that each will be significantly related to attending a government meeting in 
one’s community.  
 For political party meeting attendance, I utilize the seven-point party trust item as well as 
a single item for attitudes toward campaign involvement. Given the connection between parties 
and campaigning mentioned earlier, the attention to campaign approval appears to be reasonable.  
 Finally, the index of contacting government officials encompasses interactions with local 
leaders, the national legislature, and a government agency. I therefore measure political 
confidence with a three-item index that combines local trust, legislative trust, and national 
governmental trust.
285
 Of the mass participation approval items, the question on organizing 
appears to be the most relevant to contacting government officials. Activists intent on solving a 
political problem are likely to interact with public officials, whereas campaigning is more likely 
to focus on interactions with one’s fellow citizens. Both the mass participation item on 
organizing and the government contacting battery also refer to community problems. 
 In addition to political support, other political attitudes could mediate the relationship 
between personality and political participation. If personality works through support attitudes to 
influence participation, then the indirect effects of personality attributable to political support 
should continue to be significant after adding other attitudes as potential mediators. I would not 
be contributing to previous tests of the mediation hypothesis if the trait effects through political 
support were insignificant with the inclusion of mediators that previous studies have considered, 
such as political interest, civic duty, and internal efficacy (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 2012; 
Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013). 
                                                 
285
 The Cronbach’s alpha for the three-item trust index is 0.75. 
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 I have access to items on political interest and internal efficacy in the 
AmericasBarometer.
286
 To measure political interest, the AmericasBarometer asked about the 
level of interest in politics, with options ranging from “[a] lot” to “[n]one.” I have reverse-coded 
the variable so that higher scores refer to more political interest. The political interest variable 
ranges from 1 to 4.  
 To measure internal efficacy, I employ an item that allowed respondents to assess the 
extent to which they agree that they understand the country’s most important political issues. 
Responses range from 1 (“[s]trongly disagree”) to 7 (“[s]trongly agree”).  
 Descriptive statistics for the potential mediators are located in Appendix H. 
Examining Indirect Effects 
 To test my hypotheses on indirect trait effects, I explore the path from personality to 
political attitudes to political behavior. Mediation can occur only if psychological traits influence 
political support and only if support attitudes affect citizen participation. In other words, the 
personality–support link must be statistically significant, and the support–behavior link must be 
statistically significant.  
 Significant indirect trait effects are possible even if the total effect of personality on 
participation is insignificant (Rucker et al. 2011). An insignificant total effect could be 
attributable to positive and negative indirect effects offsetting one another. In addition, a 
significant total effect in the positive (negative) direction could mask a negative (positive) 
indirect effect. 
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 As with the relationship between political support and political participation, engaging in public affairs could 
raise an individual’s level of political interest or internal efficacy. However, measurements of internal efficacy 
(Finkel 1985) and political interest (Prior 2010) appear to be fairly stable over time, and Finkel has failed to uncover 
an effect of voting on internal efficacy.  Such information bolsters the case for the path proposed by the mediation 
hypothesis—that personality affects attitudes and attitudes influence participation.  
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 Therefore, I have opted not to follow the traditional approach to mediation analysis. To 
detect mediation, analysts often examine whether an independent variable of interest is 
significantly related to the dependent variable. If the total effect is significant, then mediation 
occurs when the coefficient for the independent variable becomes less significant or altogether 
insignificant once a mediator is inserted into the regression model (Rucker et al. 2011).  
 Because indirect effects can be observed in the absence of significant total effects for 
personality, I turn to an alternative technique for my primary mediation analysis: the KHB 
method developed by Karlson and his colleagues (Karlson and Holm 2011; Karlson et al. 2012; 
Kohler et al. 2011).
287
 The KHB method decomposes the total effect of an independent variable 
into the direct effect and the indirect effect attributable to each mediator in the model. By 
permitting the inclusion of multiple mediators at the same time, the KHB method enables me to 
determine the indirect trait effects due to political trust and approval of mass participation even 
after controlling for indirect trait effects through more traditional mediators, namely political 
interest and internal efficacy.
288
 The technique is also efficient, for mediation through multiple 
independent variables (e.g., each of the Big Five) can be assessed simultaneously. Furthermore, I 
can include sociodemographic control variables and account for survey and questionnaire design 
by inserting survey weights, clustering standard errors by country, and adjusting the method of 
estimation to the number of response options in the dependent variable. Models with 
dichotomous dependent variables are estimated with logistic regression, and models with 
polychotomous dependent variables are estimated with ordinal logistic regression.
289
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 For an application of the KHB method in political science, see Wang (2016). 
288
 I expect positive trait effects through approval of mass participation and the more traditional mediators in my 
model, namely political interest and internal efficacy. Therefore, I control for interest and internal efficacy because 
examining only indirect effects through political support attitudes would leave me open to the charge that my results 
could be due to omitted mediators.  
289
 The KHB method was executed with the khb command in Stata. 
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 With the KHB method, significant indirect effects through a particular mediator would 
denote a strong link between the personality trait and the political support attitude and a strong 
link between political support and political participation. Therefore, my main results do not 
report separate analyses for the effects of personality on support or the effects of support on 
behavior. Such information is located in Appendix I. The results in Appendix I comport with 
expectations in nearly every instance.
290
 
 The indirect effects reported by the KHB method are causal in nature as long as the 
sequential ignorability assumption is met. As noted by Wang (2006), this assumption contains 
two conditions. First, the main independent variables should be independent of the mediating and 
dependent variables. Following Wang (2016), I attempt to meet the first condition by controlling 
for other predictors of political participation, namely sociodemographics.
291
 Second, the 
mediators should not be causally related to one another. I cannot prove with cross-sectional data 
whether one mediator causes another. However, evidence in my favor would be a factor analysis 
that I conducted on all of the mediating variables in this chapter. The political trust items formed 
the only factor with an eigenvalue above 1, and none of the other items loaded onto the trust 
factor. If one attitude caused another, I might have observed greater overlap in the attitude 
structure for the potential mediators.
292
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 Of the 24 pertinent personality–support coefficients, 22 are in the expected direction and significant at the 0.10 
level or better; the two remaining coefficients are in the expected direction and have relatively low p-values of 0.103 
and 0.167. In addition, all of the political support mediators are significantly and positively associated with 
participation. For more details on my empirical analyses of the trait–support and support–behavior links, see 
Appendix I. 
291
 For examples of sociodemographic variables being significantly related to political participation, see Klesner 
(2009) and Valentino et al. (2011). 
292
 Furthermore, I observe little evidence that political trust causes approval of mass participation or vice versa, for 
correlations between the political support mediators in Tables 6.3 through 6.7 never surpass 0.16. Based on the 
correlational analyses and my factor analyses, I conclude that the mediating variables are fairly independent of one 
another, and it makes sense to refer to negative indirect effects through political trust and positive indirect effects 
through the other mediating variables.  
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 In sum, it is possible for personality to affect political attitudes and attitudes to influence 
participation. Nevertheless, I remain cautious in the interpretation of results because of the cross-
sectional nature of my data.  
Testing the Mediation Hypothesis: Results 
 Before reporting the results of the KHB method, I first briefly review my hypotheses for 
the connection between traits and support as well as support and behavior. I expect openness and 
extraversion to reduce levels of political trust because of the disappointment of highly open and 
extraverted individuals in a static, impersonal status quo. I also anticipate both trait dimensions 
to increase approval of mass participation because of the preference of highly open citizens for 
democratic ideals and the responsiveness of highly extraverted citizens to social norms. 
Likewise, rights for the majority conflate popular social norms and democratic norms, which 
should appeal to highly conscientious individuals and their tendency toward dutifulness. Finally, 
the consistent, positive perspective of emotionally stable individuals should produce positive 
relationships between this trait dimension on one hand and both political trust and approval of 
mass participation on the other.  
 My expectations for support attitudes and political behavior are comparatively simple. 
Because conventional political involvement perpetuates the current political system, I anticipate 
that both political trust and approval of mass participation will encourage greater rates of 
participation.  
 If we combine the two links, the hypotheses on indirect trait effects are as follows. For 






positive indirect effects on behavior via approval of mass participation. For conscientiousness, 
indirect effects through approval of mass participation should be positive, and emotional stability 
should exert positive indirect effects through both political trust and approval of mass 
participation.  
 I now review the results of the KHB method for each mode of political participation. 
Table 6.3 reports the total, direct, and indirect effects of personality on previous turnout. The 
total effect refers to the trait effects without any of the mediators. As expected based on past 
research (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak et al. 2010), openness and extraversion exert a positive 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.17*                     
(0.08)
0.25**                                
(0.08)
0.24**                                        
(0.08)
0.08                      
(0.09)
-0.04                         
(0.08)
Direct Effect 0.09                  
(0.08)
0.22**                                
(0.08)
0.18*                       
(0.08)
0.13                        
(0.08)
-0.06                      
(0.08)
Indirect Effect 0.08**                     
(0.03)
0.03                                     
(0.03)
0.06+                              
(0.03)
-0.05                                   
(0.03)
0.02                
(0.03)
via Trust in Elections -0.01*                   
(0.00)
0.00                                
(0.00)
-0.01*                                 
(0.00)
0.00                           
(0.01)
0.01                         
(0.01)
via Approval of Campaigning 
and Organizing
0.02**                      
(0.01)
0.02**                                  
(0.01)
0.01*                                       
(0.01)
0.01*                       
(0.00)
0.01+                                
(0.00)
via Political Interest 0.06***             
(0.01)
0.00                                            
(0.01)
0.05***                   
(0.01)
-0.06***                      
(0.02)
0.00                          
(0.01)
via Internal Efficacy 0.00                             
(0.00)
0.00                                                 
(0.00)
0.00                     
(0.00)
-0.00                                
(0.00)
0.00                            
(0.00)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 48.11% 10.50% 23.86% -54.88% -55.87%
via Trust in Elections -4.70% 1.51% -4.33% 5.66% -20.62%
via Approval of Campaigning 
and Organizing
14.40% 7.61% 5.27% 12.94% -17.87%
via Political Interest 36.40% 0.66% 21.48% -70.78% -11.56%
via Internal Efficacy 2.01% 0.72% 1.44% -2.70% -5.82%
Table 6.3
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Previous Turnout via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  previous  turnout. Cel l  entries  in the top 
panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; the constant parameter; and 
controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted so 
that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 31,962. Number of countries : 22. Method of 
estimation for the outcome variable: logi t. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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total effect on voting behavior. I also would anticipate a positive total effect for emotional 
stability based on past research (Gerber et al. 2011; Ha et al. 2013), but the result in Table 6.3 is 
not significant.  
 For openness and extraversion, the positive total effects are partially attributable to 
indirect effects through the attitudinal variables in the model. Consistent with past research on 
the mediation hypothesis (Gallego and Oberski 2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013), I observe 
significant and positive indirect effects of openness and extraversion through political interest. A 
one-unit increase from 0 to 1 in openness would indirectly raise an individual’s probability of 
turnout by 3.6 percent via political interest.
293
 An increase of 3.6 percent would be substantively 
meaningful in a close election, such as the 2016 Peruvian presidential contest between Pedro 
Pablo Kuczynski and Keiko Fujimori. The margin of victory for Kuczynski amounted to less 
than 0.5 percent of the popular vote. 
 Over and above political interest, I find positive and significant indirect trait effects 
through mass participation approval. The indirect effects for openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, and emotional stability are consistent with expectations. In substantive terms, 
openness exerts the largest indirect effect via democratic support, as a one-unit increase in this 
trait dimension would indirectly raise the probability of turnout by 1.4 percent. As the previous 
example makes clear, such an increase could have altered the outcome of the 2016 Peruvian 
presidential election. 
 Table 6.3 also reports negative indirect effects of openness and extraversion via trust in 
elections. The negative indirect effects contrast with the positive total effects and positive 
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 All changes in predicted probability for the mediation analyses have been calculated via the ape option for the 
khb command in Stata. “Ape” stands for “average partial effects.” The ape command returns results for a one-
standard deviation change in the key personality variable, but these have been converted to shifts in predicted 
probability for moving from 0 to 1 in the trait dimension under consideration. 
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indirect effects of both trait dimensions through mass participation approval and political 
interest. Previous studies also have reported positive total and indirect effects of openness and 
extraversion on turnout. Instead, the negative indirect effects comport with my expectations for 
political trust mediators and indicate that citizens who are low in openness and extraversion can 
engage in public affairs through their relatively high levels of confidence in the political system. 
 The bottom panel of Table 6.3 reports the percentage of the total trait effect attributable 
to indirect effects. Altogether, the indirect effects for openness and extraversion cover 48.11 
percent and 23.86 percent of the total trait effect, respectively. The effect of conscientiousness 
via mass participation approval also amounts to 7.61 percent of the total trait effect. Negative 
percentages in the bottom panel are due to indirect effects having the opposite sign of the total 
trait effect. Positive and negative percentages for openness and extraversion point to the 
possibility of countervailing paths from a trait dimension to political participation. 
 A final observation about Table 6.3 pertains to the value of the KHB method. Because of 
the insignificant total effects for emotional stability and agreeableness, traditional mediation 
approaches would have ruled out the possibility of indirect effects for either trait dimension. 
Instead, I observe positive and significant indirect effects of agreeableness and emotional 
stability through approval of mass participation as well as a negative and significant indirect 
effect of agreeableness through political interest. Such results are consistent with the point that 
insignificant total effects can be attributable to countervailing indirect effects (Rucker et al. 
2011).  
 The remaining empirical analyses apply my hypotheses to more uncommon forms of 
conventional political behavior. In the AmericasBarometer, fewer than 25 percent of respondents 




 As discussed above, I expect openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional 
stability to exert positive effects on participation through approval of mass participation, whereas 
the impacts of openness and extraversion via political trust should be negative. Emotional 
stability, however, should be positively associated with participation through political trust.  
 I turn to campaign involvement in Table 6.4. Regarding total effects, I find that high 
levels of openness and extraversion encourage campaign participation, whereas the reverse is 
true for emotional stability. Previous research is consistent with each of these findings (e.g., 
Mondak 2010; Weinschenk 2013). Table 6.4 also reports that openness and extraversion exert a 
positive effect on campaign involvement via internal efficacy and political interest; such findings 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.21*                         
(0.10)
-0.04                                      
(0.08)
0.52***                             
(0.09)
0.10                           
(0.13)
-0.23+                         
(0.13)
Direct Effect 0.02                          
(0.10)
-0.08                              
(0.08)
0.38***                            
(0.09)
0.22+                              
(0.13)
-0.28*                     
(0.13)
Indirect Effect 0.19**                             
(0.06)
0.04                                         
(0.06)
0.14*                      
(0.06)
-0.12*                                 
(0.06)
0.05                            
(0.06)
via Trust in Political Parties -0.01*                               
(0.01)
-0.01+                                         
(0.00)
-0.02**                            
(0.01)
0.00                           
(0.00)
0.00                                 
(0.00)
via Approval of Campaigning 0.04***                      
(0.01)
0.04***                           
(0.01)
0.03***                                    
(0.01)
0.02*                   
(0.01)
0.02**                  
(0.01)
via Political Interest 0.13***                         
(0.02)
0.00                                      
(0.02)
0.11***                        
(0.02)
-0.13***                        
(0.03)
0.01                        
(0.02)
via Internal Efficacy 0.02**                         
(0.01)
0.01*                               
(0.00)
0.02**                           
(0.01)
-0.01*                             
(0.01)
0.01*                              
(0.01)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 89.32% -114.83% 27.06% -117.96% -22.00%
via Trust in Political Parties -6.39% 15.86% -3.09% 0.38% -1.98%
via Approval of Campaigning 21.16% -96.13% 5.33% 19.70% -9.84%
via Political Interest 63.68% -7.05% 20.64% -123.99% -4.06%
via Internal Efficacy 10.86% -27.50% 4.18% -14.04% -6.12%
Table 6.4
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Campaign Involvement via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  campaign involvement. Cel l  entries  in the 
top panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; the constant parameter; 
and controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data are 
weighted so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 32,255. Number of countries : 22. 
Method of estimation for the outcome variable: logi t. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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comport with past mediation studies on various forms of participation (e.g., Gallego and Oberski 
2012; Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013).   
 As expected, multiple trait dimensions are significantly related to campaign participation 
through political support attitudes. Openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional 
stability all exert positive and significant effects on campaign involvement via approval of mass 
participation, and the indirect effects of openness and extraversion through political trust are 
negative. I thus continue to identify significant indirect personality effects through political 
support, even as I control for indirect effects via political interest and internal efficacy. The 
indirect effects are especially meaningful for openness, as they cover nearly 90 percent of the 
total effect.
294
 The major pathways from openness to campaigning appear to be specified with 
the mediators in the model.
295
 
 In substantive terms, openness and conscientiousness exert the largest indirect effects on 
campaign involvement via political support. A one-unit change in openness (conscientiousness) 
would indirectly raise a respondent’s probability of campaigning by 1.5 percent (1.3 percent) via 
approval of mass participation. The substantive influence of each trait dimension is meaningful 
for a dependent variable with a mean of 0.11 on a scale from 0 to 1. Moreover, the substantive 
impact of openness (conscientiousness) through internal efficacy amounts only to +0.8 percent 
(+0.4 percent). Political support thus outperforms internal efficacy as a mediator for the 
relationship between each trait dimension and campaign involvement. 
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 The percentage exceeds 95 percent if we ignore the negative percentage associated with political trust. 
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 The positive indirect effects for conscientiousness and emotional stability contrast with 
the negative and significant total effect for emotional stability in Table 6.4 and with the negative 
total effects for both trait dimensions observed in prior research (e.g., Mondak 2010; 
Weinschenk 2013). As I have noted for openness and extraversion, the impact of personality on 
participation may not be uniformly positive or negative. Trait effects through political support 
can contradict previous findings. 
 Next, I consider the indirect effects of personality on attending local government 
meetings in Table 6.5. As expected, extraversion exerts a positive and significant total effect on 
attendance (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Weinschenk 2013), and openness and extraversion are 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.06                       
(0.09)
0.05                                    
(0.13)
0.61***                          
(0.12)
-0.06                                  
(0.09)
-0.02                
(0.09)
Direct Effect -0.06                   
(0.10)
0.02                                     
(0.14)
0.52***                     
(0.12)
0.02                            
(0.08)
-0.06                         
(0.09)
Indirect Effect 0.12**                          
(0.04)
0.03                                      
(0.04)
0.09*                                  
(0.04)
-0.08*                            
(0.04)
0.04                                
(0.04)
via Trust in Local Government -0.02**                           
(0.01)
0.01*                                
(0.00)
-0.02**                                
(0.01)
0.01**                                
(0.00)
0.01*                      
(0.01)
via Approval of Organizing 0.01                             
(0.01)
0.01                                    
(0.01)
0.01                             
(0.00)
0.01                               
(0.00)
0.00                          
(0.00)
via Political Interest 0.09***                   
(0.02)
-0.00                                       
(0.01)
0.07***                          
(0.01)
-0.08***                         
(0.02)
0.01                      
(0.01)
via Internal Efficacy 0.03***                  
(0.01)
0.01**                                     
(0.01)
0.03***                                
(0.01)
-0.02**                             
(0.01)
0.02**                      
(0.01)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 195.38% 55.98% 14.80% 130.30% -168.53%
via Trust in Local Government -30.53% 19.00% -2.72% -23.99% -49.20%
via Approval of Organizing 24.77% 17.74% 1.14% -11.44% -8.85%
via Political Interest 147.79% -5.67% 11.66% 132.23% -31.11%
via Internal Efficacy 53.35% 24.92% 4.72% 33.51% -79.36%
Table 6.5
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Local Meeting Attendance via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  loca l  meeting attendance. Cel l  entries  in the 
top panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; the constant parameter; 
and controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted 
so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 33,868. Number of countries : 24. Method of 
estimation for the outcome variable: logi t. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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positively related to political activism through the two traditional mediators, namely political 
interest and internal efficacy (Mondak et al. 2010; Gallego and Oberski 2012). 
 Results are mixed for indirect effects through political support. Although personality does 
not appear to influence local meeting attendance through approval of mass participation, 
openness and extraversion continue to exert negative indirect effects through political trust. For 
extraversion, the indirect effects cover 14.80 percent of the significant total trait effect. Moving 
from 0 to 1 in extraversion would reduce the probability of attending a local meeting by 0.7 
percent via political trust. Such a change would qualify as fairly meaningful for a dependent 
variable with a mean of 0.12 among the individuals in the model.
296
 
 In addition, I observe a positive and significant indirect effect of emotional stability via 
political trust, as expected. The impact through political trust is more than half as much as the 
indirect effect through internal efficacy, as indicated by the percentages in the lower panel of the 
table.  
 A final observation about Table 6.5 concerns the impact of openness on local meeting 
attendance. The total effect is insignificant, possibly due to a combination of positive effects 
through such attitudes as interest and internal efficacy and negative effects through such attitudes 
as local political trust. Such countervailing indirect effects for a trait dimension can produce 
insignificant total effects.    
 Results for party meeting attendance in Table 6.6 are also consistent with expectations. 
As anticipated, extraversion exerts positive and significant total and indirect effects, with 27.35 
percent of the total effect accounted for by the mediation analyses. The total impact for openness 
is not significant, but most of the indirect effects are positive and significant, comporting with  
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previous research on political participation (e.g., Mondak et al. 2010; Schoen and Steinbrecher 
2013). In particular, both openness and extraversion are positively related to attending party 
meetings through mass participation approval, political interest, and internal efficacy. Although 
most paths for openness and extraversion—including through democratic support—run in the 
positive direction, the indirect effects via political trust are negative and significant, outpacing all 
other indirect openness or extraversion effects except for the ones through political interest in 
terms of absolute magnitude.  
 For conscientiousness and emotional stability, I again observe positive and significant 
indirect effects through mass participation approval, and emotional stability also works through  
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.09                          
(0.11)
-0.06                                              
(0.10)
0.45***                      
(0.10)
-0.45***                         
(0.09)
0.00                         
(0.08)
Direct Effect -0.08                              
(0.11)
-0.09                                                    
(0.10)
0.33***                      
(0.09)
-0.32***                                   
(0.09)
-0.07                
(0.08)
Indirect Effect 0.17**                                 
(0.06)
0.03                           
(0.06)
0.12+                          
(0.06)
-0.14*                          
(0.06)
0.07                     
(0.06)
via Trust in Political Parties -0.04***                      
(0.01)
-0.02*                          
(0.01)
-0.04***                                
(0.01)
0.00                                 
(0.01)
0.02+                        
(0.01)
via Approval of Campaigning 0.03***                 
(0.01)
0.03***                                    
(0.01)
0.02***                                
(0.01)
0.01*                            
(0.01)
0.02**                                 
(0.01)
via Political Interest 0.15***                        
(0.02)
0.00                                       
(0.01)
0.12***                       
(0.02)
-0.14***                          
(0.03)
0.02                              
(0.02)
via Internal Efficacy 0.03***                  
(0.01)
0.01**                                        
(0.00)
0.03***                    
(0.01)
-0.02**                    
(0.01)
0.02**                   
(0.01)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 188.04% -44.97% 27.35% 30.34% 4,392.36%
via Trust in Political Parties -44.42% 27.53% -9.22% -0.73% 1,030.48%
via Approval of Campaigning 38.06% -42.02% 4.40% -3.13% 982.24%
via Political Interest 162.40% -7.89% 26.33% 30.14% 1,206.27%
via Internal Efficacy 32.01% -22.59% 5.84% 4.06% 1,173.37%
Table 6.6
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Party Meeting Attendance via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  party meeting attendance. Cel l  entries  in the 
top panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; threshold parameters ; and 
controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted so 
that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 33,899. Number of countries : 24. Method of 




political trust to facilitate political behavior. The positive effects of emotional stability on trust 
and mass participation approval that were observed in Chapter 3 have downstream effects on 
facilitating party meeting attendance. 
 Finally, I examine the influence of personality traits and political attitudes on contacting 
public officials in Table 6.7. Consistent with the extant literature, the total effects of extraversion 
and emotional stability are positive and negative (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak et al 2010), 
respectively, and the overall indirect effects of openness and extraversion are positive (e.g., 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.13                      
(0.09)
0.08                                   
(0.10)
0.36***                            
(0.07)
0.00                                    
(0.08)
-0.37***          
(0.10)
Direct Effect 0.04                  
(0.08)
0.05                                         
(0.11)
0.30***                           
(0.07)
0.04                          
(0.08)
-0.40***                 
(0.10)
Indirect Effect 0.09**                    
(0.03)
0.03                                          
(0.03)
0.06*                          
(0.03)
-0.04                                       
(0.03)
0.03                     
(0.03)
via Trust in Local Gov't, 
National Gov't, and National 
Legislature
-0.02*                          
(0.01)
0.00                                   
(0.00)
-0.01*                                        
(0.01)
0.01*                       
(0.01)
0.01+                                 
(0.00)
via Approval of Organizing 0.03*                                  
(0.01)
0.02*                                     
(0.01)
0.01*                           
(0.01)
0.01*                         
(0.01)
0.00                                
(0.00)
via Political Interest 0.06***                
(0.01)
-0.00                                
(0.01)
0.05***                
(0.01)
-0.06***                     
(0.01)
0.01                           
(0.01)
via Internal Efficacy 0.02**                       
(0.01)
0.01*                           
(0.00)
0.02*                                    
(0.01)
-0.01*                                 
(0.00)
0.01*                    
(0.00)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 68.05% 34.43% 17.76% -2473.58% -8.12%
via Trust in Local Gov't, 
National Gov't, and National 
Legislature
-13.52% 5.54% -3.98% 736.09% -1.87%
via Approval of Organizing 20.39% 19.39% 3.60% 706.01% -1.08%
via Political Interest 47.79% -1.02% 13.73% -3276.25% -2.25%
via Internal Efficacy 13.40% 10.52% 4.40% -639.43% -2.92%
Table 6.7
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Contacting Officials via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  the index for contacting officia ls . Cel l  entries  
in the top panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; threshold 
parameters ; and controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data 
are weighted so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 30,536. Number of countries : 
23. Method of estimation for the outcome variable: ordinal  logi t. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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Schoen and Steinbrecher 2013; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). Likewise, openness and 
extraversion exert positive indirect effects via political interest, internal efficacy, and—as 
expected—approval of mass participation. Collectively, these three indirect effects for openness 
(extraversion) account for nearly 82 percent (22 percent) of the total trait effect. 
 Nevertheless, some of the findings from Table 6.7 contrast with prior research but are 
consistent with my expectations. The indirect effects of openness and extraversion through 
political trust are negative, and two of the indirect effects for emotional stability are positive and 
significant. Therefore, there are some paths by which citizens high in openness and extraversion 
(emotional stability) are less (more) likely to contact public officials.  
 The results also reveal a positive indirect effect of conscientiousness through mass 
participation approval. Past work on this trait dimension and contacting public officials, 
meanwhile, has reported a combination of positive and negative effects (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; 
Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). 
Reviewing the Evidence 
 My empirical analyses replicate, complement, and challenge previous research. With 
regard to replication, I corroborate past findings by observing positive total effects of openness 
in two models, positive total effects for extraversion in all five models, and negative total effects 
for emotional stability in the campaign and contacting models. Past assessments of the mediation 
hypothesis also have shown that openness and extraversion work through political interest and 
internal efficacy to influence political participation, and my mediation analyses reveal the same 
findings for both trait dimensions in 5 of 5 models for political interest and 4 of 5 models for 
internal efficacy. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to corroboration, I challenge and complement the extant literature by examining 
indirect trait effects via political trust and approval of mass participation. The pattern of results 
appears in Table 6.8. Consistent with previous research on positive indirect effects, I offer 
consistent evidence in 4 of 5 models that openness and extraversion are positively related to 
citizen engagement via approval of mass participation. Meanwhile, I show in all five models that 
openness and extraversion are negatively related to political participation through political trust. 
In other words, less open and extraverted citizens can become more politically engaged via their 
relatively high levels of confidence in the political system. This chapter, therefore, has identified 
a path by which individuals with low levels of openness and extraversion become more likely to 
partake in public affairs, holding indirect effects through other mediators constant. 
 Four of the five models also reveal positive indirect effects of conscientiousness via 
approval of mass participation. Previous studies have reported negative effects of 
conscientiousness on campaign involvement and inconclusive results for other modes of political 
behavior, but I have found a positive path from conscientiousness to campaigning as well as 
from this trait dimension to turnout, party meeting attendance, and contacting public officials. 
The total effects for conscientiousness are insignificant in the non-turnout models, but they mask 
significant indirect effects. 
 Finally, I observe positive indirect effects for emotional stability in three of the five 
mediation analyses. Whereas openness and extraversion exert positive and negative indirect 
effects through democratic support and political trust, respectively, indirect emotional stability 
effects on participation are positive for both mediators. Such consistency is reflective of the 
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Conclusions and Implications 
 This chapter has analyzed the practical implications of the relationship between 
personality and political support with data from as many as 24 countries in the Western 
Hemisphere. The connection between traits and attitudes toward the political system extends 
beyond a citizen’s opinions to his or her engagement in public affairs. Building on previous work 
on the mediation hypothesis and political support, I report that the chain from personality to 
support to behavior encompasses not just an activity with a high participation rate, namely voter 
turnout, but also activities with low participation rates, such as contacting public officials and 
attending political meetings. My findings thus apply to a variety of means by which individuals 
can exercise their responsibilities as democratic citizens to express their interests, confront 
societal problems, and hold public officials accountable.  
Connections to Previous Research 
 The results of this study are both consistent and inconsistent with extant findings on 
personality and participation. On one hand, I observe positive indirect effects for openness and 
extraversion via democratic support attitudes; these indirect effects run in the same direction as 
ones for more traditional mediators, such as political interest and internal efficacy.
298
 
Incorporating mass participation attitudes allows me to paint a more comprehensive picture of 
the positive paths from traits to attitudes to behavior, and I control for interest and internal 
                                                 
297
 The patterns summarized in Table 6.8 occur more frequently than would be expected by chance. If we assume 
that 10 percent of the indirect effects would be significant by chance, then only 3 or 4 of 35 hypothesized indirect 
effects would be significant in Tables 6.3 through 6.7. Instead, 28 are significant. 
298
 In addition, the positive effects of extraversion on behavior via mass participation approval are consistent with 
the motivating example of former U.S. President Bill Clinton. 
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efficacy so as to avoid misattributing the effects of previously explored mediators to democratic 
support.  
 On the other hand, some of my findings challenge prior results. Unlike most work in the 
personality literature, I identify negative effects of openness and extraversion on participation via 
political trust, a positive effect of conscientiousness on campaigning via approval of mass 
participation, and positive effects of emotional stability on campaigning and contacting officials 
via mass participation approval and political trust, respectively.
299
  
Relevance for Elite Political Rhetoric 
 Put together, the concordant and discordant results offer multiple strategies for political 
elites to encourage citizen participation through tailored communications based on the dominant 
traits of their audience.
300
 Such messages could function as an exogenous shock that promotes 
political support and participation due to the receptivity of recipients to the communication.
301
 
For openness and extraversion, politicians and nongovernmental organizations can target 
individuals at both ends of each trait dimension. Messages directed to highly open and 
extraverted citizens should emphasize democratic ideals and participation norms in order to 
maximize mass participation approval and mobilize participation from individuals high in each 
trait dimension. At the same time, communications to less open and less extraverted citizens 
should stress the trustworthiness of political institutions and procedures in order to promote the 
political confidence and engagement of other members of the public. 
                                                 
299
 The negative effect of extraversion on participation via political trust is consistent with one of the motivating 
examples in this chapter: the case of Republican politician Jeb Bush. 
300
 Online media communications in the United States, for example, should be directed to a highly open audience 
(Gerber et al. 2011b).  
301
 In addition to political support, a comprehensive mobilization campaign would seek to raise participation rates by 
using targeted messaging to increase levels of political interest and internal political efficacy. I concentrate, 
however, on communications related to political support because of the substantive focus of this dissertation. 
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 Meanwhile, past research has identified negative effects of conscientiousness on 
campaigning and negative effects of emotional stability on campaigning and contacting officials. 
Although I have not uncovered negative paths running from these trait dimensions through 
political support, my findings do highlight opportunities for political activists to encourage 
political support and participation from citizens who are generally less inclined to campaign and 
contact public officials—that is, citizens who are high in conscientiousness and emotional 
stability. To appeal to such citizens, political elites could promote the importance and temporal 
permanence of democratic norms, especially those pertaining to mass participation. In addition, I 
have observed a positive path from emotional stability to political trust to contacting, so 
messages about the consistency and predictability of institutional policies should appeal to 
individuals high in this trait dimension.  
 The interventions suggested above possess a realistic opportunity to influence levels of 
mass participation approval and political trust and thereby to affect participation rates. Citizens 
high in openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability have not reached the 
maximum level of mass participation approval. For each of these trait dimensions, I calculated 
the mean score for the two-item mass participation approval index among individuals above the 
mean in the particular trait dimension under consideration. The mean in each case ranged 
between 15.43 and 15.67 on a scale ranging from 5 to 20.
302
  
 Likewise, individuals low in openness, low in extraversion, and high in emotional 
stability can become even more trusting of the political system. To demonstrate my point, I 
generated an index of all of the political trust items in this chapter, except for trust in elections 
due to its omission in the Canadian and U.S. surveys. Then, I calculated the average for 
individuals below the mean in openness, below the mean in extraversion, and above the mean in 
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 These averages—15.39, 15.22, and 14.99, respectively, on a scale ranging 
from 4 to 28—indicate that tailored communications could raise the trust attitudes of many 
individuals who are low in openness, low in extraversion, or high in emotional stability. 
 By understanding the paths from personality traits to support attitudes to political 
participation, political elites can utilize targeted messaging to increase participation rates and 
thereby influence the quality of democracy. Maximizing voter turnout and increasing citizen 
involvement in political meeting attendance and other activities with low participation rates can 
enable the public to articulate its interests, work together to address societal problems, and hold 
elected officials accountable for their actions.  
 Two examples from the mass media illustrate the potential of tailored communication to 
increase political participation. First, consider a 2014 news story on a local television channel in 
Iowa. Gerber and his colleagues (2011b) find that local television news audiences tend to be less 
open to new experiences; according to my results, news stories about trustworthy politicians 
could improve participation rates. About two weeks before the 2014 elections, longtime Iowa 
Governor Terry Branstad appeared on the local ABC affiliate in Des Moines in a story featuring 
his trustworthiness and job effectiveness. “I love this state,” he told KCCI’s Todd Magel. “I’m a 
lifelong Iowan except for my two years in the service, and I want to run the best campaign I’ve 
ever run.” He also stressed the soundness of the state budget and the presence of job growth in 
Iowa. KCCI represents just one television station in Iowa, but the focus on trustworthiness could 
be representative of local TV outlets in a year in which Branstad won 59 percent of the vote. 
Consistent with my argument about the link between trust and participation, in 2014 Iowa also 
experienced the largest raw vote total in a midterm election in at least three decades, and the 
turnout rate also slightly exceeded the rates for the 2006 and 2010 elections (Murphy 2014).  
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 My analysis focused on the 24 AmericasBarometer countries in this study.  
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 Second, let us turn to a 2014 interview on a national satire television show. Gerber et al. 
(2011b) report a positive effect of openness on viewing such programs; therefore, based on the 
results in this chapter, I would expect politicians on such programs to appeal to the highly open 
audiences by emphasizing the democratic principle of mass participation. Indeed, then-President 
Barack Obama lamented the low rate of voter turnout in the 2014 midterm elections during an 
interview in December of that year on Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report. The president 
made similar comments during a press conference immediately after the 2014 midterm elections. 
According to the United States Election Project by political scientist Michael P. McDonald 
(2017), midterm turnout of voting-eligible citizens declined from 41.8 percent in 2010 to 36.7 
percent in 2014.
304
 The ultimate impact of President Obama’s attention to mass participation will 
not be known until after the 2018 midterm elections, but we could compare turnout in 2012 and 
2016, approximately two years after President Obama’s comments. Consistent with my 
argument, turnout increased modestly across the two presidential election cycles, from 58.6 
percent in 2012 to 60.2 percent in 2016.  
Next Steps 
 The existence of a chain from personality to support to behavior enhances the plausibility 
of the policy recommendations in this dissertation, including the tailored communications 
described in the present chapter. The actual efficacy of such proposals, however, is an open 
question and constitutes an arena for additional investigation.
305
 If political elites and 
nongovernmental organizations target their messages based on the dominant traits of their 
audience, do citizens become more trusting and approving of mass participation? Are they more 
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 The turnout rates in this paragraph refer to the total ballots counted (McDonald 2017).  
305
 As I detail in the next chapter, personality scholars have begun to explore how psychological factors interact with 
experimental treatments to influence political behavior or behavioral intentions (e.g., Gerber et al. 2013; 
Weinschenk and Panagopoulos 2014). Although these researchers have not investigated the path from personality to 
support to participation, their work suggests the viability of such an approach for future scholarship.  
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likely to participate in public life? I discuss these questions and other avenues for future research 













































 CHAPTER 7 
PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT: 
A CONCLUSION 
 
 Political support matters. It affects the number of citizens who vote on Election Day, join 
political campaigns, and attend government meetings. In turn, participation rates determine the 
ability of the public to express group interests, address societal problems, and hold elected 
officials accountable for their actions and policies. Aggregate levels of political support thus 
carry implications for the quality of democracy. 
 Furthermore, mass attitudes toward the political system can determine the outcome of an 
election. As I noted in the opening anecdote on Venezuela, distrust in government in the 1990s 
fueled the electoral futility of the Democratic Action Party (AD) and Social Christian Party 
(COPEI) as well as the electoral success of new political parties, such as National Convergence 
in 1993 and the Fifth Republic Movement in 1998. 
 In the case of Venezuela, the participative and partisan consequences of political support 
became intertwined. Pessimism toward political actors and institutions in the 1993 elections 
hindered turnout, upending the AD–COPEI monopoly on the presidency and attenuating the two-
party majority in both chambers of the legislature. Turnout for all parties declined by 22 percent 
between 1988 and 1993, with vote totals for the AD and COPEI combined dropping by more 
than half in the presidential and legislative contests. In addition to losing the presidency in 1993, 
the two parties witnessed noticeable reductions in the percentage of legislative seats. Together, 
the AD and COPEI controlled 164 of 201 (42 of 46) seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Senate) 
after the 1988 election, but only 108 of 203 (30 of 50) seats following the 1993 setbacks. Two-
party control ceased with the legislative elections of 1998.
306
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 To be precise, with the 1998 election, the AD and COPEI held exactly 50 percent of the seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies and just 42 percent of the seats in the Senate. 
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 The impact of political support in Venezuela sparks another question: Where do attitudes 
toward the political system originate? The preceding chapters have responded to this question by 
turning to the influence of personality on political support attitudes and the relevance of the 
personality–support relationship for political behavior. I have argued that personality constitutes 
a useful starting point for explaining inter-individual variation in political support because of the 
heritability (e.g., Heath et al. 1992; Riemann et al. 1997) and longitudinal stability (e.g., Costa 
and McCrae 1988; Rantanen et al. 2007) of psychological traits, as well as their early 
manifestation in life (e.g., Asendorpf and van Aken 2003; Ehrler et al. 1999). 
Filling the Gaps 
 My investigation of personality, political support, and citizen participation has addressed 
theoretical and empirical limitations in prior research. On the theoretical front, I developed a 
general model in Chapter 2 to account for the path from traits to support attitudes to political 
behavior, and then utilized the framework to derive specific hypotheses in each of the subsequent 
chapters. Most students of personality and political support, by contrast, form their hypotheses 
on an ad hoc basis, which hinders their ability to identify theoretical and empirical connections 
across studies. The extant literature also rarely explores the practical relevance of the 
personality–support relationship by considering whether traits work through support attitudes to 
affect actual political engagement. I have identified only two such studies (Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013; Wang 2016). 
 To explain the impact of personality on political support, Chapter 2 applied a model from 
occupational psychology known as trait activation theory (TAT) (Tett and Burnett 2003; Tett and 
Guterman 2000). The basic premise of TAT is that personality traits will influence an outcome in 
response to trait-relevant cues in the environment. Such cues include characteristics of the 
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dependent variable (e.g., the actor or community level of political support) as well as aspects of 
the broader political, economic, and social context (e.g., the level of corruption or economic 
performance). In Chapter 3 I focused on the former source of trait-relevant cues in order to study 
the direct relationship between personality and political support, and Chapters 4 and 5 considered 
the latter source of trait-relevant cues in order to investigate how contextual factors condition the 
impact of traits on attitudes toward the political system. 
 Secondly, the general model in Chapter 2 incorporated the mediation hypothesis (Blais 
and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and Oberski 2012) in order to account for the indirect effect of 
personality on political participation through political support attitudes. Hypotheses derived from 
the second part of the theoretical framework were tested in Chapter 6. 
 Following Chapter 2, each of the empirical chapters addressed theoretical and empirical 
gaps in the political behavior literature. Chapter 3 considered the direct relationship between 
personality and political support and expanded upon prior research in three ways. First, I utilized 
trait activation theory as a unifying and integrative explanation for current findings on the impact 
of personality on attitudes toward the political system (Zinnes 1976). Past studies, for example, 
have indicated that openness to experience is negatively related to political trust (e.g., Anderson 
2010a, 2010b; Mondak et al. 2017) and positively related to political tolerance (e.g., Marcus et 
al. 1995; Oskarsson and Widmalm 2016), and TAT would suggest that the divergent results are 
attributable to fundamental differences between the actor and institutional levels on one hand and 
the regime principle level on the other. In particular, instrumental evaluations of the status quo 
always could improve in the eyes of highly open individuals, who value innovation, whereas 
democratic values understandably appeal to the ideals facet of openness (John et al. 2008). 
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Throughout Chapter 3, I applied TAT to all levels (e.g., actor and institutional) and domains 
(e.g., political trust and job effectiveness evaluations) of political support. 
 Second, I pursued additive cumulation (Zinnes 1976) in Chapter 3 by considering 
previously untested relationships between personality and political support attitudes. Prior 
studies had not explored the impact of psychological traits on patriotism; democratic support, 
besides political tolerance and support for criminal rights; regime performance attitudes; 
institutional affect; institutional job evaluations, actor affect; and issue-specific actor job 
evaluations. I considered each relationship in Chapter 3. 
 Third, I expanded the geographic scope of personality and support research with the 
incorporation of data from the developing world in Chapter 3. Extant studies rely on surveys 
from advanced industrial countries,
307
 leaving the generalizability of their findings in doubt. 
Chapter 3, meanwhile, compared findings from the United States with results from a cross-
national sample of Latin American, Caribbean, and North American countries. 
 Results for Chapter 3 demonstrated the applicability of TAT to all levels of political 
support and to the United States as well as a cross-national sample. For example, I showed in 
multiple datasets that openness tends to be negatively related to actor, institutional, and 
procedural support and positively related to democratic support. My results indicated that highly 
open individuals resemble the “critical citizens” identified by Pippa Norris in a prominent 
volume on political support from the late 1990s. More broadly, the findings in Chapter 3 pointed 
to TAT as a general model of the relationship between personality and attitudes toward the 
political system. 
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 I am aware of only two exceptions: Mondak et al.’s (2017) study of political trust in the Americas and Oskarsson 
and Widmalm’s (2016) study of political tolerance in India and Pakistan.  
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 Building on Chapter 3, I explored conditional personality effects on political support 
attitudes in Chapters 4 and 5. Both chapters addressed limitations in prior research, including the 
paucity of conditional personality effects in the political support literature. The two extant 
studies of which I am aware utilize data from India and Pakistan (Oskarsson and Widmalm 
2016) as well as Switzerland (Freitag and Ackermann 2016), whereas my data cover a broader 
range of countries from throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
 Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 responded to empirical inconsistencies in previous 
research on the direct relationship between personality and political support. I argued that studies 
have reported divergent personality effects because surveys have been administered in different 
contexts that contain dissimilar trait-relevant cues. In particular, I identified cross-survey 
differences in corruption as a contributing factor to the inconsistent effects of openness and 
extraversion on external efficacy; cross-survey differences in economic performance as a 
contributing factor to the inconsistent effects of conscientiousness on attitudes toward actors, 
institutions, and procedures; and cross-survey differences in social threat to the inconsistent 
effects of conscientiousness on democratic support. Using TAT, I hypothesized that the effects 
of openness and extraversion on external efficacy become more negative as the level of 
corruption rises, the effect of conscientiousness on status quo support becomes more positive as 
economic conditions improve, and the effect of conscientiousness on political tolerance and 
support for criminal rights becomes more negative as the level of threat from political dissidents 
and crime increases. 
 I obtained support for each of these hypotheses. I operationalized the environment with 
contextual perceptions in Chapter 4 and objective contextual factors in Chapter 5, and the results 
were consistent. Likewise, I obtained support for the anticipated openness–corruption interaction 
256 
 
and conscientiousness–economic performance interaction in multiple datasets in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrated the practical relevance of this dissertation by examining 
whether personality traits work through political support attitudes to affect actual political 
behavior. Extant applications of the mediation hypothesis rarely consider political support as a 
possible mediator, but I argued for the plausibility of the chain from traits to support attitudes to 
citizen engagement. The first link is evident from Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of my dissertation, and 
previous studies have documented a significant association between political support and 
political participation (e.g., Hooghe and Marien 2013; Karp and Milazzo 2015).  
  The results from Chapter 6 complemented and challenged prior findings on the 
relationship between personality and political behavior. To date, studies have reported positive 
effects of openness (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010) and extraversion (e.g., Mondak and 
Halperin 2008; Weinschenk 2013) on most modes of citizen participation, negative effects of 
conscientiousness and emotional stability on campaigning (e.g., Ha et al. 2013; Mondak 2010), 
and positive effects of emotional stability on voting (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a; Moreno and Wals 
2014). Consistent with extant research, I found that openness and extraversion work through 
approval of mass participation to facilitate voting, campaigning, attending party meetings, and 
contacting public officials, and the effect of emotional stability on voting via approval of mass 
participation was also positive.
308
 These findings are present even with the inclusion of indirect 
effects through more traditional mediators, namely political interest and internal efficacy. 
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 Many of the total trait effects in Chapter 6 also replicate prior findings on the relationship between personality 
and political participation. In particular, the total effect of openness was positive and significant in 2 of 5 models, 
the total effect of extraversion was positive and significant in 5 of 5 models, and the total effects of emotional 
stability on campaigning and contacting were negative. 
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 But not all of the indirect effects via political support conformed to the findings in 
previous studies. Dominant paths, such as the ones discussed above, can mask indirect effects 
that have the opposite sign (Rucker et al. 2011). Instead of negative effects, I reported a positive 
effect of conscientiousness on campaigning via approval of campaign involvement and positive 
effects of emotional stability on campaigning and contacting officials via mass participation 
approval and political trust, respectively. Likewise, rather than positive effects, both openness 
and extraversion exert negative effects on participation through political trust attitudes. My 
findings thus indicate that individuals low in openness and extraversion—and high in 
conscientiousness and emotional stability—are not doomed to withdraw from public affairs. 
Political mobilization for less open and less extraverted (highly conscientious and highly 
emotionally stable) individuals can occur through their relatively high levels of political trust 
(approval for mass participation and political trust, respectively). 
Practical Implications 
 In addition to filling theoretical and empirical gaps in prior research, this dissertation has 
offered practical suggestions for mobilizing more citizens into the political process. I have 
argued that nongovernmental organizations and other political elites could raise participation 
rates in the population by influencing levels of political support through communications that are 
tailored to the dominant personality traits of an audience. For example, emphasizing economic 
success may appeal to a crowd of highly conscientious, achievement-oriented citizens, but could 
have a minimal or counterproductive effect on individuals at the other end of conscientiousness.  
 Effective messaging will require elites to be aware of which citizens are most responsive 
to contextual information. Chapter 4 and, especially, Chapter 5 indicated that individuals high in 
openness and extraversion are more likely than citizens at the low end of each dimension to form 
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their external efficacy attitudes based on the level of corruption in their environment. Likewise, I 
found that highly conscientious citizens are more responsive than less conscientious citizens to 
the level of economic performance (Chapter 5) and the level of social threat from political 
dissidents and crime (Chapters 4 and 5).  
 From a normative perspective, Chapter 5 provided reassurance that trait–situation 
interactions can be grounded in reality. Politicians might be tempted to avoid effective 
governance and instead manipulate perceptions about political, economic, or social conditions in 
order to raise the level of political support and the rates of pro-incumbent behavior. However, I 
showed that individuals high in openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness reward and punish 
the political status quo on the basis of objective contextual factors, such as bribery rates 
aggregated from survey data on citizen experiences. Elected officials thus have an incentive to 
improve actual societal conditions, along with mass perceptions of those conditions.  
 Finally, targeted communications could mobilize individuals at the low and high end of a 
personality dimension. Based on the results in Chapter 6, messages about the democratic 
principle of mass participation could increase support levels and participation rates among 
audiences high in openness and extraversion, whereas messages about the trustworthiness of 
actors, institutions, and procedures could accomplish the same goal for recipients who are low in 
openness and extraversion.
309
 A combination of communication strategies thus could maximize 
the number of voices represented in the political process, as well as the number of people who 
are willing to address societal problems or hold politicians accountable for their actions. 
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 Given the greater responsiveness of open and extraverted citizens to contextual information, however, 




Data: Advantages and Limitations 
 I have harnessed the temporal, geographic, and measurement diversity of as many as four 
surveys to assess the generalizability of my findings. Data have come from a 2015 student 
sample in Illinois, two 2012 representative surveys from the United States, and a 2010 cross-
national survey of citizens from 24 countries. Collectively, the surveys offer multiple 
measurements of personality and numerous political support items for analysis, and I have access 
to perceptual and objective measures of the environment through the survey data and other 
sources. The AmericasBarometer also includes a variety of political participation variables. In 
short, my data are well-suited to testing the hypotheses for this dissertation. 
 Nevertheless, the data suffer from four limitations that future studies should address. 
First, the geographic and temporal scope of the survey data could be broader, expanding to 
different world regions and different time periods. Future research, therefore, should examine the 
path from personality to support attitudes to political participation in Africa, Asia, Europe, and 
Oceania, as well as other Western Hemisphere countries not included in the data used for this 
dissertation (e.g., Haiti and Honduras). Scholars will need to collect new survey data in some 
countries, and I encourage efforts to replicate my findings with surveys previously administered 
in the Western Hemisphere. For example, a 1998 survey of residents in the Tallahassee, Florida, 
area included items on conscientiousness, sociotropic economic evaluations, and presidential job 
approval (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Building on Chapter 4, researchers could investigate 
whether the effect of conscientiousness on job evaluations of President Bill Clinton became more 
and more positive as perceptions of the national economy became more favorable. 
 Second, the generalizability of my findings would be improved with additional data from 
AmericasBarometer countries. The cross-national survey did not include items for political 
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affect, institutional external efficacy, actor trust, or national identification, so analyses for these 
political support attitudes were limited to the United States. Likewise, data limitations prevented 
me from including all 24 countries in the Chapter 6 analyses of previous turnout (N = 22 
countries), hypothetical turnout (N = 21), campaign participation (N = 22), and contacting public 
officials (N = 23). The Canadian and U.S. surveys omitted the trust-in-elections item used for the 
two turnout models, and the surveys for Canada, Chile, and the United States failed to ask about 
hypothetical turnout. Furthermore, no Canadian and U.S. respondents were asked both the 
approval-of-campaigning item and the campaign participation item. Finally, the Bolivian survey 
did not include the contacting government battery. Future iterations of the AmericasBarometer or 
another cross-national survey of the Western Hemisphere should field all requisite questions for 
testing the hypotheses in Chapter 6.
310
 
 Third, as noted by Hauser (1974), all contextual analysis is subject to the threat of self-
selection. Individuals choose whether to remain in one community or country or relocate to 
another, and the contextual factors in this dissertation (e.g., the strength of the economy) could 
influence a person’s preferred residence. To rule out the possibility of self-selection, researchers 
could randomly assign experimental subjects to receive one of at least two vignettes about a 
political community, real or imagined. The vignettes could differ on the contextual factor of 
interest. Ideally, the trait–situation interactions from the survey experiment would resemble the 
ones from observational data that were reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Fourth, Chapter 5 noted the relatively low rate of significant trait–situation interactions 
with objective contextual factors. Although the number of significant interactions was greater 
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 Post-2010 AmericasBarometer questionnaires have lacked a Big Five battery, preventing analyses of the path 
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than expected by chance, I would have preferred to obtain even more support for my hypotheses 
on conditional personality effects. Perhaps the contextual factors were low in salience due to the 
myriad distractions in everyday life. More conspicuous contextual factors, by contrast, may 
convey trait-relevant cues more clearly, increasing the consistency of person–situation 
interactions. To explore such a possibility, scholars could randomly assign experimental subjects 
to vignettes that vary in the intensity of treatment (e.g., a vignette that briefly refers to the level 




Covering New Territory 
 In addition to addressing data limitations, the theoretical model and empirical analyses in 
this dissertation suggest several new lines of inquiry in the study of personality and politics. 
Areas for additional study encompass conditional personality effects, mediation analysis, and 
applications of the model to outcomes besides political support. I consider each in turn.  
Further Examination of Conditional Personality Effects  
 Chapters 4 and 5 considered solutions to several empirical puzzles, or inconsistencies, in 
the personality and support literature. In future research, scholars could offer other solutions to 
the same puzzles. For instance, economic performance is not the only contextual variable that 
pertains to political success or failure; other contextual factors, such as the electoral margin of 
victory, could activate the conscientiousness facet of achievement-striving and produce positive 
or negative trait effects. Three extant surveys illustrate the potential utility of interacting 
conscientiousness with incumbent vote share. On one hand, Mondak and Halperin (2008) report 
a positive and significant conscientiousness effect on U.S. executive job approval in 2005, after 
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 Alternatively, powerful doses of contextual information in a vignette could create a strong situation that limits the 
number of viable political support response options to one. 
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President George W. Bush’s majority victory in the popular vote. On the other hand, the impact 
of conscientiousness on executive job approval and external efficacy is insignificant in two 
surveys conducted after plurality incumbent victories in the popular vote: a 1998 survey from the 
United States (Mondak and Halperin 2008) and a 2009 survey from Germany (Schoen and 
Steinbrecher 2013), respectively. 
 Meanwhile, scholars should feel free to study person–situation interactions even if 
inconsistent trait effects are not present in the extant literature. The absence of empirical puzzles 
does not preclude the utility of further investigation. Imagine if I had limited Chapters 4 and 5 to 
collectivities with moderate-to-robust economies. Although my data would have included cues of 
economic success, I would have omitted cues of economic failure. Both sets of cues activated 
conscientiousness in Chapters 4 and 5, producing negative effects in unhealthy economies, 
positive effects in healthy economies, and positive and significant interaction effects. Without 
the negative trait effects in anemic situations, interactions between conscientiousness and 
economic performance could become insignificant.
312
 In a similar way, current studies may need 
to expand the number of countries under analysis in order to amass contexts with sufficient 
variance in the environmental factor(s) under analysis. Empirical examination of the relationship 
between openness and political trust illustrates my point. Prior studies exclusively have found a 
negative and often significant association between openness and political trust (e.g., Anderson 
2010a, 2010b; Freitag and Ackermann 2016; Mondak et al. 2017). However, surveys have been 
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 For example, the significant interaction in Model II of Table 5.4 becomes insignificant if I omit subnational 
regions with poorly performing economies, denoted by a mean below 0.50 for the subnational economic 
performance variable. This contextual variable ranges from a theoretical minimum of 0 to a theoretical maximum of 
1. The trimmed model has 54 regions from 16 countries. Although a higher number of countries would be 
preferable, the number of regions is acceptable, and the model nevertheless converges in HLM. (I also should note 
that Table G.3 shows a negative and significant conscientiousness effect in Model II of Table 5.4 if economic 
performance is at its minimum and an insignificant conscientiousness effect if economic performance is at its 
maximum. Omitting poorly performing economies understandably results in an insignificant interaction.)  
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drawn only from countries with moderate-to-high levels of economic inequality.
313
 Given the 
emphasis of highly open people on innovation and novelty (John et al. 2008), a negative reaction 
to such a status quo would be expected. Results for the openness–trust relationship might be 
more heterogeneous if researchers also considered the most equal quartile of countries.  
 At the same time, personality and support scholars should not assume that trait activation 
always occurs in response to the positive and negative extremes of a contextual variable. In 
Colbert and Witt’s (2009) application of trait activation theory, conscientiousness exerts a 
significant effect in contexts of high goal-focused leadership and an insignificant effect in 
contexts of low goal-focused leadership. Although this dissertation has not anticipated 
insignificant trait effects at one extreme of an environmental variable, political support 
researchers must ask themselves whether trait-relevant cues are present at both high and low 
levels of a contextual factor. Conflicting considerations for a trait dimension could minimize 
personality effects, whereas consistent considerations for a trait dimension could maximize 
personality effects. Take as an example the interaction between economic performance and 
emotional stability in models of status quo attitudes. Positive economic news could provoke a 
positive effect of emotional stability on actor, institutional, and procedural attitudes because of 
consistency between the baseline preferences of individuals high in this trait dimension to 
persevere with current officials and with the current democratic political system. However, 
negative economic news creates a conflict for emotionally stable citizens between the desire to 
persevere with status quo officials and the desire for accountability, a core component of any 
democratic system; as a result of the absence of consistent trait-relevant cues, the impact of 
emotional stability could be insignificant at low levels of economic performance. I did not test 
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 This statement is based on available GINI index data for the year 2009 (World Bank 2017b). If the 2009 entry is 
unavailable, I count the closest prior data point. Studies of openness and political trust have included data from the 
34th most unequal country (i.e., Switzerland) to the 112th most unequal country (i.e., Colombia).  
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this hypothesis in Chapters 4 and 5 because of my attention to empirical puzzles with positive 
and negative significant effects in extant research, including my own, but I encourage 
researchers to examine the interaction of emotional stability and economic performance, and to 
consider other circumstances in which trait-relevant cues are present and absent. 
Further Examination of the Mediation Hypothesis 
 Future studies also could build on my research on the mediation hypothesis in Chapter 6. 
After examining trait–situation interactions in models of political support, scholars should apply 
the mediation hypothesis by examining whether psychological characteristics interact with 
contextual factors to influence support attitudes, which in turn affect participation. In other 
words, do political support attitudes mediate the relationship between trait–situation interactions 
and citizen participation?
314,315
 Chapter 6 omitted these interactions for the sake of simplicity. 
Now that I have documented paths from personality traits to support attitudes to citizen 
engagement, a logical next step would be to incorporate trait–situation interactions.
316
 
 Another potential addendum to Chapter 6 pertains to behavioral outcomes. Future 
research should investigate the path from personality to support attitudes to protest participation 
and other forms of unconventional activity. In Chapter 6, by contrast, I focused exclusively on 
turnout and other traditional behaviors because of my interest in negative indirect effects of 
openness and extraversion on participation via political trust. I could not have tested the 
hypothesis of negative indirect effects if the outcome had been protest involvement because prior 
research had shown a negative link between political trust and unconventional activity (e.g., 
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 For an example of mediation involving a person–situation interaction, see Colbert and Witt’s (2009) study of 
conscientiousness and workplace outcomes. 
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 Prior studies have investigated the conditional effects of political support on participation (Booth and Seligson 
2009; Carlin 2011), so researchers also could study whether traits work through political support interactions to 
influence citizen behavior. 
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Hooghe and Marien 2013; Seligson 1980). Therefore, the expected indirect effects for openness 
and extraversion would be positive because of the negative links between traits and trust in 
Chapter 3 and the negative link between trust and protest behavior (i.e., two negatives equal a 
positive). Likewise, I would expect positive openness and extraversion effects on demonstration 
involvement through approval of mass participation due to the positive connection between each 
trait dimension and democratic support in Chapter 3 and the positive connection in past research 
between democratic support and protest participation (Dalton 2004).   
 A mediational study on personality, support, and protest involvement thus would be 
valuable to personality and participation research as a complement to past findings about the 
positive effects of openness and extraversion on citizen behavior (e.g., Mondak 2010; 
Weinschenk 2013). 
 Moreover, scholars could apply the mediation hypothesis to other behavioral outcomes 
besides political participation. Prior studies have examined the relationships between political 
support and compliance with the law (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999b; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; 
Tankebe 2009; Tyler 1990, 2005) and political support and involvement in civil society (Norris 
1999b), so additional mediation research could examine the paths from personality to support 
attitudes to each of these alternative behavioral outcomes. 
 Finally, future research can examine the path from personality to support to behavior by 
testing the efficacy of audience-centered communication. The results in Chapter 6 indicate that 
political elites can mobilize more citizens into the political process by tailoring messages to the 
dominant personality traits of an audience, but field experiments and survey experiments could 
clarify the utility of such interventions. Scholars can design these experiments in multiple ways. 
In one option, the researcher could administer a personality battery and then randomly assign 
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individuals to receive no vignette or a vignette designed to appeal to their score on a particular 
trait dimension. For individuals low (high) in openness and extraversion, the vignette could 
underscore the trustworthiness of the electoral process (the democratic principle of mass 
participation). The next step would be to measure the mediator, either with a political trust 
battery or a battery on approval of mass participation. Finally, researchers would observe actual 
political behavior if the study were a field experiment, or behavioral intentions (e.g., the 
intention to vote) if the study were a survey experiment. If the experiment worked as expected, 
the experimental intervention would increase political support levels, which in turn would raise 




 Experiments in other subfields of political behavior denote the potential utility of the 
interventions described above. In both survey and field experiments, Gerber and his colleagues 
(2013) randomly assigned individuals to a control group or to a get-out-the-vote vignette. 
Empirical analyses interacted the treatment assignment with each of the Big Five, revealing 
greater participation rates and stronger behavioral intentions among highly open citizens who 
received the treatment. Meanwhile, Weinschenk and Panagopoulos (2014) conducted a survey 
experiment in which subjects were randomly assigned to a positive or negative political ad and 
then asked behavioral intention items. Both extraversion and agreeableness interacted with the 
treatment to influence general and specific behavioral intentions: Negative ads mobilized 
extraverts but demobilized highly agreeable citizens. 
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 For an example of a study testing for mediation effects through experimental research, see Bolger and Amarel 
(2007).  
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 Scholars should be aware of the roadblocks to the effective use of experiments in tests for mediation effects. For 
more on the topic, see Bullock et al. (2010). 
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Beyond Political Support 
 I have framed my model as a general theory connecting personality, political attitudes, 
and political behavior, so empirical applications of the framework need not be limited to political 
support. Political psychologists and psychologists in other substantive fields could find trait 
activation theory and the mediation hypothesis to be useful for their own research. I outline one 
application of my model below. 
 In addition to political support, scholars could apply my theoretical framework to the 
topic of policy attitudes. Both policy preferences and political support are multifaceted. Political 
support consists of multiple levels and multiple domains within each level, and the intra- and 
inter-level differences can convey unique trait-relevant cues for the direct relationship between 
personality and attitudes toward the political system. Likewise, policy attitudes pertain to social, 
economic, and foreign domains, with multiple issues in each domain; within the economic 
domain, for instance, citizens express preferences on ideal tax rates and ideal levels of economic 
redistribution. Differences across and within policy domains could generate unique trait-relevant 
cues and divergent trait effects for the direct relationship between personality and policy 
preferences.  
 Secondly, researchers could utilize TAT to study the conditional effects of personality on 
policy preferences. Citizens develop their policy attitudes in response to multiple contextual 
factors, many of which may interact with individual personality traits. Policy norms in a given 
collectivity, for instance, could influence the opinions of incoming residents, although some will 
be more resistant to social pressures than others. In an effort to coexist peaceably with friends 
and acquaintances in their community, highly agreeable individuals could be more likely than 
disagreeable citizens to conform to the dominant policy preferences in their newfound 
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surroundings. Similarly, highly conscientious newcomers may be more likely than their less 
conscientious counterparts to adjust their policy opinions due to the dutifulness of the former 
group to social norms. 
 The third step of model application would involve the mediation hypothesis. Directional 
forms of political participation (e.g., antiwar protests) may be motivated by an individual’s 
policy preference on a relevant issue (e.g., opposition to military conflict), which could be 
influenced by personality traits (e.g., openness to experience).
319
 In addition, scholars should 
examine whether some personality traits facilitate policy extremity and whether policy extremity 
mediates the relationship between psychological characteristics and political behavior.
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Improving the Quality of Democracy 
 This study of personality and political support has real-world implications. Psychological 
traits influence attitudes toward the political system, these attitudes affect actual political 
behavior, and the collective participation rate in a society shapes the quality of democracy. Ideal 
democratic citizens participate in the public arena in order to express their interests, address 
societal problems, and hold government officials accountable for their actions. Although political 
behavior benefits society, participation rates are often low because citizens have an incentive to 
free ride on the political engagement of others.
321
 If one’s fellow citizens are participating in 
politics, an individual can reap the societal benefits of an active public without bearing the 
individual costs (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Political activists who want to witness higher 
societal rates of campaign involvement, meeting attendance, contact with public officials, and 
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 Research on response biases, for instance, suggests that high levels of openness encourage individuals to express 
more extreme opinions (Hibbing et al. n.d.). Perhaps the relationship also holds for substantive responses to policy 
preference items. The link between policy extremity and political behavior also appears to be reasonable, given van 
der Meer et al.’s (2009) observation of a positive relationship between ideological extremity and citizen 
participation.  
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other political engagement will need to change attitudes so that individuals overcome obstacles 
to the collective action problem. 
 Political support attitudes constitute one such solution. As citizens become attitudinally 
attached to the community, principles, procedures, institutions, and actors of the political system, 
they develop a greater willingness to invest in public affairs through political participation 
(Booth and Seligson 2009). One key to motivating behavior and improving the quality of 
democracy, then, is identifying the correlates of political support and offering targeted 
communications to individuals based on their scores on known antecedents of political support. 
The antecedents of interest in this dissertation have pertained to a core attribute of all people: 






























PERSONALITY BATTERIES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
ANES Personality Battery 
 
We’re interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words 




tipi_extra: ‘extraverted, enthusiastic’ describes me… 
tipi_crit: ‘critical, quarrelsome’ describes me… 
tipi_dep: ‘dependable, self-disciplined’ describes me… 
tipi_anx: ‘anxious, easily upset’ describes me… 
tipi_open: ‘open to new experiences, complex’ describes me… 
tipi_resv: ‘reserved, quiet’ describes me… 
tipi_warm: ‘sympathetic, warm’ describes me… 
tipi_disorg: ‘disorganized, careless’ describes me… 
tipi_calm: ‘calm, emotionally stable’ describes me… 
tipi_conv: ‘conventional, uncreative’ describes me… 
 
Note: Respondents rated themselves on a 1-to-7 scale, with “1” meaning “[e]xtremely poorly” 
and “7” meaning “[e]xtremely well.” Using the procedure described in the main text, I combined 
items 1 and 6 for extraversion, items 2 and 7 for agreeableness, items 3 and 8 for 
conscientiousness, items 4 and 9 for emotional stability, and items 5 and 10 for openness. 
 
CCES Personality Battery 
 
Note: For the CCES, respondents answered 20 questions on a 1-to-7 scale, with “1” meaning 
“[s]trongly disagree” and “7” meaning “[s]trongly agree.” The first four items pertained to 
openness, the next four to conscientiousness, the next four to extraversion, the next four to 
agreeableness, and the final four to emotional stability. I combined the items for each trait 
dimension according to the procedure described in the main text.  
 
Note: Matthew V. Hibbing of the University of California, Merced, selected the CCES items 
from the 44-item Big Five Inventory (John and Srivastava 1999). The BFI is copyrighted, so I do 
not include the full question wordings here. Instead, I provide the exact wording for the main 
phrase or phrases for each item.  
 
Openness: reflect/play with ideas, curious, work that is routine, active imagination 
 
Conscientiousness: thorough job, reliable worker, disorganized, does things efficiently 
 
Extraversion: talkative, reserved, quiet, assertive 
 
Agreeableness: find fault, helpful/unselfish, cold/aloof, considerate/kind 
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 The following variable names correspond to the names in the dataset, not the questionnaire.   
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Emotional Stability: relaxed/handles stress well, tense, worries, emotionally stable/not easily 
upset 
 
Subject Pool Personality Battery 
 
Note: The following was the introduction on the background survey: 
 
On this page, you will answer a series of questions related to your personality. For example, the 
next question contains pairs of words people sometimes use to describe themselves. For each 
pair of words, we would like you to indicate on a scale from zero to ten which word best 
describes you. For example, in the first row the number zero means “unimaginative,” the number 





personality_1: Indicate which word best describes you.-Unimaginative | Imaginative 
personality_2: Indicate which word best describes you.-Reserved | Outgoing 
personality_3: Indicate which word best describes you.-Tense | Calm 
personality_4: Indicate which word best describes you.-Reliable | Unreliable 
personality_5: Indicate which word best describes you.-Uncooperative | Cooperative 
personality_6: Indicate which word best describes you.-Talkative | Quiet 
personality_7: Indicate which word best describes you.-Kind | Unkind 
personality_8: Indicate which word best describes you.-Bold | Shy 
personality_9: Indicate which word best describes you.-Sloppy | Neat 
personality_10: Indicate which word best describes you.-Steady | Moody 
personality_11: Indicate which word best describes you.-Careless | Careful 
personality_12: Indicate which word best describes you.-Uninquisitive | Curious 
personality_13: Indicate which word best describes you.-Relaxed | Nervous 
personality_14: Indicate which word best describes you.-Philosophical | Practical 
personality_15: Indicate which word best describes you.-Cold | Warm 
 
Note: The following was the introduction on the researcher survey: 
 
First, you will answer a series of questions related to your personality. For each pair of words, 
we would like you to indicate on a scale from zero to ten which word best describes you. For 
example, in the first row the number zero means “enthusiastic,” the number 10 means 




person2_1: Indicate which word best describes you.-Enthusiastic | Unenthusiastic 
person2_2: Indicate which word best describes you.-Angry | Calm 
person2_3: Indicate which word best describes you.-Stingy | Generous 
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 The actual variables sent to me were coded to range from a possible minimum of 1 to a possible maximum of 11. 
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 The actual variables sent to me were coded to range from a possible minimum of 1 to a possible maximum of 11. 
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 Please note that the variable names below are capitalized in the codebook and original dataset, but pasting the 
data into Stata changed the capitalization to lowercase. The lowercase approach also matches the format used in the 
other parts of Appendix A. 
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person2_4: Indicate which word best describes you.-Sophisticated | Unsophisticated 
person2_5: Indicate which word best describes you.-Contented | Discontented 
person2_6: Indicate which word best describes you.-Lazy | Hardworking 
person2_7: Indicate which word best describes you.-Uncreative | Creative 
person2_8: Indicate which word best describes you.-Trustful | Distrustful 
person2_9: Indicate which word best describes you.-Unadventurous | Adventurous 
person2_10: Indicate which word best describes you.-Responsible | Irresponsible 
 
Note: Using the procedure described in the main text, I combined personality_1, personality_12, 
personality_14, person_2_4, and person_2_7 for openness; personality_2, personality_6, 
personality_8, person_2_1, and person_2_9 for extraversion; personality_3, personality_10, 
personality_13, person_2_2, and person_2_5 for emotional stability; personality_4, 
personality_9, personality_11, person_2_6, and person_2_10 for conscientiousness; and 
personality_5, personality_7, personality_15, person_2_3, and person_2_8 for agreeableness. 
 
AmericasBarometer Personality Battery 
 
Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the 1-7 ladder, 
where 1 means ‘strongly disagree’ and 7 means ‘strongly agree,’ please tell me the number that 
indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.
 326
 You should rate the 





You see yourself as a: 
 
per1: Sociable and active person. 
per2: Critical and quarrelsome person. 
per3: Dependable and self-disciplined person. 
per4: Anxious and easily upset person. 
per5: Open to new experiences and intellectual person. 
per6: Quiet and shy person. 
per7: Generous and warm person 
per8: Disorganized and careless person. 
per9: Calm and emotionally stable person. 
per10: Uncreative and unimaginative person. 
 
Note: Using the procedure described in the main text, I combined items 1 and 6 for extraversion, 
items 2 and 7 for agreeableness, items 3 and 8 for conscientiousness, items 4 and 9 for emotional 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN CHAPTER 3 
 
 
N Mean SD Min Max
ANES
Openness 5,490 0.47 0.22 0.00 1
Conscientiousness 5,492 0.64 0.24 0.00 1
Extraversion 5,487 0.37 0.21 0.00 1
Agreeableness 5,490 0.53 0.22 0.00 1
Emotional Stability 5,487 0.50 0.23 0.00 1
Female 5,510 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 5,454 49.51 16.74 17 90
White 5,484 0.59 0.49 0 1
Education 5,468 0.49 0.29 0 1
Conservative 4,941 0.53 0.25 0 1
Republican/Party ID 5,489 0.42 0.35 0 1
Vote History 5,510 0.46 0.50 0 1
ERS 5,446 0.50 0.11 0.08 0.96
ARS 4,968 0.49 0.16 0 1
CCES
Openness 968 0.52 0.19 0.04 1
Conscientiousness 967 0.65 0.20 0.00 1
Extraversion 961 0.35 0.19 0.00 1
Agreeableness 967 0.55 0.19 0.17 1
Emotional Stability 966 0.40 0.19 0.00 1
Female 1,000 0.54 0.50 0 1
Age 1,000 51.52 16.37 18 90
White 1,000 0.73 0.45 0 1
Education 1,000 0.53 0.30 0 1
Conservative 944 0.55 0.30 0 1
Republican/Party ID 953 0.45 0.37 0 1
Vote History 1,000 0.41 0.49 0 1
ERS 829 0.55 0.13 0.15 1
ARS 808 0.50 0.12 0 0.90
Subject Pool
Openness 206 0.43 0.15 0.17 0.94
Conscientiousness 206 0.46 0.18 0.10 1
Extraversion 206 0.41 0.18 0.03 1
Agreeableness 206 0.49 0.17 0.19 1
Emotional Stability 205 0.35 0.14 0.02 0.88
Table B.1
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 3: Independent 
Variables
Note: "SD" refers  to "Standard Deviation," "Min" to "Minimum,"  
"Max" to "Maximum," "Party ID" to "Party Identi fication," "ERS" 






















Subject Pool N Mean SD Min Max
Female 206 0.53 0.50 0 1
Age 206 19.57 1.90 17 37
White 206 0.61 0.49 0 1
Education 206 0.42 0.34 0 1
Conservative 206 0.39 0.26 0 1
Republican/Party ID 206 0.42 0.26 0 1
ERS 206 0.44 0.09 0.22 0.74
AmericasBarometer
Openness 39,318 0.64 0.27 0.00 1
Conscientiousness 40,115 0.67 0.25 0.00 1
Extraversion 40,160 0.58 0.25 0.00 1
Agreeableness 40,194 0.65 0.25 0.00 1
Emotional Stability 40,058 0.53 0.26 0.00 1
Female 40,642 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 40,480 39.80 16.05 16 98
White 39,827 0.27 0.44 0 1
Education 40,487 0.55 0.25 0 1
Conservative 31,742 0.52 0.27 0 1
Party ID 38,918 0.17 0.38 0 1
Vote History 40,642 0.37 0.48 0 1
ERS 37,780 0.54 0.14 0.02 1
ARS 31,082 0.48 0.15 0 1
Note: "SD" refers  to "Standard Deviation," "Min" to "Minimum,"  
"Max" to "Maximum," "Party ID" to "Party Identi fication," "ERS" 








Survey N Mean SD Min Max
Table 3.3: Political Trust
Index of Actor Trust ANES 5,283 -0.00 0.77 -1.35 2.78
Index of Actor Trust Subject Pool 171 0.00 0.82 -1.55 2.22
Index of Institutional Trust Subject Pool 207 9.47 2.03 3 14
Index of Institutional Trust AB 36,162 30.69 10.78 8 56
Table 3.4: Overall Job Evaluations
Executive Approval ANES 5,384 2.62 1.28 1 4
Executive Approval CCES 979 2.38 1.26 1 4
Executive Approval AB 39,543 3.20 1.03 1 5
House Incumbent Approval ANES 4,424 2.76 1.01 1 4
House Incumbent Approval CCES 799 2.69 0.95 1 4
Approval of National Legislature ANES 5,130 1.73 0.96 1 4
Approval of National Legislature CCES 932 1.72 0.82 1 4
Approval of National Legislature AB 35,180 2.83 0.90 1 5
Table 3.5: Issue-Specific Job Evaluations
Executive Approval on 4 Issues ANES 5,072 10.41 4.60 4 16
Politican Approval on 5 Issues Subject Pool 207 13.52 2.71 5 21
Executive Approval on 5 Issues AB 36,525 18.73 7.88 5 35
Perceived Justice System Effectiveness AB 38,132 2.27 1.01 1 4
Perceived Effectiveness of Local Gov't AB 36,395 3.01 0.93 1 5
Table 3.6: Affective Support
Thermometer Index for Democrats ANES 5,340 180.24 92.86 0 300
Thermometer Index for Democrats Subject Pool 190 216.58 57.08 25 340
Thermometer Index for Republicans ANES 4,753 197.00 85.38 0 400
Thermometer Index for Republicans Subject Pool 205 133.87 49.37 0 270
Likeability of Democratic Party ANES 5,436 5.72 3.21 0 10
Likeability of Republican Party ANES 5,438 4.25 2.85 0 10
Thermometer Index for Gov't Agencies ANES 5,398 224.11 63.95 0 400
Thermometer for State Legislature Subject Pool 205 44.31 15.93 0 80
Table 3.7: External Efficacy
Officials Care What People Think ANES 5,492 2.35 1.00 1 5
Officials Care What People Think Subject Pool 207 2.80 1.04 1 5
Officials Care What People Think AB 37,515 3.37 1.98 1 7
People Have Say in What Government Does ANES 5,489 2.68 1.16 1 5
Elections Make Government Pay Attention ANES 5,487 2.08 0.71 1 3
Table B.2
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 3: Dependent Variables








Survey N Mean SD Min Max
Table 3.8: Regime Performance Attitudes
Democratic Satisfaction Item ANES 5,447 2.74 0.76 1 4
Democratic Satisfaction Index Subject Pool 207 5.91 0.93 3 8
Democratic Satisfaction Index AB 36,685 5.39 1.32 2 8
Government Not a Threat to Rights and 
Freedoms
ANES 5,323 3.77 1.40 1 5
Citizen Rights Protected Subject Pool 207 3.39 0.95 1 5
Citizen Rights Protected AB 38,853 3.88 1.69 1 7
Votes Counted Fairly ANES 5,449 3.10 0.81 1 4
Trust in Elections AB 36,585 4.20 1.86 1 7
Table 3.9: Abstract Democratic Support
Democracy Best System Subject Pool 207 3.86 1.01 1 5
Democracy Best System AB 38,578 5.31 1.71 1 7
Democracy Preferred to Authoritarian 
Government
AB 37,941 2.65 0.70 1 3
Table 3.10: Support for Democratic Principles
Political Tolerance Index CCES 814 1.58 1.23 0 3
Political Tolerance Index AB 37,493 24.32 9.88 4 40
Support for Criminal Rights AB 38,070 0.61 0.49 0 1
Approval of Campaigning, Organizing, and 
Protesting
AB 37,813 22.10 6.32 3 30
Prefer Balance between Executive and Other 
Political Institutions  
AB 34,796 15.00 4.82 3 21
Prefer Balance between Executive and 
Supreme Court
Subject Pool 207 3.92 0.81 2 5
Oppose Executive Orders in Response to 
Congress
Subject Pool 207 3.24 0.97 1 5
Prefer Balance between Branches during 
Foreign Invasion 
Subject Pool 207 0.53 0.50 0 1
Oppose  Coups in Response to Corruption, 
Crime, and Unemployment
AB 35,675 2.03 1.14 0 3
Table 3.11: Political Community Support
National Identification Index ANES 5,479 8.52 1.76 2 10
National Identification Item Subject Pool 207 3.50 1.09 1 5
Patriotism Index ANES 5,463 8.61 1.54 2 10
Patriotism Index Subject Pool 207 7.79 1.74 2 10
Patriotism Item AB 40,320 6.45 1.18 1 7





SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Controlling for Political Bias 
 
An individual’s partisan affiliation or previous voting history can be a powerful predictor of 
political support (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Criado and Herreros 
2007; Huddy et al. 2005; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Rudolph 2003a). Citizens who affiliate 
with or voted for the current incumbent’s party may support the political system due to a sense of 
loyalty or agreement with the government’s policy agenda. The link between political bias and 
political support should be stronger for attitudes toward political actors than for attitudes toward 
other objects of the political system because the other levels of support pertain less to particular 
political parties. Political institutions, regime principles, and the political community exist 
regardless of the current party in power. Different parties may hold different priorities for regime 
performance, but even these differences may be limited in practice because of institutional 
constraints (e.g., a recalcitrant bureaucracy).  
 
Although political bias matters for political support, I do not control for political bias in the 
models in the main text. As stated above, political bias should matter more for actor support than 
other forms of political support, and I would prefer for all of the regressions to contain the same 
independent variables in order to ensure that results cannot be attributable to differences in 
model specification. In addition, political bias variables could represent some of the personality 
attributes included in my theoretical discussion, and including partisan affiliation or previous 
voting history could unduly reduce the effects of personality variables. For example, adding 
political bias variables could attenuate the impact of openness because some parties are more 
progressive than others, and much of the discussion for openness concerned the trait facet of 
innovation. 
 
Therefore, I present results for political bias variables in this appendix instead of the main text. I 
focus on political actor models because these are the dependent variables for which partisan 
affiliation and previous vote history should have the strongest effect. In total, there are 17 actor 
dependent variables in Tables 3.3 through 3.7. 
 
To measure partisan affiliation, I use seven-point items in the ANES, CCES, and subject pool. 
Variables are recoded to range from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican).
328
 A seven-
point scale is not available in the AmericasBarometer, but the survey does allow respondents to 
state with which party they affiliate, if any. The partisanship variable for the AmericasBarometer 
is coded so that 1 refers to affiliation with the party of the executive or with a party in the 
executive’s electoral coalition and 0 refers to unaffiliated and anti-incumbent respondents.
329
  
                                                 
328
 The coding of partisan affiliation in the ANES, CCES, and subject pool does not correspond with the party of the 
incumbent president, but it does correspond with the direction of the ideology variable used in Chapter 3. I should 
note that the direction of the ideology variable is irrelevant to the robustness of the personality results. Because of 
the variable coding, the expected relationship between partisan affiliation and actor support in the ANES, CCES, 
and subject pool is negative.  
329
 Including unaffiliated voters allows me to reduce the number of missing cases in the AmericasBarometer models. 
On the initial partisan affiliation item, 26,306 respondents in the 24 countries under analysis said that they do not 





Information for previous vote history is available in the ANES, CCES, and AmericasBarometer. 
All three surveys included a question about previous vote choice. Individuals who voted for the 
current incumbent receive a score of 1 for the vote history variable, and all other respondents 




After controlling for political bias, I found that the personality results remained largely the same 
as the ones in the main text. I inserted partisan affiliation into 17 models and offered hypotheses 
for 68 personality coefficients. Of those 68 coefficients, 15 changed from significant to 
insignificant or vice versa. Meanwhile, I included previous vote history in 12 models and 
hypothesized about 48 personality coefficients.
332
 A total of 6 of those 48 coefficients changed 
from significant to insignificant or vice versa. 
 
Table C.1 shows that many of these changes are in favor of my hypotheses. Of the 15 
coefficients that change with the addition of partisan affiliation (top panel), 5 switch from 
insignificant to significant in the expected direction, and another 3 switch from significant in the 
unexpected direction to insignificant. Meanwhile, of the 6 coefficients that change with the 
inclusion of previous vote history (bottom panel), 2 switch from insignificant to significant in the 
hypothesized direction, and another one switches from significant in the unexpected direction to 
insignificant.  
 
For the most part, no discernible pattern occurs in terms of the evidence for or against the 
hypotheses for a particular trait. The only exception is agreeableness in the top panel. Controlling 
                                                 
330
 Scores of 0 thus consist of anti-incumbent voters, non-voters, non-responders, and people in the 
AmericasBarometer who said they turned in a blank, spoiled, or null ballot. I included all of these respondents in 
order to minimize the number of missing cases in the regressions. 
331
 Descriptive statistics for political bias variables are located in Appendix B. 
332








Sig in Exp 
Direction-->NS
Control: Partisan Affiliation
Openness 12 2 1 0 2 17
Conscientiousness --- --- --- --- --- ---
Extraversion 16 0 0 0 1 17
Agreeableness 13 1 0 0 3 17
Emotional Stability 12 2 2 0 1 17
Totals 53 5 3 0 7 68
Control: Previous Vote History
Openness 10 1 0 0 1 12
Conscientiousness --- --- --- --- --- ---
Extraversion 11 0 0 0 1 12
Agreeableness 11 1 0 0 0 12
Emotional Stability 10 0 1 0 1 12
Totals 42 2 1 0 3 48
A. No Change in 
Coefficient
Table C.1
Robustness Check: Change in Personality Coefficients with the Addition of Political Bias in Actor Support Models
B. In Favor of Hypotheses C. Contrary to Hypotheses
Note: Findings  for conscientiousness  are not reported because no hypothes is  was  offered for the impact of this  tra i t dimens ion on actor support. 
Results  are based on comparing the pol i tica l  bias  results  to the findings  in Tables  3.3 to 3.7. "NS," "Sig," "Exp," and "Unexp" are abbreviations  for 
"Not Signi ficant," "Signi ficant," "Expected," and "Unexpected," respectively.
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for partisan affiliation causes three significant and expected agreeableness coefficients to become 
insignificant, compared with just one coefficient that becomes significant in the expected 
direction. 
 
Controlling for Survey Response Styles 
 
The hypotheses in the direct effects chapter are based on the substantive relationship expected 
between personality traits and attitudes toward the political system, but the results could be 
spurious if a non-substantive factor were related both to personality traits and to political support 
attitudes. In this robustness check, I consider the role of survey response styles, which refer to a 
person’s general approach to answering questions on public opinion surveys. My own work, 
along with other research, shows that personality traits can influence one’s tendency to provide 
extreme responses to opinion questions or to acquiesce on agree–disagree or approve–disapprove 
items (e.g., Austin et al. 2006; He and van de Vijver 2013; Hibbing et al. n.d.). 
 
To respond to the potential implications of response styles for my research, I develop measures 
for extreme response style (ERS) and acquiescence response style (ARS) and then control for 
these factors in my models. Hibbing et al. (n.d.) offer such an approach for researchers interested 
in capturing the substantive impact of personality on the outcome in question.  
This robustness check focuses only on dependent variables that could be subject to ERS or ARS. 
To be influenced by ERS, political support dependent variables—or the constituent questions for 
multi-item indices—would need to include more than two response options. I counted 51 such 
dependent variables in Chapter 3.
333
 Of these 51 variables, I examined 50 for this robustness 
check; the democracy versus authoritarianism item in Table 3.9 was omitted because the 
response options were not asked in an order ranking from the least democratic to most 
democratic response option, or vice versa. The dependent variable reorders the responses to run 
from the least to most democratic options. The original order of response options would 




Meanwhile, ARS would be possible for dependent variables asked in agree–disagree or approve–
disapprove formats. I counted 22 such dependent variables in Tables 3.3 through 3.11, all of 




                                                 
333
 The two actor trust indices in Table 3.3 of the main text included dichotomous and non-dichotomous opinion 
items. These dependent variables were included in my ERS analyses.  
334
 For the same reason, the item for this dependent variable also was omitted from the construction of ERS in the 
AmericasBarometer. 
335
 The ANES external efficacy variables in Models I and IV of Table 3.7 deserve comment. Each of these 
dependent variables combines an agree–disagree question asked to about half of respondents and a non-agree–
disagree question asked to the other respondents. Both the agree–disagree and non-agree–disagree questions 
measure the same concept (i.e., actor or institutional external efficacy). These dependent variables are included in 
my ARS analyses because some of the responses may have been influenced by the tendency of individuals to 
acquiesce. 
336
 I included ARS in this robustness check for the following dependent variables: all of the job approval items in 
Table 3.4, the first two issue-specific indices in Table 3.5, the first four external efficacy items in Table 3.7, the 
subject pool citizen rights protected item in Table 3.8, the two democracy best system items in Table 3.9, and all of 






In sum, I always controlled for ERS and included ARS in the regression model when 
appropriate. 
 
I used the following steps to measure ERS. First, I identified opinion items on each survey with 
at least three response options.
337
 Second, each of these questions was folded to create an item 
that ranged from 0 for the midpoint or middle two response options to 1 for the lowest or highest 
response option. Third, I averaged the folded items for each survey to create an ERS variable that 
ranges from a minimum possible score of 0 to a maximum possible score of 1.
338
   
 
Meanwhile, I used the following steps to operationalize ARS. First, I identified all agree–
disagree or approve–disapprove opinion items on each survey. Second, each of these questions 
was recoded so that a score of 1 referred to a response in the agreeable portion of the scale and 0 
referred to neutral, disagreeable, or missing responses. Third, I averaged the dichotomous items 
for each survey to create an ARS variable that ranges from a minimum possible score of 0 to a 




After controlling for ERS and ARS, I found that the personality results remained largely the 
same as the ones in the main text. In the 50 models, I offered hypotheses for 209 personality 
coefficients. Of those 209 coefficients, only 25 changed from significant to insignificant or vice 
versa.  
 
Table C.2 shows that 11 of the 25 changed coefficients are supportive of my hypotheses. With 
the addition of response style(s), 9 coefficients shift from insignificant to significant in the 
                                                 
337
 All opinion items were eligible for the ERS independent variable, except for the Big Five personality items, items 
in which the response options were not presented in order (e.g., favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose), ANES 
items that were not presented to all respondents in a particular wave, two subject pool media questions with a larger 
maximum value than included in the codebook, and subject pool questions asked in conjunction with randomly 
assigned vignettes. 
338
 Only respondents who answered 75 percent or more of the ERS constituent items were included. 
339
 Respondents who did not provide a substantive response to more than one of the ARS constituent items were 
omitted. 
340








Sig in Exp 
Direction-->NS
Openness 44 1 1 0 4 50
Conscientiousness 11 0 0 0 1 12
Extraversion 44 0 0 0 3 47
Agreeableness 41 4 0 0 5 50
Emotional Stability 44 4 1 1 0 50
Totals 184 9 2 1 13 209
Note: The response s tyle variables  included in the regress ions  are extreme response s tyle (ERS) and, when appropriate, 
acquiescence response s tyle (ARS). Control l ing for ARS occurred in response to agree-disagree or approve-disapprove questions  for 
the dependent variable. Only hypothes ized coefficients  are included in the table. Results  are based on comparing the ERS/ARS 
results  to the findings  in Tables  3.3 to 3.11.  "NS," "Sig," "Exp," and "Unexp" are abbreviations  for "Not Signi ficant," "Signi ficant," 
"Expected," and "Unexpected," respectively.
Table C.2
Robustness Check: Change in Personality Coefficients with the Addition of Response Styles




expected direction, and another 2 change from being significant in the unexpected direction to 
insignificant. Meanwhile, 13 of the significant and expected coefficients become insignificant, 
and another coefficient changes from insignificant to significant and in the unexpected direction.  
 
As Table C.2 reveals, controlling for ERS and ARS improves the support for the hypotheses for 
some traits more than others. I obtain more evidence for the emotional stability hypotheses by 
adding response styles to the models, as five coefficients become more favorable for my 
hypotheses compared with one becoming less favorable. Meanwhile, more of the changes for 
openness and extraversion are contrary to expectations than in favor of expectations. Finally, for 
conscientiousness and agreeableness, nearly the same number of coefficients switch from 
insignificant to significant in the expected direction as switch from significant in the expected 





















































N Mean SD Min Max
AmericasBarometer
Greater Perceived Corruption 38,663 0.73 0.28 0 1
Positive Economic Perceptions 
(Main Indicator)
39,680 0.42 0.37 0 1
Economic Perceptions Index 
(Alternative Indicator)
34,591 0.45 0.24 0.00 1
Threat from Political Dissidents 36,457 0.38 0.33 0 1
Threat from Crime (Main 
Indicator)
38,505 0.83 0.26 0 1
Crime Measure on Neighborhood 
Safety (Alternative Indicator)
38,895 0.59 0.31 0 1
Crime Measure on Presence of 
Gangs in Neighborhood 
(Alternative Indicator)
38,414 0.38 0.36 0 1
ANES
Greater Perceived Corruption 5,404 0.48 0.23 0 1
Positive Economic Perceptions 
(Main Indicator)
5,443 0.46 0.25 0 1
Economic Perceptions Index 
(Alternative Indicator)
5,353 0.46 0.20 0 1
CCES
Positive Economic Perceptions 
(Main Indicator)
985 0.43 0.28 0 1
Economic Perceptions Index 
(Alternative Indicator)
879 0.49 0.26 0 1
Table D.1
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 4: Contextual Perceptions




SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
The results section of Chapter 4 noted several additional empirical analyses for my study of 
personality and contextual perceptions. My main tables reported the interactions between 
personality and perceptions, but I also examined the direct effects of perceptions and personality 
in regressions without interaction terms. The presence of multiple significant personality traits in 
those regressions would reduce the possibility of perceptions simply being a function of 
personality. Instead, I proposed a different causal order, with contextual perceptions containing 
trait-relevant cues that activate personality traits and, in turn, produce trait effects (Tett and 
Burnett 2003; Tett and Guterman 2000). These results are reported below. 
 
Secondly, I referred in the main text of Chapter 4 to analyses of the main results in which I 
utilized a reverse-coded contextual variable instead of the ordinary contextual variable. To 
explain the purpose of such a procedure, let me first refer to the openness coefficient in Table 
4.2. Because openness is interacted with corruption perceptions, the openness coefficient is the 
effect of this trait dimension when corruption perceptions are equal to 0. A significant coefficient 
constitutes evidence of trait activation when corruption perceptions are at the minimum score of 
0. Meanwhile, to determine whether openness is activated at the maximum level of perceived 
malfeasance, I can insert a reverse-coded corruption perceptions variable and refer again to the 
openness coefficient. The same principle applies to extraversion in Table 4.2 and to the other 
interacted traits in the other tables of the main text. The tables below compare the effect of a trait 
at the minimum and maximum scores of a contextual variable. 
 
Contextual Perceptions and Personality Traits: Direct Effects 
 
Tables E.1 through E.5 report the direct effects of contextual perceptions and personality traits 
on political support. In each table, multiple personality traits exert significant effects on the 
dependent variable(s) in question. Furthermore, most of the significant personality coefficients in 
Chapter 3 remain significant with the addition of a contextual perception variable. Such evidence 
reduces the possibility of contextual perceptions simply being a function of personality traits; 
instead, I expect perceptions to send trait-relevant cues that signal the relevance of personality 
traits for the political support dependent variable of interest. 
 
Evidence of Trait Activation 
 
Tables E.6 through E.10 identify whether a personality trait is significant at the minimum and 
maximum levels of a contextual variable. I expected trait activation at low and high scores of 
each perceptual variable. Tables E.6, E.7, and E.8 utilize data from the AmericasBarometer, and 
Tables E.9 and E.10 draw on the ANES. 
 
Table E.6 reveals that both openness and extraversion exert significant and negative effects at the 
maximum level of perceived corruption but insignificant and positive effects at the minimum 
level of perceived malfeasance. Nevertheless, the effect for extraversion at minimum corruption 












Greater Perceived Corruption -0.87***                          
(0.09)
Openness -0.37***                
(0.07)
Conscientiousness -0.10+                                
(0.06)
Extraversion -0.35***                 
(0.07)
Agreeableness 0.09                        
(0.08)
Emotional Stability -0.00                                      
(0.08)
Female -0.03                      
(0.02)
Age 0.00+                         
(0.00)
White 0.02                               
(0.08)
Education -0.03                         
(0.11)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.02
Number of Cases 33,861
Number of Countries 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal
Table E.1
Direct Effects of Corruption Perceptions 
and Personality on External Efficacy: 
AmericasBarometer
Note: Data  come from the 2010 
AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion 
coefficients , with s tandard errors  in 
parentheses . Threshold parameters  are omitted 
from the table. Country fixed effects  are included 
but not shown, and s tandard errors  are 
clus tered by country. Data  are weighted so that 
each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 





Meanwhile, Table E.7 shows evidence of conscientiousness activation for negative and positive 
economic perceptions, with five negative and significant trait effects at the minimum score of the 
contextual variable and seven positive and significant trait effects at the maximum score of the 
contextual variable. 
 
In Table E.8, I find that conscientiousness exerts positive effects in response to minimum threat 
perceptions and, in the political tolerance model, negative effects in response to maximum threat 
perceptions. These results are consistent with my expectations for trait activation. 
 
Moving to the ANES, I find little evidence of trait activation in Table E.9 that is consistent with 
expectations. The positive and significant trait effects at maximum corruption run in the opposite 
direction than anticipated, but none of those interactions are significant in the main text. The 
only consistent result is for openness at minimum corruption perceptions in the third model; this 
is the regression with the significant interaction in Table 4.5. 
 
Results for conscientiousness activation in the ANES are more consonant with my hypotheses. In 
Table E.10, all of the coefficients are significant and in the expected direction at minimum 
economic perceptions; this statement applies also to the positive and significant effect for the  





































1.62***                      
(0.17)
5.61***                  
(0.57)
0.75***                      
(0.10)
6.29***                   
(0.75)
0.40***                   
(0.06)
0.62***                   
(0.09)
1.00***                 
(0.12)
0.77***                      
(0.11)
0.66***                       
(0.11)
Openness -0.14                 
(0.10)
-1.90***                  
(0.32)
-0.45***                 
(0.07)
-2.74***                 
(0.44)
-0.49***                    
(0.06)
-0.16*                            
(0.08)
-0.14+                                   
(0.08)
-0.35***                             
(0.07)
-0.13*            
(0.06)
Conscientiousness -0.00                         
(0.08)
-0.16                         
(0.30)
-0.10+                     
(0.06)
0.16                    
(0.30)
0.01                    
(0.06)
-0.05                                    
(0.06)
0.05                          
(0.04)
-0.05                    
(0.05)
0.07                        
(0.07)
Extraversion -0.16*                        
(0.08)
-1.22**                      
(0.38)
-0.37***                   
(0.07)
-1.96**                   
(0.57)
-0.32***                         
(0.06)
-0.16**                       
(0.06)
0.01                                      
(0.08)
-0.33***             
(0.07)
-0.11                           
(0.08)
Agreeableness 0.26***                 
(0.06)
0.94**                           
(0.26)
0.09                       
(0.09)
1.71***                     
(0.43)
0.23**                                  
(0.08)
0.08                            
(0.06)
0.26***                        
(0.07)
0.16+                             
(0.08)
0.10                    
(0.09)
Emotional Stability 0.03                         
(0.09)
0.10                     
(0.27)
0.02                            
(0.08)
1.32*                                   
(0.50)
0.17*                               
(0.08)
0.12                                
(0.07)
0.13                                 
(0.10)
0.11              
(0.09)
0.14                        
(0.09)
Female 0.06                         
(0.04)
0.00                             
(0.15)
-0.00                            
(0.02)
0.21                           
(0.18)
-0.02                                  
(0.03)
0.08***                             
(0.02)
-0.03                               
(0.03)
0.06*                   
(0.03)
-0.08**                          
(0.03)
Age 0.00                          
(0.00)
-0.01                            
(0.01)
0.00                           
(0.00)
0.02                               
(0.01)
0.00                             
(0.00)
-0.00***                           
(0.00)
0.00                           
(0.00)
-0.00                           
(0.00)
0.01**                       
(0.00)
White -0.05                        
(0.10)
0.17                               
(0.24)
0.04                          
(0.07)
0.68+                                       
(0.33)
0.13**                          
(0.04)
0.13***                           
(0.04)
0.08                                   
(0.06)
0.12*                          
(0.06)
0.08*                     
(0.04)
Education -0.10                   
(0.12)
-2.16***                  
(0.52)
-0.12                          
(0.11)
-2.47**                                  
(0.84)
-0.45**                           
(0.15)
0.20*                             
(0.10)
-0.08                   
(0.12)
-0.22+                            
(0.12)
0.09                       
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.09 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Number of Cases 36,166 33,775 34,428 33,705 34,835 33,256 33,794 35,872 33,369
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 22
Method of Estimation Ordinal OLS Ordinal OLS Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold 
parameters  are omitted from the table. Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, and s tandard errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted so 
that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Table E.2
Direct Effects of Economic Perceptions and Personality on Actor, Institutional, and Procedural Support: AmericasBarometer





Republican thermometer index because conscientious citizens who perceive minimum economic 
performance are implicitly punishing the presidential party by turning to the political opposition. 
Meanwhile, five of the conscientiousness coefficients for individuals with maximum perceptions 
are in the expected direction, and three are statistically significant at the 0.20 level or better (i.e., 
the thermometer index for Democratic actors, the likeability item for the Democratic Party, and 
the regime performance item on rights and freedoms). 
 
In sum, I find that conscientiousness often is activated at minimum and maximum levels of the 
economic and social variables. In Tables E.7, E.8, and E.10, the conscientiousness coefficient is 
significant and in the expected direction in 22 of 34 opportunities. Evidence of openness and 
extraversion activation in response to corruption is less consistent with expectations. 








Perceived Threat from Political 
Dissidents or Crime
-3.43***              
(0.59)
-0.09                             
(0.12)
Openness 2.59***                
(0.36)
-0.00                           
(0.09)
Conscientiousness 0.43             
(0.29)
0.21**                         
(0.07)
Extraversion 1.34***                  
(0.35)
-0.20***                             
(0.06)
Agreeableness -2.06***                   
(0.40)
0.33***                    
(0.08)
Emotional Stability 0.64             
(0.51)
0.22*                        
(0.09)
Female -1.10***                
(0.18)
0.10***                                  
(0.03)
Age 0.00                          
(0.01)
0.01***                      
(0.00)
White 0.10                    
(0.28)
-0.00                              
(0.05)
Education 3.41***                
(0.63)
-0.00                           
(0.14)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.11 0.03
Number of Cases 32,696 35,070
Number of Countries 24 24
Method of Estimation OLS Logit
Table E.3
Direct Effects of Threat Perceptions and Personality on 
Democratic Support: AmericasBarometer
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Threat 
perceptions  perta in to pol i tica l  diss idents  in Model  I  and to 
crime in Model  I I . Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with 
s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  are omitted from the 
table. Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, and 
s tandard errors  are clustered by country. Data  are weighted so 
that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500.        















Model II:    
People Have 
Say in What 
Government 
Does




Greater Perceived Corruption -2.94***                 
(0.17)
-1.82***                           
(0.16)
-2.11***                            
(0.18)
Openness 0.54**                  
(0.18)
0.67***                      
(0.19)
0.65**                     
(0.20)
Conscientiousness -0.73***                     
(0.15)
-0.43**                   
(0.16)
-0.07                
(0.17)
Extraversion 0.74***                  
(0.19)
0.62***                        
(0.17)
0.13                       
(0.19)
Agreeableness 0.10                   
(0.18)
0.13                    
(0.19)
0.27                         
(0.21)
Emotional Stability 0.21                       
(0.18)
0.50**                                   
(0.19)
0.24                              
(0.20)
Female 0.04                       
(0.08)
0.03                         
(0.07)
0.03                                
(0.08)
Age -0.00                        
(0.00)
0.00                          
(0.00)
0.00                                
(0.00)
White -0.12                         
(0.08)
-0.40***                          
(0.08)
-0.35***                             
(0.09)
Education 0.51***                     
(0.13)
0.65***                         
(0.11)
0.25+                                
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A N/A N/A
Number of Cases 5,258 5,253 5,257
Number of Countries 1 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with 
s tandard errors  in parentheses . Threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. The 
Taylor series  method was  used for ca lculating s igni ficance tests ; Stata  does  not report 
pseudo R-squared s tatis tics  for the Taylor series  method. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
+ p < .10



































a Threat to Rights 
and Freedoms 
Positive Economic Perceptions 6.03***             
(0.21)
10.83***                
(0.24)
204.43***                   
(5.51)
-141.20***                 
(6.39)
6.12***                   
(0.20)
3.13***                 
(0.17)
Openness 1.30***                   
(0.20)
1.98***                        
(0.31)
49.71***                
(6.94)
-49.10***                     
(7.44)
1.88***                      
(0.26)
-0.36+                                            
(0.20)
Conscientiousness -0.80***              
(0.18)
-1.11***                     
(0.28)
-21.13***                     
(6.34)
23.14***                  
(6.80)
-0.16                        
(0.22)
-0.10                                 
(0.17)
Extraversion -0.04                    
(0.18)
-0.25                             
(0.30)
-0.17                     
(6.32)
24.34***                
(6.76)
0.18                            
(0.25)
0.31                                           
(0.20)
Agreeableness 0.25                     
(0.19)
0.17                       
(0.31)
15.62*                    
(6.66)
18.84**                               
(6.95)
0.62*                            
(0.24)
0.11                                    
(0.20)
Emotional Stability -0.31                     
(0.19)
-0.07                        
(0.29)
-8.23                                    
(6.31)
15.76*                           
(6.71)
-0.24                              
(0.22)
0.10                                       
(0.18)
Female 0.39***                      
(0.08)
0.62***                         
(0.12)
18.59***                   
(2.66)
-4.22                          
(2.97)
0.43***                        
(0.10)
0.27***                            
(0.08)
Age -0.00                      
(0.00)
0.00                    
(0.00)
0.07                                 
(0.08)
0.53***                        
(0.09)
0.01**                             
(0.00)
0.00                                     
(0.00)
White -1.37***                 
(0.09)
-2.36***                
(0.15)
-48.16***                         
(3.20)
20.23***                          
(3.51)
-1.39***                    
(0.12)
-0.47***                                   
(0.09)
Education -0.89***                  
(0.14)
-0.72**                     
(0.22)
-15.63**                                 
(4.94)
25.11***                    
(5.46)
-1.11***                        
(0.19)
0.16                                 
(0.13)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 N/A 0.50 0.44 0.26 0.35 N/A
Number of Cases 5,207 4,933 5,161 4,608 5,246 5,154
Number of Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1
Method of Estimation Ordinal OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordinal
Table E.5
Direct Effects of Economic Perceptions and Personality on Actor, Institutional, and Procedural Support: ANES
Note: Data come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold 
parameters  are omitted from the table. The Taylor series  method was  used for ca lculating s igni ficance tests ; Stata  does  not report pseudo R-
squared s tatis tics  for the Taylor series  method. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Political Actors
Dependent Variable
Min Value Max Value Min Value Max Value
Officials Care What People Think 0.14                          
(0.19)
-0.57***                      
(0.08)
0.29                                   
(0.18)
-0.56***             
(0.08)
Table E.6
Evidence of Openness and Extraversion Activation for External Efficacy: AmericasBarometer
Extraversion Effect When 
Corruption Perceptions 
Are at Their …
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard 
errors  in parentheses . Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate regress ion. The regress ions  in the 
"Min Value" column a l l  employed a  corruption perceptions  variable in which higher scores  indicate greater 
perceived corruption, whereas  regress ions  in the "Max Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded corruption 
perceptions  variable. In a l l  cases , openness  and extravers ion were interacted with the corruption perceptions  
variable. The other personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The 
methods  of estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 4.2. For other methodologica l  detai l s , see the main 
text of Chapters  3 and 4. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to "Maximum." *** p < .001 ** p < .01         
* p < .05 + p < .10
Openness Effect When 
Corruption Perceptions 


















Min Value Max Value
Executive Approval -0.35**                
(0.12)
0.51***                   
(0.11)
Executive Approval on 5 Issues -1.31**                     
(0.39)
1.48**                 
(0.42)
Officials Care What People Think -0.40***                         
(0.11)
0.32*                    
(0.12)
Index of Institutional Trust -0.98+                  
(0.50)
1.78**                   
(0.51)
Perceived Justice System Effectiveness -0.08                                   
(0.09)
0.14        
(0.09)
Perceived Effectiveness of Local Gov't -0.11                                 
(0.08)
0.03                     
(0.09)
Democratic Satisfaction Index -0.13                         
(0.10)
0.31**                       
(0.10)
Citizen Rights Protected -0.23***                                
(0.07)
0.21*                  
(0.09)
Trust in Elections -0.09                       
(0.11)
0.29*                           
(0.13)
Table E.7
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for Actor, Institutional, 
and Procedural Support: AmericasBarometer
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion 
coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Each cel l  entry in a  column 
comes  from a  separate regress ion. The regress ions  in the "Min Value" column 
a l l  employed an economic perceptions  variable in which higher scores  
indicate more pos i tive views, whereas  regress ions  in the "Max Value" column 
a l l  used a  reverse-coded economic perceptions  variable. In a l l  cases , 
conscientiousness  was  interacted with the economic perceptions  variable. 
The other personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  were included 
but are not shown. The methods  of estimation were identica l  to the ones  in 
Table 4.3. For other methodologica l  deta i l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 
and 4. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to "Maximum." *** p < .001 
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Economic 









Min Value Max Value
Tolerance of Political Dissidents 1.42*                      
(0.63)
-1.27+                          
(0.64)
Support for Criminal Rights 0.75***                   
(0.21)
0.11                     
(0.08)
Table E.8
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for 
Democratic Support: AmericasBarometer
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Threat 
Perceptions Are at 
Their …
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  
are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . 
Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate regress ion. 
The regress ions  in the "Min Value" column a l l  employed a  
threat perception variable in which higher scores  indicate 
greater perceived threat, whereas  regress ions  in the "Max 
Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded threat perceptions  
variable. In a l l  cases , conscientiousness  was  interacted with the 
threat perceptions  variable. When the dependent variable was  
pol i tica l  tolerance, threat perceptions  of pol i tica l  diss idents  
were used; when the dependent variable was  support for 
criminal  rights , threat perceptions  of crime were used. The other 
personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  were 
included but are not shown. The methods  of estimation were 
identica l  to the ones  in Table 4.4. For other methodologica l  
deta i l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 and 4. "Min" refers  to 
"Minimum," and "Max" refers  to "Maximum." *** p < .001              
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Dependent Variables
Min Value Max Value Min Value Max Value
Officials Care What People Think 0.59                              
(0.41)
0.49                     
(0.44)
0.32                           
(0.44)
1.19**                          
(0.45)
People Have Say in What Government Does 0.24                         
(0.42)
1.12*                         
(0.46)
0.42                         
(0.41)
0.84*                        
(0.42)
Elections Make Government Pay Attention 1.37**                           
(0.43)
-0.07                 
(0.46)
-0.01                     
(0.47)
0.26                         
(0.50)
Table E.9
Evidence of Openness and Extraversion Activation for External Efficacy: ANES
Extraversion Effect When 
Corruption Perceptions 
Are at Their …
Note: Data come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in 
parentheses . Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate regress ion. The regress ions  in the "Min 
Value" column a l l  employed a  corruption perceptions  variable in which higher scores  indicate greater 
perceived corruption, whereas  regress ions  in the "Max Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded corruption 
perceptions  variable. In a l l  cases , openness  and extravers ion were interacted with the corruption perceptions  
variable. The other personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The 
methods  of estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 4.5. For other methodologica l  detai l s , see the 
main text of Chapters  3 and 4. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to "Maximum." *** p < .001             
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Openness Effect When 
Corruption Perceptions 



















Min Value Max Value
Executive Approval -1.69***                 
(0.48)
0.16                                
(0.43)
Executive Approval on 4 Issues -1.87***           
(0.53)
-0.16                      
(0.53)
Thermometer Index for Democrats -52.90***              
(12.78)
18.49                        
(11.84)
Thermometer Index for Republicans 44.40***               
(13.16)
-3.19                      
(14.63)
Likeability of Democratic Party -0.83+                         
(0.44)
0.68                
(0.47)
Government Not a Threat to Rights and 
Freedoms 
-0.72*                          
(0.36)
0.76+                       
(0.41)
Table E.10
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for Actor, Institutional, 
and Procedural Support: ANES
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Economic 
Perceptions Are at    
Their …
Note: Data come from the 2012 ANES. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , 
with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  
separate regress ion. The regress ions  in the "Min Value" column a l l  employed 
an economic perceptions  variable in which higher scores  indicate more pos i tive 
views, whereas  regress ions  in the "Max Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded 
economic perceptions  variable. In a l l  cases , conscientiousness  was  interacted 
with the economic perceptions  variable. The other personal i ty variables  and the 
demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The methods  of 
estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 4.6. For other methodologica l  
detai l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 and 4. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN CHAPTER 5 
 
 
N Mean SD Min Max
AmericasBarometer
Country-Level World Bank Corruption 
Perceptions Measure (2009)
24 0.68 0.25 0.00 1
Country-Level World Bank Firms 
Receiving One or More Bribe Requests 
(2009 or 2010)
22 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.32
Country-Level Bribery Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010)
24 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.32
Region-Level  Bribery Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010)
118 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.38
Country-Level World Bank Growth in 
2009 GDP per Capita
24 -1.98 2.89 -6.88 3.87
Country-Level World Bank Change in 
Unemployment Rate, 2008–2009
24 0.77 1.99 -5.80 4.65
Country-Level Economic Situation 
Aggregated from Survey Data (2010) 
(Main Indicator)
24 0.48 0.08 0.30 0.62
Country-Level Economic Situation 
Aggregated from Survey Data (2010) 
(Alternative Indicator)
24 0.54 0.07 0.40 0.65
Region-Level Economic Situation 
Aggregated from Survey Data (2010) 
(Main Indicator)
118 0.48 0.09 0.26 0.66
Region-Level Economic Situation 
Aggregated from Survey Data (2010) 
(Alternative Indicator)
118 0.54 0.07 0.33 0.70
Country-Level World Bank Firm Losses 
Due to Crime (2009 or 2010)
22 0.89 0.65 0.1 2.5
Country-Level Crime Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010) (Main 
Indicator)
24 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.31
Country-Level Crime Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010) (Alternative 
Indicator)
24 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.33
Region-Level Crime Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010) (Main 
Indicator)
118 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.41
Region-Level Crime Rate Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010) (Alternative 
Indicator)
118 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.48
Country-Level GDP per capita in 2009 24 10,207.02 11,998.43 1,494.90 47,575.61 
Country-Level Education Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010)
24 0.55 0.10 0.40 0.79
Region-Level Education Aggregated 
from Survey Data (2010)
118 0.54 0.11 0.34 0.80
Table F.1
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 5: Objective Contextual Factors

























N Mean SD Min Max
ANES
Corruption Perceived by Journalists in 
State (Dincer and Johnston 2014)
49 0.44 0.29 0 1
Corruption Convictions per Million 
State Population (Department of 
Justice and U.S. Census Bureau, 
2007–2011)
51 0.31 0.18 0.00 1
State-Level Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Growth in 2011 GDP per Capita
51 0.90 2.23 -5.9 9.4
State-Level Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Change in Unemployment Rate, 
2010–2011
51 -0.61 0.43 -2.4 0.2
Bureau of Economic Analysis Natural 
Log of State-Level GDP per Capita in 
2011
51 10.76 0.26 10.35 12.02
CCES
State-Level Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Growth in 2011 GDP per Capita
51 0.90 2.23 -5.9 9.4
State-Level Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Change in Unemployment Rate, 
2010–2011
51 -0.61 0.43 -2.4 0.2
Bureau of Economic Analysis Natural 
Log of State-Level GDP per Capita in 
2011
51 10.76 0.26 10.35 12.02




SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 5 
 
The results section of Chapter 5 noted an additional empirical analysis for my study of 
personality and objective contextual factors. These analyses have been prompted by the 
expectations that low and high levels of corruption, economic performance, and crime would 
activate personality traits and produce trait effects. However, two factors prevent the tables in the 
main results from conveying the trait effects at the minimum and maximum values of the 
contextual variables. First, many of the contextual factors are not coded to run from 0 to 1. If 
they were, the personality coefficients in the main tables would denote the trait effects at the 
minimum observed score of the contextual variable in question. Second, a 0-to-1 reverse-coded 
contextual variable is required in order for the actual personality coefficients to refer to the trait 
effects at the maximum score of the contextual variable. 
 
Therefore, I have run all of the significant interactions in Tables 5.2 through 5.7 with contextual 
variables that run from 0 to 1 and with reverse-coded contextual variables that run from 0 to 1. 
The tables in this appendix refer to evidence of trait activation. 
 
Table G.1 documents the openness and extraversion effects on external efficacy in the 
AmericasBarometer at the minimum and maximum values of corruption. As expected, I observe 
negative effects for both trait dimensions at the maximum level of corruption, although the 
negative effects at the minimum level of corruption are a surprise. 
 
Table G.2 focuses on trait activation in Model II of Table 5.3 (i.e., the only model with a 
significant interaction). As anticipated, openness exerts a positive effect on actor external 
efficacy at the minimum level of corruption and a negative effect at the maximum level of 
corruption. The effects of extraversion in the same ANES model are not significant. 
 
The next three tables transition to conscientiousness effects at the minimum and maximum levels 
of economic performance. I expected to observe negative conscientiousness effects in response 
to anemic sociotropic conditions (i.e., low levels GDP per capita growth, low aggregate levels of 
change in economic well-being, and increases in unemployment) and positive conscientiousness 
effects in response to robust sociotropic conditions (i.e., high levels of GDP per capita growth, 
high aggregate levels of change in economic well-being, and decreases in unemployment).  
 
These expectations are realized in 50 percent of the coefficients in Table G.3. Three 
conscientiousness coefficients in the AmericasBarometer are negative (positive) and significant 
when economic conditions are at their minimum (maximum) value. 
 
Results also comport with my hypothesis in the ANES analyses in Table G.4. In the four 
unemployment models, one conscientiousness coefficient is positive and significant in response 
to the greatest observed reduction in unemployment, and four coefficients are negative and 
significant in response to the greatest observed increase in unemployment. Likewise, in the three 
GDP per capita growth models, three conscientiousness coefficients are negative and significant 
when economic conditions are at their worst, and one coefficient is positive and significant when 








Model Number in Table 5.2
Min Value Max Value Min Value Max Value
Model I -0.11                                
(0.18)
-0.58***                
(0.09)
0.19                             
(0.23)
-0.61***                
(0.10)
Model II -0.43**                       
(0.13)
-0.49*                       
(0.20)
-0.25**                       
(0.07)
-0.77***                  
(0.15)
Model III -0.37**                         
(0.10)
-0.55***         
(0.11)
-0.14                            
(0.11)
-0.71***           
(0.18)
Table G.1
Evidence of Openness and Extraversion Activation for External Efficacy: 
AmericasBarometer
Openness Effect When 
Corruption Is at Its …
Extraversion Effect When 
Corruption Is at Its …
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Coefficients  are the result of a  
random coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within 
regions , and regions  were nested within countries . Robust s tandard errors  (in 
parentheses) are reported. Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate 
regress ion. The regress ions  in each "Min Value" column a l l  employed a  corruption 
variable in which higher scores  indicate greater corruption, whereas  regress ions  in each 
"Max Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded corruption variable. In a l l  cases , openness  
and extravers ion were interacted with the corruption variable. The other personal i ty 
variables  and the demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The methods  
of estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 5.2. For other methodologica l  detai l s , 
see the main text of Chapters  3 and 5. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to 
"Maximum." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Model Number in Table 5.3
Min Value Max Value Min Value Max Value
Model II 1.29***                         
(0.36)
-2.12*                    
(0.82)
0.42                                            
(0.32)
0.80        
(0.76)
Table G.2
Evidence of Openness and Extraversion Activation for External Efficacy: 
ANES
Openness Effect When 
Corruption Is at Its …
Extraversion Effect When 
Corruption Is at Its …
Note: Data come from the 2012 ANES. Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient 
multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within s tates . Robust s tandard 
errors  (in parentheses) are reported. Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate 
regress ion. The regress ion in each "Min Value" column employed a  corruption variable in 
which higher scores  indicate greater corruption, whereas  the regress ion in each "Max 
Value" column used a  reverse-coded corruption variable. In a l l  cases , openness  and 
extravers ion were interacted with the corruption variable. The other personal i ty variables  
and the demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The methods  of 
estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 5.3. For other methodologica l  detai l s , see 
the main text of Chapters  3 and 5. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to 
















Model Number in Table 5.4
Min Value Max Value
Model I -0.33                         
(0.19)
0.24+                     
(0.13)
Model II -0.35+                  
(0.20)
0.23                        
(0.14)
Model III -0.15                             
(0.13)
0.24+                 
(0.12)
Model IV -0.29*                        
(0.10)
0.14                     
(0.10)
Model V -0.30*                             
(0.13)                     
0.22+                       
(0.13)
Table G.3
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for 
Status Quo Support: AmericasBarometer
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Economic 
Performance Is at Its …
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. 
Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient multi -
level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within 
regions , and regions  were nested within countries . Each 
cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate regress ion. 
The regress ions  in the "Min Value" column a l l  employed an 
economic performance variable in which higher scores  
indicate more favorable conditions , whereas  regress ions  in 
the "Max Value" column a l l  used a  reverse-coded economic 
performance variable. In a l l  cases , conscientiousness  
interacted with the economic performance variable. The 
other personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  
were included but are not shown. The methods  of 
estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 5.4. For other 
methodologica l  deta i l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 and 
5. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to 














Model Number in Table 5.5
Min Value Max Value
Model I (Change in Unemployment) 0.18                             
(0.23)
-0.50**                          
(0.15)
Model II (GDP per Capita Growth) -1.20*                 
(0.45)
2.34***                           
(0.63)
Model III (Change in Unemployment) 1.79***                     
(0.45)
-0.48+               
(0.24)
Model IV (Change in Unemployment) 23.88                            
(28.74)
-66.28**            
(19.93)
Model V (GDP per Capita Growth) -2.72*                          
(1.21)
2.09                      
(1.35)
Model VI (Change in Unemployment) 24.21                        
(17.30)
-27.13*                               
(13.28)
Model VII (GDP per Capita Growth) -1.08**                      
(0.35)
0.74                             
(0.52)
Table G.4
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for Status Quo 
Support: ANES
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Economic 
Performance Is at Its …
Note: Data  come from the 2012 ANES. Coefficients  are the result of a  
random coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were 
nested within s tates . Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  separate 
regress ion. The regress ions  in the "Min Value" column a l l  employed an 
economic performance variable in which higher scores  indicate more 
favorable conditions , whereas  regress ions  in the "Max Value" column 
a l l  used a  reverse-coded economic performance variable. In a l l  cases , 
conscientiousness  interacted with the economic performance variable. 
The other personal i ty variables  and the demographic controls  were 
included but are not shown. The methods  of estimation were identica l  
to the ones  in Table 5.5. For other methodologica l  deta i l s , see the main 
text of Chapters  3 and 5. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to 






Model Number in Table 5.6
Min Value Max Value
Model I (Change in Unemployment) 1.30                                
(0.93)
-1.29*                          
(0.59)
Table G.5
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for Status Quo 
Support: CCES
Conscientiousness 
Effect When Economic 
Performance Is at Its …
Note: Data  come from the 2012 CCES. Coefficients  are the result of a  
random coefficient multi -level  model . Individual  respondents  were 
nested within s tates . Each cel l  entry in a  column comes  from a  
separate regress ion. The regress ion in the "Min Value" column 
employed an economic performance variable in which higher scores  
indicate more favorable conditions , whereas  the regress ion in the 
"Max Value" column used a  reverse-coded economic performance 
variable. In a l l  cases , conscientiousness  interacted with the economic 
performance variable. The other personal i ty variables  and the 
demographic controls  were included but are not shown. The methods  
of estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 5.6. For other 
methodologica l  deta i l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 and 5. "Min" 
refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to "Maximum." *** p < .001           
** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Model Number in Table 5.7
Min Value Max Value
Model II 0.44***                         
(0.10)
-0.12                   
(0.11)
Model III 0.64***                          
(0.15)
-0.34*                        
(0.17)
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. 
Coefficients  are the result of a  random coefficient multi -
level  model . Individual  respondents  were nested within 
regions , and regions  were nested within countries . Each cel l  
entry in a  column comes  from a  separate regress ion. Each 
regress ion in the "Min Value" column employed a  crime rate 
variable in which higher scores  indicate a  greater 
preva lence of crime, whereas  each regress ion in the "Max 
Value" column used a  reverse-coded crime variable. In a l l  
cases , conscientiousness  interacted with the crime variable. 
The other personal i ty variables  and the demographic 
controls  were included but are not shown. The methods  of 
estimation were identica l  to the ones  in Table 5.7. For other 
methodologica l  deta i l s , see the main text of Chapters  3 and 
5. "Min" refers  to "Minimum," and "Max" refers  to 
"Maximum." *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
Conscientiousness 
Effect When the Crime 
Rate Is at Its …
Table G.6
Evidence of Conscientiousness Activation for 
Support for Criminal Rights: AmericasBarometer
299 
 
In addition, the CCES results in Table G.5 show that the effect of conscientiousness at the 
maximum increase in unemployment is negative and significant, as expected. 
 
The final set of analyses returns to the AmericasBarometer and considers the effects of 
conscientiousness on support for criminal rights at minimum and maximum crime rates. As 
anticipated, in Table G.6 conscientiousness exerts a positive effect when subnational and 
national crime rates are at their minimum values, and a negative effect when the subnational 
crime rate is at its maximum value. 
 
In sum, 27 of 46 coefficients are significant and in the expected direction. The anticipated trait 























































Participation Variables N Mean SD Min Max
Previous Turnout 36,869 0.77 0.42 0 1
Hypothetical Turnout 29,682 0.71 0.45 0 1
Campaign Involvement 37,001 0.11 0.31 0 1
Local Meeting Attendance 38,684 0.11 0.32 0 1
Party Meeting Attendance 38,764 1.25 0.61 1 4
Contacting Officials 35,841 0.32 0.69 0 3
Mediating Variables
Trust in Elections 36,585 4.20 1.86 1 7
Trust in Political Parties 39,641 3.11 1.75 1 7
Trust in Local Government 39,452 4.01 1.79 1 7
Trust in Local Gov't, National 
Gov't, and National 
Legislature
35,156 11.81 4.51 3 21
Approval of Campaigning 
and Organizing
36,611 15.01 4.32 2 20
Approval of Campaigning 38,262 6.93 2.68 1 10
Approval of Organizing 38,706 8.09 2.31 1 10
Political Interest 40,305 2.17 0.99 1 4
Internal Efficacy 37,646 3.99 1.80 1 7
Table H.1
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 6: Participation and 
Mediating Variables
Note: Al l  data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Only countries  
included in the results  in the main text are reported here. If the 
number of countries  varies  from one analys is  to another, the 
descriptive s tatis tics  for individuals  from the larger number of 
countries  are documented in this  table. "SD" refers  to "Standard 




SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 6 
 
Analyzing Hypothetical Turnout 
 
As noted in the main text, the mediation hypothesis (Blais and St-Vincent 2011; Gallego and 
Oberski 2012) expects personality to influence attitudes, which in turn should affect political 
behavior. Therefore, the best data source for testing the mediation hypothesis would be a panel 
study that measures traits at time 1, political support at time 2, and political participation at time 
3. The 2010 AmericasBarometer, however, is cross-sectional in nature, and the question wording 
conflicts with the preferred temporal order because the behavioral items refer to past actions and 
the attitudinal items denote current opinions about the political system. Nevertheless, scholars 
have noted the temporal stability of political attitudes (e.g., Bloeser et al. 2015; Goren 2005), so 
it is reasonable to assume that current support attitudes resemble the attitudes that individuals 
held prior to engaging in their previous political behavior. The longitudinal stability of 
personality noted in previous research (e.g., Rantanen et al. 2007) also minimizes concerns about 
the sequence proposed by the mediation hypothesis. 
 
I cannot fully demonstrate causality with cross-sectional data. Nevertheless, to further address 
the issue of temporal order, I examine whether my results for previous turnout apply to 
hypothetical turnout. Although all items are measured at the same point in time, current attitudes 
are now predicting future behavior, in contrast to current attitudes predicting reports of past 
behavior. 
 
In Table I.1, I observe a similar set of findings for hypothetical turnout as I observed for previous 
turnout. The table shows that openness and extraversion exert positive and significant total 
effects on participation, but the effects are largely accounted for by the mediators included in the 
model. The direct effects are insignificant. 
 
I also observe positive and negative indirect effects of openness and extraversion on hypothetical 
turnout. As with the findings for previous turnout, openness and extraversion have positive and 
significant indirect effects on hypothetical turnout through political interest and approval of 
campaigning and organizing, and in Table I.1 the indirect effects through internal efficacy are 
positive and significant. Consistent with the results for previous turnout, I also find in Table I.1 
that openness and extraversion exert negative indirect effects via political trust. In substantive 
terms, a one-unit increase from 0 to 1 in openness (extraversion) would indirectly reduce an 
individual’s probability of turnout by 1.5 percent (1.9 percent) via political trust. Indirect effects 
through political interest are much larger in absolute magnitude, as indicated by the percentages 
in the bottom panel of the table. Nevertheless, the substantive impacts of openness and 
extraversion could determine the winner in a close election.  
  
Two other hypotheses also receive support in Table I.1, as I find that conscientiousness and 
emotional stability exert positive indirect effects on hypothetical turnout through approval of 
mass participation. Again, these findings are consistent with the results for previous turnout 






Moreover, the bottom panel of Table I.1 reports that the 70.52 percent and 58.94 percent of the 
total effects of openness and extraversion are due to the indirect effects through the mediating 
variables in the model. These percentages are even higher if we ignore the negative indirect 
effects via political trust. 
 
In sum, the consistent results for previous and hypothetical turnout attenuate concerns about the 
cross-sectional nature of the data and the focus of the AmericasBarometer on previous behavior 
and current attitudes. My empirical analyses in this appendix bolster the plausibility of the 
temporal order proposed by the mediation hypothesis, although I cannot prove that traits cause 
support attitudes and these attitudes cause behavior.  
 
Examining the Personality–Support and Support–Participation Links 
 
As noted in the main text, mediation can be observed only if an independent variable is 
meaningfully related to a mediating variable and if the mediating variable is meaningfully related 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional 
Stability
Total Effect 0.23***            
(0.06)
0.04                                
(0.10)
0.22+                              
(0.12)
0.04                        
(0.12)
0.10                       
(0.09)
Direct Effect 0.07                       
(0.07)
-0.01                                          
(0.10)
0.09                            
(0.12)
0.13                             
(0.12)
0.04                    
(0.08)
Indirect Effect 0.17*                        
(0.07)
0.05                                              
(0.07)
0.13+                       
(0.07)
-0.09                                 
(0.07)
0.06                     
(0.07)
via Trust in Elections -0.02*                              
(0.01)
0.01                                   
(0.01)
-0.03**                                 
(0.01)
0.01                       
(0.01)
0.02                              
(0.01)
via Approval of Campaigning 
and Organizing
0.05***                   
(0.01)
0.04***                               
(0.01)
0.02**                        
(0.01)
0.02**                             
(0.01)
0.01+                      
(0.01)
via Political Interest 0.13***                      
(0.03)
-0.00                               
(0.02)
0.12***                       
(0.02)
-0.12***                         
(0.03)
0.02                           
(0.02)
via Internal Efficacy 0.01*                       
(0.00)
0.01*                                    
(0.00)
0.01*                           
(0.01)
-0.01+                          
(0.00)
0.01*                        
(0.00)
Mediation Percentages
Percentage of Total Effect 70.52% 129.63% 58.94% -226.42% 57.27%
via Trust in Elections -10.00% 28.87% -11.94% 31.87% 16.92%
via Approval of Campaigning 
and Organizing
21.29% 96.86% 10.05% 57.57% 11.08%
via Political Interest 55.24% -11.99% 55.45% -303.28% 22.72%
via Internal Efficacy 3.98% 15.89% 5.38% -12.58% 6.55%
Table I.1
Decomposing the Total Effect of Personality Traits on Hypothetical Turnout via Political Attitudes
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable i s  hypothetica l  turnout. Cel l  entries  in the top 
panel  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . Country fixed effects ; the constant parameter; and 
controls  for gender, age, race, and education are not shown. Standard errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted so 
that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. Number of cases : 26,068. Number of countries : 21. Method of 
estimation for the outcome variable: logi t. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10
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to the dependent variable. Both conditions are met when the KHB method reports significant 
indirect effects, as accounted for in Tables 6.3 through 6.7 of the main text.  
 
To supplement my primary results in Chapter 6, I have used traditional regression analysis to 
examine the relationship between personality and political support, as well as the relationship 
between political support and political participation. Controls for gender, age, racial or ethnic 
self-identification, and education are included in all models, and I also have inserted political 
interest and internal efficacy as independent variables predicting citizen behavior. Only countries 
in the empirical analyses in Chapter 6 are part of the results in this robustness check. 
 
Table I.2 reports the effects of personality on the political support variables used in Chapter 6. 
As expected, all of the openness coefficients are negative and significant in the trust models (i.e., 
Models I through IV) and positive and significant in the democratic support models (i.e., Models 
V through VII). Likewise, all of the conscientiousness coefficients are positive and significant in 
the mass participation approval regressions.  
 
Furthermore, nearly all of the extraversion and emotional stability coefficients are consistent 
with expectations. As anticipated, 3 of 4 extraversion effects on political trust are negative and 
significant, and all four emotional stability coefficients are positive and significant.
341
 
Furthermore, 3 of 3 extraversion coefficients and 2 of 3 emotional stability coefficients are 




Meanwhile, the impact of political support on political participation is documented in Table I.3. 
As expected, both political trust and approval of mass participation are positively related to 




The results in Tables I.2 and I.3, therefore, corroborate the indirect effects observed in the main 
text. High levels of political support encourage citizen participation in every model of Table I.3. 
In Table I.2 only openness and extraversion are negatively related to political trust, and each of 
these trait dimensions exerts a negative indirect effect on political behavior in Tables 6.3 through 
6.7. Meanwhile, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability are all 
positively associated with approval of mass participation in Table I.2, and I observe positive 
indirect effects for each of these trait dimensions through democratic support in a majority of the 
models in the main text. Finally, individuals high in emotional stability express greater political 
trust in Table I.2, and three of the five indirect effects of emotional stability via trust are positive 
and significant in the main text.  
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 However, the emotional stability coefficient in Model II becomes insignificant if the United States and Canada 
are omitted from the regression. The two countries are not included in the mediation analysis for campaign 
involvement, but all 24 are part of the mediation analysis for party meeting attendance. 
342
 The insignificant emotional stability coefficient in Model VII becomes significant if Bolivia is omitted from the 
regression. Bolivia is not included in the mediation analysis for contacting public officials, but all 24 are part of the 
mediation analysis for local meeting attendance. 
343
 The results in Table I.3 minimize concerns about a spurious relationship between political support and political 
participation, for I have controlled for known correlates of behavior—namely political interest, internal efficacy, and 












































Openness -0.13*                    
(0.06)
-0.32***              
(0.08)
-0.29***                  
(0.07)
-1.02***                
(0.19)
1.51***                    
(0.15)
0.65***                    
(0.08)
0.91***                   
(0.09)
Conscientiousness 0.07                      
(0.07)
-0.17**                         
(0.07)
0.12+                     
(0.07)
0.19                                
(0.16)
1.15***                      
(0.16)
0.47***                          
(0.09)
0.61***                               
(0.09)
Extraversion -0.11                           
(0.08)
-0.31***          
(0.09)
-0.18*                               
(0.07)
-0.71**                 
(0.21)
0.80***                                 
(0.15)
0.37***                           
(0.08)
0.45***                     
(0.09)
Agreeableness 0.10                           
(0.09)
-0.01                 
(0.07)
0.25***                        
(0.07)
0.74***                   
(0.17)
0.72***                     
(0.19)
0.29*                          
(0.11)
0.44***                         
(0.09)
Emotional Stability 0.17+                           
(0.09)
0.11+                    
(0.06)
0.23**                        
(0.08)
0.51*                                     
(0.19)
0.44*                             
(0.17)
0.27**                    
(0.09)
0.15                            
(0.09)
Female -0.09***                 
(0.03)
0.02                   
(0.03)
0.02                    
(0.02)
0.08                            
(0.09)
-0.16**                     
(0.05)
-0.06*                       
(0.03)
-0.10**                                    
(0.03)
Age 0.01**                       
(0.00)
0.00                           
(0.00)
0.00                           
(0.00)
0.00                        
(0.00)
0.00                     
(0.00)
0.01**                      
(0.00)
-0.00                              
(0.00)
White 0.08*                   
(0.04)
0.12+                          
(0.07)
0.13***                          
(0.03)
0.22                    
(0.15)
-0.18                        
(0.14)
0.02                         
(0.07)
-0.13+                     
(0.08)
Education 0.11                     
(0.13)
-0.07                         
(0.11)
-0.28*                      
(0.11)
-0.93*                    
(0.35)
0.93***                       
(0.21)
0.46**                             
(0.14)
0.54***                      
(0.08)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10
Number of Cases 34,092 37,097 36,910 33,153 34,145 35,741 36,067
Number of Countries 22 24 24 23 22 24 24
Method of Estimation Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal OLS OLS OLS OLS
Political Trust Approval of Mass Participation
Total Effects of Personality on Political Support
Table I.2
Note: Data come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with s tandard errors  in parentheses . 
Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, and s tandard 
errors  are clustered by country. Data are weighted so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. *** p < .001           




















Trust in Elections 0.05***                          
(0.01)
Trust in Political 
Parties
0.05***                 
(0.01)
0.13***                    
(0.02)
Trust in Local 
Government
0.07***                 
(0.01)
Trust in Local Gov't, 
National Gov't, and 
National Legislature









0.07***                 
(0.01)




0.02*                  
(0.01)
0.03*                                    
(0.01)
Political Interest 0.30***                   
(0.04)
0.63***                 
(0.03)
0.38***             
(0.03)
0.65***                  
(0.02)
0.27***                       
(0.03)
Internal Efficacy 0.01                      
(0.01)
0.06***                      
(0.02)
0.08***                
(0.01)
0.07***               
(0.01)
0.04**               
(0.01)
Female 0.09*                      
(0.05)
-0.15*                 
(0.07)
-0.18***                  
(0.05)
-0.16***              
(0.05)
0.06                 
(0.05)
Age 0.06***                   
(0.00)
0.00*                              
(0.00)
0.00+                 
(0.00)
-0.00                  
(0.00)
0.01***                    
(0.00)
White -0.11*                 
(0.05)
-0.17+                      
(0.10)
0.05                        
(0.07)
-0.02                  
(0.06)
0.01                        
(0.06)
Education 0.92***                    
(0.17)
0.27+                  
(0.15)
-0.13                       
(0.21)
-0.23+               
(0.12)
-0.25*                       
(0.12)
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.03
Number of Cases 33,094 33,399 35,038 35,029 31,514
Number of Countries 22 22 24 24 23
Method of Estimation Logit Logit Logit Ordinal Ordinal
Note: Data  come from the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Cel l  entries  are regress ion coefficients , with 
s tandard errors  in parentheses . Constants  and/or threshold parameters  are omitted from the table. 
Country fixed effects  are included but not shown, and s tandard errors  are clustered by country. Data  
are weighted so that each nation’s  sample contributes  a  va lue of N = 1,500. *** p < .001 ** p < .01          
* p < .05 + p < .10
Table I.3
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